_Crito_: There are persons who at no great cost are willing to save
you and bring you out of prison; and as for the informers, you may
observe that they are far from being exorbitant in their demands; a
little money will satisfy them. My means, which, as I am sure, are
ample, are at your service, and if you have a scruple about spending
all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of others; and
one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a sum of money for this
very purpose; and Cebes and many others are willing to spend their
money too. I say, therefore, do not on that account hesitate about
making your escape, and do not say, as you did in court, that you will
have difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself if you escape. For
men will love you in other places to which you may go, and not in
Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go
to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalians will give
you any trouble.
Nor can I think that you are justified, Socrates, in betraying your
own life when you might be saved; this is playing into the hands of
your enemies and destroyers; and moreover I should say that you were
betraying your children; for you might bring them up and educate them;
instead of which you go away and leave them, and they will have to
take their chance; and if they do not meet with the usual fate of
orphans, there will be small thanks to you. No man should bring
children into the world who is unwilling to persevere to the end in
their nurture and education. But you are choosing the easier part, as
I think, not the better and manlier, which would rather have become
one who professes virtue in all his actions, like yourself. And indeed
I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are your friends, when I
reflect that this entire business of yours will be attributed to our
want of courage. The trial need never have come on, or might have been
brought to another issue; and the end of all, which is the crowning
absurdity, will seem to have been permitted by us, through cowardice
and baseness, who might have saved you, as you might have saved
yourself, if we had been good for anything (for there was no
difficulty in escaping); and we did not see how disgraceful, Socrates,
and also miserable all this will be to us as well as you. Make your
mind up then, or rather have your mind already made up, for the time
of deliberation is over, and there is only one thing to be done, which
must be done, if at all, this very night, and which any delay will
render all but impossible; I beseech you therefore, Socrates, to be
persuaded by me, and to do as I say....
_Socrates_: From these premises I proceed to argue the question
whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of
the Athenians; and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will
make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations
which you mention, of money and loss of character and the duty of
educating children, are, as I fear, only the doctrines of the
multitude, who would be as ready to call people to life if they were
able as they are to put them to death--and with as little reason. But
now, since the argument has thus far prevailed, the only question
which remains to be considered is whether we shall do rightly either
in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying
them in money and thanks, or whether we shall not do rightly; and if
the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my
remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the calculation.
_Crito_: I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we
proceed?
_Socrates_: Let us consider the matter together, and do you either
refute me if you can, and I will be convinced, or else cease, my dear
friend, from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes
of the Athenians; for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by you,
but not against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my
first position, and do your best to answer me.
_Crito_: I will do my best....
_Socrates_: Again, Crito, may we do evil?
_Crito_: Surely not, Socrates.
_Socrates_: And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the
morality of the many; is that just or not?
_Crito_: Not just.
_Socrates_: For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?
_Crito_: Very true.
_Socrates_: Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to
any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have
you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For
this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any
considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who
are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only
despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me,
then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that
neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever
right. And shall that be the premise of our argument? Or do you
decline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still
my opinion; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you
have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind, I will proceed.
_Crito_: You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.
_Socrates_: Then I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in
the form of a question: Ought a man to do what he admits to be right
or ought he to betray the right?
_Crito_: He ought to do what he thinks right.
_Socrates_: But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving
the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or
rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not
desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just? What
do you say?
_Crito_: I can not tell, Socrates; for I do not know.
_Socrates_: Then consider the matter in this way: Imagine that I am
about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which
you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me:
"Tell us, Socrates," they say; "what are you about? Are you going by
an act of yours to overturn us--the laws and the whole state, as far
as in you lies? Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be
overthrown in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set
aside and overthrown by individuals?" What will be our answer, Crito,
to these and the like words? Any one, and especially a clever
rhetorician, will have a good deal to urge about the evil of setting
aside the law which requires a sentence to be carried out; and we
might reply, "Yes; but the state has injured us and given an unjust
sentence." Suppose I say that?
_Crito_: Very good, Socrates.
_Socrates_: "And was that our agreement with you?" the law would say;
"or were you to abide by the sentence of the state?" And if I were to
express astonishment at their saying this, the law would probably add:
"Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes; you are in the habit
of asking and answering questions. Tell us what complaint you have to
make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and
the state? In the first place, did we not bring you into existence?
Your father married your mother by our aid and begot you. Say whether
you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate
marriage?" None, I should reply. "Or against those of us who regulate
the system of nurture and education of children in which you were
trained? Were not the laws, which have the charge of this, right in
commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?" Right, I
should say. "Well then, since you were brought into the world and
nurtured and educated by us, can you deny, in the first place, that
you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if
this is true, you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think
that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you
have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or
to your master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled
by him, or received some other evil at his hands? You would not say
this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you
have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in
you lies? And will you, O professor of true virtue, say that you are
justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that
our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother
or father or any master, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the
gods and of men of understanding; also to be soothed, and gently and
reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and if not
persuaded, obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with
imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence;
and if she lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as
is right; neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank, but
whether in battle, or in a court of law, or in any other place, he
must do what his city and his country order him, or he must change
their view of what is just; and if he may do no violence to his father
or mother, much less may he do violence to his country." What answer
shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?
_Crito_: I think that they do.
_Socrates_: Then the laws will say: "Consider, Socrates, if this is
true, that in your present attempt you are going to do us wrong. For,
after having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated
you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good that
we had to give, we further proclaim and give the right to every
Athenian that if he does not like us when he has come of age and has
seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where
he pleases and take his goods with him; and none of our laws will
forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us and
the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city, may go
where he likes and take his goods with him. But he who has experience
of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state, and
still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as
we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice
wrong; first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents;
secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly,
because he had made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our
commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands
are wrong; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the
alternative of obeying or convincing us; that is what we offer, and he
does neither. These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were
saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your
intentions; you above all other Athenians." Suppose I ask, why is
this? They will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have
acknowledged the agreement. "There is clear proof," they will say,
"Socrates, that we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all
Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which,
as you never leave, you may be supposed to love. For you never went
out of the city either to see the games, except once when you went to
the Isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military
service; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor have you any
curiosity to know other states or their laws; your affections did not
go beyond us and our state; we were your special favorites, and you
acquiesced in our government of you; and this is the state in which
you begot your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction.
Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have fixt the penalty at
banishment in the course of the trial--the state which refuses to let
you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you
preferred death to exile, and that you were not grieved at death. And
now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us
the laws, of which you are the destroyer, and are doing what only a
miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon the
compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all
answer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to
be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that
true or not?" How shall we answer that, Crito? Must we not agree?
_Crito_: There is no help, Socrates.
_Socrates_: Then will they not say: "You, Socrates, are breaking the
covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not
in any haste or under any compulsion or deception, but having had
seventy years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty
to leave the city, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants
appeared to you to be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone
either to Lacedæmon or Crete, which you often praise for their good
government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign state. Whereas you,
above all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the state, or, in
other words, of us her laws (for who would like a state that has no
laws?), that you never stirred out of her; the halt, the blind, the
maimed were not more stationary in her than you were. And now you run
away and forsake your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take
our choice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the
city.
"For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way,
what good will you do either to yourself or to your friends? That your
friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will
lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself if you fly
to one of the neighboring cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara,
both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them as an
enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all
patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of
the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the justice
of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of the
laws is more than likely to be a corrupter of the young and foolish
portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and
virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms?...
"Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of
life and children first, and of justice afterward, but of justice
first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world
below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or
holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as
Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of
evil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth,
returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants
and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom
you ought least to wrong--that is to say, yourself, your friends, your
country, and us--we shall be angry with you while you live, and our
brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy;
for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen,
then, to us and not to Crito."
This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the
sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is
humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know
that anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you
have anything to say.
_Crito_: I have nothing to say, Socrates.
_Socrates_: Then let me follow the intimations of the will of God.