according to their particular natures; but this motion makes him not
the cause of sin. Had our innocent nature continued, God had moved us
according to that innocent nature; but when the state was changed for
a corrupt one, God must either forbear all concourse, and so annihilate
the world, or move us according to that nature he finds in us. If he
had overthrown the world upon the entrance of sin, and created another
upon the same terms, sin might have as soon defaced his second work,
as it did the first; and then it would follow, that God would have been
alway building and demolishing. It was not fit for God to cease from
acting as a wise governor of his creature, because man did cease from
his loyalty as a subject. Is it not more agreeable to God’s wisdom as
a governor, to concur with his creature according to his nature, than
to deny his concurrence upon every evil determination of the creature?
God concurred with Adam’s mutable nature in his first act of sin; he
concurred to the act, and left him to his mutability. If Adam had put
out his hand to eat of any other unforbidden fruit, God would have
supported his natural faculty then, and concurred with him in his
motion. When Adam would put out his hand to take the forbidden fruit,
God concurred to that natural action, but left him to the choice of
the object, and to the use of his mutable nature: and when man became
apostate, God concurs with him according to that condition wherein he
found him, and cannot move him otherwise, unless he should alter that
nature man had contracted. God moving the creature as he found him, is
no cause of the ill {b161} motion of the creature: as when a wheel is
broken the space of a foot, it cannot but move ill in that part till
it be mended. He that moves it, uses the same motion (as it is his act)
which he would have done had the wheel been sound; the motion is good
in the mover, but bad in the subject: it is not the fault of him that
moves it, but the fault of that wheel that is moved, whose breaches
came by some other cause. A man doth not use to lay aside his watch
for some irregularity, as long as it is capable of motion, but winds it
up: why should God cease from concurring with his creature in its vital
operations and other actions of his will, because there was a flaw
contracted in that nature, that came right and true out of his hand?
And as he that winds up his disordered watch, is in the same manner the
cause of its motion then, as he was when it was regular, yet, by that
act of his, he is not the cause of the false motion of it, but that is
from the deficiency of some part of the watch itself: so, though God
concurs to that action of the creature, whereby the wickedness of the
heart is drawn out, yet is not God therefore as unholy as the heart.
(5.) God hath one end in his concurrence, and man another in his
action: so that there is a righteous, and often a gracious end in
God, when there is a base and unworthy end in man. God concurs to
the substance of the act; man produceth the circumstance of the act,
whereby it is evil. God orders both the action wherein he concurs, and
the sinfulness over which he presides, as a governor, to his own ends.
In Joseph’s case, man was sinful, and God merciful; his brethren acted
“envy,” and God designed “mercy” (Gen. xlv. 4, 5). They would be rid
of him as an eye‑sore, and God concurred with their action to make
him their preserver (Gen. l. 20), “Ye thought evil against me, but God
meant it unto good.” God concurred to Judas his action of betraying our
Saviour; he supported his nature while he contracted with the priests,
and supported his members while he was their guide to apprehend him;
God’s end was the manifestation of his choicest love to man, and Judas’
end was the gratification of his own covetousness. The Assyrian did a
divine work against Jerusalem, but not with a Divine end (Isa. x. 5‒7).
He had a mind to enlarge his empire, enrich his coffers with the
spoil, and gain the title of a conqueror; he is desirous to invade his
neighbors, and God employs him to punish his rebels; but he means not
so, nor doth his heart think so; he intended not as God intended. The
axe doth not think what the carpenter intends to do with it. But God
used the rapine of ambitious nature as an instrument of his justice;
as the exposing malefactors to wild beasts was an ancient punishment,
whereby the magistrates intended the execution of justice, and to that
purpose used the natural fierceness of the beasts to an end different
from what those ravaging creatures aimed at. God concurred with Satan
in spoiling Job of his goods, and scarifying his body; God gave Satan
licence to do it, and Job acknowledges it to be God’s act (Job i.
12‒21); but their ends were different; God concurred with Satan for the
clearing the integrity of his servant, when Satan aimed at nothing but
the provoking him to curse his Creator. The physician applies leeches
{b162} to suck the superfluous blood, but the leeches suck to glut
themselves, without any regard to the intention of the physician, and
the welfare of the patient. In the same act where men intend to hurt,
God intends to correct; so that his concurrence is in a holy manner,
while men commit unrighteous actions. A judge commands the executioner
to execute the sentence of death, which he hath justly pronounced
against a malefactor, and admonisheth him to do it out of love to
justice; the executioner hath the authority of the judge for his
commission, and the protection of the judge for his security; the judge
stands by to countenance and secure him in the doing of it; but if the
executioner hath not the same intention as the judge, _viz._ a love to
justice in the performance of his office, but a private hatred to the
offender, the judge, though he commanded the fact of the executioner,
yet did not command this error of his in it; and though he protects him
in the fact, yet he owns not this corrupt disposition in him in the
doing what was enjoined him, as any act of his own.
To conclude this. Since the creature cannot act without God,
cannot lift up a hand, or move his tongue, without God’s preserving
and upholding the faculty, and preserving the power of action, and
preserving every member of the body in its actual motion, and in every
circumstance of its motion, we must necessarily suppose God to have
such a way of concurrence as doth not intrench upon his holiness. We
must not equal the creature to God, by denying his dependence on him;
nor must we imagine such a concurrence to the sinfulness of an act,
as stains the Divine purity, which is, I think, sufficiently salved by
distinguishing the matter of the act from the evil adhering to it; for
since all evil is founded in some good, the evil is distinguishable
from the good, and the deformity of the action from the action itself;
which, as it is a created act, hath a dependence on the will and
influence of God; and as it is a sinful act, is the product of the
will of the creature.
_Prop. VI._ The holiness of God is not blemished by proposing objects
to a man, which he makes use of to sin. There is no object proposed
to man, but is directed by the providence of God, which influenceth
all the motions in the world; and there is no object proposed to man,
but his active nature may, according to the goodness or badness of
his disposition, make a good or an ill use of. That two men, one of
a charitable, the other of a hard‑hearted disposition, meet with an
indigent and necessitous object, is from the providence of God; yet
this indigent person is relieved by the one, and neglected by the other.
There could be no action in the world, but about some object; there
could be no object offered to us but by Divine Providence; the active
nature of man would be in vain, if there were not objects about which
it might be exercised. Nothing could present itself to man as an object,
either to excite his grace, or awaken his corruption, but by the
conduct of the Governor of the world. That David should walk upon the
battlements of his palace, and Bathsheba be in the bath at the same
time, was from the Divine Providence which orders all the affairs of
the world (2 Sam. xi. 7); and so some understand (Jer. vi. 21): “Thus
saith the Lord, I will lay {b163} stumbling‑blocks before this people,
and the fathers and sons together shall fall upon them.” Since they
have offered sacrifices without those due qualifications in their
hearts, which were necessary to render them acceptable to me, I will
lay in their way such objects, which their corruption will use ill to
their farther sin and ruin; so (Ps. cv. 25), “He turned their heart
to hate his people;” that is, by the multiplying his people, he gave
occasion to the Egyptians of hating them, instead of caressing them,
as they had formerly done. But God’s holiness is not blemished by this;
for,
1. This proposing or presenting of objects invades not the liberty of
any man. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil, set in the midst
of the garden of Eden, had no violent influence on man to force him
to eat of it; his liberty to eat of it, or not, was reserved entire to
himself; no such charge can be brought against any object whatsoever.
If a man meet accidentally at a table with meat that is grateful to
his palate, but hurtful to the present temper of his body, doth the
presenting this sort of food to him strip him of his liberty to decline
it, as well as to feed of it? Can the food have any internal influence
upon his will, and lay the freedom of it asleep whether he will or no?
Is there any charm in that, more than in other sorts of diet? No; but
it is the habit of love which he hath to that particular dish, the
curiosity of his fancy, and the strength of his own appetite, whereby
he is brought into a kind of slavery to that particular meat, and not
anything in the food itself. When the word is proposed to two persons,
it is embraced by the one, rejected by the other; is it from the word
itself, which is the object, that these two persons perform different
acts? The object is the same to both, but the manner of acting about
the object is not the same; is there any invasion of their liberty by
it? Is the one forced by the word to receive it, and the other forced
by the word to reject it? Two such contrary effects cannot proceed
from one and the same cause; outward things have only an objective
influence, not an inward; if the mere proposal of things did suspend or
strike down the liberty of man, no angels in heaven, no man upon earth,
no, not our Saviour himself, could do anything freely, but by force;
objects that are ill used are of God’s creation, and though they
have allurements in them, yet they have no compulsive power over the
will.[925] The fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil was
pleasing to the sight; it had a quality to allure; there had not else
needed a prohibition to bar the eating of it; but it could not have so
much power to allure, as the Divine threatening to deter.
2. The objects are good in themselves, but the ill use of them is
from man’s corruption. Bathsheba was, by God’s providence, presented to
David’s sight, but it was David’s disposition moved him to so evil an
act; what if God knew that he would use that object ill? yet he knew
he had given him a power to refrain from any ill use of it; the objects
are innocent, but our corruption poisons them. The same object hath
been used by one to holy purposes and holy improvements, that hath been
used by another to sinful ends; when a charitable object is presented
to a good man, and a cruel man, one {b164} relieves him, the other
reviles him; the object was rather an occasion to draw out the charity
of one, as well as the other; but the refusing to reach out a helping
hand, was not from the person in calamity, but the disposition of the
refuser to whom he was presented; it is not from the nature of the
object that men do good or evil, but from the disposition of the person;
what is good in itself, is made bad by our corruption. As the same
meat which nourishes and strengthens a sound constitution, cherisheth
the disease of another that eats at the same table, not from any
unwholesome quality in the food, but the vicious quality of the humors
lodging in the stomach, which turn the diet into fuel for themselves,
which in its own nature was apt to engender a wholesome juice. Some
are perfected by the same things whereby others are ruined. Riches
are used by some, not only for their own, but the advantage of others
in the world; by others only for themselves, and scarcely so much
as their necessities require. Is this the fault of the wealth, or
the dispositions of the persons, who are covetous instead of being
generous? It is a calumny, therefore, upon God to charge him with the
sin of man upon this account. The rain that drops from the clouds upon
the plants is sweet in itself, but when it moistens the root of any
venomous plant, it is turned into the juice of the plant, and becomes
venomous with it. The miracles that our Saviour wrought, were applauded
by some, and envied by the Pharisees; the sin arose not from the nature
of the miracles, but the malice of their spirits. The miracles were
fitter in their own nature to have induced them to an adoration of our
Saviour, than to excite so vile a passion against one that had so many
marks from heaven to dignify him, and proclaim him worthy of their
respect. The person of Christ was an object proposed to the Jews; some
worship him, others condemn and crucify him, and according to their
several vices and base ends they use this object. Judas to content
his covetousness, the Pharisees to glut their revenge, Pilate for his
ambition, to preserve himself in his government, and avoid the articles
the people might charge him with of countenancing an enemy to Cæsar.
God at that time put into their minds a rational and true proposition
which they apply to ill purposes.[926] Caiaphas said, that “it was
expedient for one man to die for the people,” which “he spake not of
himself” (John xi. 50, 51). God put it into his mind; but he might have
applied it better than he did, and considered, though the maxim was
commendable, whether it might justly be applied to Christ, or whether
there was such a necessity that he must die, or the nation be destroyed
by the Romans. The maxim was sound and holy, decreed by God; but what
an ill use did the high‑priest make of it to put Christ to death as a
seditious person, to save the nation from the Roman fury!
3. Since the natural corruption of men will use such objects ill,
may not God, without tainting himself, present such objects to them in
subserviency to his gracious decrees? Whatsoever God should present to
men in that state, they would make an ill use of; hath not God, then,
the sovereign prerogative to present what he pleases, and suppress
others? To offer that to them which may serve his {b165} holy purpose,
and hide other things from them which are not so conducing to his
gracious ends, which would be as much the occasions of exciting their
sin, as the others which he doth bring forth to their view? The Jews,
at the time of Christ, were of a turbulent and seditious humor; they
expected a Messiah, a temporal king, and would readily have embraced
any occasion to have been up in arms to have delivered themselves from
the Roman yoke; to this purpose the people attempted once to make him
king: and probably the expectation they had that he had such a design
to head them, might be one reason of their “hosannas;” because without
some such conceit it was not probable they should so soon change
their note, and vote him to the cross in so short a time, after they
had applauded him as if he had been upon a throne; but their being
defeated of strong expectations, usually ended in a more ardent fury.
This turbulent and seditious humor God directs in another channel,
suppresseth all occurrences that might excite them to a rebellion
against the Romans, which, if he had given way to, the crucifying
Christ, which was God’s design to bring about at that time, had not
probably been effected, and the salvation of mankind been hindered or
stood at a stay for a time. God, therefore, orders such objects and
occasions, that might direct this seditious humor to another channel,
which would else have run out in other actions, which had not been
conducing to the great design he had then in the world. Is it not the
right of God, and without any blemish to his holiness, to use those
corruptions which he finds sown in the nature of his creature by the
hand of Satan, and to propose such objects as may excite the exercise
of them for his own service? Sure God hath as much right to serve
himself of the creature of his own framing, and what natures soever
they are possessed with, and to present objects to that purpose, as a
falconer hath to offer this or that bird to his hawk to exercise his
courage, and excite his ravenousness, without being termed the author
of that ravenousness in the creature. God planted not those corruptions
in the Jews, but finds them in those persons over whom he hath an
absolute sovereignty in the right of a Creator, and that of a Judge
for their sins: and by the right of that sovereignty may offer such
objects and occasions, which, though innocent in themselves, he knows
they will make use of to ill purposes, but which by the same decree
that he resolves to present such occasions to them, he also resolves
to make use of them for his own glory. It is not conceivable by us
what way that death of Christ, which was necessary for the satisfaction
of Divine justice, could be brought about without ordering the evil
of some men’s hearts by special occasions to effect his purpose; we
cannot suppose that Christ can be guilty of any crime that deserved
death by the Jewish law; had he been so a criminal, he could not
have been a Redeemer: a perfect innocence was necessary to the design
of his coming.[927] Had God himself put him to that death, without
using instruments of wickedness in it, by some remarkable hand from
heaven, the innocence of his nature had been forever eclipsed, and
the voluntariness of his sacrifice had been obscured: the strangeness
of such a judgment would have made his {b166} innocence incredible;
he could not reasonably have been proposed as an object of faith.
What, to believe in one that was struck dead by a hand from heaven? The
propagation of the doctrine of redemption had wanted a foundation; and
though God might have raised him again, the certainty of his death had
been as questionable as his innocence in dying, had he not been raised.
But God orders everything so as to answer his own most wise and holy
ends, and maintain his truth, and the fulfilling the predictions of
the minutest concerns about them, and all this by presenting occasions
innocent in themselves, which the corruptions of the Jews took hold of,
and whereby God, unknown to them, brought about his own decrees: and
may not this be conceived without any taint upon God’s holiness? for
when there are seeds of all sin in man’s nature, why may not God hinder
the sprouting up of this or that kind of seed, and leave liberty to the
growth of the other, and shut up other ways of sinning, and restrain
men from them, and let them loose to that temptation which he intends
to serve himself of, hiding from them those objects which were not
so serviceable to his purpose, wherein they would have sinned, and
offer others, which he knew their corruption would use ill, and were
serviceable to his ends; since the depravation of their natures would
necessarily hurry them to evil without restraining grace, as a scale
will necessarily rise up when the weight in it, which kept it down, is
taken away?
_Prop. VII._ The holiness of God is not blemished by withdrawing his
grace from a sinful creature, whereby he falls into more sin. That God
withdraws his grace from men, and gives them up sometimes to the fury
of their lusts, is as clear in Scripture, as anything (Deut. xxix. 4):
“Yet the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to see,
and ears to hear,” &c. Judas was delivered to Satan after the sop,
and put into his power, for despising former admonitions. He often
leaves the reins to the devil, that he may use what efficacy he can
in those that have offended the Majesty of God; he withholds further
influences of grace, or withdraws what before he had granted them. Thus
he withheld that grace from the sons of Eli, that might have made their
father’s pious admonitions effectual to them (1 Sam. ii. 25): “They
hearkened not to the voice of their father, because the Lord would
slay them.” He gave grace to Eli to reprove them, and withheld that
grace from them, which might have enabled them against their natural
corruption and obstinacy to receive that reproof. But the holiness of
God is not blemished by this.
1. Because the act of God in this is only negative.[928] Thus God is
said to “harden” men: not by positive hardening, or working anything
in the creature, but by not working, not softening, leaving a man
to the hardness of his own heart, whereby it is unavoidable by the
depravation of man’s nature, and the fury of his passions, but that he
should be further hardened, and “increase unto more ungodliness,” as
the expression is (2 Tim. ii. 19). As a man is said to give another his
life, when he doth not take it away when it lay at his mercy; so God
is said to “harden” a man, when he doth not {b167} mollify him when it
was in his power, and inwardly quicken him with that grace whereby he
might infallibly avoid any further provoking of him. God is said to
harden men when he removes not from them the incentives to sin, curbs
not those principles which are ready to comply with those incentives,
withdraws the common assistances of his grace, concurs not with
counsels and admonitions to make them effectual; flasheth not in the
convincing light which he darted upon them before. If hardness follows
upon God’s withholding his softening grace, it is not by any positive
act of God, but from the natural hardness of man. If you put fire
near to wax or rosin, both will melt; but when that fire is removed,
they return to their natural quality of hardness and brittleness; the
positive act of the fire is to melt and soften, and the softness of
the rosin is to be ascribed to that; but the hardness is from the rosin
itself, wherein the fire hath no influence, but only a negative act
by a removal of it: so, when God hardens a man, he only leaves him to
that stony heart which he derived from Adam, and brought with him into
the world. All men’s understandings being blinded, and their wills
perverted in Adam, God’s withdrawing his grace is but a leaving them
to their natural pravity, which is the cause of their further sinning,
and not God’s removal of that special light he before afforded them, or
restraint he held over them. As when God withdraws his preserving power
from the creature, he is not the efficient, but deficient cause of the
creature’s destruction; so, in this case, God only ceaseth to bind and
dam up that sin which else would break out.