for eternal life by the tenor of the covenant of works. Though this
{b213} ruler’s conscience was not thoroughly satisfied with what he had
done, but imagined he might, for all that, fall short of eternal life,
yet he still hugs the imagination of obtaining it by doing (ver. 17);
“What shall I do, that I may inherit eternal life?” This is natural
to corrupted man. Cain thought to be accepted for the sake of his
sacrifice; and, when he found his mistake, he was so weary of seeking
happiness by doing, that he would court misery by murdering. All men
set too high a value upon their own services. Sinful creatures would
fain make God a debtor to them, and be purchasers of felicity: they
would not have it conveyed to them by God’s sovereign bounty, but by
an obligation of justice upon the value of their works. The heathens
thought God would treat men according to the merit of their services;
and it is no wonder they should have this sentiment, when the Jews,
educated by God in a wiser school, were wedded to that notion. The
Pharisees were highly fond of it: it was the only argument they used
in prayer for Divine blessing. You have one of them boasting of his
frequency in fasting, and his exactness in paying his tithes (Luke
xix. 12); as if God had been beholden to him, and could not, without
manifest wrong, deny him his demand. And Paul confesseth it to be his
own sentiment before his conversion; he accounted this “righteousness
of the law gain to him” (Phil. iii. 7); he thought, by this, to make
his market with God. The whole nation of the Jews affected it,[949]
compassing sea and land to make out a righteousness of their own, as
the Pharisees did to make proselytes. The Papists follow their steps,
and dispute for justification by the merit of works, and find out
another key of works of supererogation, to unlock heaven’s gate, than
whatever the Scripture informed us of. It is from hence, also, that men
are so ready to make faith, as a work, the cause of our justification.
Man foolishly thinks he hath enough to set up himself after he hath
proved bankrupt, and lost all his estate. This imagination is born with
us, and the best Christians may find some sparks of it in themselves,
when there are springings up of joy in their hearts, upon the more
close performance of one duty than of another; as if they had wiped off
their scores, and given God a satisfaction for their former neglects.
“We have forsaken all, and followed thee,” was the boast of his
disciples: “What shall we have, therefore?” was a branch of this root
(Matt. xix. 27). Eternal life is a gift, not by any obligation of
right, but an abundance of goodness; it is owing, not to the dignity
of our works, but the magnificent bounty of the Divine nature, and
must be sued for by the title of God’s promise, not by the title of
the creature’s services. We may observe,
3. How insufficient are some assents to Divine truth, and
some expressions of affection to Christ, without the practice of
christian precepts. This man addressed Christ with a profound respect,
acknowledging him more than an ordinary person, with a more reverential
carriage than we read any of his disciples paid to him in the days of
his flesh; he fell down at his feet, kissed his knees, as the custom
was, when they would testify the great respect they had to any eminent
person, especially to their rabbins. All this some think to be {b214}
included in the word γονυπετήσας.[950] He seems to acknowledge him the
Messiah by giving him the title of “Good,” a title they did not give
to their doctors of the chair; he breathes out his opinion, that he was
able to instruct him beyond the ability of the law; he came with a more
than ordinary affection to him, and expectation of advantage from him,
evident by his departing sad, when his expectations were frustrated by
his own perversity; it was a sign he had a high esteem of him from whom
he could not part without marks of his grief. What was the cause of his
refusing the instructions he pretended such an affection to receive?
He had possessions in the world. How soon do a few drops of worldly
advantages quench the first sparks of an ill‑grounded love to Christ!
How vain is a complimental and cringing devotion, without a supreme
preference of God, and valuation of Christ above every outward
allurement. We may observe this,
4. We should never admit anything to be ascribed to us, which is
proper to God. “Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one,
that is, God.” If you do not acknowledge me God, ascribe not to me the
title of Good. It takes off all those titles which fawning flatterers
give to men, “mighty,” “invincible” to princes, “holiness” to the
pope. We call one another good, without considering how evil; and wise,
without considering how foolish; mighty, without considering how weak,
and knowing, without considering how ignorant. No man, but hath more of
wickedness than goodness; of ignorance than knowledge; of weakness than
strength. God is a jealous God of his own honor; he will not have the
creature share with him in his royal titles. It is a part of idolatry
to give men the titles which are due to God; a kind of a worship of
the creature together with the Creator. Worms will not stand out, but
assault Herod in his purple, when he usurps the prerogative of God, and
prove stiff and invincible vindicators of their Creator’s honor, when
summoned to arms by the Creator’s word (Acts xii. 22, 23).
_Doctrine._ The observation which I intend to prosecute, is this:――Pure
and perfect goodness is only the royal prerogative of God; goodness is
a choice perfection of the Divine nature. This is the true and genuine
character of God; he is good, he is goodness, good in himself, good
in his essence, good in the highest degree, possessing whatsoever is
comely, excellent, desirable; the highest good, because first good:
whatsoever is perfect goodness, is God; whatsoever is truly goodness
in any creature, is a resemblance of God.[951] All the names of God are
comprehended in this one of good. All gifts, all variety of goodness,
are contained in him as one common good. He is the efficient cause
of all good, by an overflowing goodness of his nature; he refers
all things to himself, as the end, for the representation of his own
goodness; “Truly God is good” (Ps. lxxiii. 1). Certainly, it is an
undoubted truth; it is written in his works of nature, and his acts of
grace (Exod. xxxiv. 6). “He is abundant in goodness.” And every thing
is a memorial, not of some few sparks, but of his greater goodness (Ps.
cxlv. 7). This is often celebrated in the Psalms, and men invited more
than once, to sing forth the praises of it (Ps. cvii. 8, 15, 21, 31).
It may better be admired than {b215} sufficiently spoken of, or thought
of, as it merits. It is discovered in all his works, as the goodness of
a tree in all its fruits; it is easy to be seen, and more pleasant to
be contemplated. In general,
1. All nations in the world have acknowledged God good; Τὸ Ἀγαθὸν was
one of the names the Platonists expressed him by; and good and God, are
almost the same words in our language. All as readily consented in the
notion of his goodness, as in that of his Deity. Whatsoever divisions
or disputes there were among them in the other perfections of God,
they all agreed in this without dispute, saith Synesius. One calls him
Venus, in regard of his loveliness.[952] Another calls him Ἐρώτα love,
as being the band which ties all things together.[953] No perfection
of the Divine nature is more eminently, nor more speedily visible in
the whole book of the creation, than this. His greatness shines not
in any part of it, where his goodness doth not as gloriously glister:
whatsoever is the instrument of his work, as his power; whatsoever is
the orderer of his work, as his wisdom; yet nothing can be adored as
the motive of his work, but the goodness of his nature. This only could
induce him to resolve to create: his wisdom then steps in, to dispose
the methods of what he resolved; and his power follows to execute,
what his wisdom hath disposed, and his goodness designed. His power in
making, and his wisdom in ordering, are subservient to his goodness;
and this goodness, which is the end of the creation, is as visible to
the eyes of men, as legible to the understanding of men, as his power
in forming them, and his wisdom in tuning them. And as the book of
creation, so the records of his government must needs acquaint them
with a great part of it, when they have often beheld him, stretching
out his hand, to supply the indigent, relieve the oppressed, and punish
the oppressors, and give them, in their distresses, what might “fill
their hearts with food and gladness.” It is this the apostle (Rom. i.
20, 21), means by his Godhead, which he links with his eternity and
power, as clearly seen in the things that are made, as in a pure glass,
“For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world, are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his
eternal power and Godhead.” The Godhead which comprehends the whole
nature of God as discoverable to his creatures, was not known, yea,
was impossible to be known, by the works of creation. There had been
nothing then reserved to be manifested in Christ: but his goodness,
which is properly meant there by his Godhead, was as clearly visible
as his power. The apostle upbraids them with their unthankfulness, and
argues their inexcusableness, because the arm of his power in creation
made no due impression of fear upon their spirits, nor the beams of
his goodness wrought in them sufficient sentiments of gratitude. Their
not glorifying God, was a contempt of the former; and their not being
thankful, was a slight of the latter. God is the object of honor,
as he is powerful, and the object of thankfulness properly as he is
bountiful. All the idolatry of the heathens, is a clear testimony of
their common sentiment of the goodness of God: since the more eminently
useful any person was in some advantageous invention for the benefit
of mankind, they thought he {b216} merited a rank in the number of
their deities. The Italians esteemed Pythagoras a god, because he
was φιλανθρωπότατος:[954] to be good and useful, was an approximation
to the Divine nature. Hence it was, that when the Lystrians saw a
resemblance of the Divine goodness in the charitable and miraculous
cure of one of their crippled citizens, presently they mistook Paul
and Barnabas for gods, and inferred from thence their right to divine
worship, inquiring into nothing else but the visible character of
their goodness and usefulness, to capacitate them for the honor of
a sacrifice (Acts xiv. 8‒11). Hence it was, that they adored those
creatures that were a common benefit, as the sun and moon, which must
be founded upon a pre‑existent notion, not only of a Being, but of
the bounty and goodness of God, which was naturally implanted in them,
and legible in all God’s works. And the more beneficial anything was
to them, and the more sensible advantages they received from it, the
higher station they gave it in the rank of their idols, and bestowed
upon it a more solemn worship: an absurd mistake to think everything
that was sensibly good to them, to be God, clothing himself in such
a form to be adored by them. And upon this account the Egyptians
worshipped God under the figure of an ox; and the East Indians, in some
parts of their country, deify a heifer, intimating the goodness of God,
as their nourisher and preserver, in giving them corn, whereof the ox
is an instrument in serving for ploughing, and preparing the ground.
2. The notion of goodness is inseparable from the notion of a God. We
cannot own the existence of God, but we must confess also the goodness
of his nature. Hence, the apostle gives to his goodness the title of
his Godhead, as if goodness and godhead were convertible terms (Rom.
i. 20). As it is indissolubly linked with the being of a Deity, so
it cannot be severed from the notion of it: we as soon undeify him
by denying him good, as by denying him great: _Optimus_, _Maximus_,
the best, greatest, was the name whereby the Romans entitled Him. His
nature is as good, as it is majestic; so doth the Psalmist join them
(Ps. cxlv. 6, 7), “I will declare my greatness; they shall abundantly
utter the memory of thy great goodness.” They considered his goodness
before his greatness, in putting _Optimus_ before _Maximus_; greatness
without sweetness, is an unruly and affrighting monster in the world;
like a vast turbulent sea, always casting out mire and dirt. Goodness
is the brightness and loveliness of our majestical Creator. To fancy
a God without it, is to fancy a miserable, scanty, narrow‑hearted,
savage God, and so an unlovely, and horrible being: for he is not a
God that is not good; he is not a God that is not the highest good:
infinite goodness is more necessary to, and more straitly joined with
an infinite Deity, than infinite power and infinite wisdom: we cannot
conceive him God, unless we conceive him the highest good, having
nothing superior to himself in goodness, as he hath nothing superior to
himself in excellency and perfection. No man can possibly form a notion
of God in his mind, and yet form a notion of something better than God;
for whoever thinks anything better than God, fancieth a God {b217} with
some defect: by how much the better he thinks that thing to be, by so
much the more imperfect he makes God in his thoughts. This notion of
the goodness of God was so natural, that some philosophers and others,
being startled at the evil they saw in the world, fancied, besides
a good God, an evil principle, the author of all punishments in the
world. This was ridiculous; for those two must be of equal power, or
one inferior to the other; if equal, the good could do nothing, but the
evil one would restrain him; and the evil one could do nothing, but the
good one would contradict him; so they would be always contending, and
never conquering: if one were inferior to the other, then there would
be nothing but what that superior ordered. Good, if the good one were
superior; and nothing but evil, if the bad one were superior. In the
prosecution of this, let us see.
I. What this goodness is. II. Some propositions concerning the nature
of it. III. That God is good. IV. The manifestation of it in creation,
providence, and redemption. V. The use.
I. What this goodness is. There is a goodness of being, which is the
natural perfection of a thing; there is the goodness of will, which
is the holiness, and righteousness of a person; there is the goodness
of the hand, which we call liberality, or beneficence, a doing good to
others.
1. We mean not by this, the goodness of his essence, or the
perfection of his nature. God is thus good, because his nature is
infinitely perfect; he hath all things requisite to the completing of a
most perfect and sovereign Being. All good meets in his essence, as all
water meets in the ocean. Under this notion all the attributes of God,
which are requisite to so illustrious a Being, are comprehended. All
things that are, have a goodness of being in them, derived to them by
the power of God, as they are creatures; so the devil is good, as he is
a creature of God’s making: he hath a natural goodness, but not a moral
goodness: when he fell from God, he retained his natural goodness as
a creature; because he did not cease to be, he was not reduced to that
nothing, from whence he was drawn; but he ceased to be morally good,
being stripped of his righteousness by his apostasy; as a creature,
he was God’s work; as a creature, he remains still God’s work; and,
therefore, as a creature, remains still good, in regard of his created
being. The more of being anything hath, the more of this sort of
natural goodness it hath; and so the devil hath more of this natural
goodness than men have; because he hath more marks of the excellency
of God upon him, in regard of the greatness of his knowledge, and the
extent of his power, the largeness of his capacity, and the acuteness
of his understanding, which are natural perfections belonging to the
nature of an angel, though he hath lost his moral perfections. God
is sovereignly and infinitely good in this sort of goodness. He is
unsearchably perfect (Job xi. 7); nothing is wanting to his essence,
that is necessary to the perfection of it; yet this is not that which
the Scripture expresseth under the term of goodness, but a perfection
of God’s nature as related to us, and which he poureth forth upon all
his creatures, as goodness which flows from this natural perfection of
the Deity.
{b218} 2. Nor is it the same with the blessedness of God, but something
flowing from his blessedness. Were he not first infinitely blessed, and
full in himself, he could not be infinitely good and diffusive to us;
had he not an infinite abundance in his own nature, he could not be
overflowing to his creatures; had not the sun a fulness of light in
itself, and the sea a vastness of water, the one could not enrich the
world with its beams, nor the other fill every creek with its waters.
3. Nor is it the same with the holiness of God. The holiness of God
is the rectitude of his nature, whereby he is pure, and without spot
in himself; the goodness of God is the efflux of his will, whereby he
is beneficial to his creatures: the holiness of God is manifest in his
rational creatures; but the goodness of God extends to all the works of
his hands. His holiness beams most in his law; his goodness reacheth to
everything that had a being from him (Ps. cxlv. 9): “The Lord is good
to all.” And though he be said in the same Psalm (ver. 17) to be “holy
in all his works,” it is to be understood of his bounty, bountiful in
all his works; the Hebrew word signifying both holy and liberal, and
the margin of the Bible reads it “merciful” or “bountiful.”
4. Nor is this goodness of God the same with the mercy of God. Goodness
extends to more objects than mercy; goodness stretcheth itself out to
all the works of his hands; mercy extends only to a miserable object;
for it is joined with a sentiment of pity, occasioned by the calamity
of another. The mercy of God is exercised about those that merit
punishment; the goodness of God is exercised upon objects that have
not merited anything contrary to the acts of his bounty. Creation is
an act of goodness, not of mercy; providence in governing some part of
the world, is an act of goodness, not of mercy.[955] The heavens, saith
Austin, need the goodness of God to govern them, but not the mercy of
God to relieve them; the earth is full of the misery of man, and the
compassions of God; but the heavens need not the mercy of God to pity
them, because they are not miserable; though they need the goodness and
power of God to sustain them; because, as creatures, they are impotent
without him. God’s goodness extends to the angels, that kept their
standing, and to man in innocence, who in that state stood not in need
of mercy. Goodness and mercy are distinct, though mercy be a branch
of goodness; there may be a manifestation of goodness, though none of
mercy. Some think Christ had been incarnate, had not man fallen: had
it been so, there had been a manifestation of goodness to our nature,
but not of mercy, because sin had not made our natures miserable.
The devils are monuments of God’s creating goodness, but not of his
pardoning compassions. The grace of God respects the rational creature;
mercy the miserable creature; goodness all his creatures, brutes, and
the senseless plants, as well as reasonable man.
5. By goodness, is meant the bounty of God. This is the notion of
goodness in the world; when we say a good man, we mean either a holy
man in his life, or a charitable and liberal man in the management
{b219} of his goods. A righteous man, and a good man, are distinguished
(Rom. v. 7). “For scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet for
a good man one would even dare to die;” for an innocent man, one as
innocent of the crime as himself would scarce venture his life; but for
a good man, a liberal, tender‑hearted man, that had been a common good
in the place where he lived, or had done another as great a benefit
as life itself amounts to, a man out of gratitude might dare to die.
“The goodness of God is his inclination to deal well and bountifully
with his creatures.”[956] It is that whereby he wills there should be
something besides himself for his own glory. God is good himself, and
to himself, _i. e._ highly amiable to himself; and, therefore, some
define it a perfection of God, whereby he loves himself and his own
excellency; but as it stands in relation to his creatures, it is that
perfection of God whereby he delights in his works, and is beneficial
to them. God is the highest goodness, because he doth not act for
his own profit, but for his creatures’ welfare, and the manifestation
of his own goodness. He sends out his beams, without receiving any
addition to himself, or substantial advantage from his creatures. It
is from this perfection that he loves whatsoever is good, and that is
whatsoever he hath made, “for every creature of God is good” (1 Tim.
iv. 4); every creature hath some communications from him, which cannot
be without some affection to them; every creature hath a footstep of
Divine goodness upon it; God, therefore, loves that goodness in the
creature, else he would not love himself. God hates no creature, no,
not the devils and damned, as creatures; he is not an enemy to them,
as they are the works of his hands; he is properly an enemy, that doth
simply and absolutely wish evil to another; but God doth not absolutely
wish evil to the damned; that justice that he inflicts upon them, the
deserved punishment of their sin, is part of his goodness, as shall
afterwards be shown.[957] This is the most pleasant perfection of the
Divine nature; his creating power amazes us; his conducting wisdom
astonisheth us; his goodness, as furnishing us with all conveniences,
delights us; and renders both his amazing power, and astonishing wisdom,
delightful to us. As the sun, by effecting things, is an emblem of
God’s power; by discovering things to us, is an emblem of his wisdom;
but by refreshing and comforting us, is an emblem of his goodness;
and without this refreshing virtue it communicates to us, we should
take no pleasure in the creatures it produceth, nor in the beauties
it discovers. As God is great and powerful, he is the object of our
understanding; but as good and bountiful, he is the object of our love
and desire.