I suppose that you are satisfied at having a life of pleasure which is
without pain. And if you are satisfied, and if you are unable to show
any good or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the
consequences: If this is true, then I say that the argument is absurd
which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly when he might
abstain, because he is seduced and amazed by pleasure; or again, when
you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is
overcome at the moment by pleasure. Now that this is ridiculous will
be evident if we only give up the use of various names, such as
pleasant and painful and good and evil. As there are two things, let
us call them by two names--first, good and evil, and then pleasant and
painful. Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil
knowing that he does evil. But some one will ask, Why? Because he is
overcome, is the first answer. And by what is he overcome? the
inquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able to reply, by
pleasure, for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that of
good.
In our answer, then, we shall say only that he is overcome. By what?
he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply; indeed, we
shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one
of the swaggering sort, that is too ridiculous, that a man should do
what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by
good. Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy
of conquering the evil? And in answer to that we shall clearly reply,
because it was not worthy; for if it had been worthy, then he who, as
we say, was overcome by pleasure, would not have been wrong. But how,
he will reply, can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of
the good? Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion
to each other, either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer? This
we can not deny. And when you speak of being overcome, what do you
mean, he will say, but that you choose the greater evil in exchange
for the lesser good? This being the case, let us now substitute the
names of pleasure and pain, and say, not as before, that a man does
what is evil knowingly, but that he does what is painful knowingly,
and because he is overcome by pleasure, which is unworthy to overcome.
And what measure is there of the relations of pleasure to pain other
than excess and defect, which means that they become greater and
smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in degree? For if any one
says, Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future
pleasure and pain, to which I should reply: And do they differ in any
other way except by reason of pleasure and pain? There can be no other
measure of them. And do you, like a skilful weigher, put into the
balance the pleasures and the pains, near and distant, and weigh them,
and then say which outweighs the other? If you weigh pleasures against
pleasures, you of course take the more and greater; or if you weigh
pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if pleasures
against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the
painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near
or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in
which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my
friends, that this is true? I am confident that they can not deny
this.
He agreed with me.
Well then, I shall say, if you admit that, be so good as to answer me
a question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight
when near, and smaller when at a distance. They will acknowledge that.
And the same holds of thickness and number; also sounds which are in
themselves equal are greater when near and lesser when at a distance.
They will grant that also. Now supposing that happiness consisted in
making and taking large things, what would be the saving principle of
human life? Would the art of measuring be the saving principle or
would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that deceiving art
which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one time of
which we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice of
things great and small? But the art of measurement is that which would
do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would
fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus
save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art
which accomplishes this is the art of measurement?
Yes, he said, the art of measurement.
Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of
odd and even, and on the knowledge of when men ought to choose the
greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other
whether near or at a distance; what would be the saving principles of
our lives? Would not knowledge?--a knowledge of measuring, when the
question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when
the question is of odd and even? The world will acknowledge that, will
they not?
Protagoras admitted that they would.
Well then, I say to them, my friends, seeing that the salvation of
human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures
and pains--in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater
and the less, and the nearer and remoter--must not this measuring be a
consideration of excess and defect and equality in relation to one
another?
That is undeniably true.
And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and
science?
They will agree to that....
Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful
evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his
distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable,
delightful, joyful. However and in whatever way he rejoices to name
them, I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer this in my
sense.
Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others.
Then, my friends, I said, what do you say to this? Are not all actions
the tendency of which is to make life painless and pleasant honorable
and useful? The honorable work is also useful and good.
This was admitted.
Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under
the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is
also attainable when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a
man to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to
himself is wisdom.
They all assented.
And does not ignorance consist in having a false opinion and being
deceived about important matters?
To that they unanimously assented also.
Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil or that which he thinks
to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a
man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the
greater when he might have the less.
We all agreed to every word of this.
Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and
here, Prodicus, I should particularly like to know whether you would
agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil.
Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear
and not terror.
Never mind about that, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if
our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears
when he need not? Would not this be in contradiction to the admission
which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears
to be evil? And no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he
thinks to be evil.