blame upon him. Though the foreknowledge of God be infallible, yet
it doth not necessitate the creature in acting. It was certain from
eternity, that Adam would fall, that men would do such and such actions,
that Judas would betray our Saviour; God foreknew all those things
from eternity; but, it is as certain that this foreknowledge did not
necessitate the will of Adam, or any other branch of his posterity, in
the doing those actions that were so foreseen by God; they voluntarily
run into such courses, not by any impulsion. God’s knowledge was not
suspended between certainty and uncertainty; he certainly foreknew that
his law would be broken by Adam; he foreknew it in his own decree of
not hindering him, by giving Adam the efficacious grace which would
infallibly have prevented it; yet Adam did freely break this law, and
never imagined that the foreknowledge of God did necessitate him to it;
he could find no cause of his own sin, but the liberty of his own will;
he charges the occasion of his sin upon the woman, and consequently
upon God in giving the woman to him (Gen. iii. 12). He could not be so
ignorant of the nature of God, as to imagine him without a foresight
of future things: since his knowledge of what was to be known of God
by creation, was greater than any man’s since, in all probability.
But, however, if he were not acquainted with the notion of God’s
foreknowledge, he could not be ignorant of his own act; there could
not have been any necessity upon him, any kind of constraint of him
in his action, that could have been unknown to him; and he would not
have omitted a plea of so strong a nature, when he was upon his trial
for life or death; especially when he urgeth so weak an argument, to
impute his crime to God, as the gift of the woman; as if that which
was designed him for a help, were intended for his ruin. If God’s
prescience takes away the liberty of the creature, there is no such
thing as a free action in the world (for there is nothing done but
is foreknown by God, else we render God of a limited understanding),
nor ever was, no, not by God himself, _ad extra_; for whatsoever he
hath done in creation, whatsoever he hath done since the creation,
was foreknown by him: he resolved to do it, and, therefore, foreknew
that he would do it. Did God do it, {b146} therefore, necessarily,
as necessity is opposed to liberty? As he freely decrees what he will
do, so he effects what he freely decreed. Foreknowledge is so far from
intrenching upon the liberty of the will, that predetermination, which
in the notion of it speaks something more, doth not dissolve it; God
did not only foreknow, but determine the suffering of Christ (Acts iv.
27, 28). It was necessary, therefore, that Christ should suffer, that
God might not be mistaken in his foreknowledge, or come short of his
determinate decree; but did this take away the liberty of Christ in
suffering? (Eph. v. 2): “Who offered himself up to God;” that is, by a
voluntary act, as well as designed to do it by a determinate counsel.
It did infallibly secure the event, but did not annihilate the liberty
of the action, either in Christ’s willingness to suffer, or the crime
of the Jews that made him suffer. God’s prescience is God’s provision
of things arising from their proper causes; as a gardener foresees
in his plants the leaves and the flowers that will arise from them in
the spring, because he knows the strength and nature of their several
roots which lie under ground; but his foresight of these things is not
the cause of the rise and appearance of those flowers. If any of us
see a ship moving towards such a rock or quicksand, and know it to be
governed by a negligent pilot, we shall certainly foresee that the ship
will be torn in pieces by the rock, or swallowed up by the sands; but
is this foresight of ours from the causes, any cause of the effect; or
can we from hence be said to be the authors of the miscarriage of the
ship, and the loss of the passengers and goods? The fall of Adam was
foreseen by God to come to pass by the consent of his free will, in
the choice of the proposed temptation. God foreknew Adam would sin,
and if Adam would not have sinned, God would have foreknown that he
would not sin. Adam might easily have detected the serpent’s fraud,
and made a better election; God foresaw that he would not do it; God’s
foreknowledge did not make Adam guilty or innocent: whether God had
foreknown it or no, he was guilty by a free choice, and a willing
neglect of his own duty. Adam knew that God foreknew that he might
eat of the fruit, and fall and die, because God had forbidden him; the
foreknowledge that he would do it, was no more a cause of his action,
than the foreknowledge that he might do it. Judas certainly knew
that his Master foreknew that he would betray him, for Christ had
acquainted him with it (John xiii. 21, 26); yet he never charged this
foreknowledge of Christ with any guilt of his treachery.
_Prop. III._ The holiness of God is not blemished by decreeing the
eternal rejection of some men. Reprobation, in its first notion, is
an act of preterition, or passing by. A man is not made wicked by the
act of God; but it supposeth him wicked; and so it is nothing else but
God’s leaving a man in that guilt and filth wherein he beholds him.
In its second notion, it is an ordination, not to a crime, but to a
punishment (Jude 4): “an ordaining to condemnation.” And though it be
an eternal act of God, yet, in order of nature, it follows upon the
foresight of the transgression of man, and supposeth the crime. God
considers Adam’s revolt, and views the whole mass of his corrupted
posterity, and chooses some to reduce to himself by {b147} his grace,
and leaves others to lie sinking in their ruins. Since all mankind fell
by the fall of Adam, and have corruption conveyed to them successively
by that root, whereof they are branches; all men might justly be left
wallowing in that miserable condition to which they are reduced by the
apostasy of their common head; and God might have passed by the whole
race of man, as well as he did the fallen angels, without any hope of
redemption. He was no more bound to restore man, than to restore devils,
nor bound to repair the nature of any one son of Adam; and had he dealt
with men as he dealt with the devils, they had had, all of them, as
little just ground to complain of God; for all men deserved to be left
to themselves, for all were concluded under sin; but God calls out some
to make monuments of his grace, which is an act of the sovereign mercy
of that dominion, whereby “he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy”
(Rom. ix. 18); others he passes by, and leaves them remaining in that
corruption of nature wherein they were born. If men have a power to
dispose of their own goods, without any unrighteousness, why should not
God dispose of his own grace, and bestow it upon whom he pleases; since
it is a debt to none, but a free gift to any that enjoy it? God is not
the cause of sin in this, because his operation about this is negative;
it is not an action, but a denial of action, and therefore cannot
be the cause of the evil actions of men.[911] God acts nothing, but
withholds his power; he doth not enlighten their minds, nor incline
their wills so powerfully, as to expel their darkness, and root out
those evil habits which possess them by nature. God could, if he would,
savingly enlighten the minds of all men in the world, and quicken their
hearts with a new life by an invincible grace; but in not doing it,
there is no positive act of God, but a cessation of action. We may with
as much reason say, that God is the cause of all the sinful actions
that are committed by the corporation of devils, since their first
rebellion, because he leaves them to themselves, and bestows not a new
grace upon them,――as say, God is the cause of the sins of those that he
overlooks and leaves in that state of guilt wherein he found them. God
did not pass by any without the consideration of sin; so that this act
of God is not repugnant to his holiness, but conformable to his justice.
_Prop. IV._ The holiness of God is not blemished by his secret will
to suffer sin to enter into the world. God never willed sin by his
preceptive will. It was never founded upon, or produced by any word
of his, as the creation was. He never said, Let there be sin under the
heaven, as he said, “Let there be water under the heaven.” Nor doth
he will it by infusing any habit of it, or stirring up inclinations to
it; no, “God tempts no man” (James i. 13). Nor doth he will it by his
approving will; it is detestable to him, nor ever can he be otherwise;
he cannot approve it either before commission or after.
1. The will of God is in some sort concurrent with sin. He doth not
properly will it, but he wills not to hinder it, to which, by his
omnipotence, he could put a bar. If he did positively will it, it might
be wrought by himself, and so could not be evil. If he did {b148} in
no sort will it, it would not be committed by his creature; sin entered
into the world, either God willing the permission of it, or not willing
the permission of it. The latter cannot be said; for then the creature
is more powerful than God, and can do that which God will not permit.
God can, if he be pleased, banish all sin in a moment out of the world:
he could have prevented the revolt of angels, and the fall of man;
they did not sin whether he would or no: he might, by his grace, have
stepped in the first moment, and made a special impression upon them of
the happiness they already possessed, and the misery they would incur
by any wicked attempt. He could as well have prevented the sin of the
fallen angels, and confirmed them in grace, as of those that continued
in their happy state: he might have appeared to man, informed him of
the issue of his design, and made secret impressions upon his heart,
since he was acquainted with every avenue to his will. God could have
kept all sin out of the world, as well as all creatures from breathing
in it; he was as well able to bar sin forever out of the world, as
to let creatures lie in the womb of nothing, wherein they were first
wrapped. To say God doth will sin as he doth other things, is to deny
his holiness; to say it entered without anything of his will, is to
deny his omnipotence. If he did necessitate Adam to fall, what shall
we think of his purity? If Adam did fall without any concern of God’s
will in it, what shall we say of his sovereignty? The one taints his
holiness, and the other clips his power. If it came without anything
of his will in it, and he did not foresee it, where is his omniscience?
If it entered whether he would or no, where is his omnipotence (Rom.
ix. 19)? “Who hath resisted his will?” There cannot be a lustful act
in Abimelech, if God will withhold his power (Gen. xx. 6); “I withheld
thee:” nor a cursing word in Balaam’s mouth, unless God give power
to speak it (Numb. xxii. 38): “Have I now any power at all to say
anything? The word that God puts in my mouth, that shall I speak.” As
no action could be sinful, if God had not forbidden it; so no sin could
be committed, if God did not will to give way to it.
2. God doth not will directly, and by an efficacious will. He doth not
directly will it, because he hath prohibited it by his law, which is
a discovery of his will: so that if he should directly will sin, and
directly prohibit it, he would will good and evil in the same manner,
and there would be contradictions in God’s will: to will sin absolutely,
is to work it (Ps. cxv. 3): “God hath done whatsoever he pleased.” God
cannot absolutely will it, because he cannot work it. God wills good by
a positive decree, because he hath decreed to effect it.[912] He wills
evil by a private decree, because he hath decreed not to give that
grace which would certainly prevent it. God doth not will sin simply,
for that were to approve it, but he wills it, in order to that good
his wisdom will bring forth from it.[913] He wills not sin for itself,
but for the event. To will sin as sin, or as purely evil, is not in
the capacity of a creature, neither of man nor devil. The will of a
rational creature cannot will anything but under the appearance of good,
of some good in the sin itself, or some good in the issue of it. {b149}
Much more is this far from God, who, being infinitely good, cannot will
evil as evil; and being infinitely knowing, cannot will that for good
which is evil.[914] Infinite wisdom can be under no error or mistake:
to will sin as sin, would be an unanswerable blemish on God; but to
will to suffer it in order to good, is the glory of his wisdom; it
could never have peeped up its head, unless there had been some decree
of God concerning it. And there had been no decree of God concerning
it, had he not intended to bring good and glory out of it. If God did
directly will the discovery of his grace and mercy to the world, he did
in some sort will sin, as that without which there could not have been
any appearance of mercy in the world; for an innocent creature is not
the object of mercy, but a miserable creature: and no rational creature
but must be sinful before it be miserable.
3. God wills the permission of sin. He doth not positively will sin,
but he positively wills to permit it. And though he doth not approve
of sin, yet he approves of that act of his will, whereby he permits it.
For since that sin could not enter into the world without some concern
of God’s will about it, that act of his will that gave way to it, could
not be displeasing to him: God could never be displeased with his own
act: “He is not as man, that he should repent” (1 Sam. xv. 29). What
God cannot repent of, he cannot but approve of: it is contrary to the
blessedness of God to disapprove of, and be displeased with any act
of his own will. If he hated any act of his own will, he would hate
himself, he would be under a torture: every one that hates his own acts,
is under some disturbance and torment for them. That which is permitted
by him, is in itself, and in regard of the evil of it, hateful to him:
but as the prospect of that good which he aims at in the permission
of it is pleasing to him, so that act of his will, whereby he permits
it, is ushered in by an approving act of his understanding. Either God
approved of the permission, or not; if he did not approve his own act
of permission, he could not have decreed an act of permission. It is
inconceivable that God should decree such an act which he detested,
and positively will that which he hated. Though God hated sin, as being
against his holiness, yet he did not hate the permission of sin, as
being subservient by the immensity of his wisdom to his own glory. He
could never be displeased with that which was the result of his eternal
counsel, as this decree of permitting sin was, as well as any other
decree, resolved upon in his own breast. For as God acts nothing in
time, but what he decreed from eternity, so he permits nothing in
time but what he decreed from eternity to permit. To speak properly,
therefore, God doth not will sin, but he wills the permission of it,
and this will to permit is active and positive in God.
4. This act of permission is not a mere and naked permission, but
such an one as is attended with a certainty of the event. The decrees
of God to make use of the sin of man for the glory of his grace in the
mission and passion of his Son, hung upon this entrance of sin. Would
it consist with the wisdom of God to decree such great and stupendous
things, the event whereof should depend upon an uncertain foundation
which he might be mistaken in? God would have {b150} sat in counsel
from eternity to no purpose, if he had only permitted those things to
be done, without any knowledge of the event of this permission. God
would not have made such provision for redemption to no purpose, or an
uncertain purpose, which would have been, if man had not fallen; or if
it had been an uncertainty with God whether he would fall or no. Though
the will of God about sin was permissive, yet the will of God about
that glory he would promote by the defect of the creature, was positive;
and, therefore, he would not suffer so many positive acts of his will
to hang upon an uncertain event; and, therefore, he did wisely and
righteously order all things to the accomplishment of his great and
gracious purposes.
5. This act of permission doth not taint the holiness of God.
That there is such an act as permission, is clear in Scripture (Acts
xiv. 16): “Who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own
ways.” But that it doth not blemish the holiness of God, will appear,
1st. From the nature of this permission.
1. It is not a moral permission, a giving liberty of toleration by any
law to commit sin with impunity; when, what one law did forbid, another
law doth leave indifferent to be done or not, as a man sees good in
himself. As when there is a law made among men, that no man shall
go out of such a city or country without license; to go out without
license is a crime by the law; but when that law is repealed by another,
that gives liberty for men to go and come at their pleasure, it doth
not make their going or coming necessary, but leaves those which were
before bound, to do as they see good in themselves. Such a permission
makes a fact lawful, though not necessary; a man is not obliged to do
it, but he is left to his own discretion to do as he pleases, without
being chargeable with a crime for doing it. Such a permission there
was granted by God to Adam of eating of the fruits of the garden, to
choose any of them for food, except the tree of “knowledge of good and
evil.” It was a precept to him, not to “eat of the fruit of the tree
of knowledge of good and evil;” but the other was a permission, whereby
it was lawful for him to feed upon any other that was most agreeable
to his appetite: but there is not such a permission in the case of sin;
this had been an indulgence of it, which had freed man from any crime,
and, consequently, from punishment; because, by such a permission by
law, he would have had authority to sin if he pleased. God did not
remove the law, which he had before placed as a bar against evil, nor
ceased that moral impediment of his threatening: such a permission as
this, to make sin lawful or indifferent, had been a blot upon God’s
holiness.
2. But this permission of God, in the case of sin, is no more than the
not hindering a sinful action, which he could have prevented. It is not
so much an action of God, as a suspension of his influence, which might
have hindered an evil act, and a forbearing to restrain the faculties
of man from sin; it is, properly, the not exerting that efficacy
which might change the counsels that are taken, and prevent the action
intended; as when one man sees another ready to fall, and can preserve
him from falling by reaching out his hand, he permits {b151} him
to fall, that is, he hinders him not from falling. So God describes
his act about Abimelech (Gen. xx. 6); “I withheld thee from sinning
against me, therefore suffered I thee not to touch her.” If Abimelech
had sinned, he had sinned by God’s permission; that is, by God’s not
hindering, or not restraining him by making any impressions upon him.
So that permission is only a withholding that help and grace, which, if
bestowed, would have been an effectual remedy to prevent a crime; and
it is rather a suspension, or cessation, than properly a permission,
and sin may be said to be committed, not without God’s permission,
rather than by his permission. Thus, in the fall of man, God did not
hold the reins strict upon Satan, to restrain him from laying the bait,
nor restrain Adam from swallowing the bait: he kept to himself that
efficacious grace which he might have darted out upon man to prevent
his fall. God left Satan to his malice of tempting, and Adam to his
liberty of resisting, and his own strength, to use that sufficient
grace he had furnished him with, whereby he might have resisted and
overcome the temptation. As he did not drive man to it, so he did not
secretly restrain him from it. So, in the Jews crucifying our Saviour,
God did not imprint upon their minds, by his Spirit, a consideration
of the greatness of the crime, and the horror of his justice due to it;
and, being without those impediments, they run furiously, of their own
accord, to the commission of that evil; as, when a man lets a wolf or
dog out upon his prey, he takes off the chain which held them, and they
presently act according to their natures.[915] In the fall of angels
and men, God’s act was leaving them to their own strength; in sins
after the fall, it is God’s giving them up to their own corruption;
the first is a pure suspension of grace; the other hath the nature of
a punishment (Ps. lxxxi. 12): “So I gave them up to their own hearts’
lusts.” The first object of this permissive will of God was to leave
angels and men to their liberty, and the use of their free will, which
was natural to them,[916] not adding that supernatural grace which was
necessary, not that they should not at all sin, but that they should
infallibly not sin: they had a strength sufficient to avoid sin, but
not sufficient infallibly to avoid sin; a grace sufficient to preserve
them, but not sufficient to confirm them.
3. Now this permission is not the cause of sin, nor doth blemish the
holiness of God. It doth not intrench upon the freedom of men, but
supposeth it, establisheth it, and leaves man to it. God acted nothing,
but only ceased to act; and therefore could not be the efficient cause
of man’s sin. As God is not the author of good, but by willing and
effecting it, so he is not the author of evil, but by willing and
effecting it: but he doth not positively will evil, nor effect it by
any efficacy of his own. Permission is no action, nor the cause of that
action which is permitted; but the will of that person who is permitted
to do such an action is the cause.[917] God can no more be said to
be the cause of sin, by suffering a creature to act as it will, than
he can be said to be the cause of the not being of any creature, by
denying it being, and letting it remain nothing; it is not from God
that it is nothing, it is nothing in itself. Though God be said {b152}
to be the cause of creation, yet he is never by any said to be the
cause of that nothing which was before creation. This permission of God
is not the cause of sin, but the cause of not hindering sin. Man and
angels had a physical power of sinning from God, as they were created
with freewill, and supported in their natural strength; but the moral
power to sin was not from God; he counselled them not to it, laid no
obligation upon them to use their natural power for such an end; he
only left them to their freedom, and not hindered them in their acting
what he was resolved to permit.