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VOL. 5.
NO. 5.
·
·
Seoul,
Korea.
·
The
KOREA
REVIEW
Published each Month.
HOMER B. HULBERT, Editor.
CONTENTS.
KOREA AND JAPAN 161
A VISIT TO QUELPART 172
THE MAGIC OX-CURE 179
THE SEOUL-FUSAN RAILWAY 183
EDITORIAL COMMENT 187
NEWS CALENDAR 191
MAY, 1905.
METHODIST PUBLISHING HOUSE: SEOUL
ADVERTISEMENTS.
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION.
CAPITAL $10,000,000.00
RESERVE FUND { Sterling at 2/- $10,000,000.00 } $15,500,000.00
{ Silver $5,500,000.00 }
RESERVE LIABILITY OF PROPRIETORS $10,000,000.00
CHIEF MANAGER
HONGKONG—J. R. M. SMITH, ESQUIRE.
CHEMULPO—INTEREST ALLOWED ON FIXED DEPOSITS:—
For 6 months, 3 per cent, per annum.
” 12 ” 4 ” ”
No interest allowed on current accounts.
All the Accounts of the Corporation with its customers are kept in _Yen_
local currency.
Drafts issued and Bills discounted on all the Principal Cities of Europe
and America.
THE SEOUL-CHEMULPO SECTION.
The Seoul-Fusan Railway Company.
Time Tables 1st December, 1904.
-------------------------------+----------+-------------------------------
EAST BOUND | | WEST BOUND
-------------------------------+ STATIONS +-------------------------------
TRAIN LEAVES | | TRAIN LEAVES
----+-----+-----+----+----+----+----------+----+-----+-----+----+----+----
A.M.| A.M.| P.M.|P.M.|P.M.|P.M.| |A.M.| A.M.| P.M.|P.M.|P.M.|P.M.
7.20|10.00|12.30|3.00|5.30|8.30| Chemulpo |8.50|11.12| 2.00|4.30|7.00|9.42
7.28|10.06|12.38|3.08|5.38|8.36| Saalijy |8.45|11.18| 1.55|4.25|6.55|9.38
7.33| ... |12.43|3.13|5.43|... | Sopple |8.38| ... | 1.48|4.18|6.48| ...
7.51| ... | 1.01|3.31|6.01|... | Poopyong |8.20| ... | 1.30|4.00|6.30| ...
8.07|10.36| 1.17|3.47|6.17|9.06| Sosha |8.08|10.39| 1.18|3.48|6.18|9.09
8.19| ... | 1.29|3.59|6.29|... | Oricle |7.51| ... | 1.03|3.33|6.03| ...
8.36|10.57| 1.46|4.16|6.46|9.29|Yungtongpo|7.36|10.16|12.49|3.19|5.49|8.46
8.43| ... | 1.53|4.23|9.53|... | Nodol |7.27| ... |12.42|3.12|5.42| ...
8.49| ... | 1.59|4.29|6.59|... | Yungsan |7.21| ... |12.36|3.06|5.36| ...
9.01|11.14| 2.11|4.41|7.11|9.46|South Gate|7.21|10.00|12.27|2.57|5.27|8.30
9.05|11.17| 2.15|4.45|7.15|9.50| Seoul |7.05| 9.55|12.20|2.50|5.20|8.26
----+-----+-----+----+----+----+----------+----+-----+-----+----+----+----
Passengers from the intermediate stations where no Ticket office exists,
will Procure the Tickets from Conductors on the Trains. Where Ticket
office exists Tickets procured from the Conductors must be paid for at
the rate of 5 sen extra for each fare.
Any Passenger who over-rides the distance indicated on the ticket, or
who changes cars for a higher class, must pay the difference, and 5 sen
extra, for each fare.
Dogs taken in the Passenger-cars, with no objection from the other
passengers are charged 40 sen per head.
50 Trip Coupon Tickets for family use are issued at the following rates:—
1st class 60 yen. 2nd class 30 yen.
THE KOREA REVIEW.
MAY, 1905.
Korea and Japan.
The attitude of the Korean people toward Japan has undergone many changes
during that past quarter of a century. The thing that we must always
reckon with is the ancient feeling of enmity aroused, in the first place,
by the devastating raids of Japanese freebooters during the tenth,
eleventh and twelfth centuries. At that time the Koreans suffered so
severely that the very name of Japanese became the synonym of all that
was dreadful and to be hated. This was further intensified by the great
invasion of 1592 when the Koreans suffered untold things at the hands
of the temporary conquerors. The result of these things are clearly
seen in Korean character today. It would be very hard to find a Korean
child who does not drink in, almost with his mother’s milk, a feeling of
dislike against the Japanese. On the other hand the Japanese seem to have
imbibed as strong a feeling toward the Korean. This feeling is one of
contempt, born of the less warlike character of the Korean and his strong
conservatism.
These sentiments we firmly believe to be the real underlying ones and if
so the only genuine _rapprochement_ between the two people must be along
the line of mutual self-interest. If it _pays_ sufficiently to forget the
old feud then forgotten it will be, but it is plain that the interest
must be a mutual one.
From the days of the Great Invasion up to the year 1868 the difficulties
between Korea and Japan were quiescent, though by no means dead. After
the Manchu invasion of Korea the Japanese even offered Korea help in
throwing off the Manchu yoke. As we look at conditions today we can
almost say that it was a pity Korea did not accept the offer.
The late Regent, during the first decade of the present reign, conceived
a fanatical hatred against all outsiders and, through a few unfortunate
victories over them, conceived the idea of hermetically sealing the
country against foreign intercourse. He adopted the one course which
was sure to effect the opening of the country, namely by banning the
Japanese commercial settlement at Fusan. This was just at the time of
Japan’s great awakening and it is probable that she sincerely hoped and
believed that Korea was capable of taking the same forward step which she
herself was taking. When, therefore, Korea not only took no forward step
even but attempted to retire more deeply into her political solitude she
aroused a good deal of feeling in Japan, a feeling that was so intense
that it resulted in a sanguinary civil war called the Satsuma Rebellion.
The leaders of the people in the Southern island of Kiusiu, which lies
nearest to Korea, earnestly desired that Japan should force upon Korea at
the point of the sword what time has at last effected. If the leaders of
that rebellion could have looked forward to the year 1905 they would have
left their swords in their scabbards.
In opposition to these advocates of force the new government in Tokyo
took the wholly reasonable and laudable ground that Korea should be
treated as a coördinate and independent power and that she should be
approached from the diplomatic rather than the military side. The
rebellion which resulted caused a long delay in the carrying out of any
plans that Japan may have formed relative to the opening up of Korea.
At the same time the approaching majority of the King of Korea, and the
consequent retirement of the Regent, was sure to cause important changes
in the attitude of the peninsular government. This became all the more
evident as the queen and her powerful faction developed a feeling of
strong hostility to the person and the policy of the Regent.
Taking advantage of this rift in the Korean lute the Japanese sent a
semi-official agent in the person of Hanabusa who found means to secure
frequent access to the Queen and her party and who doubtless used every
argument to widen the breach between the Queen and the Regent. When
everything was ready the Japanese warship _Unyo Kan_ appeared off the
Korean coast near Chemulpo and got herself fired upon by a Korean fort.
This was the last, the dying act of the Regent, but it formed an opening
wedge for the negotiations which were immediately instituted and which
resulted in the signing of the treaty between Korea and Japan at Kangwha
in 1876. The Regent had already retired from public life in disgust,
although his friends were constantly plotting to bring him back to Seoul
and reinstate him in power.
The years 1876-1880 form one of the most important periods in the modern
history of Korea, even though they were very quiet years. The king had
entered upon his career and his course was to be determined upon. The
court was in a plastic state ready to be moulded into any form which a
strong mind might suggest. Chinese suzerainty had slept so long and was
so nominal in character that no protest was forthcoming even when Korea
and Japan signed a treaty as between wholly independent powers. The
ruling faction had come into power through the help of the Japanese. The
latter recognized to the fullest extent the independence of Korea. There
was every reason in the world why Japan should use her powerful influence
to direct the stream of Korean politics into safe and progressive
channels. She had an unparalleled opportunity. Everything was in her
favor. England never began to have such a favorable outlook in India as
Japan had in Korea beginning with the year 1876.
What then, was the reason for the comparative failure that resulted?
There can be but one answer. The Japanese failed to study the situation
closely enough and to gauge the quality of the instrument by means of
which Korea must be led. The king was young and physically strong and
a long reign was to be expected. His will was led by the powerful Min
faction. It was the province of statesmanship to study these factors
and so gauge their qualities as to be able to mould them in the forms
desired. The central figure was the Queen. The country and the court went
with her. She was young and impressionable and favorably impressed by the
Japanese. Behind her was the Min faction, strong, ambitious, selfish,
tenacious of its prerogatives. That faction was itself impressionable. It
recognized that a new era was opening, that the policy of the Regent had
been cast aside. It felt the incentive of national independence and was
ready and willing to undertake the responsible work of leading the nation
into these new and untrodden paths; but first and most of all it held to
its own prestige. The selfish element was preeminent. There was no love
of country, detached and altruistic. It was their conviction that the
progress of the country would enhance their own prestige. The motive was
not a very high one but such as it was it should have received careful
study from the Japanese before it was rejected. The latter strongly
favored a radical change in Korean conditions, a change for which Korea
had received no such preparation as Japan had received and for which it
was not ready. There were two things which might cause such a radical
change as that of the Japanese—education or the rise of an intense
nationalistic spirit. It was the latter which worked in Japan, but in
Korea there was neither education nor a national spirit to work upon.
These things had yet to be evolved.
The Japanese saw with impatience the slowness of the Koreans to take
advantage of their opportunity and it was this impatience which spoiled
the whole thing. If the Japanese could have realized the mental and
traditional standpoint of the Koreans at that time and could have
exercised tact and large patience the outcome might have been very
different, but the truth is that the Japanese were as unable to
understand the Koreans as the Koreans were to understand them. There
were a few Koreans who seem to have taken hold of the problem in the same
spirit as the Japanese but they were in such a hopeless minority and they
were so far ahead of their time that the Japanese made a damaging mistake
in forsaking the ruling faction and pinning their faith to these few
progressives. Of course the ideas of these progressives were excellent.
What they proposed would have been for the good of the country, but they
had no public sentiment behind them and their views were so radical
as to bar them from the field of practical politics. It is not good
statesmanship to attempt what is better than the best thing possible, and
the mistake the Japanese made at that critical point was in supposing
that the Korean people would fall in with a radical progressive policy.
The result was seen in 1884 when, throwing over diplomacy, they assisted
the Korean radicals in a sanguinary _emeute_ in which seven cold-blooded
murders proved the quality of the would-be reformers. Here we see a
second case in which a diplomatic failure was tided over by military
force. But even so they did not succeed, for the Chinese, who were on
the scene and who had been making high bids for the Queen’s favor by
kidnapping the Regent and carrying him away to China, were in greater
force than the Japanese and virtually forced their retirement.
Up to this time people had not greatly favored either the Chinese or
Japanese influence but if anything were inclined toward the latter. But
now the ruling faction turned wholly toward China and with it went the
mass of the people. The common people did not understand nor appreciate
the ideals of the progressives, and the death of seven government
ministers effectually weaned away what little fealty they had given to
the progressive cause.
A new phase of the situation now opened during which the high-handed acts
of the Chinese Minister alarmed the better class of Koreans and made them
think more kindly of the Japanese who had at least not tampered with the
independence of the country. Japanese diplomacy did all it could during
this period to stem the rising tide of Chinese influence, but the Queen
was so constituted mentally that having once conceived a thorough dislike
for any person or policy it was well-nigh impossible to change. From the
time when the Japanese, in 1884, helped the progressives in their attempt
to wrest the power from the hands of the Queen’s faction there was no
peace between her and the Japanese. But she was the pivotal point in the
whole situation, and this the Japanese failed to see, or, seeing, ignored.
As we have said, the Chinese were striving hard to make up for the
mistake which they had made in allowing Korea to sign treaties on the
basis of independence, and with such good results that Japanese diplomacy
was again frustrated. Once more she had recourse to the arm of force to
carry out her ideas. The war with China resulted in complete success for
her arms and again Japanese influence became paramount; but it should be
noted that this aroused little enthusiasm among the Koreans. To be sure
they had been saved from the threatened Chinese supremacy but the Koreans
had no confidence in the ability of the Japanese to handle the situation
wisely. In this they were right, for Japan began by enforcing unnecessary
sumptuary laws which did not strike at the root of the Korean difficulty
but only wounded the pride of the Korean people. At that time Japan had
a second opportunity to prove her ability to handle an alien people
and again she failed. The assassination of the Queen and the enforced
detention of the King in is palace, which resulted in his throwing
himself into the arms of Russia, was the direct result.
This series of events convinced the Koreans that Japan was unable to
effect the changes which were necessary in order to prepare for the real
progress of the country, and they also demonstrated to the Western world
that however capable Japan may have been in leading her own people toward
civilization and enlightenment she lacked the peculiar power necessary to
the handling of an alien people.
As time went on and Russian prestige increased in the peninsula it became
evident that diplomacy would again fail to save the situation and Japan
was again driven to arms. The result bids fair to be another Japanese
success. So far as Korea is concerned the situation is much the same as
it was at the close of the Japan-China war. Japan is in a position to
do about as she pleases here. The question arises whether, during the
years that have elapsed since her former failures to handle the Korean
problem, she has gained the requisite ability to do so. At the beginning
of the present war she concluded a special agreement with Korea by virtue
of which the latter gave her the right of way through the peninsula for
war purposes. Korea, on her side, received the solemn pledge of Japan to
uphold her independence and to work for her welfare.
To review the successive steps of the policy which Japan has pursued in
Korea since the ratification of that agreement is not a particularly
agreeable task. It must always be borne in mind that the Japanese are
working under a terrible strain. Hundreds of thousands of their people
are perishing on the battle field and millions of treasure are being
poured out to secure to the Japanese nation a guarantee of continued
existence. It is a life and death struggle and when a man is in the midst
of such a struggle we do not expect from him the niceties of courtesy
which we should expect from him at other times. There have been many
criticisms of Japan’s course in Korea during the past year. She is
charged with having done little or nothing to stem the tide of official
corruption, that she has not bent her energies to the bettering of the
condition of the common people, that nothing has been effected in the
line of currency reform. Whatever may be the reasons for this it must
appear to the unprejudiced observer that the charges are substantially
true. We do not dare to say that Japan has no intention of effecting
these needed reforms and it may be that there are cogent reasons why they
could not be. Leaving out of view what the intentions of the Japanese may
be and holding ourselves strictly to what has been actually accomplished
we are bound to admit that up to the present time the results have been
disappointing.
But the fact that the needed reforms have not been instituted should
not lead us to a wholesale condemnation of the Japanese regime. The
problem is an extremely complicated one and those who expected that by a
single wave of the hand a condition of official corruption that has been
fostered and fed by centuries of precedent could be rectified were doomed
to disappointment from the start.
But unfortunately both for Korea and for Japan the failure to carry
out reforms is only one, and the lesser one at that, of the complaints
that are heard. It is stated from various parts of the country that
Koreans are being deprived of their property without receiving proper
compensation. Doubtless some of these stories are exaggerations but
enough of them have been witnessed by foreigners of unquestioned veracity
to establish the general fact. What we wonder at is that in the midst of
a great war, in which all her energies are absorbed, Japan should allow
the already difficult Korean problem to become complicated to such a
painful degree by an influx of the less desirable element of their people
into the peninsula. We hear it repeatedly asserted that the reinforcement
of Japan’s enormous army in Manchuria is gradually depleting the supply
of labor in Japan itself. This must be so if something like a million
young men have been taken away to the seat of war. But if it is so how
does it come about that thousands upon thousands of Japanese are flocking
into Korea? It must be because they consider their opportunities better
here than in the home country. But just at the present crisis they
are doing their own land a double injury, first by further depleting
the supply of labor there and secondly by complicating the already
sufficiently difficult Korean problem.
The Japanese authorities in Korea have repeatedly been heard to say
that a very undesirable class of Japanese is pouring into this country.
They are thoroughly aware of this and they feel very keenly the extreme
difficulty of holding their nationals in check. What we wonder at is
that the Japanese government, which has shown such consummate ability
in holding its subjects in check in Japan should allow itself to become
hampered by the lawless acts of its subjects in Korea. It seems to us,
and in this we are simply voicing the general sentiment of foreign
observers in Korea, that the obvious course would have been to prohibit
promiscuous emigration from Japan to Korea until the war was over and
adequate arrangements could be made for the management and jurisdiction
of those who wished to come.
Whether we are reasonable in this may be seen from the following
consideration. It is affirmed by the defenders of Japan’s policy in Korea
that as soon as the war is over and things quiet down these acknowledged
difficulties will be overcome and the common people of Korea will be
protected in their rights. This sounds reasonable, but does not every
undesirable Japanese who comes here before that time make that solution
more difficult? What, for instance of all the Koreans who have been
forced to sell their property for a mere fraction of its value? Will
the justice which Japan’s advocates foresee be retroactive, and will
those acts of injustice be rectified? The Korean government guaranteed
to secure the land for the building of the great railway through the
peninsula. Was it not the duty of the Japanese to see to it that this
land was paid for by the Korean government before it was seized, or at
least should not each Korean whose land was appropriated have received an
official paper signifying the amount of land he surrendered, such paper
constituting a claim on the government for payment at some future time?
Unless something like this was done it is hard to see how any future
action of the Japanese could right the manifest wrong. The evidence has
been lost.
It seems to be an object of general surprise that Japan should estimate
at such a small value the good will of the Korean people. It was not
to be expected that the government could look with satisfaction upon
a Japanese occupation, but at first the people were enthusiastic over
it and hailed it as a sign that all abuses were to be done away. We
confess to utter inability to understand how or why Japan should have
sacrificed this heavy asset of good will. It is the province of diplomacy
and statesmanship to make use of all such moral factors to the fullest
extent. We hear on all sides the statement that the Koreans have brought
the present state of things upon themselves, but what we would like to
know is the reason why Japan has not only failed to carry out needed
reforms but has rendered future work in this time almost impossible by
allowing an army of adventurers to come in and exasperate the people. We
can see only two possible answers, either the Japanese government has
concluded that reforms will not pay or else they are not fully aware of
the actual conditions that prevail in Korea.
A few weeks ago at a station on the Seoul-Fusan Railway a Korean stepped
upon a path leading away from the station. There was no sign to indicate
that this was forbidden. Instantly three or four Japanese rushed upon
him, knocked him down and beat him into unconsciousness. He remained
in that state two days but finally recovered. It was an utterly brutal
and causeless assault, and this sort of thing is going on all over the
country. The class of Japanese who for the most part are exploiting
Korea seem to take delight in wantonly abusing the people, simply out of
braggadocio. There is no use in multiplying examples of this. We think
that the Japanese are injuring themselves in allowing this sort of thing
to go on. We are sorry to see that Koreans have come to the conclusion
that all Japanese are like this. Such is far from being the case. We
believe the average Japanese would act very different from this. The
daily press of Japan is constantly recording acts of generosity and
kindness on the part of Japanese even toward Russian captives and we
believe that if the more respectable class of Japanese should come to
Korea the people would be treated justly and kindly.
We have consistently upheld Japan in her opposition to Russian intrigues
in the Far East. Japan is doing a splendid work and is fitting herself
to do a still greater work in this region. She probably aspires to be a
leader of opinion in this part of the world and to bring her influence
to bear upon China for the renovation of that enormous mass of humanity.
That is a much larger work than the mere absorption of a little corner
of the Far East like Korea; but if Japan breaks her solemn pledges to
Korea and continues to treat this people as she is now doing she is sure
to injure herself in the eyes of the world. Japan is fighting Russia
because of the latter’s broken promises in Manchuria, but if Japan
herself breaks the promises she has made to Korea, how can she gain the
countenance and acquiescence of the Western powers in any plan for large
work in the rehabilitation of China? The best thing for Japan from the
merely selfish standpoint would be to clear her skirts of all suspicion
of double dealing with Korea, to give this people even-handed justice, to
visit swift and exemplary punishment on any Japanese subject who treats a
Korean less justly than he would a fellow Japanese.
We would ask what Korea has done that her people should be despoiled
of their property and debarred from ordinary justice. To be sure she
has not responded to the appeal which Japan made so many years ago and
still retains the forms of conservation, but this can hardly be called
crime. If Korea had been leagued with Russia against Japan and had been
conquered by the latter then Japan would have some semblance of right to
absorb the territory of the peninsula, but this was not the case. Of her
own accord Japan formed an alliance with Korea and engaged to preserve
the interests of the country. A failure to carry out this agreement would
throw suspicion upon all Japan’s policy regarding the territory she
acquires during the present war and would make it difficult to believe
any of her promises.
A man who is prominent in the Japanese _regime_ told us flatly a
few days ago that as soon as this war is over Japan would declare a
protectorate over this country. The excuse seems to be that it has been
found impossible to make anything out of the Korean government or to
effect reforms. This is the merest subterfuge. No serious attempt has
been made to effect reforms, no one stands in the way of reforms, the
people have been waiting for them and hoping against hope that reforms
would be instituted, but so far as reforming this government for the
sake of the Korean people is concerned there are few signs of a desire
or determination to do so. Russia was severely blamed for making use of
corrupt officials to carry out her schemes in Korea but we find today
that Japanese are doing the very same thing in some parts of the country.
We do not believe the leading authorities in Japan are aware of all the
facts in the case and we cannot believe that they would countenance such
a close imitation of Russian methods. What is needed is that the facts
should be known. If they are known there are those who will attempt to
have the evils remedied.
Our attitude, and that of most foreigners in Korea, is one of admiration
of Japan’s wonderful ability and of earnest desire for the real welfare
of the people. We want to see Japan’s military and naval record equalled
by a wise and broad-minded solution of the Korean problem, a solution
that will secure to Japan all the legitimate fruits of victory and still
ensure to Koreans immunity from unjust reprisals.
A Visit to Quelpart.
There appeared in the Korean Repository in 1899 an interesting article on
the island of Quelpart by Rev. A. A. Pieters, one of the few foreigners
who have visited that place.
As a rule we hesitate to use our pages for the reproduction of material
once published, but we believe that comparatively few of the readers of
this REVIEW saw that article and the subject is such an interesting one
that we venture to reprint it here.
The island of Quelpart, or as Rev. W. E. Griffis, D.D. in his book on
Korea calls it—the Sicily of Korea, or as Koreans call it, Chai-joo, is
the largest island of the Korean archipelago and is situated south of
the peninsula at a distance of some fifty miles from the mainland. The
shape of the island is elliptical, and straight lines drawn between the
two farthest and two nearest points thro the center would be forty and
seventeen miles long. As you approach the island from the north at a
distance of twenty miles it looks like an isosceles, the two sides rising
at an angle of about seventeen degrees and only near the top turning a
little steeper—something like Namsan as you look at it from the north
gate of Seoul. The island rises gradually all round from the edges toward
the center where the foot of Mount Auckland, or Hal-la-san, is planted.
All over the island are scattered small conical hills, which look very
insignificant before the cloudy peak of Hal-la-san rising to the height
of 6,558 feet. The origin of the island is decidedly volcanic, the
mountain being most probably an extinct volcano. The flow of lava was
toward the north and south-southwest, the streams being, the first, some
twenty miles wide along the coast of the island and the second, some
thirty miles. Thus the lava covered two-fifths of the whole area of the
island. This part of it is very stony and very difficult to cultivate
and gigantic labor must have been spent in trying to clear the fields of
the innumerable stones. Often on a field of one acre there will be four
or five piles of stone eight or ten feet high. Another way of disposing
of these stones was to build walls between the fields, so that from the
top of one of the small hills the land seems to be covered with a large
irregular net. The other three-fifths of the island are almost free from
stones and the soil is black and rich. The mountain slopes gradually
towards the east and the west, but comes down abruptly in deep ravines
towards the south and especially towards the north.
On the top of the mountain there is a small, round lake and at the bottom
of one of the ravines another large lake. The first one is probably the
old crater filled with water from the melting snow. We were told that
ice lies on the top until June, altho the climate on the island is so
warm that cabbage grows all winter in the open air. When we were there,
towards the end of February, the grass in some places was four inches
high and on the southern coast flowers were blooming. In spite of that
a third of the mountain was covered with deep snow which would make all
attempts to climb to the top useless. All the mountains as well as the
hills to the east of it are covered with thick woods of oak. In these
forests deer, wild hogs, hares and other animals abound but there are no
tigers or bears. The hills that have no trees on them, are covered with
the peculiar short Korean grass which makes such fine lawns. This grass
is much prettier in Quelpart than anywhere on the mainland and often one
comes across natural lawns four or five hundred yards square, with not a
weed on them and all covered as with a heavy velvet carpet. The coast of
Quelpart is devoid of harbors or any shelters, rocky, and the numerous
small islands which are scattered so thickly all along the southern and
western coast of Korea are absent here.
This absence of shelter together with the constant strong winds makes
navigation very difficult.
One is surprised at the absence of streams and springs. On making our
trip around the island we came across only two streams, and that after a
whole week of rains. While there are some powerful springs in the city
of Chai-joo, in the other two magistracies there are no springs nor any
wells and the people have to use rain water gathered in artificial ponds.
Where the water from the melting show on the mountain goes is a mystery.
As I above mentioned there are three magistracies on the island: Chai-Joo
on the northern coast, the capital and the seat of the Governor (Mok-sa).
Tai-Chung on the southwest coast and Chung Ui in the east part of the
island. All the three cities are walled. Chai Joo counts some twelve
hundred houses, Tai-chung, four hundred, and Chung Ui three hundred. The
distance from Chai Joo to Tai Chung is ninety _li_, from there to Chung
Ui a hundred and thirty _li_, and from Chung Ui to Chai Joo seventy _li_.
Until the war the island belonged to Chul-lado: soon after the war it
was made independent, and again when Korea was divided into thirteen
provinces, Quelpart was put under the jurisdiction of the Governor
(Quan-chul-sa) of South Chul-la-do. On the whole island there are said
to be about a hundred villages and some hundred thousand people. These
figures are given by the Koreans and of course are probably not quite
true. All the villages lie either along the coast where the people can
raise some rice or at the foot and along the sides of the mountain where
fuel is plentiful and where Irish potatoes grow very well. The space
between the shore and the foot of the mountain is not populated and long
stretches of rich soil lie uncultivated. Only those woods and fields
that are near the towns and larger villages have owners. All the rest
of the island belongs to nobody and anyone may come and cut the trees
or cultivate the ground. An oxload of wood which a man has to bring on
his ox for ten or fifteen miles is sold in the cities for twelve cents.
Of the cereals raised on the island millet takes the first place, and
this is the main article of diet. Rice is a luxury and is eaten only by
well-to-do people in the cities. In the villages the people never use it.
This is on account of the scarceness of rice fields, of which there are
only a few along the coast. The little rice there is mostly brought from
the mainland. Besides millet, rice and Irish potatoes, the people raise
barley, wheat, buckwheat, beans, sweet potatoes, tobacco, vegetables
and a few other less important cereals. Of fruits peaches, oranges
and pomeloes are the only things that grow there. Of animal food the
islanders, like the people of the mainland, eat very little. It consists
of beef, horse and dog meat, pork, game, fish and pearl oysters. Crabs,
common oysters and all the different kinds of clams that are so plentiful
on the southern and western coast of Korea are absent in the Quelpart
waters. Owing to the rocky bottom of the sea very little, if any, net
fishing is done and the fish are mostly caught with hooks. For going out
into the sea to fish, boats are not employed. Instead of them people go
out on small rafts made of some ten short logs with a platform built a
foot above them to which an our is fastened. Instead of the tiny little
frames not more than eight inches long, used by the fisherman on the
mainland for fastening the string, the Quelpart fisherman uses regular
rods made of bamboo some twelve feet long, and lack of fish, clams, etc.,
is supplied by the abundance of pearl oysters and seaweed, which are both
used on the island and exported. The pearl oysters are very large some
measuring ten inches in diameter, and very fleshy. Unlike other oysters,
it has only one shell, which is often used by the Koreans as an ash tray
and from which mother of pearl is obtained. Covered with this shell as
with a roof the oyster lives fastened to a rock. Its meat is considered a
luxurious dish and one oyster costs as much as six cents on the island.
Pearls are but very seldom found in the oysters. For export the oysters
are torn out of the shell; the intestine bag cut off, the meat cleaned,
dried and strung on thin sticks. Altho white when fresh the color changes
to a dark red, like that of a dried apricot. They can be seen displayed
in the native grocery shops in Seoul, flat reddish disks about four
inches in diameter fastened by tens with a thin stick stuck thro them.
Of the seaweeds there are several different kinds: some of them are
used as fertilizers, some are used for food and some are sold to the
Japanese for making carbonate of soda. The first kind is gathered on the
seashore, but the other two have to be obtained from the bottom of the
sea. It is strange to say that the diving for these weeds as well as
for the pearl oysters is entirely done by women. Dressed in a kind of
bathing suit with a sickle in one hand and a gourd with bag tied to it
in front of them, they swim out from the shore as far as half a mile:
boats cannot be afforded and they dive, probably a depth of forty or
fifty feet, to the bottom, cut the weeds with the sickle, or if they
find a pearl oyster, tear it off from the stone, and then put it into
the bag which is kept floating by the gourd. They do not go back before
the bag is filled, which often takes more than half an hour. Altho they
are magnificent swimmers, one cannot help admiring their endurance, when
he thinks that this work is begun in February. Of late Japanese supplied
with diving apparatus, have been coming to Quelpart and catching all
the pearl oysters, so that the poor women have to be satisfied with the
weeds only. The magistrates told us that these Japanese never asked for
permission nor paid anything for catching the pearl oysters. If it is so,
the imposition upon the weak Koreans is surprising.
The Quelpart women not only dive for weeds and oysters but do the largest
part of all work. Even ox loads of grain are brought to the city market
for sale by women. The carrying of the water is done entirely by the
women, who have often to go a long distance to fetch it. For carrying
the water they use broad low pitchers set in a basket, which is fastened
with strings around the shoulders and carried on the back. I never saw
this done anywhere else in Korea as it is considered very disgraceful
for a woman to carry anything on her back. I was told by the Koreans
whom we had with us, that if on the mainland a man made his wife to do
so he would be driven out of the village. Native hats, hair bands and
skull-caps, which are extensively manufactured on the island are also
mostly made by women. In fact the women of Quelpart might be called the
Amazonians of Korea. They not only do all the work but greatly exceed
the men in number, and on the streets one meets three women to one man.
This is because so many men are away sailing. The women are more robust
and much better looking than their sisters on the mainland. As almost
everything is done by the women, there remains nothing else for the men
to do but to loaf, and to do them credit they do it well. Except for
a shop here and there in which a man is presiding with a long pipe in
his mouth, it is very difficult to find a man doing anything. For this,
however, they are not any better off, as all the islanders seem to be
strikingly poor. Not only the food, but the clothes and houses are much
worse than on the mainland. Dog skins are extensively used for making
clothes. Hats, the shape of a tea-cup, overcoats, leggings, like those
worn by the Chinese, and stockings are all made of dog skin with the
hair outside, which for greater warmth are used untanned. A suit of such
clothes is handed down from generation to generation, and the smell
of it is far from being sweet. The women’s clothes as well the men’s
trousers and shirts are made of native or Manchester sheeting. To make
the sheeting stronger they dip it into the juice pressed out of some kind
of a wild persimmon. This makes it a dirty brown color, which saves the
trouble of washing it. The cloth is thus worn until it falls to pieces.
Besides skin hats the men also use felt hats of the same shape as those
worn by the Seoul chair coolies, only much larger, the brims measuring
more than two feet in diameter. The one exception in respect of clothes
is made by the people in the magistracies who wear the same white clothes
and black hats as the people on the mainland.
The houses consist of one six foot room and an open kitchen. The walls,
ceiling and floor of the room are bare, and the floor has no flues for
heating it. Instead of this a large hole is dug in the floor of the
kitchen and in the cold weather a fire is kept there day and night.
Around this fire they eat, work, and sleep. This again is different in
the cities where the houses are much the same as on the mainland. All the
houses with a few exceptions are thatched. On account of the strong winds
the thatch is fastened by a net of straw ropes two inches thick and eight
inches apart.
The needs of the people for things outside of their own products seem to
be so small that a few shops supply them all. In the capital, Chai-Joo,
there are some eight small shops; in Tai-Chung one; and in Chung-Ui
perhaps one. These are probably the only shops on the whole island and
from them the people obtain the few needed foreign articles, such as
shirting, dyes, thread, needles, nails, etc. The periodical markets which
are held on the mainland and in all the towns and many villages every
five days, are altogether absent, and on the whole trading seems to be
yet in its infancy. The things exported from Quelpart are pearl oyster,
seaweed, native medicine, cosmetic oil, horse and cow hides, horses
and cattle. The cosmetic oil is pressed from the seeds of the fruit of
the _Ditnea Strawmium_ or, as the Koreans call it, _Tang Paik_. This
tree grows abundantly all over the southern part of the island. It is
evergreen and blooms in February with beautiful crimson flowers. On the
mainland this tree is very rare.
(TO BE CONTINUED.)
The Magic Ox-Cure.
A wealthy country gentleman, whom we will call Mr. Cho, tiring of the
_otium cum dignitate_ of provincial life and wishing to throw himself
into the vortex of official activity, came up to Seoul and became
the ante-room loafer and flatterer in general to one of the highest
dignitaries in the land. Morning and evening he inquired assiduously
after his patron’s health and backed up his words with frequent and
costly gifts. Of course this began to tell upon his finances and after
ten years of perseverance he received word from his family in the country
that he was bankrupt and that as his household were about to die of
starvation they must write and let him know.
This disclosure aroused Mr. Cho to violent anger against the official who
had so long accepted his gifts with complacency but had never suggested
any equivalent in the shape of a government position. He hurried to the
official’s house and explained that as his property was all gone be must
return to his shattered home and his starving family.
“Very well,” replied the official. “Of course you will consult your own
convenience.” This made Cho’s anger burn seven times hot. He stalked from
the room and posted to his country place vowing that he would find some
way to bring the unfeeling official to terms.
Arrived at his ancestral village he found that his family had given up
the spacious mansion he had formerly owned and were living, or rather
dying, in a wretched straw-thatched hovel. It was necessary to raise some
money, and so he started out for a distant town where his fourth cousin
lived, in order to negotiate a small loan.
As he was on his way he was overtaken by a severe storm. He looked all
about but could see no shelter anywhere. He struggled on, looking to
right and left through the pouring rain, and at last sighted a little
cottage among the trees. At the door he called out to the good-man of
the house but there was no reply. The house was not deserted, for he saw
a thin line of smoke issuing from the chimney. He shouted aloud and at
last an old woman appeared at the door and questioned who it was that
thus rudely demanded entrance, though uninvited. When the bedraggled Cho
explained the situation the woman relented and let him in. There was but
one stone-floored room but this she gave up to him with good grace and
went about preparing him a nice supper, after which he lay down and fell
asleep.
How long he had slept he could not tell, when he awoke with a start to
the sound of a man’s voice who was asking of the woman gruffly:
“What time is it, anyway? I must get off to market early with that ox”;
whereupon the couple entered Cho’s room, the man carrying four sticks
and the wife a halter. The farmer dragged the bedclothes off the guest,
bestrode his chest and began to belabor him with the sticks, while the
woman fastened the halter around his neck. He was then dragged out of the
room, but to his horror he found himself going on four legs and when he
tried to speak he could only low like an ox. When one of his horns caught
against the door-post he learned that he had indeed been transformed into
a four-footed beast and was being taken to market. To say that he was
experiencing a new sensation would be to put it very mildly indeed.
At the market town he was herded with a drove of cattle, among which
he was the largest and fattest, and consequently there were many eager
buyers; but the farmer asked such a high price that none of them could
buy. At last a burly butcher came to terms with the farmer and poor Mr.
Cho found that he was being led away to slaughter.
But as fate would have it, the butcher was of a bibulous temperament
and when they came to a wine shop the ox was tied to a stake while the
butcher indulged in the flowing bowl. And so copiously did the latter
drink that he forgot all about the animal. Mr. Cho stood waiting for
hours but his master did not appear. Just over the hedge to the right
was a field of succulent turnips. To the bovine nostrils of Mr. Cho this
proved as tempting as the wine had proved to the butcher.
Mr. Cho had a ring through his nose which was very awkward but at last
he managed to get loose from the stake and, crowding through the hedge,
he pulled a turnip and began to munch it. After the first bite a curious
sensation overtook him and he began to have an over-mastering desire to
stand on his hind legs only. A thrill went through him from tail to horns
and in another instant he found himself an ox no longer but the same
old two-legged Cho as of old. This was eminently satisfactory and the
satisfaction was doubled when, coming through the hedge into the road,
a befuddled butcher asked him if he had seen a loose ox anywhere. He
assured the purveyor of beef that he had not, and walked away toward home
pondering upon this rather unusual occurrence.
Suddenly he stood stock still in the road, uttered an exclamation of
triumph, slapped his thigh and hurried forward with his mind evidently
made up.
“Sticks and turnips! Sticks and turnips!” he repeated over and over again
as if it were a magic formula. He kept straight on till night overtook
him near the very house which had witnessed his metamorphosis. He called
out again as before and was similarly received, but instead of sleeping,
he arose in the night and sneaked about the premises until he found and
secured the four sticks with which the work had been done. He followed
this larceny with a silent and speedy departure, not toward his home but
toward Seoul, still muttering in his beard,
“Sticks and turnips! Sticks and turnips!”
Of course he knew the ins and outs of the official’s house which he had
haunted for ten long fruitless years, and as it was summer time and
very hot all the windows were open. So he had no difficulty in marking
down his prey. He found him sleeping profoundly. Cho knelt beside the
recumbent form and taking only two of the sticks began tapping very
gently upon the sleeper, but not hard enough to awaken him. By the dim
light of the moon he soon saw two horns grow out of the sleeper’s head
and his two hands gradually turn into hoofs. This was enough. He arrested
the operation at this point and silently departed.
When morning came there were hurryings to and fro and whispered
consultations in that high official’s house. A celebrated physician came
hurrying up in his two man chair and disappeared within the house. On a
distant hill a devil shrine awoke to life at the howlings and twistings
of a _mudang_ who was begging the imps in frenzied terms to lift their
heavy hands from the person of a high official.
But there was no relief. The great man sat there dumb as a brute with two
great horns protruding from his forehead and his two hands turned into
horny hoofs.
At this juncture Mr. Cho appeared upon the scene, announcing that he had
just come from the country, and when told of the terrible affliction of
his former patron expressed the utmost concern. Admitted to the chamber
of the official he inquired what had been done for him. He learned that
physicians had exhausted their skill and that, at the instance of the
lady of the house, _mudangs_ had done their best but all to no avail.