Let it be laid down by us, that pleasure is a certain motion of the
soul, and a settlement of it, at once rapid and perceptible, into its
own proper nature; and that pain is the contrary. If then pleasure be
a thing of this nature, it is plain that whatever is productive of the
disposition I have described is pleasant; while everything of a
nature to destroy it, or produce a disposition the opposite to it, is
painful.
Generally speaking, therefore, it is necessary, both that the being in
progress toward a state conformable to nature should be pleasant; and
that, in the highest degree, when those feelings, whose original is
conformable to it, shall have recovered that their nature; and habits,
because that which is habitual becomes by that time natural, as it
were; for, in a certain way, custom is like nature, because the idea
of frequency is proximate to that of always; now nature belongs to the
idea of always, custom to that of often. What is not compulsory, also,
is pleasant; for compulsion is contrary to nature. Wherefore acts of
necessity are painful; and it has been truly remarked, "Every act of
necessity is in its nature painful." It must be also that a state of
sedulous attention, anxiety, the having the mind on the stretch, are
painful, for they all are acts of necessity, and constrained, unless
they have become habitual; but it is custom which, under such
circumstances, renders them pleasant. The contraries of these must
also be pleasant; wherefore, relaxation of mind, leisure,
listlessness, amusements, and intervals of rest, rank in the class of
things pleasant; for none of these has anything to do with necessity.
Everything of which there is an innate appetite, is pleasant; for
appetite is a desire of what is pleasant.
Now, of appetites, some are irrational, others attended by reason. I
call all those irrational which men desire, not from any conception
which they form: of this kind are all which are said to exist
naturally, as those of the body; thirst or hunger, for instance, in
the case of sustenance; and the appetite of sustenance in every kind.
And the appetites connected with objects of taste, and of lust, and,
in fact, objects of touch generally; the appetite of fragrant odors,
too, as connected with smelling, and hearing, and sight. Appetites
attended by reason are all those whatsoever which men exercise from a
persuasion: for many things there are which they desire to behold, and
possess, on hearsay and persuasion. Now, as the being pleased stands
in the perception of a certain affection, and as imagination is a kind
of faint perception, there will attend on him who exercises either
memory or hope a kind of imagination of that which is the object of
his memory or hope; but if so, it is plain that they who exercise
memory or hope, certainly feel pleasure, since they have also a
perception. So that everything pleasant consists either in the
perception of present objects, or in the remembrance of those which
have already been, or in the hope of such as are yet to be; for men
exercise perception on present, memory on past, and hope on future
objects. Now the objects of memory are pleasant, not only such as at
the moment while present were pleasant, but some even which were not
pleasant, should their consequence subsequently be honorable and good;
and hence this saying, "But it is indeed pleasant for a man, when
preserved, to remember his toils"; and this, "For after his
sufferings, a man who has suffered much, and much achieved, is
gladdened at the recollection." But the reason of this is, that to be
exempt from evil is pleasant. And all objects are pleasant in hope,
which appear by their presence either to delight or benefit in a great
degree; or to benefit, without giving pain. In a word, whatever
objects by their presence delight us, do so, generally speaking, as we
hope for, or remember them. On which account, too, the feeling of
anger is pleasant; just as Homer has remarked of anger in his poem,
"That which with sweetness far greater than distilling honey as it
drops"; for there is no one who feels anger where the object seems
impracticable to his revenge; nor with those far their superiors in
power do men feel anger at all, or if they do, it is in a less degree.
There is also a kind of pleasure consequent on most appetites; for
either in the recollection that they have enjoyed them, or in the hope
that they shall enjoy them, men are affected and delighted by a
certain pleasure: thus men possest by fevers feel delight, amid their
thirst, as well at the remembrance how they used to drink, as at the
hope of drinking yet again. Lovers, too, feel delight in conversing,
writing, and composing something, ever about the object beloved;
because, in all those energies, they have a perception, as it were, of
the object they love. And this is in all cases a criterion of the
commencement of love, when persons feel pleasure not only in the
presence of the object, but are enamored also of it when absent, on
memory; wherefore, even when pain arises at absence, nay in the midst
of mourning, and the very dirge of death, there yet arises within us a
certain pleasure. For the pain is felt because the object is not
present; but the pleasure consists in remembering and seeing, as it
were, both the person, and what he used to do, and the kind of
character of which he was. Whence has it been said, and with
probability enough, "Thus spake he, and excited within them all a
desire of lamentation." Also the avenging oneself is pleasant; for the
getting of that is pleasant, the failing to get which is painful: now
the angry do feel pain in an excessive degree if they be not avenged;
but in the hope of revenge they take pleasure.
Again, to overcome is pleasant, not to the ambitious only, but even to
all; for there arises an imagination of superiority, for which all,
either in a faint or more violent degree, have an appetite. But since
to overcome is pleasant, it must follow, of course, that amusements
where there is field for rivalry, as those of music and disputations,
are pleasant; for it frequently occurs, in the course of these, that
we overcome; also chess, ball, dice, and drafts.
Again, it is the same with respect to amusements where a lively
interest is taken; for, of these, some become pleasant as accustomed
to them; others are pleasant at first; for instance, hunting and every
kind of sporting; for where there is rivalry, there is also victory;
on which principle the disputations of the bar and of the schools are
pleasant to those who have become accustomed to them, and have
abilities. Also honor and good character are most pleasant, by reason
that an idea arises, that one is such as is the good man; and this in
a greater degree should those people pronounce one such who he thinks
speak truth: such are those immediately about one, rather than those
who are more removed; familiar friends, and acquaintances, and one's
fellow citizens, rather than those who are at a distance; the present,
rather than a future generation; a man of practical wisdom, rather
than a mere ignoramus; many, than a few; for it is more likely that
these I have mentioned will adhere to the truth, than that the
opposite characters will: since one has no anxiety about the honor or
the opinion of such as one greatly despises, children and animals, for
instance, not at least for the sake of such opinion itself; but if one
is anxious about it, then it is on account of something else.
A friend, too, ranks among things pleasant; for the affection of love
is pleasant; since there is no lover of wine who does not delight in
wine: also the having affection felt toward one is pleasant; for there
is in this case also an idea of one's being an excellent person, which
all who have any sensibility to it are desirous of; now the having
affection felt for you is the being beloved yourself, on your own
account. Also the being held in admiration is pleasant, on the very
account of being honored by it. Flattery and the flatterer are
pleasant; since the flatterer is a seeming admirer and a seeming
friend. To continue the same course of action is also pleasant; for
what is habitual was laid down to be pleasant. To vary is also
pleasant; for change is an approach to what is natural: for sameness
produces an excess of a stated habit; whence it has been said, "In
everything change is pleasant." For on this principle, whatever occurs
at intervals of time is pleasant, whether persons or things; for it is
a variation of present objects; and at the same time that which
occurs merely at intervals possesses the merit of rarity. Also
learning and admiration, generally speaking, are pleasant; for under
admiration exists a desire [to learn], so that what is admired is
desired; and in the act of learning there is a settlement into a state
conformable to nature. To benefit and to be benefited are also of the
number of pleasant things; for to be benefited is to get what people
desire; but to benefit is to possess and abound; things, the both of
which men desire. And because a tendency to beneficence is pleasant,
it is also pleasant to a man to set his neighbor on his legs again,
and to put a finish to that which was deficient in some particular.