A terrific struggle followed, as a result of which Grossetti

ILLUSTRATED MICHELIN GUIDES

TO THE BATTLE-FIELDS.

BATTLE-FIELDS

OF

THE MARNE

1914

[Illustration]

Published:

in FRANCE; by +MICHELIN & Cⁱᵉ.+, Clermont-Ferrand.

in ENGLAND; by +MICHELIN TYRE Cº Lᵗᵈ.+,

81 Fulham Road, London, S.W.

in the U.S.A.; by +MICHELIN TIRE Cº+,

Milltown, New Jersey.

_For all Information and Advice_--

MOTORISTS MAY APPLY

TO THE 'BUREAU DE TOURISME MICHELIN'

99, Boulevard Pereire--PARIS

* * * * *

Hotels and Motor-agents.

[** 5 hotels symbol]Palatial and luxuriously appointed hotels.

[** 4 hotels symbol]Well-appointed, first-class hotels.

[** 3 hotels symbol]Comfortable hotels with modern improvements.

[** 2 hotels symbol]Well-managed hotels with good accommodation.

[** 1 hotel symbol]Hotels with good service for luncheon and dinner.

[** small hotel symbol]Small hotels or inns where good meals are

provided.

Compressed Air Depôt for 'bouteilles d'air Michelin' for inflation

of tyres.

[** wrench symbol] Repair shop.

_Agt de_ Manufacturer's Agent.

[** 3 symbol] Garage showing car capacity.

[** pit symbol] Repair Pit.

[** electric symbol] Electric installation for recharging accumulators.

[** phone symbol] 104 Telephone number.

[** telegraph symbol] Telegraphic address.

=MEAUX= (Seine-et-Marne).

[** 2 hotels symbol] de la Sirène, _34 r. St-Nicolas_. Ⓑ(wc) Gar

[** 3 symbol] Shed [** 5 symbol] [** telegraph symbol] Sirène [**

phone symbol] 83.

[** 1 hotel symbol] des Trois-Rois, _1 r. des Ursulines and 30 r.

St-Rémy_. (wc) Shed [** 4 symbol] Inner courtyard [** 10 symbol]

[** phone symbol] 146.

[** wrench symbol] =MICHELIN STOCK (Compressed Air) Garage Central

(A. Feillée)=, _17-21 r. du Grand-Cerf_. _Agt. de_: +Panhard+,

+Renault+, +de Dion+. [** 30 symbol] [** pit symbol] G Petrol

Depôt [** phone symbol] 59.

-- =MICHELIN STOCK Auto-Garage de Meaux (E. Vance)=, _55-57 pl. du

Marché_. _Agt de_: +Delahaye+. [** 20 symbol] [** pit symbol] G

[** electric symbol] [** phone symbol] 84.

=SENLIS= (Oise).

[** 3 hotels symbol] du Grand-Cerf, _47 r. de la République_.

Central heating [** dial symbol] Ⓑ (wc) Inner coach-house [** 6

symbol] [** pit symbol] [** telegraph symbol] Grandcerf [** phone

symbol] 111.

[** 1 hotel symbol] des Arènes, _30 r. de Beauvais_. (wc) Inner

coach-house [** 7 symbol] ott [** phone symbol] 17.

[** wrench symbol] =MICHELIN STOCK Guinot=, _8 pl. de la Halle_.

_Stock_: +de Dion+. _Agt de_: +Peugeot+. [** 3 symbol] [** pit

symbol] [** phone symbol] 46.

-- =MICHELIN STOCK L. Buat and A. Rémond=, _2 r. de Crépy_. _Agts

de_: +Panhard+, +Renault+, +Cottin-Desgouttes+, +Delahaye+,

+Rochet-Schneider+, +Mors+. [** 10 symbol] [** pit symbol] G [**

electric symbol] [** phone symbol] 38.

=CHANTILLY= (Oise).

[** 4 hotels symbol] du Grand-Condé, _av. de la Gare_. Closed

in 1917. Asc Central heating [** dial symbol] Ⓑ (wc) Gar [** 50

symbol] [** pit symbol] [** phone symbol] 52.

[** 3 hotels symbol] d'Angleterre, _r. de Paris and pl. de

l'Hôpital_. [** dial symbol] Ⓑ (wc) Inner shed [** 8 symbol] [**

phone symbol] 59.

[** 3 hotels symbol] Noguey's Family Hotel, _10 av. de la Gare_.

[** dial symbol] Ⓑ (wc) Inner coach-house [** 5 symbol] [** phone

symbol] 146.

[** wrench symbol] =MICHELIN STOCK Grigaut=, _72 r. du Connétable_.

[** phone symbol] 1.14.

-- =MICHELIN STOCK Garage Bourdeau=, _1 bis r. de Gouvieux_. [** 6

symbol] [** pit symbol] G [** electric symbol] [** phone symbol]

1.90.

=COULOMMIERS= (Seine-et-Marne).

[** 1 hotel symbol] du Soleil-Levant, _62 r. de Melun_. Central

heating, Inner coach-house [** 3 symbol] courtyard [** 15 symbol]

[** phone symbol] 22.

[** 1 hotel symbol] de l'Ours, _r. de Melun_. Central heating.

Inner coach-house [** 3 symbol] courtyard [** 10 symbol] [**

phone symbol] 27.

[** wrench symbol] =MICHELIN STOCK Doupé-Lejeune=, _42 r. de

Paris_. _Agt de_: +Panhard+, +Delage+, +Darracq+. [** 10 symbol]

[** pit symbol] Petrol Depôt [** electric symbol] [** phone

symbol] 92.

-- =Gautier=, _6 av. de la Ferté-sous-Jouarre_. _Agt de_:

+Peugeot+, +Vinot-Deguingand+, +de Dion+. [** 4 symbol] [** pit

symbol] Petrol Depôt [** phone symbol] 1.19.

-- =P. Fritsch=, _51 av. de Strasbourg_. _Agt de_: +Brasier+, +Le

Zèbre+. [** 6 symbol] [** pit symbol] Petrol Depôt.

-- =Purson=, cycles, _1 r. de Melun_. _Agt de_: +Clément-Bayard+.

[** 2 symbol] [** pit symbol] Petrol Depôt.

-- =A. Gontier=, cycles, _Le Martroy_.

-- =Doupé-Boucher=, cycles, _1 r. de la Ferté-sous-Jouarre_. Petrol

Depôt.

'OFFICE NATIONAL DU TOURISME'

_17, Rue de Surène, PARIS (VIIIᵉ)_

The 'Office National du Tourisme' was created by an Act of April 8,

1910, and reorganised in 1917. It enjoys civil privileges and financial

autonomy.

It is directed by an administrative council chosen by the Minister of

Public Works.

Its mission is to seek out every means of developing travel; to urge

and, if necessary, to take any measure capable of ameliorating the

condition of the transport, circulation and sojourn of tourists.

It co-ordinates the efforts of touring societies and industries,

encourages them in the execution of their programmes and stimulates

legislative and administrative initiative with regard to the

development of travel in France.

It promotes understanding between the public services, the great

transport companies, the 'Syndicats d'Initiative' and the 'Syndicats

Professionnels.'

It organises propaganda in foreign countries; and arranges for the

creation of travel enquiry offices in France and abroad, with a view

to making known the scenery and monuments of France as well as the

health-giving powers of French mineral waters, spas and bathing places.

* * * * *

ALL ENQUIRIES WITH REGARD TO TRAVELLING

SHOULD BE ADDRESSED

TO THE 'TOURING-CLUB DE FRANCE'

65, Avenue de la Grande Armée, 65

PARIS

'THE TOURING-CLUB DE FRANCE'

ADVANTAGES OF MEMBERSHIP

The 'Touring-Club de France' (founded in 1890), is at the present time

the largest touring association in the world. Its principal aim is

to introduce France--one of the loveliest countries on earth--to the

French people themselves and to tourists of other nations.

It seeks to develop travel in all its forms: on foot, horseback,

bicycle, in carriage, motor, yacht or railway, and, eventually, by

aeroplane.

Every member of the association receives a badge and an identity

ticket, free of charge, and also the 'Revue Mensuelle' every month.

Members have the benefit also of special prices in a certain number

of affiliated hotels; and this advantage holds good in the purchasing

of guide-books and Staff (Etat-major) maps, as well as those of the

'Ministère de l'Intérieur,' the T.C.F., etc. They may insert notices

regarding the sale or purchase of travelling requisites, in the 'Revue'

(1 fr. per line). The 'Comité de Contentieux' is ready to give them

council with regard to travelling, and 3,000 delegates in all the

principal towns are retained to give advice and information about

the curiosities of art or of nature of the neighbourhood, as well as

concerning the roads, hotels, motor-agents, garages, etc.

Members are accorded free passages across the frontier for a bicycle

or motor-bicycle. For a motor-car the association gives a 'Triptyque'

ensuring free passage through the 'douane,' etc.

* * * * *

TO TOUR FRANCE IN COMFORT JOIN

THE 'TOURING-CLUB DE FRANCE'

+-----------------------------------------------------------------+

| |

| IN MEMORY OF THE MICHELIN EMPLOYEES AND WORKMEN WHO DIED |

| GLORIOUSLY FOR THEIR COUNTRY. |

| |

+-----------------------------------------------------------------+

THE MARNE

BATTLE-FIELDS

(1914)

[Illustration: JOFFRE

Commander-in-chief of the French Army]

Copyright 1919 by Michelin & Cie.

_All rights of translation, adaptation, or reproduction

(in part or whole) reserved in all countries._

FOREWORD

_For the benefit of tourists who wish to visit the battlefields and

mutilated towns of France we have tried to produce a work combining a

practical guide with a history._

_Such a visit should be a pilgrimage, not merely a journey across a

ravaged land. Seeing is not enough, one must understand: a ruin is more

moving when one knows what has caused it; a stretch of country which

might seem dull and uninteresting to the unenlightened eye, becomes

transformed at the thought of the battles which have raged there._

_We have, therefore, prefaced the description of our journeys by a

short account of the events which took place in the vicinity, and we

have done our best to make this account quite clear by the use of many

illustrations and maps._

_In the course of the description we give a brief military commentary

on the numerous views and panoramas contained in the book._

_When we come across a place that is interesting either from an

archæological or an artistic point of view, there we halt, even though

the war has passed it by; that the tourist may realise it was to

preserve intact this heritage of history and beauty that so many of our

heroes have fallen._

_Our readers will not find any attempt at literary effect in these

pages; the truth is too beautiful and tragic to be altered for the sake

of embellishing the story. We have, therefore, after carefully sifting

the great volume of evidence available, selected only that obtained

from official documents or from reliable eye-witnesses._

_This book was written before the end of the war, even then the

country over which it leads the reader had long been freed. The wealth

of illustration in this work allows the intending tourist to make a

preliminary trip in imagination, until such time as circumstances

permit of his undertaking a journey in reality beneath the sunny skies

of France._

HISTORICAL PART

IMPORTANT NOTE.--On pages 4 to 16 will be found a brief summarized

account of the Battle of the Marne and of the events which immediately

preceded it. We recommend the reading of these few pages attentively,

and the consultation of the maps annexed to the same, before reading

the descriptive part which commences at page 17.

A clear understanding of the action as a whole is absolutely necessary

to comprehend with interest the description of the separate combats.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

(1914)]

The above map gives a general view of the ground on which took place

successively: the battle of the frontier, the retreat of the Allies,

the victorious stand, and the pursuit of the retreating enemy.

The distance from Paris to Verdun is 140 miles as the crow flies; from

Charleroi to the Marne is 97 miles.

In consequence of the tearing up of that fateful "scrap of paper"

which preceded the invasion of Belgium by Germany, in violation of

the common rights of man, the Battle of the Frontier (also called

the Battle of Charleroi) was fought in August 1914 on the line

Mons--Charleroi--Dinant--Saint-Hubert--Longwy--Metz.

[Illustration: MAUNOURY]

On August 22, 1914, and the two succeeding days this Allied

offensive failed at Charleroi, in consequence of which the French

Commander-in-chief, General Joffre, broke off contact with the enemy

and ordered a general retreat.

It was impossible to do otherwise as the enemy forces were greatly

superior in numbers. Moreover, they were well equipped with powerful

artillery and machine-guns, whereas the Franco-British forces were

short of both. Lastly, the German soldier had long been trained in

trench warfare, whereas the Allies had yet to learn this art.

To help in readjusting the balance between the opposing forces, Joffre

fell back in the direction of the French reserves.

The respite thus afforded was utilized to re-arrange the commands, and

to train the reserves in the form of warfare adopted by the Germans.

Meanwhile, the latter greatly extended their line of communications and

more or less tired themselves.

Then began that heroic retreat, without precedent in history, which

attained a depth of 122 miles, and in the course of which the Allied

soldiers, though already fatigued, marched as much as thirty miles a

day facing about from time to time and counter-attacking fiercely,

often with success.

The Germans followed in pursuit, overrunning the country like a plague

of locusts. Using their left wing as a pivot, their right undertook a

vast turning movement taking in Valenciennes, Cambrai, Péronne, and

Amiens.

By August 27 Joffre had fixed up a plan according to which the

offensive was to be taken again at the first favourable opportunity. In

view of the execution of this plan an important mass of troops, under

the orders of General Maunoury, was formed on the French left.

General Maunoury's task was to outflank at a given moment the German

right wing while, at the same time, a general attack, or at least

unflinching resistance, was to be made along the rest of the front.

This was the Allies' reply to the turning movement of the German

general Von Kluck.

A first line of resistance offered itself on the River Somme, where

fierce fighting took place. It was, however, realized that the

battle front could not be reformed there successfully. Joffre wanted

a flanking position not only for his left wing, but also for his

right, which the Somme line did not offer. He therefore continued the

withdrawal of the whole front towards the River Marne and Paris.

On September 3 German cavalry patrols were signalled at Ecouen, only

eight miles from the gates of Paris. The inhabitants of the latter

were asking themselves anxiously whether they, too, would not have

to face the horrors of a German occupation. The suspense was cruel.

Fortunately, a great man, General Gallieni, was silently watching over

their destinies.

This great soldier had just been made Military Governor of Paris, with

General Maunoury's Army, mentioned a moment ago, under his orders.

The entrenched camp of Paris and this army were, in turn, under the

authority of the French Commander-in-Chief, Joffre, who thus had full

liberty of action from Paris to Verdun.

On September 3 General Gallieni issued his stirring proclamation which

put soldiers and civilians alike on their mettle:

"_Armies of Paris, Inhabitants of Paris, the Government of the Republic

has left Paris to give a new impulse to the National Defence. I have

received orders to defend Paris against invasion. I shall do this to

the end._"

The temptation to push straight on to the long-coveted capital must

have been very great for the German High Command. However, in view of

the danger presented by the Franco-British forces, which were still

unbroken, it was eventually decided first to crush the Allied armies,

and then to march on Paris, which would fall like 'a ripe pear.'

[Illustration: GALLIENI]

Seemingly ignorant of Maunoury's existence, Von Kluck's Army slanted

off eastwards in pursuit of the British force, which it had received

orders from the Kaiser to exterminate and which it had been harrying

incessantly during its retreat from the Belgian frontier.

There will be heated arguments for many years to come as to whether the

German High Command was right or wrong in giving up the direct advance

on Paris, but whatever the consensus of expert opinion on the point

may eventually be, one thing is certain--Von Kluck did not expect the

furious attack by the Army of Paris, which followed.

Later, he declared: "There was only one general who, against all rules,

would have dared to carry the fight so far from his base. Unluckily for

me, that man was Gallieni."

On September 3, thanks to the Flying Corps, General Gallieni learned

of the change of direction taken by Von Kluck's Army. Realising the

possibilities which this offered, he suggested a flank attack by the

Army of Paris. As previously mentioned, such an attack formed part of

Joffre's general plan, matured on August 27. It was, however, necessary

that the attack should be not merely a local and temporary success,

as would have been the case on the Somme line for instance, where the

remainder of the front was not in a favourable position for resistance,

or attack.

On September 4, after conferring with General Gallieni, Joffre decided

that conditions were favourable for a new offensive, and fixed upon

September 6 as the date on which the decisive battle should be begun

along the whole front.

[Illustration]

SEPTEMBER 5, 1914

[Illustration: VON KLUCK]

The map before you shows the respective positions occupied by the

opposing armies on September 5, 1914, the eve of the great battle.

The Allied forces are represented by a thick black line, those of the

Germans by a black and white line.

Joffre directed the operations first from Bar-sur-Aube and afterwards

from Romilly.

As you see, the half-circle formed by the Allies, into which the

Germans imprudently penetrated, was supported at the western extremity

by the entrenched camp of Paris and at the eastern extremity by the

fortified position of Verdun. The River Marne flows through the middle.

Although the battle was only to begin on the 6th, General Maunoury's

Army was already engaged the day before. Its orders were to advance to

the River Ourcq (see map), but, despite furious fighting, it was unable

to get there.

The British forces were to occupy a line running north and south,

with Coulommiers as point of support. Unfortunately, the exceedingly

fatiguing retreat it had just accomplished, retarded the execution of

the necessary _volte-face_. The map shows them on the 5th, still far to

the south of Coulommiers.

The fact that neither of these two forces was able to take up its

assigned position greatly increased the difficulties of the turning

movement planned by Joffre.

In front of the forces under Maunoury and French, were the right and

centre of the First German Army, under Von Kluck.

The Fifth French Army, under General Franchet d'Esperey, whose position

extended from the north of Provins to Sézanne, delivered a frontal

attack against the left wing of Von Kluck's army and the right wing of

the Second German army under Von Bulow.

At the right of Franchet d'Esperey's army was the Ninth French Army

under General Foch, whose task it was to cover his neighbour on the

left by holding the issues south of the Marshes of St.-Gond.

Opposing Foch was the left of Von Bulow's army, with the right of the

Third German Army commanded by Von Hausen.

The Fourth French Army, under General Langle de Cary, was minus two

army corps which had helped to form Foch's army. This diminution of

the forces of the Fourth Army prevented the latter from breaking off

contact with the enemy. While, at the extreme left, General Maunoury

had already begun his advance towards the River Ourcq, General Langle

de Cary received orders to hold up the opposing forces under the

Duke of Wurtemberg. Unfortunately, Langle de Cary's forces had not

sufficient liberty of movement to effect the necessary _volte-face_.

At the extreme right of the Allied front was the Third French Army,

under General Sarrail, established in a position extending from

the north-east of Revigny to Verdun, with a reserve group to the

west of Saint-Mihiel, to be moved either east or west, according to

circumstances.

The forces opposing General Sarrail were commanded by the future

"War-Lord": the Crown Prince.

While the French were preparing to thrust back the invader, "War Lord

the Second," drunk with victory, ordered the pursuit to be continued as

far as the line Dijon--Besançon--Belfort: triumphal dreams destined to

give place first to surprise, then to uncertainty, and finally to the

bitterness of defeat.

Posterity will compare this arrogant order of the Crown Prince's with

the stirring proclamation which Joffre caused to be made known to the

whole of the French army on the eve of the great battle:

[Illustration: FRENCH]

[Illustration: DOUGLAS HAIG]

"_On the eve of the battle, on which the future of our country depends,

it is important to remind all that there must be no looking back. Every

effort mast be made to attack and drive back the enemy. Troops which

can no longer advance must at all costs keep the ground they have won,

and die rather than fall back. Under present circumstances no weakness

can be tolerated._"

SEPTEMBER 6, 1914

On this and the succeeding maps, the Allied positions of the previous

evening and at the end of the next day are shown.

The German positions are not shown, as too many lines might create

confusion in reading the maps.

Maunoury's Army effected an advance of about six miles, but his

left was unable to accomplish its task, which was to outflank the

German right. Von Kluck who, till then, seeming to ignore Maunoury

had concentrated all his efforts against the British and Franchet

d'Esperey's Army, now perceived this manœuvre. With the promptitude and

audacity which particularly marked his character, he completely changed

his plans and rounded on Maunoury. Taking advantage of the state of

extreme fatigue of the British forces, Von Kluck withdrew one of the

army corps which were facing them and despatched it by forced marches

to the help of his right wing. It was these unexpected reinforcements

which enabled Von Kluck to hold up Maunoury's left.

On this day the British army finally recovered itself, and reached a

line running from the north-west to the south-east of Coulommiers.

[Illustration]

[Illustration: FRANCHET D'ESPEREY]

The armies of Generals Franchet d'Esperey and Foch fought with great

stubbornness. The former wrested several dominating positions from

the Germans and approached Esternay, but the latter was able only to

maintain himself on the line of resistance assigned to him south of the

Marshes of Saint-Gond.

General Langle de Cary was eventually able to hold up the bulk of the

troops under the Duke of Wurtemberg on positions extending from the

south-west of Vitry-le-François to Revigny.

The general plan of operations included an attack by the Third Army,

under General Sarrail, against the German left wing, such attack to

coincide with that of General Maunoury at the other end of the line.

This was, however, anticipated by the Germans who, under the Crown

Prince, and in far greater numbers, forced back Sarrail's left and

prevented all progress on his right.

SEPTEMBER 7, 1914

On September 7, Maunoury's army began to feel the effects of the German

heavy artillery, established out of range of the French 75's, and could

advance but very slowly.

However, at the end of the day, Maunoury still hoped to be able to

outflank the German right. Meanwhile, Von Kluck continued his risky

manœuvre, and detached a second army corps from the forces opposed to

the British, adding it to his right. Each was endeavouring to outflank

the other.

Fronting the British, there was now only a thin curtain of troops taken

from two of the German army corps opposed to Franchet d'Esperey.

This small force fought with great stubbornness, in order, if possible,

to give Von Kluck time to crush Maunoury, before the advance by the

British and Franchet d'Esperey could become really dangerous.

[Illustration]

[Illustration: VON BULOW]

The slow progress effected in the British sector is explained by the

extreme fierceness of the struggle.

General Franchet d'Esperey took advantage of the reduction of the

forces opposed to him. Vigorously pushing back the latter, he continued

his advance northwards, eventually reaching and crossing the River

Grand Morin.

This advance helped to lessen the effects of the furious attacks that

the Germans were then making against General Foch's army.

In front of the latter, Von Bulow, whose armies were still intact,

realised the danger which threatened Von Kluck, and, in order to avert

it, endeavoured to pierce the French front. He concentrated the whole

of his efforts against the 42nd Division, under General Grossetti,

whose arduous mission it was to maintain the connection between the

Fifth and Ninth Armies, under Franchet d'Esperey and Foch respectively.

A terrific struggle followed, as a result of which Grossetti was forced

to fall back. Fortunately, as we have just seen, the right of Franchet

d'Esperey's Army was able, thanks to its advance, to come to the rescue

and prevent the French front from being pierced.

Before Von Hausen, the whole line fell back slightly.

Meanwhile, the Duke of Wurtemberg and the Crown Prince attacked

fiercely at the junction of the Fourth and Third French Armies under

Langle de Cary and Sarrail respectively.

The aim of the attack was to separate these two armies and force what

is known as the _Revigny Pass_. The latter is a hollow through which

flow the Rivers Ornain and Saulx, and the canal from the Marne to the

Rhine.

While the Germans under the Duke of Wurtemberg attacked the right of

Langle de Cary's army, in the direction of Saint-Dizier, the Crown

Prince sought to drive back General Sarrail's left towards Bar-le-Duc.

The resistance of Langle de Cary's army began to weaken under the

weight of the greater opposing forces. On the other hand, General

Sarrail's army reinforced by an army corps sent by Joffre stood firm.

At this juncture General Sarrail learned that the Germans were getting

very active in his rear, on the heights above the River Meuse, and was

accordingly obliged to make dispositions to avoid being surprised by

German forces who were preparing to cross the river.

SEPTEMBER 8, 1914

During the night of September 7-8 Gallieni, who had been following

carefully the different phases of the battle, despatched a division

from Paris, in all haste, to Maunoury's left to assist in turning the

German right.

To do this with maximum rapidity, Gallieni made use of an ingenious

expedient, "a civilian's idea," as he termed it. He commandeered all

the taxicabs in Paris. Those running in the streets were held up by the

police, and the occupants made to alight. When the latter learned the

reason, instead of grumbling, they gave a rousing cheer. Eleven hundred

taxis made the journey twice during the night from Paris to the front

transporting, in all, eleven thousand men.

Unfortunately, the effect of these reinforcements was fully

counterbalanced by the troops which Von Kluck had brought up on the

two previous days from before the British front, and only the extreme

tenacity and courage of his troops enabled Maunoury to avoid being

outflanked.

However, Von Kluck could not with impunity reduce his forces opposed to

the British. The latter pulled themselves together, crossed the Petit

Morin river and reached La Ferté-sous-Jouarre.

The danger feared by the German generals became apparent.

[Illustration: FOCH]

[Illustration: VON HAUSEN]

On this day of September 8, a German officer wrote in his notebook:

"_Caught sight of Von Kluck. His eyes usually so bright, were dull. He,

who was wont to be so alert, spoke in dejected tones. He was absolutely

depressed._"

At the right of the British army, General Franchet d'Esperey continued

his rapid advance and occupied the outskirts of Montmirail.

Moreover, his troops co-operated efficiently in helping to check the

violent attacks of Von Bulow's army against Grossetti's division.

The Germans became more and more anxious, and rightly so, at the turn

events were taking on their right where Von Kluck's army was beginning

to be tightly squeezed between the armies of General Maunoury, the

British and General Franchet d'Esperey. Von Kluck was forced to retreat

and, in doing so, left exposed Von Bulow's army. The armies of Von

Bulow and Von Hausen received orders to crush Foch and break through

the French centre at all costs, so as to be able to turn Franchet

d'Esperey's army on the west, and that of Langle de Cary on the east.

The position was this: If the manœuvre succeeded, Joffre's entire

plan would fall to pieces. If, on the other hand, it failed a general

retreat on the part of the Germans would be inevitable.

Foch's army received a terrible blow. It was forced back in the

centre, and almost pierced on the right. However, Foch in no wise lost

confidence, but pronounced the situation to be 'excellent.' The fact

was, he clearly realised that these furious attacks were dictated

by the desperate position in which the Germans found themselves. He

rallied his troops, hurled them again against the Germans, but was

unable to win back the ground which he had just lost.

[Illustration]

[Illustration: DE LANGLE DE CARY]

Von Hausen's fierce thrust also made itself felt on Langle de Gary's

left; the connection between the latter's army and Foch's was in great

danger of being severed, and could only be maintained by the rapid

displacement of troops, and by the intervention of a new army corps

despatched by Joffre just in time to restore the balance.

While Von Hausen was striking on the left, the Duke of Wurtemberg

brought all his weight to bear on Langle de Cary's right, with the

Crown Prince executing a similar manœuvre against Sarrail's left.

The German plan was still the same, viz., to separate the two armies

and, if possible, isolate Sarrail's army, so that the latter, attacked

at the same time in the rear on the heights above the Meuse, where the

Germans had begun to bombard the fort of Troyon, would find itself

encircled and be forced to surrender.

SEPTEMBER 9, 1914

On September 9, the battle reached its culminating point along the

whole front.

Under pressure from the right wing of Maunoury's army, and before

the menacing advance of the British forces which had reached

Château-Thierry, the Germans were obliged to withdraw from both banks

of the River Ourcq.

In order to make this retreat easier along the banks of the Ourcq Von

Kluck, at the end of the day, caused an extremely fierce attack to be

made against the French left, which bent beneath the shock and was

almost turned.

At that time, the situation was truly extraordinary: the Germans were

already retreating, while the French, stunned by the blow they had just

received, were in anxious doubt whether the morrow would not bring them

disaster.

The struggle seemed so hopeless, that orders were asked for, in view

of a possible retreat on Paris. However, General Gallieni refused to

consider this possibility and, faithful to Joffre's instructions, gave

orders to "_die rather than give way_." Maunoury's left continued

therefore its heroic resistance.

[Illustration]

[Illustration: GROSSETTI]

Von Kluck's retreat along the Ourcq left Von Bulow's army completely

unprotected, and he was, in turn, obliged to give way before Franchet

d'Esperey's left.

The latter continued to co-operate actively in the heroic resistance of

the French centre, by taking in the flank the enemy forces which were

furiously attacking Foch. This general became the objective of the last

and most furious attacks of Von Bulow and Von Hausen who, realizing

that should they fail they would be forced to continue the retreat

begun on their right, decided to make one more attempt to crush in the

French centre.

They very nearly succeeded; all along the line, the French were forced

to fall back, and the southern boundary of the Marshes of Saint-Gond

was entirely abandoned.

The position, to the east of Sézanne, seemed hopeless. It was there

that the loss of ground was most dangerous, and it is perhaps necessary

to explain in detail this critical phase of the battle.

On the large-scale map below is shown the position of Foch's left and

centre on September 8 and 9.

It was in the region of Villeneuve and Soisy that General Grossetti's

Division had fought so heroically for four days. Absolutely decimated,

it was replaced on the morning of the 9th by one of the neighbouring

army corps under Franchet d'Esperey. This corps advanced during the

day but, further to the right, the Germans forced back the French from

the Woods of Botrait and from the crest of the Poirier, capturing the

heights of Mondement.

Mondement is situated on a narrow plateau, the last counterfort before

reaching the vast plain of the Aube. On the opposite side of this

plateau are to be seen the villages of Allemant and Broyes.

[Illustration]

If the Germans, in possession of Mondement, had succeeded in reaching

these two villages on the day of the 9th, they would have attacked in

the rear those forces under Foch which were fighting in the plain.

Mondement had, therefore, to be held at all costs. Thus the battle

pivoted on this axis. In accordance with Foch's instructions, the

Moroccan Division under General Humbert, was placed there and, with the

help of the 77th Infantry, not only held its ground but, recapturing

the castle during the day, forced the Germans back on the Marshes in

the evening.

At the foot of the villages of Allemant and Broyes, the vast plain of

the Aube spreads itself out, and it was there that things were going

badly with Foch, the loss of ground being serious. The colonials

under General Humbert, who were hanging on grimly to the Plateau of

Mondement, could see their comrades on the right falling back as far

as Mount Chalmont, while the enemy fire reached successively Linthes

and Pleurs.

[Illustration: ALB. VON WURTEMBERG]

If the centre had given way completely, the defenders of Mondement

would have been taken in the rear, and obliged to abandon the plateau.

In other words, it would have meant complete defeat.

To avert this terrible danger, Foch had only Grossetti's Division

which, as mentioned a few moments ago, had been decimated by four days

of the fiercest fighting, and which he had that morning taken from his

left wing and sent to the rear to rest.

Foch recalled this division, and hurled it against the most critical

point of his line between Linthes and Pleurs. He hoped it would be in a

position to attack about noon, but at three in the afternoon it had not

yet been reformed. These were hours of mortal suspense along the whole

front.

General Grossetti needed all his energy to reform the scattered units

of his division, and his men, who were on their way to the rear to

rest, when they were again ordered into the thick of the battle, had

need of superhuman courage to carry out the long fatiguing flank march

of twelve miles, which was to bring them that afternoon to Foch's

centre.

Finally, at about four in the afternoon, Grossetti appeared on the

scene and the situation rapidly changed.

With what feelings of intense relief the defenders of Mondement must

have seen Grossetti's men moving eastwards to the attack and driving

the Germans back again behind Mount Chalmont. The enemy was literally

demoralized by this unexpected arrival of reinforcements.

The objective of Grossetti's attack was the junction of the armies of

Von Bulow and Von Hausen, viz.: the weakest point of the German front.

The German generals had at that time nothing with which to counter this

last effort of Foch's, and, realising that the battle was indeed lost,

began to make preparations for retreat.

[Illustration]

Just as Franchet d'Esperey had supported Foch energetically on his

left, so, throughout this fateful day, Langle de Cary helped him not

less effectually on his right, where he violently attacked Von Hausen.

However, in the centre and on the right, the troops of Langle de Cary

could not do more than hold their ground against the furious attacks of

the Duke of Wurtemberg's army.

[Illustration: SARRAIL]

[Illustration: CROWN PRINCE]

Sarrail, in turn, supported Langle de Cary, by operating with his

left against the flank of the German forces, which were pressing that

commander. Meanwhile, his right was in a critical position, owing to

the operations in his rear by German forces on the heights above the

Meuse. In spite of the danger, and although he had been authorized

by the commander-in-chief to withdraw his right so as to escape this

menace, Sarrail clung with dogged tenacity to Verdun: he would not

abandon his position, so long as the Meuse had not been crossed, and

while there was still the slightest hope of being able to hold out.

SEPTEMBER 10 to 13, 1914

The morning of the 10th witnessed a theatrical change of scene on the

French left, where it will be remembered Maunoury's army was in a most

critical position. After a night of anxious suspense, it was seen that

the Germans had abandoned their positions, and were retreating hastily

towards the north-east, to avoid being caught in the pincer-like jaws

formed by the Franco-British forces the previous day.

[Illustration]

Thus Paris and France were saved, as Von Kluck's retreat carried away

Von Bulow's army with it, and Franchet d'Esperey crossed the Marne.

Von Hausen's right followed suit, pursued by Foch. The troops of the

former had crossed the Marshes of St. Gond during the night to avoid

disaster.

Langle de Cary precipitated the retreat of Von Hausen's army. His

right, still under heavy pressure, was however obliged to fall back.

Here, the Germans were only held up by the increasingly effectual help

rendered by Sarrail's army. The latter withstood the furious attacks

of the Crown Prince without flinching, while on the heights above the

Meuse, the fort of Troyon, the heroic defence of which has since become

famous, withstood the terrible onslaughts of the enemy forces which

sought to cross the river.

It was only on the 11th that the Duke of Wurtemberg followed the

retreat begun on his right the day before, and it was only during the

night of the 12th-13th that the German retreat became general.

On the 13th the Germans reached their line of resistance, and, as will

be seen on the map before you, their front extended from Soissons to

Verdun, passing by Rheims. This map also shows the positions at the

beginning of the battle.

The foregoing sketch gives a general idea of the character of this

great battle, which has been called "The Miracle of the Marne," and for

the winning of which the following factors were responsible: firmness

on the part of the commander-in-chief; the clear and well-laid plan

which he caused to be executed by highly capable army commanders

working in close collaboration with one another; and, above all, the

superhuman courage and endurance of the soldiers.

As time passes, these memorable days stand out more and more

gloriously. The study in detail of this stupendous event will continue

for centuries hence, but its main lines, which we have been at pains

to trace, already stand out clearly. They recall all the old French

traditions. The clearness of the plan, the suppleness of manœuvre,

the bold use of the reserves, remind one of the Napoleonic era. The

enthusiasm which galvanized soldiers and chiefs alike dates back to the

Revolution. And going back into the remote past, it was the remembrance

of the arresting on the soil of Gaul of the great barbarian invasions

which inspired the Victory of the Marne.

[Illustration: MARSHAL JOFFRE]

TOURIST SECTION

For the greater convenience of tourists, we have divided our guide

to the Marne Battlefields into the following sub-divisions, which

correspond to the three main sectors of the battle:

1, =THE OURCQ=.--Visit to =Chantilly=, =Senlis=, and =Meaux=.

2, =THE MARSHES OF SAINT-GOND=.--Visit to =Coulommiers=, =Provins=, and

=Sézanne=.

3, =THE REVIGNY-PASS=.--Visit to =Châlons-sur-Marne=,

=Vitry-le-François=, and =Bar-le-Duc=.

PRACTICAL INFORMATION

ITINERARY FOR MOTORISTS AND MOTOR-CYCLISTS

_This tour is comprised in the section 11-12 of the Michelin map,

Scale: 200,000 (see scale of kilometres on French map)._

The circuit is about 850 km. and can be covered in six days, i.e. two

days for each part:

Ourcq;

Marshes of Saint-Gond;

Pass of Revigny.

I., OURCQ.

=1st day.=--Leaving Paris in the morning through the Porte de la

Chapelle by N. 1 we cross Saint-Denis, then passing Pierrefitte turn to

the right by N. 16 which leads straight to Chantilly (34 km. from the

gates of Paris) through Ecouen, Le Mesnil-Aubry and Luzarches.

We visit the town (see pp. 22-36): lunch either at Chantilly (palatial

hotel) or at Senlis (good hotel) 9 km. from Chantilly; afternoon, visit

Senlis (pp. 39-67); dine sleep and at Senlis or Chantilly.

_Tourists who wish to see the whole of the Castle and Park of Chantilly

must choose a Thursday, Saturday, or Sunday (see p. 31) and devote a

part of the afternoon to this visit._

* * * * *

=2nd day.=--Leave Senlis or Chantilly in the morning and reach Meaux by

the route given on pp. 68-75. The distance from Senlis is 65 km. (by

the direct route only 37 km.); lunch at Meaux (good hotel).

+Afternoon.+--Do the tour of the Ourcq as indicated on pp. 84-118. This

tour may be increased from 53 to 92 km., according to the time the

traveller has at his disposal or the speed of his car.

Dine and sleep at Meaux.

* * * * *

=Alternate routes.=--Tourists who consider the second day's distance

too great, as planned above, can leave Senlis in the afternoon and thus

dine and sleep at Meaux on the first day. They can visit Meaux in the

morning of the second day, lunch there and make the tour of the Ourcq

in the afternoon, returning to dine and sleep at Meaux.

II., MARSHES OF SAINT-GOND.

=3rd day.=--After mounting the course of the Grand Morin as far as La

Ferté-Gaucher _via_ Crécy, Couilly and Coulommiers, the tourist will

lunch at Provins. In the afternoon he may visit the town, after which

he will proceed to Sézanne to pass the night. =4th day.=--In the

morning make the tour of the Marshes of Saint-Gond. In the afternoon

proceed to Fère-Champenoise, Sommesous, ascending the valley of the

Somme and spend the night at Châlons-sur-Marne.

III., PASS OF REVIGNY (273 km.)

=5th day.=--In the morning cover the distance from Châlons to

Vitry-le-François and visit the latter town before lunch.

After lunch leave Vitry for Bar-le-Duc where the tourist can dine and

sleep.

=6th day.=--In the morning the tourist may visit the lower town

Bar-le-Duc and effect the circular tour which we indicate round the

town. He will come back to Bar-le-Duc for lunch.

In the afternoon the tourist will visit the upper town proceeding

thence to Verdun. The latter town and the surrounding battlefields

should be visited with the help of the separate guide which has been

dedicated to them.

IMPORTANT NOTE

For details concerning hotels and garages see insides of cover.

[Illustration: PLAN OF TOUR DESCRIBED IN THE PRESENT GUIDE]

On the above plan, towns, of which a map is given in the present guide,

are shown by a circle enclosed in a small square; the large rectangles

indicate the boundaries of the coloured maps inserted in the guide, on

which the reader will be able to follow the itinerary.

I. THE OURCQ

VISIT TO THE LOCALITIES

in which were enacted the preliminary scenes of the

BATTLE OF THE OURCQ

from September 5 to 14, 1914

CHANTILLY

(See map on next page)

ORIGIN AND MAIN HISTORICAL FACTS

Chantilly derives its name from that of the Gallo-Roman _Cantilius_,

who was the first to establish himself in the locality. The Castle (a

fortress during the Middle Ages) passed to the family of Montmorency in

the fifteenth century and in the seventeenth to that of Condé. These

two illustrious families brought Chantilly to a height of splendour

which made it a rival of the royal residences.

In 1830 the Duc d'Aumale succeeded the last of the Condés and at his

death (1897) bequeathed the domain, with the Condé Museum, which he had

installed in the castle (_see pp. 24-35_), to the 'Institut de France.'

The town itself, built in the seventeenth century, was for a long time

dependent on the castle. In our day it has become a big centre for

horse training and racing, the great race meetings in May, July and

September attracting huge crowds.

CHANTILLY IN 1914-1916

The Germans, coming from Creil, entered Chantilly on September 3, 1914,

and occupied it for several days. The mayor was at once seized as

hostage but did not suffer the same tragic fate as the Mayor of Senlis.

The troops were billeted at the castle (_see p. 28_).

After the victory of the Marne, Chantilly became the seat of General

Joffre's headquarters and remained so until the end of 1916.

[Illustration: CHANTILLY]

VISIT TO THE TOWN

_Arriving by the Paris road the tourist will pass under the railway

bridge, then 600 yards further on turn to the right and come out on to

the "Pelouse" (Lawn). Turning round the Grand Condé Hotel on the left,

he follows the Boulevard d'Aumale as far as the =Maison de Joffre=,

shown in the photograph below_.

[Illustration: JOFFRE LEAVING GENERAL HEADQUARTERS]

Joffre lived here until he was made Marshal of France.

The hundreds of officers and secretaries employed in the tremendous

work incumbent on the Generalissimo were lodged in the Grand Condé

hotel, near which the tourist has just passed. In contrast with this

buzzing hive, Joffre's house seemed the embodiment of silence and

meditation.

Only two orderly officers lived with the generalissimo, and his door

was strictly forbidden to all unsummoned visitors, whoever they might

be.

On leaving his office Joffre had the daily relaxation of a walk in

the forest near by. It was thanks to the strict routine to which he

subjected himself that the generalissimo was able to carry the crushing

weight of his responsibility without faltering. We shall see, however,

when comparing the peace time photograph given _on p. 1_ with that _on

p. 22_ that these years of war have counted as double.

During the tragic hours of the Marne the general headquarters were

first at Bar-sur-Aube and then at Romilly. The commander-in-chief's

intense concentration of mind made him dumb and as though absent in the

midst of his colleagues, who received all his orders in writing. In a

few days his hair and moustache became perfectly white.

The Allies' grand councils of war were held in this house, which has

counted among its guests all the great actors of the war.

The military functions were held on the lawn. The photograph on the

next page was taken during a review.

_After having seen Joffre's house we pass the few villas which separate

it from the Rue d'Aumale and bear to the right, skirting the lawn;

next we turn to the left into the Avenue de Condé, then to the right

into the Rue du Connétable._ In front of the "Grandes Écuries" (great

stables), which border the extreme end of the road on the right,

stands the equestrian statue of the Duc d'Aumale, by Gérome (1899).

[Illustration: JOFFRE HOLDING A REVIEW ON THE LAWN]

_Leaving the church we turn to the right, passing through the

monumental gateway, and go towards the castle._ On the lawn (still

keeping to the right) we come to the principal façade of the "=Grandes

Écuries=", Jean Aubert's _chef-d'œuvre_, built between 1719 and 1740.

They are seen on the right in the above photograph.

On the opposite side of the lawn stands a little chapel, erected in

1535, by the high constable Anne de Montmorency, at the same time as

six others dotted here and there about Chantilly, in memory of the

seven churches of Rome which he had visited in order to obtain the

indulgences pertaining to this pilgrimage. He obtained the same grant

from the Pope for the chapels of Chantilly.

Of these only two now remain, that on the lawn--Sainte-Croix, and

another in the park--Saint-Paul.

The photograph below gives a view of the whole of the castle. The

little castle dates from the sixteenth century; the big castle is

the work of a contemporary architect, Daumet, who erected it on the

basement of the old dwelling, demolished during the Revolution. The

Castle of Enghien, built in the eighteenth century, is now occupied by

the guardians entrusted with its preservation. The water surrounding

the castle teems with centenarian carp. One can get bread from the

concierge and, on throwing a few crumbs into the moat, which passes

beneath the entrance bridge, watch the onrush of the huge fish.

[Illustration:

Little Castle

Chapel

Great Castle

The constable's Terrace

Porter's Lodge

Castle of Enghien

CASTLE OF CHANTILLY] In the pages which follow we give a short

historical account of the castle, referring the tourist for further

details to the extremely interesting work of the curator, Mr. Gustave

Macon: _Chantilly and the Condé Museum_.

SHORT HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CASTLE

The Marne Battle-fields (1914) · 第 1 / 18 段