He who proposes to make the fitting inquiry as to which form of
government is the best, ought first to determine what manner of living
is most eligible; for while this remains uncertain, it will also be
equally uncertain what government is best. For, unless some unexpected
accident interfere, it is probable that those who enjoy the best
government will live best according to existing circumstances; he
ought, therefore, first to come to some agreement as to the manner of
life which, so to speak, is most desirable for all; and afterward,
whether this life is the same or different in the individual and the
member of a state.
Deeming then that we have already sufficiently shown what sort of life
is best, in our popular discourses on that subject, we must now make
use of what we there said. Certainly no one ever called in question
the propriety of one of the divisions; namely, that as there are three
kinds of things good for man, which are, what is external, what
belongs to the body, and to the soul, it is evident that all these
must conspire to make men truly happy. For no one would say that a man
was happy who had nothing of fortitude or temperance, justice or
prudence, but was afraid of the flies that flew round him; or who
would abstain from nothing, if he chanced to be desirous of meat or
drink, or who would murder his dearest friend for a farthing; or, in
like manner, one who was in every particular as wanting and misguided
in his understanding as an infant or a maniac. These truths are so
evident that all must agree to them, tho some may dispute about the
quantity and the degree: for they may think, that a very little amount
of virtue is sufficient for happiness; but as to riches, property,
power, honor, and all such things, they endeavor to increase them
without bounds. But to such we say, that it is easy to prove, from
what experience teaches us concerning these cases, that it is not
through these external goods that men acquire virtue, but through
virtue that they acquire them. As to a happy life, whether it is to be
found in pleasure or in virtue, or in both, certain it is that it
belongs more frequently to those whose morals are most pure, and whose
understandings are best cultivated, and who preserve moderation in
the acquisition of external goods, than to those who possess a
sufficiency of external good things, but are deficient in the rest.
And that such is the case will be clearly seen by any one who views
the matter with reflection. For whatsoever is external has its
boundary, as a machine; and whatsoever is useful is such that its
excess is either necessarily hurtful, or at best useless to the
possessor. But every good quality of the soul, the higher it is in
degree, becomes much the more useful, if it is permitted on this
subject to adopt the word "useful" as well as "noble." It is also
evident that the best disposition of each thing will follow in the
same proportion of excess, as the things themselves, of which we allow
they are accidents, differ from each other in value. So that if the
soul is more noble than any outward possession, or than the body, both
in itself and with respect to us, it must be admitted, of course, that
the best disposition of each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it
is for the sake of the soul that these things are desirable, and it is
on this account that wise men should desire them, and not the soul for
them.
Let us therefore be well agreed that so much of happiness falls to the
lot of every one as he possesses of virtue and wisdom, and in
proportion as he acts according to their dictates; since for this we
have the example of the God Himself, who is completely happy, not from
any external good, but in Himself, and because He is such by nature.
For good fortune is something of necessity different from happiness,
as every external good of the soul is produced by chance or by
fortune; but it is not from fortune that any one is just or wise.
Hence it follows, as established by the same reasoning, that the state
which is best, and acts best, will be happy: for no one can fare well
who acts not well; nor can the actions either of man or city be
praiseworthy without virtue and wisdom. For valor, justice and wisdom
have in a state the same force and form as in individuals; and it is
only as he shares in these virtues that each man is said to be just,
wise, and prudent.