When the news had arrived at Rome that Hannibal had encamped over
against their lines, and was actually besieging their forces, there
was a universal excitement and terror, from a feeling that the result
of the impending battle would decide the whole war. Consequently, with
one heart and soul, the citizens had all devoted themselves to
sending out reenforcements and making preparations for this struggle.
On their part, the Capuans were encouraged by the receipt of
Hannibal's letter, and by thus learning the object of the Carthaginian
movement, to stand by their determination, and to await the issue of
this new hope. At the end of the fifth day, therefore, after his
arrival on the ground, Hannibal ordered his men to take their supper
as usual, and leave their watch-fires burning; and started with such
secrecy that none of the enemy knew what was happening. He took the
road through Samnium, and marched at a great pace and without
stopping, his skirmishers always keeping before him to reconnoiter and
occupy all the posts along the route: and while those in Rome had
their thoughts still wholly occupied with Capua,[87] and the campaign
there, he crossed the Anio without being observed; and having arrived
at a distance of not more than forty stades from Rome, there pitched
his camp.
On this being known at Rome, the utmost confusion and terror prevailed
among the inhabitants--this movement of Hannibal's being as unexpected
as it was sudden; for he had never been so close to the city before.
At the same time their alarm was increased by the idea at once
occurring to them that he would not have ventured so near if it were
not that the armies at Capua were destroyed. Accordingly, the men at
once went to line the walls, and the points of vantage in the defenses
of the town; while the women went round to the temples of the gods and
implored their protection, sweeping the pavements of the temples with
their hair: for this is their customary way of behaving when any
serious danger comes upon their country. But just as Hannibal had
encamped, and was intending to attempt the city itself next day, an
extraordinary coincidence occurred which proved fortunate for the
preservation of Rome.
For Gnæus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, having already enrolled one
consular army, had bound the men with the usual oath to appear at Rome
armed on that very day; and were also engaged on that day in drawing
out the lists and testing the men for the other army: whereby it so
happened that a large number of men had been collected in Rome
spontaneously in the very nick of time. These troops the Consuls
boldly led outside the walls, and, entrenching themselves there,
checked Hannibal's intended movement. For the Carthaginians were at
first eager to advance, and were not altogether without hope that they
would be able to take Rome itself by assault. But when they saw the
enemy drawn up in order, and learned before long from a prisoner what
had happened, they abandoned the idea of attacking the city, and began
devastating the country-side instead, and setting fire to the houses.
In these first raids they collected an innumerable amount of booty,
for the field of plunder upon which they were entered was one into
which no one had ever expected an enemy to set foot.
But presently, when the Consuls ventured to encamp within ten stades
of him, Hannibal broke up his quarters before daylight. He did so for
three reasons: first, because he had collected an enormous booty;
secondly, because he had given up all hope of taking Rome; and
lastly, because he reckoned that the time had now come at which he
expected, according to his original idea, that Appius would have
learned the danger threatening Rome, and would have raised the siege
of Capua, and come with his whole force to the relief of the city; or
at any rate would hurry up with the greater part, leaving a detachment
to carry on the siege. Publius had caused the bridges over the Anio to
be broken down, and thus compelled Hannibal to get his army across by
a ford; and he now attacked the Carthaginians as they were engaged in
making the passage of the stream and caused them great distress. They
were not able however to strike an important blow, owing to the number
of Hannibal's cavalry, and the activity of the Numidians in every part
of the field. But before retiring to their camp they wrested the
greater part of the booty from them, and killed about three hundred
men; and then, being convinced that the Carthaginians were beating a
hasty retreat in a panic, they followed in their rear, keeping along
the line of hills. At first Hannibal continued to march at a rapid
pace, being anxious to meet the force which he expected; but at the
end of the fifth day, being informed that Appius had not left the
siege of Capua, he halted; and waiting for the enemy to come up, made
an attack upon his camp before daylight, killed a large number of
them, and drove the rest out of their camp. But when day broke, and he
saw the Romans in a strong position upon a steep hill, to which they
had retired, he decided not to continue his attack upon them; but
marching through Daunia and Bruttium he appeared at Rhegium so
unexpectedly that he was within an ace of capturing the city, and did
cut off all who were out in the country; and during this excursion
captured a very large number of the Rhegini....
Who could refrain from speaking in terms of admiration of this great
man's strategic skill courage and ability when one looks to the length
of time during which he displayed those qualities; and realizes to
oneself the pitched battles, the skirmishes and sieges, the
revolutions and counter-revolutions of states, the vicissitudes of
fortune, and in fact the course of his design and its execution in its
entirety? For sixteen continuous years Hannibal maintained the war
with Rome in Italy without once releasing his army from service in the
field, but keeping those vast numbers under control, like a good
pilot, without any sign of disaffection toward himself or toward each
other, tho he had troops in his service who, so far from being of the
same tribe, were not even of the same race. He had Libyans, Iberians,
Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, Greeks, who had naturally
nothing in common with each other, neither laws, nor customs, nor
language. Yet the skill of the commander was such that these
differences, so manifold and so wide, did not disturb the obedience to
one word of command and to a single will. And yet circumstances were
not by any means unvarying: for tho the breeze of fortune often set
strongly in his favor, it as often also blew in exactly the opposite
direction. There is therefore good ground for admiring Hannibal's
display of ability in campaign; and there can be no fear in saying
that, if he had reserved his attack upon the Romans until he had
first subdued other parts of the world, there is not one of his
projects which would have eluded his grasp. As it was, he began with
those whom he should have attacked last, and accordingly began and
ended his career with them.[88]