Since we have spoken of the virtues, of the different kinds of
friendships, and of pleasures, it remains that we should discuss the
subject of happiness in outline, since we assumed this to be the end
of human actions. Therefore, if we recapitulate what has been said
before, the argument will be more concise.
We have said that it is not a habit; for if it were, it might exist in
a man who slept throughout his life, living the life of a plant, and
suffering the greatest misfortunes. If, then, this does not please us,
but if we must rather bring it under a kind of energy, as was said
before; and if, of energies, some are necessary and eligible for the
sake of something else, others are eligible for their own sakes; it is
plain that we must consider happiness as one of those which are
eligible for their own sakes, and not one of those which are eligible
for the sake of something else; for happiness is in want of nothing,
but is self-sufficient. Now those energies are eligible for their own
sakes from which nothing more is sought for beyond the energy. But of
this kind, actions done according to virtue seem to be: for the
performance of honorable and good acts is among things eligible for
their own sakes. And of amusements, those are eligible for their own
sakes which are pleasant: for men do not choose these for the sake of
anything else: for they are rather injured by them than benefited,
since they neglect their persons and property. But the majority of
those who are called happy fly to such pastimes as these; and,
therefore, those who have a happy turn for such pastimes as these are
in favor with tyrants; for they make themselves agreeable in those
things which tyrants desire; and such are the men they want.
These things are thought to belong to happiness, because those who are
in power pass their leisure in them. But such men are perhaps no
proof; for neither virtue nor intellect consists in having power, and
from these two good energies proceed; nor if those, who have never
tasted pure and liberal pleasure, fly to bodily pleasures, must we
therefore think that these pleasures are more eligible; for children
think those things which are esteemed by them the best. It is
reasonable, therefore, to suppose, that as the things which appear
honorable to children and men differ, so also those which appear so to
the bad and the good will differ likewise, and therefore, as we have
very often said, those things are honorable and pleasant which are so
to the good man. But to every man that energy is most eligible which
is according to his proper habit; and, therefore, to the good man,
that is most eligible which is according to virtue.
Consequently happiness does not consist in amusement; for it is absurd
that the end should be amusement; and that men should toil and suffer
inconvenience all their life long for the sake of amusement; for we
choose everything, as we might say, for the sake of something else,
except happiness; for that is an end. But to be serious and to labor
for the sake of amusement appears foolish and very childish. But to
amuse ourselves in order that we may be serious, as Anacharsis said,
seems to be right: for amusement resembles relaxation. Relaxation,
therefore, is not the end, for we have recourse to it for the sake of
the energy. But the happy life seems to be according to virtue; and
this is serious, and does not consist in amusement. We say also that
serious things are better than those which are ridiculous and joined
with amusement; and that the energy of the better part and of the
better man is more serious; and the energy of the better man is at
once superior, and more tending to happiness. Besides, any person
whatever, even a slave, may enjoy bodily pleasures no less than the
best man; but no one allows that a slave partakes of happiness except
so far as that he partakes of life: for happiness does not consist in
such modes of passing life, but in energies according to virtue, as
has been said already.
If happiness be an energy according to virtue, it is reasonable to
suppose that it is according to the best virtue; and this must be the
virtue of the best part of man. Whether, then, this best part be the
intellect, or something else--which is thought naturally to bear rule
and to govern, and to possess ideas upon honorable and divine
subjects, or whether it is itself divine, or the most divine of any
property which we possess; the energy of this part according to its
proper virtue must be perfect happiness: and that this energy is
contemplative has been stated. This also would seem to agree with what
was said before, and with the truth: for this energy is the noblest;
since the intellect is the noblest thing within us, and of subjects of
knowledge, those are noblest with which the intellect is conversant.
It is also most continuous; for we are better able to contemplate
continuously than to do anything else continuously. We think also that
pleasure must be united to happiness: but of all the energies
according to virtue, that according to wisdom is confessedly the most
pleasant: at any rate, wisdom seems to contain pleasures worthy of
admiration, both in point of purity and stability: and it is
reasonable to suppose that his mode of life should be pleasanter to
those who know it than to those who are only seeking it. Again, that
which is called self-sufficiency must be most concerned with
contemplative happiness; for both the wise man and the just, and all
others, need the necessaries of life; but supposing them to be
sufficiently supplied with such goods, the just man requires persons
toward whom and with whom he may act justly; and in like manner the
temperate man, and the brave man, and so on with all the rest. But the
wise man, if even by himself, is able to contemplate; and the more so
the wiser he is; perhaps he will energize better, if he has
cooperators, but nevertheless he is most self-sufficient. This would
seem also to be the only energy which is loved for its own sake; for
it has no result beyond the act of contemplation; but from the active
energies, we gain more or less beyond the performance of the action.
Happiness seems also to consist in leisure; for we are busy in order
that we may have leisure; and we go to war in order that we may be at
peace. Now the energies of the active virtues are exerted in political
or military affairs; and the actions with respect to these are thought
to allow of no leisure. Certainly military actions altogether exclude
it; for no one chooses war, nor makes preparations for war for the
sake of war; for a man would be thought perfectly defiled with blood,
if he made his friends enemies in order that there might be battles
and massacres. The energy of the statesman is also without leisure;
and besides the actual administration of the state, the statesman
seeks to gain power and honors, or at least happiness for himself and
his fellow citizens, different from the happiness of the state, which
we are in search of, clearly as being different.
If, then, of all courses of action which are according to the virtues,
those which have to do with politics and war excel in beauty and
greatness; and these have no leisure, and aim at some end, and are not
chosen for their own sakes; but the energy of the intellect is thought
to be superior in intensity, because it is contemplative; and to aim
at no end beyond itself, and to have a pleasure properly belonging to
it; and if this increases the energy; and if self-sufficiency, and
leisure, and freedom from cares (as far as anything human can be
free), and everything which is attributed to the happy man, evidently
exist in this energy; then this must be the perfect happiness of man,
when it attains the end of life complete; for nothing is incomplete of
those things which belong to happiness.
But such a life would be better than man could attain to; for he would
live thus, not so far forth as he is man, but as there is in him
something divine. But so far as this divine part surpasses the whole
compound nature, so far does its energy surpass the energy which is
according to all other virtue. If, then, the intellect be divine when
compared with man, the life also, which is in obedience to that, will
be divine when compared with human life. But a man ought not to
entertain human thoughts, as some would advise, because he is human,
nor mortal thoughts, because he is mortal: but as far as it is
possible he should make himself immortal, and do everything with a
view to living in accordance with the best principle in him; altho it
be small in size, yet in power and value it is far more excellent than
all. Besides, this would seem to be each man's "self," if it really is
the ruling and the better part. It would be absurd, therefore, if a
man were to choose not his own life, but the life of some other thing.
And what was said before will apply now; for that which peculiarly
belongs to each by nature is best and most pleasant to every one; and
consequently to man, the life according to intellect is most pleasant,
if intellect especially constitutes Man. This life, therefore, is the
most happy.