Marine Corps Historical Collection

_2dLt Carl R. Davidson (seen_ circa _September 1941), VMF-211’s

assistant gunnery officer, was awarded a Navy Cross posthumously for

courageously and unhesitatingly attacking an overwhelming number of

Kates on 21 December._]

Nevertheless, all of the planes from _Hiryu_ and _Soryu_ returned

undamaged to their decks. Then, Abe’s force steamed south to be in a

position 200 miles from Wake the next day to provide an antisubmarine

screen for Kajioka’s ships.

At Pearl Harbor, Vice Admiral Pye read with concern Cunningham’s

dispatch reporting the raid by carrier planes. The Japanese had

inserted a dangerous new factor into the equation. Pye deemed it

essential “to insure [the] defense of the [Hawaiian] islands.” With

the Army’s Hawaiian defense in shambles, and the battleship strength

significantly reduced by the Japanese attack on 7 December, he believed

that the Pacific Fleet’s three carriers constituted the best protection

for Oahu. After he considered the evidence of increased Japanese air

activity in the Marshalls, with one, or perhaps two, carrier groups

in that vicinity, as well as “evidence of extensive offshore lookout

and patrol,” he decided that a surprise raid on Jaluit could not be

conducted successfully. Thus, Pye reluctantly abandoned the proposed

carrier raid on the Marshalls.

While he allowed the efforts to relieve Wake to continue, Pye warned

Fletcher not to get within 200 miles of the atoll, and directed Brown

to move north with Task Force 11 to support Task Force 14. That

decided, on the afternoon of 20 December, he radioed his decision to

the Navy Department.

With efforts to relieve Wake progressing, CinCPac radioed Cunningham on

the morning of the 22d (21st at Pearl Harbor) and asked him to report

the condition of the aircraft runways. He also requested to be informed

immediately of any significant developments.

At 0800 on 22 December, 39 planes from the _Soryu_ and the _Hiryu_

ascended and headed into the gray skies above the beleaguered atoll.

Their pilots expected to meet American fighters.

Second Lieutenant Davidson took off from Wake at 1000, cranked up his

landing gear, and set out on the regular midday patrol. Engine trouble

prevented Captain Freuler from getting aloft until 1030.

Shortly before noon, Davidson, patrolling to the north of Wake, radioed

Freuler, then flying to the south of the atoll, informing him of

approaching enemy aircraft. In spite of the odds, both men gave battle.

[Illustration:

A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island · 第 16 / 33 题