BROWNSTOWN AND MAGUAGA
The garrison at Amherstburg consisted of a subaltern detachment of
the Royal Artillery, three hundred men of the 41st, and about the
same number of militia. Captain Chambers, with fifty men of the
41st, had been sent to the Moravian town on the river Thames for the
purpose of collecting the militia and Indians there, and advancing on
the left flank of the enemy. Forty more had been sent to Long Point
to collect the militia in that neighbourhood. Sixty of the 41st had
just arrived with Colonel Procter at Amherstburg. General Hull,
after issuing his futile proclamation, seems to have remained closely
in his quarters at Sandwich, evidently afraid to venture too far from
Fort Detroit. He had not met with the encouragement he expected from
the settlers of Essex and Kent. Although some malcontents had joined
his standard, the majority of the inhabitants had remained firm in
their allegiance to Great Britain. An advance upon Fort Malden
(Amherstburg) had been expected, but three detachments of Americans
on three successive days had been foiled in their attempt to cross
the river Canard, scarcely four miles from that place. On July 22nd
General Hull {236} wrote to Washington: "If Malden were in our
possession, I could inarch the army to Niagara or York in a very
short time." Sir George Prevost on the 27th of the same month had
written to Brock: "The possession of Malden, which I consider means
Amherstburg, appears a favourable object with the government of the
United States. I sincerely hope you will disappoint them."
The fort of Amherstburg could not, from the description given of it,
have sustained a siege. "Quadrangle in form, four bastions alone
flanked a dry ditch, offering little obstacle to a determined enemy.
This passed, there was but a single line of picketing, perforated
with loopholes for musketry, and supported by a slight breastwork.
All the buildings within were of wood, covered with pine shingles of
extreme thinness."[1] Colonel St. George, who was in command there,
well knew the disadvantage of awaiting the enemy in this position,
and sallied out with his small garrison to guard the approaches to
the river Canard. In one of the slight skirmishes that occurred
between his troops and an advance body of American cavalry and
infantry, the first blood was shed in the war of 1812. It was that
of a private of the 41st, named Hancock, who was killed when
defending a bridge, while his companion Dean was curried off a
prisoner to Detroit.[2] {237} Their determined resistance gave time
for a reinforcement of Indians led by Tecumseh to arrive, whose
appearance and wild shouts carried such a panic among the Americans
that they retired in disorder. This was Tecumseh's first exploit as
an ally. As soon as Colonel Procter arrived he sent the chief with a
band of Indians and a detachment of the 41st under Major Muir across
the river to Brownstown, a place about twenty-five miles south of
Detroit, and nearly opposite Amherstburg. The object of the
expedition was to intercept a body of the enemy, which was marching
from Detroit as an escort for the mail, and also to meet and convoy a
supply of provisions from the river Raisin. The American troops
consisted of about two hundred Ohio volunteers, under Major Van
Horne. Tecumseh with about twenty-five Indians, learning from their
scouts the route the Americans had taken, formed an ambuscade three
miles from Brownstown and lined the thick woods on either side of the
road. When Van Horne with the mounted riflemen {238} appeared, the
Indians opened a deadly fire, killing twenty of the number, including
five officers, and wounding as many more. The Americans sought
safety in flight, and the despatches and correspondence from Detroit
fell into the hands of Tecumseh, who lost only one man in the
encounter. The provision train, with cattle and other supplies for
Detroit, in charge of Captain Brush, was also intercepted by the
Indians. This was most discouraging for General Hull, who received
all his provisions and supplies from Ohio by the rivers Raisin and
Miami. News of the reverse followed quickly on the news of the loss
of Michilimackinac, which Hull said let loose the northern hive of
Indians on his frontier. So discouraged was he that on July 7th and
8th he abandoned Sandwich in order to concentrate his forces at
Detroit.
[Sidenote: Maguaga]
He then sent a detachment of six hundred men with some artillery to
dislodge the British from Brownstown. These met at Maguaga, fourteen
miles below Detroit, a company of the 41st under Major Muir, with
about sixty militia and two hundred Indians. A sharp engagement
ensued, in which the Americans were successful, and the British had
to retire to their boats. Major Richardson, who was present as a
subaltern on this occasion, has given a detailed account of this
skirmish, to which the Americans seem to attach undue importance. He
says:--
"On the morning of Sunday, the 9th, the wild {239} and distant cry of
our Indian scouts gave us to understand that the enemy were
advancing. In the course of ten minutes the Indians appeared issuing
from the wood, bounding like wild deer chased by the huntsman, and
uttering that peculiar shout which is known among themselves as the
'news cry.' From them we ascertained that a strong column of the
enemy, cavalry and infantry, were on their march to attack us, but
that the difficulty of transporting their guns rendered it improbable
that they could reach our position before night, although then only
at a distance of eight miles. It being instantly decided on to meet
them, the detachment was speedily under arms and on its march for
Maguaga, a small Indian village distant about a league. Having taken
up a position about a quarter of a mile beyond Maguaga, our
dispositions of defence were speedily made, the rustling of the
leaves alone breaking on the silence which reigned throughout our
line. Following the example of the Indians, we lay reclined on the
ground, in order to avoid being perceived until within a few yards of
the enemy. While awaiting in this manner the approach of the column,
our little force was increased by the arrival of Lieutenant Bullock
of the 41st Grenadiers, who, with a small detachment of twenty men of
his own company, twenty Light Infantry, and twenty Battalion men, had
been urged forward by General Brock from the headquarters of the
regiment then stationed at Fort George, for the {240} purpose of
reinforcing the little garrison of Amherstburg, and who, having
reached their destination the preceding day, had been despatched by
Colonel Procter to strengthen us. Shortly the report of a single
shot echoed through the wood, and the instant afterwards the loud and
terrific yells of the Indians, followed by a heavy and desultory
fire, apprised us that they were engaged. The action then became
general along our line, and continued for half an hour without
producing any material advantage, when, unluckily, a body of Indians
that had been detached to a small wood about five hundred yards
distant from our right, were taken by the troops for a corps of the
enemy endeavouring to turn their flank. In vain we called out to
them that they were our Indians. The fire which should have been
reserved for their foes was turned upon their friends, who, falling
into the same error, returned it with equal spirit. The fact was,
they had been compelled to retire before a superior force, and the
movement made by them had given rise to the error. Closely pressed
in front by an almost invisible foe, and on the point of being taken
in the rear as was falsely imagined, the troops were at length
compelled to yield to circumstance and number.
[Sidenote: The retreat]
"Although our retreat in consequence of this unfortunate
misapprehension, commenced in some disorder, this was soon restored,
when Major Muir, who had been wounded early in the engagement,
succeeded in rallying his men and forming them on {241} the brow of a
hill which commanded a short and narrow bridge intersecting the high
road and crossing a morass, over which the enemy's guns must
necessarily pass. This was about a quarter of a mile in the rear of
the position we had previously occupied. Here we remained at least
fifteen minutes, when, finding that the Americans did not make their
appearance as expected, Major Muir, whose communication with Tecumseh
had been cut off, and who heard some smart firing in the woods beyond
his left, naturally inferred that the enemy were pushing the Indians
in that quarter with a view of turning his flank, gaining the high
road in our rear, and thus cutting off our retreat. The order was
then given to retire, which we certainly did at the double quick,
without being followed by the enemy, who suffered us to gain our
boats without further molestation....
"In this skirmish we had first an opportunity of perceiving the
extreme disadvantage of opposing regular troops to the enemy in the
woods. Accustomed to the use of the rifle from his infancy, dwelling
in a measure amid forests with the intricacies of which he is wholly
acquainted, and possessing the advantage of a dress which renders him
almost undistinguishable to the eye of a European, the American
marksman enters with comparative security into a contest with the
English soldier, whose glaring habiliment and accoutrements are
objects too conspicuous to be missed, while his {242} utter ignorance
of a mode of warfare in which courage and discipline are of no avail,
renders the struggle for mastery even more unequal. The principal
armies to which the Right Division was opposed during the war
consisted not of regular and well disciplined troops, but levies of
men taken from the forests of Ohio and Kentucky, scarcely inferior as
riflemen to the Indians. Dressed in woollen frocks of a gray colour,
and trained to cover their bodies behind the trees from which they
fired, without exposing more of their persons than was absolutely
necessary for their aim, they afforded us on more than one occasion
the most convincing proofs that without the assistance of the Indian
warriors the defence of so great a portion of western Canada as was
entrusted to the charge of the numerically feeble Right Division
would have proved a duty of great difficulty and doubt."
[Sidenote: Indian allies]
In this engagement at Maguaga, the American forces consisted,
according to their own report, of the 4th United States Infantry,
except one company left at Sandwich, a small detachment of the 1st
Infantry, and some artillerymen, in all about three hundred regulars,
and sixty men of the Michigan Militia, forty Dragoons, and three
hundred riflemen of the Ohio Volunteers. The British force was about
a hundred men of the 41st Regiment, the reinforcement of sixty men of
the Grenadier Company under Lieutenant Bullock, and a few
militia--Richardson says forty or fifty. The number {243} of Indians
is variously stated. It was probably about two hundred, although in
the American account they give the number as four hundred and
fifty.[3] As an offset to the reverse of Maguaga, Lieutenant
Rolette, on August 7th, with boats from the _Queen Charlotte_ and
_Hunter_, had attacked and captured a convoy of eleven _bateaux_ on
their way from Maguaga to Detroit, having on board fifty wounded men
from Brownstown, some prisoners, and a quantity of provisions and
baggage.
The news of the capture of Michilimackinac was the means of largely
augmenting Tecumseh's forces, for as soon as he heard of its downfall
he despatched runners to all his associate tribes, bidding them
assemble at Fort Malden immediately, and telling them that the
Americans, by not marching on Malden and by the easy discomfiture of
several detachments, had shown they would not fight; that the braves
should come forward with all speed so as to participate in the
capture of the army and share in the plunder, which would be great.
His appeal was promptly responded to, and by August 15th seven
hundred warriors had joined him.
[1] Richardson in "The War of 1812."
[2] The brave conduct of the two privates was thus noticed in a
general order, dated Quebec, August 6th: "The commander of the forces
takes great pleasure in also announcing to the troops that the enemy
under Brigadier-General Hull have been repulsed in three attacks made
on the 18th, 19th and 20th of last month upon part of the garrison of
Amherstburg, on the river Canard, in which attacks His Majesty's 41st
Regiment have particularly distinguished themselves. In justice to
that corps, His Excellency wishes particularly to call the attention
of the troops to the heroism and self-devotion displayed by two
privates, who being left as sentinels when the party to which they
belonged had retired, contrived to maintain their station against the
whole of the enemy's force, until they both fell, when one of them,
whose arm had been broken, again raising himself, opposed with his
bayonet those advancing against him until overwhelmed by numbers."
[3] Although the skirmish at Maguaga ended in the retreat of the
British, their loss in killed and wounded was much less than that of
the enemy. General Hull's despatch of August 13th puts the American
loss at eighteen killed and sixty-one wounded. Colonel Procter's
despatch of the 11th says the British loss including regulars,
militia, and Indians, was six killed, twenty-one wounded, two missing.
{244}
[Illustration: OPERATIONS ON THE DETROIT FRONTIER 1812-13.]
{245}