original knowledge, wherein he excels all creatures. No man doth
exactly know himself; much less doth he understand the full nature
of a spirit; much less still the nature and perfections of God; for
what proportion can there be between a finite faculty and an infinite
object? Herein consists the infiniteness of God’s knowledge, that he
knows his own essence, that he knows that which is unknowable to any
else. It doth not so much consist in knowing the creatures, which he
hath made, as in knowing himself, who was never made. It is not so
much infinite, because he knows all things which are in the world, or
that shall be; or things that he can make, because the number of them
is finite; but because he hath a perfect and comprehensive knowledge
of his own infinite perfections.[684] Though it be said that angels
“see his face” (Matt. xviii. 10), that sight notes rather their
immediate attendance, than their exact knowledge; they see some signs
of his presence and majesty, more illustrious and express than ever
appeared to man in this life; but the essence of God is invisible to
them, hid from them in the secret place of eternity; none knows God
but himself (1 Cor. ii. 11): “What man knows the things of a man save
the spirit of a man? so the things of God knows no man but the Spirit
of God; the Spirit of God searches the deep things of God;” searcheth,
that is, exactly knows, thoroughly understands, as those who have
their eyes in every chink and crevice, to see what lies hid there; the
word search notes not an inquiry, but an exact knowledge, such as men
have of things upon a diligent scrutiny: as when God is said to search
the heart and the reins, it doth not signify a precedent ignorance,
but an exact knowledge of the most intimate corners of the hearts
of men. As the conceptions of men are unknown to any but themselves,
so the depths of the divine essence, perfections, and decrees, are
unknown to any but to God himself; he only knows what he is, and
what he knows, what he can do, and what he hath decreed to do. For
first, if God did not know himself, he would not be perfect. It is
the perfection of a creature to know itself, much more a perfection
belonging to God. If God did not comprehend himself, he would want an
infinite perfection, and so would cease to be God, in being defective
in that which intellectual creatures in some measure possess. As
God is the most perfect being, so he must have the most perfect
understanding: if he did not understand himself, he would be under the
greatest ignorance, because he would be ignorant of the most excellent
object. Ignorance is the imperfection of the understanding; and
ignorance of one’s self is a greater imperfection than ignorance of
things without. If God should know all things without himself, and not
know himself, he would not have the most perfect knowledge, because he
would not have the knowledge of the best {a415} of objects. Secondly,
Without the knowledge of himself, he could not be blessed. Nothing can
have any complacency in itself, without knowledge of itself. Nothing
can in a rational manner enjoy itself, without understanding itself.
The blessedness of God consists not in the knowledge of anything
without him, but in the knowledge of himself and his own excellency,
as the principle of all things; if, therefore, he did not perfectly
know himself and his own happiness, he could not enjoy a happiness;
for to be, and not to know to be, is as if a thing were not. “He
is God, blessed forever” (Rom. ix. 5.), and therefore forever had a
knowledge of himself. Thirdly, Without the knowledge of himself, he
could create nothing. For he would be ignorant of his own power, and
his own ability; and he that doth not know how far his power extends,
could not act: if he did not know himself, he could know nothing; and
he that knows nothing, can do nothing; he could not know an effect to
be possible to him, unless he knew his own power as a cause. Fourthly,
Without the knowledge of himself, he could govern nothing. He could
not, without the knowledge of his own holiness and righteousness,
prescribe laws to men, nor without a knowledge of his own nature
order himself a manner of worship suitable to it. All worship must be
congruous to the dignity and nature of the object worshipped: he must
therefore know his own authority, whereby worship was to be enacted;
his own excellency, to which worship was to be suited; his own glory,
to which worship was to be directed. If he did not know himself,
he did not know what to punish, because he would not know what was
contrary to himself: not knowing himself, he would not know what was a
contempt of him, and what an adoration of him; what was worthy of God,
and what was unworthy of him. In fine, he could not know other things,
unless he knew himself; unless he knew his own power, he could not
know how he created things; unless he knew his own wisdom, he could
not know the beauty of his works; unless he knew his own glory, he
could not know the end of his works; unless he knew his own holiness,
he could not know what was evil; and unless he knew his own justice,
he could not know how to punish the crimes of his offending creatures.
And, therefore,
(1.) God knows himself, because his knowledge, with his will, is
the cause of all other things that can fall under his cognizance:
he knows himself first, before he can know any other thing; that is,
first according to our conceptions; for, indeed, God knows himself and
all other things at once; he is the first truth, and therefore is the
first object of his own understanding. There is nothing more excellent
than himself, and therefore nothing more known to him than himself. As
he is all knowledge, so he hath in himself the most excellent object
of knowledge. To understand, is properly to know one’s self. No object
is so intelligible to God as God is to himself, nor so intimately and
immediately joined with his understanding as himself; for his
understanding is his essence, himself.
(2.) He knows himself by his own essence. He knows not himself and his
own power by the effect, because he knows himself {a416} from eternity,
before there was a world, or any effect of his power extant. It is not
a knowledge by the cause, for God hath no cause; nor a knowledge of
himself by any species, or anything from without: if it were anything
from without himself, that must be created or uncreated; if uncreated
it would be God; and so we must either own many Gods, or own it to
be his essence, and so not distinct from himself: if created, then
his knowledge of himself would depend upon a creature: he could not,
then, know himself from eternity, but in time, because nothing can
be created from eternity, but in time. God knows not himself by any
faculty, for there is no composition in God; he is not made up of
parts, but is a simple being; some, therefore, have called God, not
_intellectus_, understanding, because that savors of a faculty, but
_intellectio_, intellection: God is all act in the knowledge of
himself and his knowledge of other things.
(3.) God, therefore, knows himself perfectly, comprehensively. Nothing
in his own nature is concealed from him; he reflects upon everything
that he is.[685] There is a positive comprehension, so God doth not
comprehend himself; for what is comprehended hath bounds, and what is
comprehended by itself is finite to itself; and there is a negative
comprehension――God so comprehends himself; nothing in his own nature
is obscure to him, unknown by him; for there is as great a perfection
in the understanding of God to know, as there is in the divine nature
to be known. The understanding of God, and the nature of God, are both
infinite, and so equal to one another: his understanding is equal to
himself; he knows himself so well, that nothing can be known by him
more perfectly than himself is known to himself. He knows himself
in the highest manner, because nothing is so proportioned to the
understanding of God as himself. He knows his own essence, goodness,
power; all his perfections, decrees, intentions, acts, the infinite
capacity of his own understanding, so that nothing of himself is in
the dark to himself: and, in this respect, some use this expression,
that the infiniteness of God is in a manner finite to himself, because
it is comprehended by himself. Thus God transcends all creatures; thus
his understanding is truly infinite, because nothing but himself is
an infinite object for it: what angels may understand of themselves
perfectly I know not, but no creature in the world understands himself.
Man understands not fully the excellency and parts of his own nature;
upon God’s knowledge of himself depends the comfort of his people,
and the terror of the wicked: this is also a clear argument for
his knowledge of all other things without himself; he that knows
himself, must needs know all other things less than himself, and which
were made by himself; when the knowledge of his own immensity and
infiniteness is not an object too difficult for him, the knowledge
of a finite and limited creature, in all his actions, thoughts,
circumstances, cannot be too hard for him: since he knows himself,
who is infinite, he cannot but know whatsoever is finite. This is the
foundation of all his other knowledge; the knowledge of everything
present, past, {a417} and to come, is far less than the knowledge
of himself. He is more incomprehensible in his own nature, than all
things created, or that can be created, put together can be. If he,
then, have a perfect comprehensive knowledge of his own nature, any
knowledge of all other things is less than the knowledge of himself;
this ought to be well considered by us, as the fountain whence all his
other knowledge flows.
2. Therefore God knows all other things, whether they be possible,
past, present, or future; whether they be things that he can do,
but will never do, or whether they be things that he hath done, but
are not now; things that are now in being, or things that are not
now existing, that lie in the womb of their proper and immediate
causes.[686] If his understanding be infinite, he then knows all
things whatsoever that can be known, else his understanding would
have bounds, and what hath limits is not infinite, but finite. If
he be ignorant of any one thing that is knowable, that is a bound to
him, it comes with an exception, a _but_, God knows all things _but_
this; a bar is then set to his knowledge. If there were anything, any
particular circumstance in the whole creation or non‑creation, and
possible to be known by him, and yet were unknown to him, he could not
be said to be omniscient; as he would not be Almighty if any one thing,
that implied not a repugnancy to his nature, did transcend his power.
First, All things possible. No question but God knows what he could
create, as well as what he hath created; what he would not create,
as well as what he resolved to create; he knew what he would not
do before he willed to do it; this is the next thing which declares
the infiniteness of his understanding; for, as his power is infinite,
and can create innumerable worlds and creatures, so is his knowledge
infinite, in knowing innumerable things possible to his power.
Possibles are infinite; that is, there is no end of what God can do,
and therefore no end of what God doth know; otherwise his power would
be more infinite than his knowledge: if he knew only what is created,
there would be an end of his understanding, because all creatures may
be numbered, but possible things cannot be reckoned up by any creature.
There is the same reason of this in eternity; when never so many
numbers of years are run out, there is still more to come, there
still wants an end; and when millions of worlds are created, there
is no more an end of God’s power than of eternity. Thus there is no
end of his understanding; that is, his knowledge is not terminated
by anything. This the Scripture gives us some account of: God knows
things that are not, “for he calls things that are not as if they
were” (Rom. iv. 17); he calls things that are not, as if they were in
being; what he calls is not unknown to him: if he knows things that
are not, he knows things that may never be; as he knows things that
shall be, because he wills them, so he knows things that might be,
because he is able to effect them: he knew that the inhabitants of
Keilah would betray David to Saul if he remained in that place (1 Sam.
xxiii. 11); he knew what they would do upon that occasion, though it
was never done; as he knew what was in {a418} their power and in their
wills, so he must needs know what is within the compass of his own
power; as he can permit more than he doth permit so he knows what
he can permit, and what, upon that permission, would be done by his
creatures; so God knew the possibility of the Tyrians’ repentance,
if they had had the same means, heard the same truths, and beheld the
same miracles which were offered to the ears, and presented to the
eyes of the Jews (Matt. xi. 21). This must needs be so, because,
1. Man knows things that are possible to him, though he will never
effect them. A carpenter knows a house in the model he hath of it
in his head, though he never build a house according to that model.
A watch‑maker hath the frame of a watch in his mind, which he will
never work with his instruments; man knows what he could do, though he
never intends to do it.[687] As the understanding of man hath a virtue,
that where it sees one man it may imagine thousands of men of the same
shape, stature, form, parts; yea, taller, more vigorous, sprightly,
intelligent, than the man he sees; because it is possible such a
number may be. Shall not the understanding of God much more know what
he is able to effect, since the understanding of man can know what
he is never able to produce, yet may be produced by God, viz. that he
who produced this man which I see, can produce a thousand exactly like
him? If the Divine understanding did not know infinite things, but
were confined to a certain number, it may be demanded whether God can
understand anything farther than that number, or whether he cannot?
If he can, then he doth actually understand all those things which he
hath a power to understand; otherwise there would be an increase of
God’s knowledge, if it were actually now, and not before, and so he
would be more perfect than he was before; if he cannot understand them,
then he cannot understand what a human mind can understand; for our
understandings can multiply numbers _in infinitum_; and there is no
number so great, but a man can still add to it: we must suppose the
divine understanding more excellent in knowledge. God knows all that
a man can imagine, though it never were, nor never shall be; he must
needs know whatsoever is in the power of man to imagine or think,
because God concurs to the support of the faculty in that imagination;
and though it may be replied, an atheist may imagine that there
is no God, a man may imagine that God can lie, or that he can be
destroyed; doth God know therefore that he is not? or that he can
lie, or cease to be? No, he knows he cannot; his knowledge extends
to things possible, not to things impossible to himself; he knows
it as imaginable by man, not as possible in itself; because it is
utterly impossible, and repugnant to the nature of God,[688] since he
eminently contains in himself all things possible, past, present, and
to come; he cannot know himself without knowing them.
2. God knowing his own power, knows whatsoever is in his power to
effect. If he knows not all things possible, he could not know the
extent of his own power, and so would not know himself, as a cause
sufficient for more things than he hath created. How can he {a419}
comprehend himself, who comprehends not all effluxes of things
possible that may come from him, and be wrought by him? How can he
know himself as a cause, if he know not the objects and works which he
is able to produce?[689] Since the power of God extends to numberless
things, his knowledge also extends to numberless objects; as if
a unit is, could see the numbers it could produce, it would see
infinite numbers: for a unit, as it were, all number. God knowing the
fruitfulness of his own virtue, knows a numberless multitude of things
which he can do, more than have been done, or shall be done by him;
he therefore knows innumerable worlds, innumerable angels, with higher
perfections, than any of them which he hath created have: so that if
the world should last many millions of years, God knows that he can
every day create another world more capacious than this; and having
created an inconceivable number, he knows he could still create more:
so that he beholds infinite worlds, infinite numbers of men, and other
creatures in himself, infinite kinds of things, infinite species, and
individuals under those kinds, even as many as he can create, if his
will did order and determine it; for not being ignorant of his own
power, he cannot be ignorant of the effects wherein it may display
and discover itself. A comprehensive knowledge of his own power doth
necessarily include the objects of that power; so he knows whatsoever
he could effect, and whatsoever he could permit, if he pleased to do
it. If God could not understand more than he hath created, he could
not create more than he hath created: for it cannot be conceived how
he can create anything that he is ignorant of; what he doth not know,
he cannot do: he must know also the extent of his own goodness, and
how far anything is capable to partake of it: so much therefore, as
any detract from the knowledge of God, they detract from his power.
3. It is further evident that God knows all possible things, because
he knew those things which he has created, before they were created,
when they were yet in a possibility. If God knew things before they
were created, he knew them when they were in a possibility, and not
in actual reality. It is absurd to imagine that his understanding did
lackey after the creatures, and draw knowledge from them after they
were created. It is absurd to think that God did create, before he
knew what he could or would create. If he knew those things he did
create when they were possible, he must know all things which he can
create, and therefore all things that are possible. To conclude this,
we must consider that this knowledge is of another kind than his
knowledge of things that are or shall be. He sees possible things as
possible, not as things that ever are or shall be. If he saw them as
existing or future, and they shall never be, this knowledge would be
false, there would be a deceit in it, which cannot be. He knows those
things not in themselves, because they are not, nor in their causes,
because they shall never be: he knows them in his own power, not in
his will: he understands them as able to produce them, not as willing
to effect them. Things possible he knows only in his power; things
future he knows both in his power and his {a420} will, as he is both
able and determined in his own good pleasure to give being to them.
Those that shall never come to pass, he knows only in himself as a
sufficient cause; those things that shall come into being, he knows
in himself as the efficient cause, and also in their immediate second
causes. This should teach us to spend our thoughts in the admiration
of the excellency of God, and the divine knowledge; his understanding
is infinite.
Secondly, God knows all things past. This is an argument used by God
himself to elevate his excellency above all the commonly adored idols
(Isa. xli. 22): “Let them show the former things, what they be, that
we may consider them, and know the latter end of them.” He knows them
as if they were now present, and not past: for indeed in his eternity
there is nothing past or future to his knowledge. This is called
remembrance, in Scripture, as when God remembered Rachel’s prayer for
a child (Gen. xxx. 22), and he is said to put tears into his bottle,
and write them in his book of accompts, which signifies the exact
and unerring knowledge in God of the minute circumstances past in
the world; and this knowledge is called a book of remembrance (Mal.
iii. 16), signifying the perpetual presence of things past, before
him. There are two elegant expressions, signifying the certainty
and perpetuity of God’s knowledge of sins past (Job xiv. 17), “My
transgression is sealed up in a bag, and thou sewest up mine iniquity;”
a metaphor, taken from men that put up in a bag the money they would
charily keep, tie the bag, sew up the holes, and bind it hard, that
nothing may fall out; or a vessel, wherein they reserve liquors, and
daub it with pitch and glutinous stuff, that nothing may leak out, but
be safely kept till the time of use; or else, as some think, from the
bags attornies carry with them, full of writings, when they are to
manage a cause against a person. Thus we find God often in Scripture
calling to men’s minds their past actions, upbraiding them with their
ingratitude, wherein he testifies his remembrance of his own past
benefits and their crimes. His knowledge in this regard hath something
of infinity in it, since though the sins of all men that have been
in the world are finite in regard of number, yet when the sins of one
man in thoughts, words, and deeds, are numberless in his own account,
and perhaps in the count of any creature, the sins of all the vast
numbers of men that have been, or shall be, are much more numberless,
it cannot be less than infinite knowledge that can make a collection
of them, and take a survey of them all at once. If past things had
not been known by God, how could Moses have been acquainted with the
original of things? How could he have declared the former transactions,
wherein all histories are silent but the Scripture? How could he know
the cause of man’s present misery so many ages after, wherewith all
philosophy was unacquainted? How could he have writ the order of the
creation, the particulars of the sin of Adam, the circumstances of
Cain’s murder, the private speech of Lamech to his wives, if God had
not revealed them? And how could a revelation be made, if things past
were forgotten by him? Do we not remember many things done among men,
as well as by ourselves, and reserve the forms of divers things in
our minds, which {a421} rise as occasions are presented to draw them
forth? And shall not God much more, who hath no cloud of darkness upon
his understanding? A man that makes a curious picture, hath the form
of it in his mind before he made it; and if the fire burn it, the form
of it in his mind is not destroyed by the fire, but retained in it.
God’s memory is no less perfect than his understanding. If he did not
know things past, he could not be a righteous Governor, or exercise
any judicial act in a righteous manner; he could not dispense rewards
and punishments, according to his promises and threatenings, if things
that were past could be forgotten by him; he could not require that
which is past (Eccles. iii. 15), if he did not remember that which is
past. And though God be said to forget in Scripture, and not to know
his people, and his people pray to him to remember them, as if he
had forgotten them (Ps. cxix. 49), this is improperly ascribed to
God.[690] As God is said to repent, when he changes things according
to his counsel beyond the expectation of men, so he is said to forget,
when he defers the making good his promise to the godly, or his
threatenings to the wicked; this is not a defect of memory belonging
to his mind, but an act of his will. When he is said to remember his
covenant, it is to will grace according to his covenant; when he is
said to forget his covenant, it is to intercept the influences of it,
whereby to punish the sin of his people; and when he is said not to
know his people, it is not an absolute forgetfulness of them, but
withdrawing from them the testimonies of his kindness, and clouding
the signs of his favor; so God in pardon is said to forget sin, not
that he ceaseth to know it, but ceaseth to punish it. It is not to be
meant of a simple forgetfulness, or a lapse of his memory, but of a
judicial forgetfulness; so when his people in Scripture pray, Lord,
remember thy word unto thy servant, no more is to be understood but,
Lord, fulfil thy word and promise to thy servant.
Thirdly, He knows things present (Heb. iv. 13): “All things are
naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do;” this
is grounded upon the knowledge of himself; it is not so difficult
to know all creatures exactly, as to know himself, because they are
finite, but himself is infinite; he knows his own power, and therefore
everything through which his omnipotence is diffused, all the acts
and objects of it; not the least thing that is the birth of his power,
can be concealed from him; he knows his own goodness, and therefore
every object upon which the warm beams of his goodness strike; he
therefore knows distinctly the properties of every creature, because
every property in them is a ray of his goodness; he is not only the
efficient, but the exemplary cause; therefore as he knows all that
his power hath wrought, as he is the efficient, so he knows them in
himself as the pattern; as a carpenter can give an account of every
part and passage in a house he hath built, by consulting the model in
his own mind, whereby he built it. “He looked upon all things after
he had made them, and pronounced them good” (Gen. i. 3), full of
a natural goodness he had endowed them with: he did not ignorantly
pronounce them so, and call them good, {a422} whether he knew them or
not; and therefore he knows them in particular, as he knew them all
in their first presence. Is there any reason he should be ignorant of
everything now present in the world, or that anything that derives an
existence from him as a free cause, should be concealed from him? If
he did not know things present in their particularities, many things
would be known by man, yea, by beasts, which the infinite God were
ignorant of; and if he did not know all things present, but only
some, it is possible for the most blessed God to be deceived and be
miserable: ignorance is a calamity to the understanding: he could
not prescribe laws to his creatures, unless he knew their natures to
which those laws were to be suited: no, not natural ordinances to the
sun, moon, and heavenly bodies, and inanimate creatures, unless he
knew the vigor and virtue in them, to execute those ordinances; for
to prescribe laws above the nature of things, is inconsistent with
the wisdom of government; he must know how far they were able to obey;
whether the laws were suited to their ability: and for his rational
creatures, whether the punishments annexed to the law were proper, and
suited to the transgression of the creature.