Relation between the physical condition and happiness, and
between happiness and longevity—Longevity a good, and
why—Epochs of life—The age of maturity the only one that
admits of extension—Proof of this from physiology—Proof
from statistics—Explanation of terms—Life a fluctuating
quantity—Amount of it possessed in ancient Rome: in modern
Europe: at present in England among the mass of the people
and among the higher classes.
Life depends on the action of the organic organs. The action of the
organic organs depends on certain physical agents. As each organic
organ is duly supplied with the physical agent by which it carries on
its respective process, and as it duly appropriates what it receives,
the perfection of the physical condition is attained; and, according to
the perfection or imperfection of the physical condition, supposing no
accident interrupt its regular course, is the length or the brevity of
life.
It is conceivable that the physical condition might be brought to a
high degree of perfection, the mind remaining in a state but little
fitted for enjoyment; because it is necessary to enjoyment that there
be a certain development, occupation, and direction of the mental
powers and affections: and the mental state may be neglected, while
attention is paid to the physical processes. But the converse is not
possible. The mental energies cannot be fully called forth while the
physical condition is neglected. Happiness presupposes a certain degree
of excellence in the physical condition; and unless the physical
condition be brought to a high degree of excellence, there can be no
such development, occupation, and direction of the mental powers and
affections as is requisite to a high degree of enjoyment.
That state of the system in which the physical condition is sound is
in itself conducive to enjoyment; while a permanent state of enjoyment
is in its turn conducive to the soundness of the physical condition.
It is impossible to maintain the physical processes in a natural and
vigorous condition if the mind be in a state of suffering. The bills
of mortality contain no column exhibiting the number of persons who
perish annually from bodily disease, produced by mental suffering;
but every one must occasionally have seen appalling examples of the
fact. Every one must have observed the altered appearance of persons
who have sustained calamity. A misfortune, that struck to the heart,
happened to a person a year ago; observe him some time afterwards; he
is wasted, worn, the miserable shadow of himself; inquire about him at
the distance of a few months, he is no more.
It is stated by M. Villermé, that the ordinary rate of mortality in
the prisons of France, taking all together, is one in twenty-three—a
rate which corresponds to the age of sixty-five in the common course
of life. But in the vast majority of cases the unfortunate victims
of the law are no older than from twenty-five to forty-five years of
age. Taking them at the mean age of thirty-five, it follows that the
suffering from imprisonment, and from the causes that lead to it, is
equivalent to thirty years wear and tear of life. But this is not all;
for it is found that, during imprisonment, the ordinary chances of
death are exactly quadrupled.
In regard to the whole population of a country, indigence may be
assumed to be a fair measure of unhappiness, and wealth of happiness.
If the rate of mortality in the indigent class be compared with that
of the wealthy, according to M. Villermé, it will be found in some
cases to be just double. Thus it is affirmed that, in some cases in
France, taking equal numbers, where there are one hundred deaths in a
poor arrondissement, there are only fifty in a rich; and that taking
together the whole of the French population, human life is protracted
twelve years and a half among the wealthy beyond its duration among
the poor: consequently, in the one class, a child, newly born, has a
probability of living forty-two and a half years; in the other only
thirty years.
In the great life-insurance establishments in England, a vast
proportion of the persons who insure their lives are persons compelled
to do so by their creditors; while three-fourths of those who
voluntarily insure their lives are professional men, living in great
towns, and experiencing the anxieties and fatigues, the hopes and
disappointments of professional life. In one of these establishments in
London, out of 330 deaths that happened in twenty-six years preceding
the year 1831, it was found that eleven died by suicide, being one
in thirty, implying the existence of an appalling amount of mental
suffering. The number of persons belonging to an insurance office who
perish by suicide is sure to be accurately known, death by suicide
rendering the policy void. It would be most erroneous to suppose that
these persons put an end to their existence under the mere influence of
the mental states of disappointment and despondency. The mind reacted
upon the body: produced physical disease, probably inflammation of the
brain, and under the excitement of this physical disease, the acts of
suicide were committed. More than one case has come to my knowledge
in which inflammation of the brain having been excited by mental
suffering, suicide was committed by cutting the throat. During the flow
of blood, which was gradual, the brain was relieved; the mind became
perfectly rational; and the patient might have been saved had a surgeon
been upon the spot, or had the persons about the patient known where
and how to apply the pressure of the finger to staunch the flow of
blood, until surgical aid could be procured.
By a certain amount and intensity of misery life may be suddenly
destroyed; by a smaller amount and intensity, it may be slowly worn out
and exhausted. The state of the mind affects the physical condition;
but the continuance of life is wholly dependent on the physical
condition: it follows that in the degree in which the state of the
mind is capable of affecting the physical condition, it is capable of
influencing the duration of life.
Were the physical condition always perfect, and the mental state always
that of enjoyment, the duration of life would always be extended to
the utmost limit compatible with that of the organization of the
body. But as this fortunate concurrence seldom or never happens,
human life seldom or never numbers the full measure of its days.
Uniform experience shows, however, that, provided no accident occur to
interrupt the usual course, in proportion as body and mind approximate
to this state, life is long; and as they recede from it, it is short.
Improvement of the physical condition affords a foundation for the
improvement of the mental state; improvement of the mental state
improves up to a certain point the physical condition; and in the ratio
in which this twofold improvement is effected, the duration of life
increases.
Longevity then is a good, in the first place, because it is a sign
and a consequence of the possession of a certain amount of enjoyment;
and in the second place, because this being the case, of course in
proportion as the term of life is extended, the sum of enjoyment must
be augmented. And this view of longevity assigns the cause, and shows
the reasonableness of that desire for long life which is so universal
and constant as to be commonly considered instinctive. Longevity and
happiness, if not invariably, are generally, co-incident.
If there may be happiness without longevity, the converse is not
possible: there cannot be longevity without happiness. Unless the state
of the body be that of tolerable health, and the state of the mind
that of tolerable enjoyment, long life is unattainable: these physical
and mental conditions no longer existing, nor capable of existing, the
desire of life and the power of retaining it cease together.
An advanced term of life and decrepitude are commonly conceived to
be synonymous: the extension of life is vulgarly supposed to be the
protraction of the period of infirmity and suffering, that period which
is characterized by a progressive diminution of the power of sensation,
and a consequent and proportionate loss of the power of enjoyment, the
"sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans every thing." But this is so
far from being true, that it is not within the compass of human power
to protract in any sensible degree the period of old age properly so
called, that is, the stage of decrepitude. In this stage of existence,
the physical changes that successively take place clog, day by day, the
vital machinery, until it can no longer play. In a space of time, fixed
within narrow limits, the flame of life must then inevitably expire,
for the processes that feed it fail. But though, when fully come, the
term of old age cannot be extended, the coming of the term may be
postponed. To the preceding stage, an indefinite number of years may be
added. And this is a fact of the deepest interest to human nature.
The division of human life into periods or epochs is not an arbitrary
distinction, but is founded on constitutional differences in the
system, dependent on different physiological conditions. The periods
of infancy, childhood, boyhood, adolescence, manhood, and old age, are
distinguished from each other by external characters, which are but
the outward signs of internal states. In physiological condition, the
infant differs from the child, the child from the boy, the boy from the
man, and the adult from the old man, as much in physical strength as in
mental power. There is an appointed order in which these several states
succeed each other; there is a fixed time at which one passes into
another. That order cannot be inverted: no considerable anticipation
or postponement of that fixed time can be effected. In all places and
under all circumstances, at a given time, though not precisely at the
same time in all climates and under all modes of life, infancy passes
into childhood, childhood into boyhood, boyhood into adolescence, and
adolescence into manhood. In the space of two years from its birth,
every infant has ceased to be an infant, and has become a child; in the
space of six years from this period, every male child will have become
a boy; add eight years to this time, and every boy will have become a
young man; in eight years more, every young man will have become an
adult man; and in the subsequent ten years, every adult man will have
acquired his highest state of physical perfection. But at what period
will this state of physical perfection decline? What is the maximum
time during which it can retain its full vigour? Is that maximum fixed?
Is there a certain number of years in which, by an inevitable law,
every adult man necessarily becomes an old man? Is precisely the same
number of years appointed for this transition to every human being?
Can no care add to that number? Can no imprudence take from it? Does
the physiological condition or the constitutional age of any two
individuals ever advance to precisely the same point in precisely the
same number of years? Physically and mentally, are not some persons
older at fifty than others are at seventy? And do not instances
occasionally occur in which an old man, who reaches even his hundredth
year, retains as great a degree of juvenility as the majority of those
who attain to eighty?
If this be so, what follows? One of the most interesting consequences
that can be presented to the human mind. The duration of the periods of
infancy, childhood, boyhood, and adolescence, is fixed by a determinate
number of years. Nothing can stay, nothing retard, the succession of
each. Alike incapable of any material protraction is the period of old
age. It follows that every year by which the term of human existence is
extended is really added to the period of mature age; the period when
the organs of the body have attained their full growth and put forth
their full strength; when the physical organization has acquired its
utmost perfection; when the senses, the feelings, the emotions, the
passions, the affections, are in the highest degree acute, intense,
and varied; when the intellectual faculties, completely unfolded
and developed, carry on their operations with the greatest vigour,
soundness, and continuity; in a word, when the individual is capable of
receiving and of communicating the largest amount of the highest kind
of enjoyment.
A consideration more full of encouragement, more animating, there
cannot be. The extension of human life, in whatever mode and degree it
may be possible to extend it, is the protraction of that portion of it,
and only of that portion of it, in which the human being is capable of
RECEIVING AND OF COMMUNICATING THE LARGEST MEASURE OF THE NOBLEST KIND
OF ENJOYMENT.
Considerations, purely physiological, establish this indubitably; but
it is curious that a class of facts, totally different from those of a
physiological nature, equally prove it; namely, the results obtained
from the observation of the actual numbers that die at different ages,
and the knowledge consequently acquired of the progressive decrement
of life. Mortality is subject to a law, the operation of which is as
regular as that of gravitation. The labours of my valued friend Mr.
Finlaison, the actuary of the National Debt, have not only determined
what that law is in relation to different nations at different periods
of their history, but this celebrated calculator has also invented a
striking mode of expressing and representing the fact. He constructed
a chart on which 100 perpendicular lines, answering to the respective
ages of human life, are laid down and numbered in succession. These
are crossed at right angles by 500 horizontal lines; so that, in the
manner of musical notation, a point may be laid down either on the
horizontal line, or on the space between any two of them: and thus,
1000 points may be laid down on each of the perpendicular lines. The
horizontal lines are in like manner numbered from 1 to 1000, ascending
from the base. Taking any observation which shows the number of living
persons that commence, and in like manner the number that die in each
particular year of human life, the calculator reduced by the rule of
three every such actual number of living persons for every separate
year to 10,000: he next showed the corresponding proportion of deaths
out of such 10,000. These proportions he represented on the chart by
a point inserted on the horizontal line or space for the number of
deaths, and on the perpendicular line for the particular age. He then
connected all the points so laid down, and the result is a curve,
representing the track of death through an equal number of human beings
existing at each age of life. As the curve rises on the perpendicular
line, at any given age, it indicates by so much an increase of the
mortality at that age; and as the curve falls, the reverse is denoted.
Now, it is a highly interesting fact, that the curves on this chart
drawn upon it before the physiological phenomena were known to the
operator, placed there because such he found to be the actual path
along which death marshals his course, exactly correspond to the epochs
which physiology teaches to be determinate stages of human existence.
The infant, the child, the boy, the adolescent, the man, the old man,
are not exposed to the same danger. The liability of each to death
is not merely different; it is widely different; the liability of
each class is uniformly the same, the circumstances influencing life
remaining the same; and under no known change of circumstances does
the relative liability of the class vary; under no change does the
liability of the adolescent become that of the infant, or the liability
of the adult that of the aged. Take from any statistical document any
number of persons; observe out of this number the proportion that
dies at the different stages just enumerated; and the period of human
life which admits of extension will be strikingly manifest. Take with
this view the Prussian statistical tables, the general correctness of
which is admitted. From these tables it appears, and the correctness
of the result is confirmed by a multitude of other tables, that out
of a million living male births, there will die in the first year of
life 180,492 infants, and out of the like number of living female
births, there will die 154,705 infants. Let us follow up the decrement
of life through the different epochs of human existence, confining
our observations to the male sex, in which the development is more
emphatically marked.
In Mr. Finlaison's report, printed by the House of Commons on the 30th
of March, 1829, there are six original observations on the mortality of
as many separate sets of annuitants of the male sex.
From an examination and comparison of these observations, it
appears—1st. That the rate of mortality falls to a minimum at
the close of the period of childhood. 2d. That from this point
the mortality rises until the termination of adolescence or the
commencement of adult age. 3d. That from the commencement of adult age
the mortality again declines, and continues to decline to the period of
perfect maturity. And 4th. That from the period of perfect maturity,
the mortality rises, and uniformly, without a single exception,
returns, at the age of forty-eight, to the point at which it stood at
the termination of adolescence. These results clearly indicate that
certain fixed periods are marked by nature as epochs of human life;
and that at the date of the recorded facts which furnish the data
for these observations, and as far as regards the class of persons
to which they relate, the age of forty-eight was the exact point at
which the meridian of life was just passed, and a new epoch began. The
following table exhibits at one view the exact results of each of the
observations. For example,
According to The mortality From whence From this And from this
the is at a it rises point it age it again
observation, minimum at the until declines rises, but is not
No. age of the age of to the equal to the
age of mortality in
the 2d column
until the age of
15 — 13 — 23 — 34 — 48
16 — 13 — 23 — 35 — 48
17 — 14 — 22 — 33 — 48
18 — 13 — 23 — 33 — 48
19 — 13 — 24 — 34 — 48
20 — 13 — 24 — 34 — 48
The observation, No. 15, is founded on the large mass of 9,347 lives
and 4,870 deaths. From this observation, it appears that, at the age of
thirteen, the mortality out of a million is 5,742, being 174,750 less
than in the first year of infancy At the age of twenty-three, it is
15,074, being 9,332 more than at the close of childhood. At the age of
thirty-four, the period of complete manhood, it falls to 11,707, being
3,367 less than at the close of adolescence. At the age of forty-eight,
the mortality returns to 14,870, all but identically the same as at
twenty-three, the adult age. From the age of forty-eight, when, as
has been stated, life just begins to decline from its meridian, the
mortality advances slowly, but in a steady and regular progression.
Thus, at the age of fifty-eight it is 29,185, being 14,315 more than
at the preceding decade, or almost exactly double. At the age of
sixty-eight, it is 61,741, being 32,556 more than at the preceding
decade, or more than double. At the age of seventy-eight, it is
114,255, being 52,514 more than at the preceding decade. At the age of
eighty-eight, it is 246,803, being 132,548 more than at the preceding
decade.
During the first year of infancy, as has been shown, the mortality
out of a million is 180,492. At the extreme age of eighty-four, it
is 178,130, very nearly the same as in the first year of infancy.
Greatly as the mortality of all the other epochs of life is affected
by country, by station, by a multitude of influences arising out of
these and similar circumstances; yet the concurrent evidence of all
observation shows that at this and the like advanced ages the mean term
of existence is nearly the same in all countries, at all periods, and
among all classes of society. Thus, among the nobility and gentry of
England, the expectation of life at eighty-four is four years; among
the poor fishermen of Ostend, it is precisely the same. M. De Parcieux,
who wrote just ninety years ago, establishes the expectation of life
at that time in France, at the same age, to have been three and a half
years; and Halley, who wrote 120 years ago, and whose observations are
derived from documents which go back to the end of the seventeenth
century, states the expectation of life at eighty-four to be two years
and nine months.
From these statements, then, it is obvious, that from the termination
of infancy at three years of age, a decade of years brings childhood to
a close, during which the mortality, steadily decreasing, comes to its
minimum. Another decade terminates the period of adolescence, during
which the mortality as steadily advances. A third decade changes the
young adult into a perfect man, and during this period, the golden
decade of human life, the mortality again diminishes; while, during
another decade and a half, the mortality slowly rises, and returns
at the close of the period to the precise point at which it stood at
adult age. Thus the interval between the period of birth and that of
adult age includes a term of twenty-three years. The interval between
the period of adult age and that when life just begins to decline from
its meridian, includes a term of twenty-four years: consequently, a
period more than equal to all the other epochs of life from birth
to adult age is enjoyed, during which mortality makes no advance
whatever. Now the term of years included in the several epochs that
intervene between birth and adult age is rigidly fixed. Thus the
period of infancy includes precisely three years, that of childhood
ten years, and that of adolescence ten years. Within the space of time
comprehended in these intervals, physiological changes take place,
on which depend every thing that is peculiar to the epochs. These
changes cannot be anticipated, cannot be retarded, except in a very
slight degree. In all countries, among all classes, they take place in
the same order and nearly in the same space of time. In like manner,
in extreme old age, or the age of decrepitude, which may be safely
assumed to commence at the period when the mortality equals that of the
first year of infancy, namely, the age of eighty-four, physiological
changes take place, which, within a given space of time, inevitably
bring life to a close. That space of time, in all countries, in all
ranks, in all ages, or rather as far back as any records enable us to
trace the facts, appears to be the same. As within a given time the
boy must ripen into manhood, so within a given time the man of extreme
old age must be the victim of death. Consequently, it is the interval
between the adult age and the age of decrepitude, and only this, that
is capable of extension. During the interval between adult age and the
perfect meridian of life, comprehending at present, as we have seen,
a period of twenty-four years, the constitution remains stationary,
mortality making no sensible inroad upon it. But there is no known
reason why this stationary or mature period of life should, like
the determinate epochs, be limited to a fixed term of years. On the
contrary, we do in fact know that it is not fixed; for we know that the
physiological changes on which age depends are, in some cases, greatly
anticipated, and in others, proportionately postponed; so that some
persons are younger at sixty, and even at seventy, than others are at
fifty; whereas, an analogous anticipation or postponement of the other
epochs of life is never witnessed. So complete is the proof, that the
extension of human life can consist in the protraction neither of the
period of juvenility, nor in that of senility, but only in that of
maturity.
Were it necessary to adduce further evidence of this most interesting
fact, it would be found equally in the statistics of disease as
in those of mortality. Indeed, the evidence derived from both
these sources must be analogous, because mortality is invariably
proportionate to the causes of mortality, of which causes, sickness, in
all its forms, may be taken as the general or collective expression.
We do not possess the same means of illustrating the prevalence
of disease through all the epochs of life as we do of showing the
intensity of mortality; yet the report of Mr. Finlaison, already
referred to, enables us to show its comparative prevalence at several
of those stages. Thus, from this document, it appears, that among
the industrious poor of London, members of benefit societies, out
of a million of males, the proportion constantly sick at the age of
twenty-three, is 19,410; at the age of twenty-eight, it is 19,670; at
the age of thirty-three, it is 19,400; at the age of thirty-eight,
it is 23,870; at the age of forty-three, it is 26,260; at the age of
forty-eight, it is 26,140; at the age of fifty-three, it is 27,060;
at the age of fifty-eight, it is 36,980; at the age of sixty-three,
it is 57,000; at the age of sixty-eight, it is 108,040; at the age of
seventy-three and upwards, it is 317,230. The prevalence of sickness
is not an exact and invariable measure of the intensity of mortality;
but there is a close connexion between them, as is manifest from
the progressively increasing amount of sickness, as age advances.
Thus, in the first ten years from the age of twenty-three to that of
thirty-three, there is no increase of sickness, its prevalence is
all but identically the same; in the next ten years from the age of
thirty-three to that of forty-three, the increase of sickness, as
compared with that of the preceding decade, is 6,860; in the next ten
years from the age of forty-three to that of fifty-three, the increase
is only 800; in the next ten years from the age of fifty-three to
that of sixty-three, the increase is 29,940, while from the age of
sixty-three to seventy-three, it is 260,230.
Such are the results derived from the experience of disease considered
in the aggregate, all its varied forms taken together. I am enabled
further to present an exact and most instructive proof, that one
particular disease which, in this point of view, may be considered
as more important than any other, because it is the grand agent of
death, namely fever, carries on its ravages in a ratio which steadily
and uniformly increases as the age of its victim advances. Having
submitted the experience of the London Fever Hospital for the ten
years preceding January 1834, an observation including nearly 6,000
patients affected with this malady, to Mr. Finlaison, it was subjected
by him to calculation. Among other curious and instructive results to
be stated hereafter, it was found that the mortality of fever resolves
itself into the following remarkable progression. Thus suppose 100,000
patients to be attacked with this disease between the ages of 5 and
16, of these there would die - 8,266 and of an equal number
between 15 and 26 there would die 11,494
25 and 36 " " " 17,071
35 and 46 " " " 21,960
45 and 56 " " " 30,493
55 and 66 " " " 40,708
65 and upwards " " " 44,643
Thus the risk of life from this malady is twice as great at the age
of thirty-one as it is at eleven. It is also nearly twice as great
at forty-one as it is at twenty-one. It is five times as great at
sixty-one as it is at eleven, and nearly four times as great above
sixty-five as it is at twenty-one.
From the whole of the foregoing statements, it is manifest that life is
a fluctuating quantity. In order to compare this fluctuating quantity
under different circumstances, writers on this branch of statistics use
several terms, the exact meaning of which it is desirable to explain.
It is, for example, very important to have a clear understanding of
what is meant by such expressions as the following: the expectation,
the probability, the value, the decrement of life, and the law of
mortality.
1. THE EXPECTATION OF LIFE. It is important to bear in mind that
several expressions in common use have a signification perfectly
synonymous with this: namely, _share of existence_; _mean duration of
life_; _la vie moyenne_.
By these terms is expressed the total number of years, including also
the fractional parts of a year, ordinarily attained by human beings
from and after any given age. Suppose, for example, that one thousand
persons enter on the eighty-sixth year of their age: suppose the
number of years and days which each one of them lives afterwards be
observed and recorded; suppose the number ultimately attained by each
be formed into a sum total; suppose this total be divided equally among
the thousand, the quotient of this division is said to be each one's
share of existence, or his mean duration of life, or his expectation
of life. Thus, of the thousand persons in the present case supposed
to commence the age of eighty-five, suppose the number of years they
collectively attain amount to 3,500 years: the one-thousandth part of
3,500 is three and a half: three years and a half then is said to be
the expectation of life at the age of eighty-five, because, of all the
persons originally starting, this is the equal share of existence that
falls to the lot of each.
2. PROBABILITY OF LIFE; or _the probable duration of life_, _la vie
probable_. These are synonymous terms, in use chiefly among continental
writers as an expression of the comparative duration of life. The
tabular methods of setting forth the duration of life consist, for the
most part, in assuming that 10,000 infants are born; and that at the
age of one, two, three, and each successive year of life, there are
so many still remaining in existence. Fix on any age; observe what
number remain alive to commence that age; note at what age this number
decreases to one-half; the age at which they so come to one-half is
called the probable term of life; because, say the continental writers,
it is an equal wager whether a person shall or shall not be alive at
that period. Thus, suppose one thousand males commence together the age
of eighty-four; suppose the table indicate that there will be alive
at the age of eighty-five, 817; at the age of eighty-six, 648; at the
age of eighty-seven, 493; at the age of eighty-eight, 357, and so on.
In the present case, the probable duration of life at eighty-four is
said to be very nearly three years, because, at the age of eighty-seven
there are left alive 493, very nearly one-half of the thousand that
originally started together.
3. VALUE OF LIFE. This term, when used accurately, expresses the
duration of life as measured by one or other of the methods already
expounded. But it is sometimes popularly used in a loose and singularly
inaccurate sense. Thus it is very commonly said—"Such a man's life
is not worth ten years' purchase," which is the same thing as to say,
that an annuity, suppose a hundred pounds a year, payable during the
life of the person in question, is not worth ten times its magnitude,
that is one thousand pounds. If a thousand pounds be put into a bank
at some rate of interest to be agreed upon, and if a hundred pounds be
drawn every year from the stock, the expression under consideration
affirms that the person in question will be dead before the principal
and interest are exhausted. For instance, at four per cent., the value
of an annuity of one hundred pounds to a man of the age of twenty-five
is 1694_l._, which is 16-9/10 years' purchase; whereas, his expectation
of life at that age is 35-9/10 years.
4. LAW OF MORTALITY. By this term is expressed the proportion out of
any determinate number of human beings who enter on a given year of
age, that will die in that year. Every observation on the duration of
life presents certain numbers, which, by recorded facts, are found to
pass through each year of age, and also shows how many have died or
failed to pass through every year of age. Those numbers, by the rule
of three, are converted into the proportions who would die at each
age out of one million of persons, if such a number had commenced it.
Suppose, then, a million of persons to be in existence at the first
year of age; suppose a million to be in existence at the second year
of age; suppose a million to be in existence at the third year of
age; and in this manner suppose an equal number to be in existence at
the commencement of each and every year to the extreme term of human
life. Now, the proportions that by actual observation are found to
die at each and every year out of the million that were alive at the
commencement of it, form separately the law of mortality for each year,
and collectively for the whole of life.
5. DECREMENT OF LIFE. Assuming, as before, that a million of male
children are born alive (for the still-born must be excluded from
the calculation) if it be found that 180,492 would die in the first
year, it follows that the difference, namely, 819,508, will enter upon
the age of one year. Suppose the law of mortality indicate that the
proportion that will die, out of a million, between the age of one
and two, is 30,000; it is plain that the number who would die out of
819,508 will by the rule of three be 27,863, and consequently that the
residue, namely, 791,615, will remain alive, and so enter on the age
of two years. This method being pursued through each and every age to
the extreme term of life, when none of the original million survive,
the result is a table of mortality in the form in which it is commonly
presented in the works of writers on this branch of science. In the
table thus constructed there is a column containing the number of
living persons who, out of the original million, lived to enter upon
each and every year. Of this rank of numbers the difference between
each term and its next succeeding one, is the number who die in that
particular interval: that number is the measure of what is technically
called the decrement of life for that particular year, and the whole
of the decrements for each and every year taken collectively is termed
the decrement of life. The decrement of life, then, is not only not
the same as the law of mortality, but is carefully to be distinguished
from it. The law of mortality is derived from observing the number
who die out of one and the same number which is always supposed to
enter on each and every year. The decrement of life constitutes a
rank of numbers arising out of the successive deaths; that is, out of
the original million in the first year; out of the survivors of that
million in the second year; out of the survivors of those survivors in
the third year, and so on. In the first case the number of the living
is always the same; the number that die is the variable quantity: in
the second case the number of the living is the variable quantity,
while the number that die may remain pretty much the same for a
succession of years; and on casting the eye on the tables constructed
in the ordinary mode, it will be seen that the number often does remain
the same for a considerable series of years.
We have said that life is a fluctuating quantity. It fluctuates
in different countries at the same period; in the same country at
different periods; in the same country, at the same period, in
different places; in the same country, at the same period, in the
same place, among different classes; in the same country, at the same
period, in the same place, among the same class, at the different
determinate stages of life. Some few of these fluctuations, and
more especially the last, depend on the primary constitution of the
organization in which life itself has its seat, over which man has
little or no control. The greater part of them depend on external
and adventitious agencies over which man has complete control. Human
ignorance, apathy, and indolence, may render the duration of life, in
regard to large classes and entire countries, short; human knowledge,
energy and perseverance, may extend the duration of life far beyond
what is commonly imagined. It will be interesting and instructive to
select a few of the more striking examples of this from the records we
possess, few and imperfect as they are, in relation to this subject.
Of the duration of life in the earlier periods of the history of the
human race we know nothing with exactness, though there are incidental
statements which afford the means of deducing with some probability
the rate of mortality in particular situations. There has come down to
us one document through Domitius Ulpianus, a judge, who flourished in
the reign of Alexander Severus, which enables us to form a probable
conjecture at least of the opinion of the Roman people of the value
of life among the citizens of Rome in that age. It happened at Rome
as in other countries, that when an estate came into the possession
of an individual it was burthened with a provision for another person
during the life of the latter, a younger brother, for example. This
provision was called by the Romans an aliment. No estate, burthened
with such a provision, could be sold by the heir in possession, unless
the purchaser retained in his hands so much of the price as was deemed
adequate to secure the regular and continuous payment of the aliment.
This imposed upon the Romans the necessity of considering what the term
of life would probably be from and after any given age. What they did
conceive that term to be is stated in a document of Ulpianus, recorded
by Justinian, and given in the note below.[1] This document imports
that from infancy up to the age of
20 there should be allowed 30 years
From 20 to 25 " " " " 28 "
25 to 30 " " " " 25 "
30 to 35 " " " " 22 "
35 to 40 " " " " 20 "
————
From 50 to 55 " " " " 9 "
55 to 60 " " " " 7 "
And at all ages above 60 " " " " 5 "
But between 40 and 50, as many years were to be allowed as the age of
the party fell short of 60, deducting one year.
No clue has hitherto been obtained to the discovery of the real
meaning of this document. It is, however, highly probable that the
Romans had fallen on one of the two methods of measuring the value of
life already explained; namely, that termed the Probability of Life.
Of the two modes of determining the value of life, the probability was
more likely to occur to a Roman judge than the expectation. He had
no tables, no registers to guide him. What course, then, would he be
likely to take? Probably he would form a list of his own school-fellows
and others within his own knowledge, of the age, say, of twenty. By
prevailing on persons of his own age, on whose correctness he could
rely, to draw out similar lists, he might accumulate some thousand
names. In this list it is probable that the male sex alone would be
included, on account of the greater ease of ascertaining both their
exact age and the exact date of their death. For the same reason,
it is probable that the list would consist only of the nobility and
the inhabitants of towns. Having thus completed his list, the next
step would be to frame another list of all who died at the age of
twenty-one; and next, another list of all who died at the age of
twenty-two, and so on through each and every year of life. Now by
subtracting the number in the list, No. 1, that is, those who died
between twenty and twenty-one, from the number who originally started
at twenty, which, in other words, would be to find the decrement of
life, in the mode already explained, he would see how many lived to
commence the age of twenty-one, and so on, through each year of life.
But this would be to construct a table, showing the probable duration
of life; that is, a table from which he could observe at what advanced
age the number originally starting at twenty, and so on, came to
diminish to one-half, when it would naturally occur to him that it
is an equal wager whether such younger life would or would not be in
existence at the advanced age so ascertained. If we suppose this to
have been the method actually adopted by the Roman judge, and apply
it to the table of Ulpianus, the result obtained is consistent in an
extraordinary degree, and is highly interesting.
There is reason to believe that the mortality at present throughout
Europe, taking all countries together, including towns and villages,
and combining all classes into one aggregate, is one in thirty-six.
Süssmilch, a celebrated German writer, who flourished about the middle
of the last century, estimated it at this average at that period. The
result of all Mr. Finlaison's investigations is a conviction that the
average for the whole of Europe does not materially differ at the
present time. He has ascertained by an actual observation, that in the
year 1832 it was precisely this in the town of Ostend. Taking this
town, then, as the subject of comparison, it is found that the probable
duration of life among the male sex at Ostend exceeds the Roman
allowance by the following number of years; namely,
At the age of 17, the excess in round
numbers is 5 years.
22 " " 5
27 " " 5
32 " " 5
37 " " 3
42 " " 3
47 " " 5
52 " " 5
57 " " 4
62 " " 4
67 " " 2
72 " " 1
77 " " 0
But it is not improbable that the Romans made some deduction from
what they knew to be the real value of life among the citizens of
Rome, on account of the use of the money appropriated to the aliment,
which the purchaser of the estate retained in his own hands. It has
been shown that the average mortality at present at Ostend is one
in thirty-six; which is the same thing as to assert that a new-born
child at Ostend has an expectation of thirty-five and a half years
of life. The Roman allowance from birth, _à primâ ætate_, was thirty
years. If we suppose the Romans deducted from the real value of life
five and a half years for the interest of money, it would bring the
Roman allowance and the duration of life at Ostend to the same. The
like deduction at the age of seventeen would likewise bring the
probability of life in both cases to the same. It is not likely that
the Romans, without any record of the individual facts, and acting
only on a general principle of utility, the best they could find,
would make any variation for the intermediate years of childhood and
youth: consequently the presumption is, that the duration of life at
Rome, 1300 years ago, was very much the same as it is throughout Europe
at the present day. This estimate, however, for the reasons already
assigned, includes only the resident citizens of Rome, the male sex,
and the higher classes. What the mortality was at Rome among the lower
class, including the slaves—what it was in the Roman provinces, and in
the less civilized countries of that age—we have no means of forming
even a conjecture. What it was in Europe during the succeeding ages
of barbarism we do not know. In civilized Rome, the value of life
had probably reached a very high point; in barbarian Europe we may
be sure it fell to an exceedingly low point. From that low point, in
civilized Europe, it has been slowly but gradually rising, until, in
modern times, the whole mass of the European population has, to say
the very least, reached the highest point attained by the select class
in ancient Rome. But in some favoured spots in Europe, the whole mass
has advanced considerably beyond the select class in ancient Rome. In
England, for example, the expectation of life, at the present day, for
the mass of the people, as compared with that of the mass at Ostend,
which, as has been shown, is the same as that of the whole of Europe,
is as follows:—
At birth 41½ years.
At 12 46¾
17 41½
22 38⅜
27 35¼
32 32
37 28¾
42 25½
47 22¼
52 19
57 16
62 13
67 10½
72 8
77 6
It should be borne in mind that the females of the mass exceed in
duration the lives of the males at every age by two or three years.
The earliest statistical document bearing on the rate of mortality, in
any European nation, emerging from the state of barbarism, appears to
be a manuscript of the fourteenth century, relating to the mortality
of Paris, from which M. Villermé has calculated that the mortality
of Paris at that period was one in sixteen. How the individual facts
contained in this manuscript were collected, from which M. Villermé's
calculation is made, does not appear; and it makes the mortality so
excessive as to be altogether incredible. Yet a statement scarcely
less extraordinary is made with regard to Stockholm, in the middle of
the last century. From a table given by Dr. Price, vol. ii., p. 411,
it appears that, for all Sweden, between the years 1756 and 1763, the
expectation of life
Of males at birth, was Females,
33¼ years. 35¾ years.
while at the same time it was at Stockholm,
For males at birth, Females,
14¼ years. 18 years.
Whereas, for the twenty years preceding 1800, it was, for all Sweden,
at birth,
Males, Females,
34¾. 37½.
Hitherto, in all places which man has made his abode, noxious agents
have been present which act injuriously upon his body, tending to
disturb the actions of its economy, and ultimately to extinguish life.
All these noxious agents, of whatever name or quality, may be included
under the term Causes of Mortality. Inherent in the constitution of the
body are conservative powers, the tendency of which is to resist the
influence of these causes of mortality. The actual mortality at all
times will of course be according to the relative strength of these
destructive agents, and the relative weakness of these conservative
powers. There are states of the system tending to enfeeble these
conservative powers. Such states become tests, often exceedingly
delicate, of the presence and power of the destructive agents to which
the body is exposed; and such, more especially, are, the states of
parturition, infancy, and sickness. During the prevalence of these
states, in which the conservative powers of the body are weak, life
is destroyed by causes which do not prove mortal in other conditions
of the system. Accordingly, in every age and country, the rate of
mortality among its lying-in women, its infants and its sick, may
be taken as a measure of the degree in which the state of the whole
population is favourable or unfavourable to life.
The change that has taken place in the condition of lying-in women
during the last century in all the nations of Europe cannot be
contemplated without astonishment. The mortality of lying-in women in
France, at the Hôtel Dieu of Paris, in 1780, is stated to have been
one in 15. In 1817, for the whole kingdom of Prussia, including all
ranks, it was one in 112. In England, in the year 1750, at the British
Lying-in Hospital of London, it was one in 42; in 1780, it diminished
to one in 60; in the years between 1789 and 1798, it further decreased
to one in 288; in 1822, at the Lying-in Hospital of Dublin, it was no
more than one in 223; while during the last fifteen years at Lewes, a
healthy provincial town, out of 2410 cases there have been only two
deaths, that is, one in 1205. There is no reason to suppose that the
mortality in the state of parturition is less at Lewes than in any
other equally healthy country-town in England.
Equally striking is the proof of the diminished violence of the
prevalent causes of disease and death derived from the diminished
mortality of children, the vital power of resistance being always
comparatively weak in the human infant, and consequently, the agents
that prove destructive to life exerting their main force on the new
born, and on those of tender age. From mortuary tables, preserved with
considerable accuracy at Geneva since the year 1566, it appears that at
the time of the Reformation one-half of the children born died within
the sixth year; in the seventeenth century, not till within the twelfth
year; in the eighteenth century, not until the twenty-seventh year;
consequently, in the space of about three centuries, the probability
that a child born in Geneva would arrive at maturity has increased
fivefold. In the present day, at Ostend, only half of the new-born
children attain the age of thirty; whereas, in England, they attain the
age of forty-five.
No less remarkable is the progressive diminution of mortality among
the sick of all ages. Hippocrates has left a statement, which has come
down to our times, of the history and fate of forty-two cases of acute
disease. Out of this number, thirty-seven were cases of continued
fever; of these thirty-seven febrile cases twenty-one died, above half
of the whole. The remaining five were cases of local inflammation,
and of these four were fatal; thus, of the whole number of the sick
(forty-two), twenty-five were lost. Now, even in the Fever Hospital of
London, to which, for the most part, only the worst cases that occur
in the metropolis are sent, and even of these many not until so late
a period of the disease that all hope of recovery is extinct, the
mortality ranges in different years from one in six to one in twelve;
and for a period of ten consecutive years, it is no more than one in
seven; while, in the Dublin Fever Hospital, where most of the cases are
sent very early, the average mortality from 1804 to 1812 was one in
twelve. At the Imperial Hospital at Petersburg, the average mortality
for fourteen years, ending in 1817, was one in four and a half. In the
Charité of Berlin, on an average of twenty years, from 1796 to 1817,
it was one in six. At Dresden, it was one in seven; at Munich, it was
one in nine, the lowest of any hospital of equal size in Germany. In
the year 1685, the average mortality at St. Bartholomew's and St.
Thomas's Hospitals was from one in seven to one in ten. During the ten
years from 1773 to 1783, it decreased to one in fourteen. From 1803 to
1813, it was one in sixteen. The average for fifty years from 1764 to
1813, was one in fifteen. In the smaller towns, the mortality is still
less. It is less in Edinburgh and Dublin than in London; while in the
hospital at Bath during 1827, even among the physician's patients, the
mortality was only one in twenty. In the German provincial towns, the
diminution is still more remarkable. In the hospital at Gottingen, for
example, it is only one in twenty-one.
If the accuracy of these statements could be relied on, they
would not only afford striking illustrations of the well-known fact
that extraordinary differences prevail in the rate of mortality
in different places, at different periods, and under different
circumstances; but they would further prove that, during the last
century, a steady and progressive diminution of mortality has taken
place in all the countries of Europe. But of the truth of this there
is much more certain evidence than can be derived from calculations,
the trustworthiness of the data of which is not established, and
the correctness of the calculators not known. Both the fluctuations
of mortality and the increase in the value of life in the different
countries of Europe, from the earliest period when statistical facts
began to be collected and compared, are exhibited in a striking
point of view in the following table, drawn up by Mr. Finlaison. The
facts relating to selected lives and to the mass of the people are
distinguished from each other, in order that they may be contrasted.
The data are derived from the most authentic sources, and the
calculations are made by men of the highest authority.
Let it be conceived, that at each 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
of the following ages, viz. Yrs.Yrs.Yrs.Yrs.Yrs.Yrs.Yrs.Yrs.
The average duration of Human
Life of both sexes collectively
may thenceforward be assumed at
a maximum of[2] 23 19 16 13 11 8 6 3
By how many weeks does the
average duration which results
from the most authentic Tables
at present known fall short of
the maximum Term thus assumed?
Among the higher classes of people exclusively.
Answer. Name of the
Observer. Wks. Wks. Wks. Wks. Wks. Wks. Wks. Wks.
In England—
Among the Government
Annuitants, between
1775 and 1822
John Finlaison. 35 1 7 10 47 11 14 53
Among the Lives assured
at the Equitable Office,
between 1760 and 1834
Arthur Morgan. 119 83 87 81 96 33 10 27
Among the Nominees of
the Tontine of 1693--
between that year
and 1775
John Finlaison. 269 195 170 141 157 110 90 89
In France--
Among the Nominees of
the Tontine of 1693--
between that year and
1745 M. de Parcieux. 133 88 87 86 118 70 55 65
In Holland--
Among the Public
Annuitants, between
1615 and 1740
M. Kersseboom. 186 118 104 75 96 61 48 84
In regard to the mass of the people.
In Breslau in Silesia,
between 1700 and 1725,
Dr. Halley. 275 211 181 150 166 100 36 137
In Sweden,
between 1775
and 1795, M. Nicander,
and Mr. Milne. 207 161 164 146 156 94 60 60
In Northampton,
in England, between
1735 and 1780,
Dr. Price. 209 178 145 110 125 76 65 85
In Carlisle,
in England, between
1779 and 1787, Dr. Heysham,
and Mr. Milne. 98 74 86 63 94 52 26 46
In all England and
Wales, between
1811 and 1831,
John Finlaison. 100 59 65 58 87 48 37 49
In the town of Ostend,
in Flanders, between
1805 and 1832,
John Finlaison. 276 210 184 146 143 76 50 75
In all Belgium, between
1725 and 1832,
M. Quetelet. 183 133 133 117 112 84 50 61
Let us trace from this table the differences that have taken place, in
different countries at different periods, in the duration of life at
a given age. Let us take the age given in the first column, namely,
fifty. Assuming, then, the highest degree of longevity hitherto
attained at the age of fifty to be twenty-three years, it appears that,
between the years 1700 and 1725, the mass of the people in Breslau,
in Silesia, fell short of reaching this period by 275 weeks; the
inhabitants of the town of Ostend in Flanders, between 1805 and 1832,
by 276 weeks; the nominees of the tontine of England, between the years
1693 and 1775, by 269 weeks; the inhabitants of the town of Northampton
in England, between 1735 and 1780, by 209 weeks; the mass of the people
in Sweden, between 1775 and 1795, by 207 weeks; the public annuitants
of Holland, between 1615 and 1740, by 186 weeks; the inhabitants of
all Belgium, between 1725 and 1832, by 183 weeks; the persons assured
at the Equitable Office, between 1760 and 1834, by 119 weeks; the
inhabitants of all England and Wales, between 1811 and 1831, by 100
weeks; the English government annuitants, between 1775 and 1832, only
by 35 weeks.
From these statements, it appears that, towards the close of the
seventeenth century, the duration of life in England was considerably
less than in France: less even than in Holland nearly a century
earlier. Thus, the nominees of the tontine of France, between the years
1693 and 1745, at the age of fifty, according to M. De Parcieux, fell
short of the maximum longevity by 133 weeks; the public annuitants of
Holland, seventy-eight years before, namely, between the years 1615 and
1740, according to M. Kersseboom, fell short of the maximum longevity
by 186 weeks; whereas, the nominees of the tontine of England, between
the years 1693 and 1775, according to Mr. Finlaison, fell short of it
by 269 weeks; a difference nearly double that of Holland, and quite
double that of France in persons of the corresponding rank in society.
Since that period, surprising changes have taken place in all the
nations of Europe; but in none has the change been so great as in
England. From that period, when its mortality exceeded that of any
great and prosperous European country, its mortality has been steadily
diminishing, and at the present time the value of life is greater in
England than in any other country in the world. Not only has the value
of life been regularly increasing until it has advanced beyond that of
any country of which there is any record; but the remarkable fact is
established, that the whole mass of its people now live considerably
longer than its higher classes did in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Thus, by inspecting the preceding table, it will be seen
that between the years 1693 and 1715, the nominees of the tontine of
England, at the age of fifty, fell short of the maximum longevity
by 269 weeks; whereas, the mass of the people in all England and
Wales, between the years 1811 and 1831, fell short of it only by 100
weeks; the entire mass having not only reached the select class, but
absolutely advanced beyond it by 169 weeks.
There cannot be a more interesting and instructive thing than to
connect these facts with their causes. This will be attempted in a
subsequent part of this work; but the reader will be incomparably
better prepared for the investigation when the processes of life have
been explained, and the influence of physical and moral agents upon
them traced. And with this exposition we now proceed.