CONSEQUENCES OF ARMISTICE
The month of September had seen the arrival at Montreal of the
wretched prisoners from Detroit. Colonel Baynes wrote that they had
reached there in a very miserable state, having travelled without
halt. They had been sent to Fort William Henry on their way to
Quebec. The officers were to be on parole and the men confined in
the transports on the river. General Hull had been allowed to return
home on parole, and also most of the officers who had families with
them. "General Hull," Colonel Baynes said, "seemed to possess less
feeling and sense of shame than any man in his situation could be
supposed to have. The grounds on which he rests his defence are not
well founded, as he said he had not gunpowder enough for one day.
Sir George showed him the return of the large supply found in the
fort. It did not create a blush!"
The unfortunate and incapable general was tried by court-martial on
his return on parole to the United States. He was found guilty and
sentenced to death. His defence was that he had not provisions
enough to maintain the siege, that he expected the enemy would be
reinforced, and that he knew the savage ferocity of the Indians. His
sentence of death was remitted on account of his past {284} services,
but his name was struck off the roll of the army, and he passed the
remainder of his life in disgrace and obscurity.
Colonel Baynes reported in September that about half of the 8th, or
King's Regiment, three hundred men, were at Côteau du Lac and the
Isle aux Noix. These two places were the keys of Lower Canada, the
former commanding the navigation of the St. Lawrence at its entrance
into Lake Francis, the latter, in the Richelieu River, being the
barrier of Lower Canada from the Champlain frontier. In the conflict
of the eighteenth century these places had been much thought of by
French engineers. They were, after the conquest, fortified by
General Haldimand. Colonel Baynes was confident, he wrote, that the
British could bring as many men into the field as the Americans, and
of superior stuff, as the militia had improved so much in discipline,
and therefore in spirit and confidence. Montreal, he thought, could
turn out two thousand volunteer militia very tolerably drilled.
A naval success on the Atlantic on August 19th, when H.M.S.
_Guerrière_ was taken by the _Constitution_, had gone far to console
the Americans for their discomfiture at Detroit, and they were
hopefully preparing for another invasion, in this instance on the
Niagara frontier, where Major-General Van Rensselaer[1] had assembled
an army of over six {285} thousand men, with headquarters at the
village of Lewiston, opposite Queenston.
[Sidenote: Dearborn's command]
At Plattsburg there were about five thousand troops, half of them
regulars under the immediate command of Major-General Dearborn, who
wrote on September 26th to General Van Rensselaer: "At all events we
must calculate on possessing Upper Canada before the winter sets in."
Ex-President Jefferson wrote: "I fear that Hull's surrender has been
more than the mere loss of a year to us. Perhaps, however, the
patriotic efforts from Kentucky and Ohio by recalling the British
force to its upper posts, may yet give time to Dearborn to strike a
blow below. Effective possession of the river from Montreal to
Chaudiere, which is practicable, would give us the upper country at
our leisure."
So spoke the generals and politicians. In the meantime, courteous
messages were passing from Major-General Van Rensselaer to
Major-General Brock as to the disposition of the prisoners of war,
and of the women and children who had accompanied them from Detroit.
General Brock writes to the American general: "With much regret I
have perceived very heavy firing from both sides of the river. I am,
however, given to understand that on all occasions it commenced on
your side, and from the circumstance of the flag of truce which I did
myself the honour to send over yesterday, having been repeatedly
fired on while in the act of crossing {286} the river, I am inclined
to give full credit to the correctness of the information. You may
rest assured on my repeating my most positive orders against the
continuance of a practice which can only be injurious to individuals,
without promoting the object which both our nations may have in view."
Another letter from John Lovett,--secretary to General Van
Rensselaer--to Joseph Alexander, gives an idea of the state of
affairs from the American point of view, and indirectly bears
testimony to the unceasing labour and watchfulness of the British
general:--
_Headquarters, Lewiston, September 32nd, 1812._ "The enemy appears to
be in a state of preparedness to give or receive an attack. Every
day or two they make some movement which indicates a disposition to
attack us immediately. The night before last every ship they have on
Lake Ontario came into the mouth of Niagara. Then, to be sure, we
thought it time to look out for breakers. But yesterday, when
Colonel Van Rensselaer went over with a flag to Fort George, there
was not a ship in sight nor a general officer there; where gone we
know not. Notwithstanding the most positive orders on both sides,
our sentries have kept up almost a constant warfare for a month past.
On the bank of the river musket balls are about as thick as
whip-poor-wills on a summer evening. We are promised reinforcements
by companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, {287} and I might
almost say armies, but not a single man has joined us in some weeks.
Besides our men here are getting down very fast. The morning's
report of sick was one hundred and forty-nine. Give Mrs. Lovett the
inclosed. It contains an impression of General Brock's seal, with
his most appropriate motto, 'He who guards never sleeps.'"
[Sidenote: The Niagara frontier]
Although this did not happen to be the general's motto, it very well
expressed his attitude. That forty miles of frontier to defend with
his limited force, was a problem ever present to him. The American
army on the Niagara frontier consisted of five thousand two hundred
men of the New York militia, three hundred field and light artillery,
eight hundred of the 6th, 13th and 23rd Regiments of Foot (regulars),
in all six thousand three hundred men, stationed between Niagara and
Lewiston, under the command of Major-General Van Rensselaer. At
Black Rock and Buffalo, twenty-eight miles distant, were one thousand
six hundred and forty regulars three hundred and eighty-six militia
and two hundred and fifty sailors under the command of
Brigadier-General Smyth. Four hundred Seneca Indians had also joined
the United States forces.
Major-General Brock had under his immediate command part of the 41st
and 49th Regiments, a few companies of militia and three hundred
Indians, a force in all of about fifteen hundred men, dispersed
between Fort Erie, opposite Black Rock, and Fort George, thirty-six
miles distant. Only a {288} small number could be available at any
one point. With unwearied diligence the British commander watched
the motions of the enemy, but under the circumstances he knew that it
was impossible to prevent the landing of the hostile troops,
especially if their operations were carried out at night. There was
one point in his favour, the want of accord between the American
generals. Smyth thought the crossing should be made above the Falls,
Van Rensselaer favoured the attack on the river below.
A letter to Brock from Sir George Prevost of September 25th, showed
that he still held the idea of simply being on the defensive, and had
a slavish fear of doing anything that might draw on himself blame
from the English ministry. He wrote: "It no longer appears by your
letter of the 13th that you consider the enemy's operations on the
Niagara frontier indicative of active operations. If the government
of America inclines to defensive measures, I can only ascribe its
determination to two causes, the first is the expectation of such
overtures from us as will lead to a suspension of hostilities
preparatory to negotiations for peace; the other arises from having
ascertained by experience our ability in the Canadas to resist the
attack of a tumultuary force. I agree in opinion with you that so
wretched is the organization and discipline of the American army,
that at this moment much might be effected against them; but as the
government at home could derive no substantial advantage from any
disgrace we {289} might inflict on them, whilst the more important
concerns of the country are committed in Europe, I again request you
will steadily pursue that policy which shall appear to you best
calculated to promote the dwindling away of such a force by its own
inefficient means."
These were certainly rather enigmatical words from the
commander-in-chief, and calculated rather to dampen than to inspire
the ardour of the defenders of the country. The evil effect of the
policy of inaction was soon apparent.
[Sidenote: The "Detroit" and "Caledonia"]
On October 9th the brig _Detroit_ (late United States brig _Adams_),
and the North-West Company's brig _Caledonia_ (one hundred tons),
having arrived at Fort Erie the preceding day from Detroit, were
boarded and carried off at dawn by Lieutenant Elliott of the American
navy with a hundred seamen and soldiers in two large boats. This
officer was stationed at the time at Black Rock, superintending the
equipment of some schooners purchased for service on Lake Erie. Had
it not been for the defensive measures forced on General Brock by the
commander-in-chief, these schooners would probably have been
destroyed. The two British vessels contained forty prisoners, some
cannon and small arms captured at Detroit, and also a valuable lot of
furs in the _Caledonia_ belonging to the South-West Company. The
Americans who attacked the two brigs far out-numbered the crews and
militia on board, who amounted {290} in all to sixty-eight men.
After the capture Lieutenant Elliott ran the _Caledonia_ close under
the batteries at Black Rock, but on account of the heavy fire from
Fort Erie he was compelled to abandon the _Detroit_ at Squaw Island.
Here she was boarded by a subaltern detachment from Fort Erie, which
had come to the rescue. Unfortunately their efforts were unavailing,
and the Americans set her on fire.
[Sidenote: The capture]
General Brock's letter relating to the disaster is dated Fort George,
October 11th, 1812: "I had scarcely closed my despatch to your
Excellency, of the 9th, when I was suddenly called away to Fort Erie,
in consequence of a bold, and I regret to say, successful attack by
the enemy on His Majesty's ship _Detroit_ and the private brig
_Caledonia_, which had both arrived the preceding day from
Amherstburg. It appears by every account I have been able to
collect, that a little before day a number of boats, full of men,
dropped down with the current unobserved, boarded both vessels at the
same moment, and cutting their cables were proceeding with them to
the American shore, when Major Ormsby who witnessed the transaction,
directed the batteries to open upon them, and soon compelled the
enemy to abandon the _Detroit_, which grounded about the centre of
Squaw Island, a little more than a mile below Black Rock. She was
then boarded by a party of the 49th Regiment, but as no anchor
remained, and being otherwise unprovided {291} with every means by
which she could be hauled off, the officers, throwing her guns
overboard, after sustaining a smart fire of musketry, decided to quit
her. A private, who is accused of getting drunk, and a prisoner of
war, who was unable from his wounds to escape, with about twenty
prisoners brought by the _Detroit_ from Amherstburg, remained,
however, behind; these it became necessary to remove before the
vessel could be destroyed, and Cornet Pell, major of the Provincial
Cavalry, offered his services. Being unfortunately wounded as he was
getting on board, and falling back into the boat, a confusion arose,
during which the boat drifted from the vessel, leaving on board two
of the 41st who had previously ascended. In the meantime the
_Caledonia_ was secured by the enemy, and a cargo of furs belonging
to the South-West Company landed. I reached the spot soon after
sunset, and intended to have renewed the attempt to recover the
_Detroit_, which I had every prospect of accomplishing, assisted by
the crew of the _Lady Prevost_, which vessel had anchored a short
time before, but before the necessary arrangements could be made, the
enemy boarded her, and in a few minutes she was seen in flames. This
event is particularly unfortunate, and may reduce us to incalculable
distress.
"The enemy is making every exertion to gain a naval superiority on
both lakes, which if they accomplish I do not see how we can retain
the {292} country. More vessels are fitting out for war on the other
side of Squaw Island, which I should have attempted to destroy but
for your Excellency's repeated instructions to forbear. Now such a
force is collected for their protection as will render every
operation against them very hazardous. The manner our guns were
served yesterday points out the necessity of an increase, if
possible, of artillerymen to our present small number of regulars.
The militia evinced a good spirit, but fired without much effect.
The enemy, however, must have lost some men, and it is only wonderful
that in a contest of a whole day, no life was lost on our side. The
fire of the enemy was incessant, but badly directed till the close of
the day, when it began to improve.
"Lieutenant Rolette, who commanded the _Detroit_, had, and I believe
deservedly, the character of a brave, attentive officer. His vessel
must, however, have been surprised--an easy operation when she lay at
anchor, and I have reason to suspect that this consideration was not
sufficiently attended to by the officers commanding on board and on
shore. We have not only sustained a heavy loss in the vessel, but
likewise in the cargo, which consisted of four 12-pounders, a large
quantity of shot and about two hundred muskets, all of which were
intended for Kingston and Prescott. The only consolation is that she
escaped the enemy, whose conduct did not entitle him to so rich a
prize.
"The enemy has brought some boats overland {293} from Schlosser to
the Niagara River, and made an attempt last night to carry off the
guard over the store at Queenston. I shall refrain as long as
possible under your Excellency's positive injunctions, from every
hostile act, although sensible that each day's delay gives him an
advantage."
[Sidenote: Colonel Procter]
On the same day General Brock wrote to Colonel Procter, who was still
in command on the Detroit frontier. After various instructions the
letter concludes as follows: "An active, interesting scene is going
to commence with you. I am perfectly at ease as to the result,
provided we can manage the Indians and keep them attached to your
cause, which, in fact, is theirs. The fate of the province is in
your hands. Judging by every appearance we are not to remain long
idle in this quarter. Were it not for the positive injunctions of
the commander of the forces I should have acted with greater
decision. This forbearance may be productive of ultimate good but I
doubt its policy--perhaps we have not the means of judging correctly.
You will, of course, adopt a very different line of conduct. The
enemy must be kept in a state of constant ferment. Nothing new at
Montreal. Lord Wellington has totally defeated Marmont, near
Salamanca."
[1] General Van Rensselaer, "padron" of New York, was not a
professional soldier, but relied in military matters on the advice of
his cousin and adjutant, Colonel Van Rensselaer.
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