CHAPTER IX.

DRAW-BRIDGE DISASTERS.

It is difficult to see how on double track roads, where the

occurrence of an accident on one line of tracks is always liable to

instantly "foul" the other line, it is possible to guard against

contingencies like that which occurred at New Hamburg. At the time,

as is usual in such cases, the public indignation expended itself

in vague denunciation of the Hudson River Railroad Company, because

the disaster happened to take place upon a bridge in which there was

a draw to permit the passage of vessels. There seemed to be a vague

but very general impression that draw-bridges were dangerous things,

and, because other accidents due to different causes had happened

upon them, that the occurrence of this accident, from whatever

cause, was in itself sufficient evidence of gross carelessness. The

fact was that not even the clumsy Connecticut rule, which compels

the stopping of all trains before entering on any draw-bridge,

would have sufficed to avert the New Hamburg disaster, for the

river was then frozen and the draw was not in use, so that for the

time being the bridge was an ordinary bridge; and not even in the

frenzy of crude suggestions which invariably succeeds each new

accident was any one ever found ignorant enough to suggest the

stopping of all trains before entering upon every bridge, which, as

railroads generally follow water-courses, would not infrequently

necessitate an average of one stop to every thousand feet or so.

Only incidentally did the bridge at New Hamburg have anything to

do with the disaster there, the essence of which lay in the sudden

derailment of an oil car immediately in front of a passenger train

running in the opposite direction and on the other track. Of course,

if the derailment had occurred long enough before the passenger

train came up to allow the proper signals to be given, and this

precaution had been neglected, then the disaster would have been

due, not to the original cause, but to the defective discipline

of the employés. Such does not appear to have been the case at

New Hamburg, nor was that disaster by any means the first due to

derailment and the throwing of cars from one track in front of a

train passing upon the other;--nor will it be the last. Indeed, an

accident hardly less destructive, arising from that very cause, had

occurred only eight months previous in England, and resulted in

eighteen deaths and more than fifty cases of injury.

A goods train made up of a locomotive and twenty-nine wagons was

running at a speed of some twenty miles an hour on the Great

Northern road, between Newark and Claypole, about one hundred miles

from London, when the forward axle under one of the wagons broke. As

a result of the derailment which ensued the train became divided,

and presently the disabled car was driven by the pressure behind it

out of its course and over the interval, so that it finally rested

partly across the other track. At just this moment an excursion

train from London, made up of twenty-three carriages and containing

some three hundred and forty passengers, came along at a speed of

about thirty-five miles an hour. It was quite dark, and the engineer

of the freight train waved his arm as a signal of danger; one of

the guards, also, showed a red light with his hand lantern, but his

action either was not seen or was misunderstood, for without any

reduction of speed being made the engine of the excursion train

plunged headlong into the disabled goods wagon. The collision was

so violent as to turn the engine aside off the track and cause it

to strike the stone pier of a bridge near by, by which it was flung

completely around and then driven up the slope of the cutting, where

it toppled over like a rearing horse and fell back into the roadway.

The tender likewise was overturned; but not so the carriages. They

rushed along holding to the track, and the side of each as it passed

was ripped and torn by the projecting end of the goods wagon.

Of the twenty-three carriages and vans in the train scarcely one

escaped damage, while the more forward ones were in several cases

lifted one on top of the other or forced partly up the slope of

the cutting, whence they fell back again, crushing the passengers

beneath them.

This accident occurred on the 21st of June, 1870; it was very

thoroughly investigated by Captain Tyler on behalf of the Board of

Trade, with the apparent conclusion that it was one which could

hardly have been guarded against. The freight cars, the broken

axle of which occasioned the disaster, did not belong to the Great

Northern company, and the wheels of the train had been properly

examined by viewing and tapping at the several stopping-places; the

flaw which led to the fracture was, however, of such a nature that

it could have been detected only by the removal of the wheel. It did

not appear that the employés of the company had been guilty of any

negligence; and it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the

accident was due to one of those defects to which the results of

even the most perfect human workmanship must ever remain liable, and

this had revealed itself under exactly those conditions which must

involve the most disastrous consequences.

The English accident did, however, establish one thing, if nothing

else; it showed the immeasurable superiority of the system of

investigation pursued in the case of railroad accidents in England

over that pursued in this country. There a trained expert after

the occurrence of each disaster visits the spot and sifts the

affair to the very bottom, locating responsibility and pointing out

distinctly the measures necessary to guard against its repetition.

Here the case ordinarily goes to a coroner's jury, the findings of

which as a rule admirably sustain the ancient reputation of that

august tribunal. It is absolutely sad to follow the course of these

investigations, they are conducted with such an entire disregard of

method and lead to such inadequate conclusions. Indeed, how could it

be otherwise?--The same man never investigates two accidents, and,

for the one investigation he does make, he is competent only in his

own esteem.

Take the New Hamburgh accident as an example. Rarely has any

catastrophe merited a more careful investigation, and few

indeed have ever called forth more ill-considered criticism or

crude suggestions. Almost nothing of interest respecting it was

elicited at the inquest, and now no reliable criticism can be

ventured upon it. The question of responsibility in that case,

and of prevention thereafter, involved careful inquiry into at

least four subjects:--First, the ownership and condition of the

freight car, the fractured axle of which occasioned the disaster,

together with the precautions taken by the company, usually and in

this particular case, to test the wheels of freight cars moving

over its road, especially during times of severe cold.--Second,

the conduct of those in charge of the freight train immediately

preceding and at the time of the accident; was the fracture of the

axle at once noticed and were measures taken to stop the train, or

was the derailment aggravated by neglect into the form it finally

took?--Third, was there any neglect in signaling the accident on

the part of those in charge of the disabled train, and how much

time elapsed between the accident and the collision?--Fourth, what,

if any, improved appliances would have enabled those in charge

of either train to have averted the accident?--and what, if any,

defects either in the rules or the equipment in use were revealed?

No satisfactory conclusion can now be arrived at upon any of these

points, though the probabilities are that with the appliances since

introduced the train might have been stopped in time. In this case,

as in that at Claybridge, the coroner's jury returned a verdict

exonerating every one concerned from responsibility, and very

possibly they were justified in so doing; though it is extremely

questionable whether Captain Tyler would have arrived at a similar

conclusion. There is a strong probability that the investigation

went off, so to speak, on a wholly false issue,--turned on the

draw-bridge frenzy instead of upon the question of care. So far

as the verdict declared that the disaster was due to a collision

between a passenger train and a derailed oil car, and not to the

existence of a draw in the bridge on which it happened to occur, it

was, indeed, entitled to respect, and yet it was on this very point

that it excited the most criticism. Loud commendation was heard

through the press of the Connecticut law, which had been in force

for twenty years, and, indeed, still is in force there, under which

all trains are compelled to come to a full stop before entering

on any bridge which has a draw in it,--a law which may best be

described as a useless nuisance. Yet the grand jury of the Court of

Oyer and Terminer of New York city even went so far as to recommend,

in a report made by it on the 23d of February, 1871,--sixteen days

after the accident,--the passage by the legislature then in session

at Albany of a similar legal absurdity. Fortunately better counsels

prevailed, and, as the public recovered its equilibrium, the matter

was allowed to drop.

The Connecticut law in question, however, originated in an accident

which at the time had startled and shocked the community as much

even as that at Versailles did before or that at Abergele has since

done. It occurred to an express train on the New York & New Haven

road at Norwalk, in Connecticut, on the 6th of May, 1853.

Notes on Railroad Accidents · 第 9 / 23 章