that God is essentially in every part of the world, and essentially
above ours without the world (Isa. lxvi. 1): “The heaven is my throne,
and the earth is my footstool.” He is essentially in every part of the
world; he is in heaven and earth at the same time, as a man is upon
his throne and his footstool. God describes himself in a human shape,
accommodated to our capacity; as if he had his head in heaven, and his
feet on earth. Doth not his essence then, fill all intermediate spaces
between heaven and earth? As when the head of a man is in the upper
part of a room, and his feet upon the floor, his body fills up the
space between the head and his feet: this is meant of the essence
of God; it is a similitude drawn from kings sitting upon the throne,
and not their power and authority, but the feet of their persons
are supported by the footstool; so here it is not meant only of the
perfections of God, but the essence of God. Besides, God seems to tax
them with an erroneous conceit they had, as though his essence were
in the temple, and not in any part of the world; therefore God makes
an opposition between heaven and earth, and the temple: “Where is
the house that you built unto me? and where is the place of my rest?”
Had he understood it only of his providence, it had not been anything
against their mistake; for they granted his providence to be not only
in the temple, but in all parts of the world. “Where is the house that
you build to me;” to Me, not to my power or providence, but think to
include Me within those walls. Again, it shows God to be above the
heavens, if the heavens be his throne; he sits upon them, and is above
them, as {a378} kings are above the thrones on which they sit. So it
cannot be meant of his providence, because no creature being without
the sphere of the heavens, there is nothing of the power and the
providence of God visible there, for there is nothing for him to
employ his providence about; for providence supposeth a creature
in actual being; it must be therefore meant of his essence, which
is above the world and in the world. And the like proof you may
see (Job. xi. 7, 8), “It is as high as heaven, what canst thou do?
deeper than hell, what canst thou know? the measure thereof is longer
than the earth, and broader than the sea.” Where he intends the
unsearchableness of God’s wisdom, but proves it by the infiniteness
of his essence, (Heb.) “he is the height of the heavens,” he is the
top of all the heavens; so that, when you have begun at the lowest
part, and traced him through all the creatures, you will find his
essence filling all the creatures, to be at the top of the world,
and infinitely beyond it.
_Prop. V._ This is the property of God, incommunicable to any
creature. As no creature can be eternal and immutable, so no creature
can be immense, because it cannot be infinite; nothing can be of an
infinite nature, and therefore nothing of an immense presence but God.
It cannot be communicated to the human nature of Christ, though in
union with the Divine;[658] some indeed argue, that Christ in regard
of his human nature is everywhere, because he sits at the right hand
of God, and the right hand of God is everywhere. His sitting at the
right hand of God signifies his exaltation, and cannot with any reason,
be extended to such a kind of arguing. “The hearts of kings are in the
hand of God;” are the hearts of kings everywhere, because God’s hand
is everywhere? The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God; is
the soul, therefore, of every righteous man everywhere in the world?
The right hand of God is from eternity; is the humanity of Christ,
therefore, from eternity, because it sits at the right hand of God?
The right hand of God made the world; did the humanity of Christ,
therefore, make heaven and earth? the humanity of Christ must then be
confounded with his divinity; be the same with it, not united to it.
All creatures are distinct from their Creator, and cannot inherit
the properties essential to his nature, as eternity, immensity,
immutability, omnipresence, omniscience; no angel, no soul, no
creature can be in all places at once; before they can be so they
must be immense, and so must cease to be creatures, and commence God;
this is impossible.
II. Reasons to prove God’s essential presence. _Reason I._ Because
he is infinite. As he is infinite, he is everywhere; as he is simple,
his whole essence is everywhere: for, in regard of his infiniteness,
he hath no bounds; in regard of his simplicity, he hath no parts: and,
therefore, those that deny God’s omnipresence, though they pretend to
own him infinite, must really conceive him finite.
1. God is infinite in his perfections. None can set bounds to
terminate the greatness and excellency of God (Ps. cxlv. 3): “His
greatness is unsearchable,” Sept. οὐκ ἔστι πέρας, there is no end,
no limitation. What hath no end is infinite; his power is infinite
(Job v. 9): {a379} “which doth great things and unsearchable;”――no end
of those things he is able to do. His wisdom infinite (Ps. cxlvii. 5);
he understands all things past, present, and to come; what is
already made, what is possible to be made. His duration infinite
(Job xxxvi. 26): “The number of his years cannot be searched out,”
ἀπέραντος. To make a finite thing of nothing is an argument of an
infinite virtue. Infinite power can only extract something out of the
barren womb of nothing; but all things were drawn forth by the word
of God, the heavens, and all the host of them; the sun, moon, stars,
the rich embellishments of the world, appeared in being “at the
breath of his mouth” (Ps. xxxiii. 6). The author, therefore, must be
infinite; and since nothing is the cause of God, or of any perfection
in him,――since he derives not his being, or the least spark of his
glorious nature, from anything without him,――he cannot be limited
in any part of his nature by anything without him; and, indeed, the
infiniteness of his power and his other perfections is asserted by
the prophet, when he tells us that “the nations are as a drop of a
bucket, or the dust of the balance, and less than nothing and vanity”
(Isa. xl. 15, 17), they are all so in regard of his power, wisdom, &c.
Conceive what a little thing a grain of dust or sand is to all the
dust that may be made by the rubbish of a house: what a little thing
the heap of the rubbish of a house is to the vast heap of the rubbish
of a whole city, such an one as London; how little that, also, would
be to the dust of a whole empire; how inconsiderable that, also,
to the dust of one quarter of the world, Europe or Asia; how much
less that, still, to the dust of the whole world! The whole world
is composed of an unconceivable number of atoms, and the sea of an
unconceivable number of drops; now what a little grain of dust is in
comparison to the dust of the whole world――a drop of water from the
sea, to all the drops remaining in the sea――that is the whole world to
God. Conceive it still less, a mere nothing, yet is it all less than
this in comparison of God; there can be nothing more magnificently
expressive of the infiniteness of God to a human conception, than
this expression of God himself in the prophet. In the perfection of
a creature, something still may be thought greater to be added to it;
but God containing all perfections in himself formally, if they be
mere perfections, and eminently, if they be but perfections in the
creature, mixed with imperfection, nothing can be thought greater,
and therefore every one of them is infinite.
2. If his perfections be infinite, his essence must be so. How God
can have infinite perfections, and a finite essence, is unconceivable
by a human or angelical understanding; an infinite power, an infinite
wisdom, an infinite duration, must needs speak an infinite essence;
since the infiniteness of his attributes is grounded upon the
infiniteness of his essence: to own infinite perfections in a finite
subject is contradictory. The manner of acting by his power, and
knowing by his wisdom, cannot exceed the manner of being by his
essence. His perfections flow from his essence, and the principle must
be of the same rank with what flows from it; and, if we conceive his
essence to be the cause of his perfections, it is utterly impossible
that an infinite effect should arise from a finite cause: but, indeed,
his {a380} perfections are his essence; for though we conceive the
essence of God as the subject, and the attributes of God as faculties
and qualities in that subject, according to our weak model, who
cannot conceive of an infinite God without some manner of likeness to
ourselves――who find understanding, and will, and power in us distinct
from our substance; yet truly and really there is no distinction
between his essence and attributes; one is inseparable from the other.
His power and wisdom are his essence; and therefore to maintain God
infinite in the one, and finite in the other, is to make a monstrous
god, and have an unreasonable notion of the Deity; for there would be
the greatest disproportion in his nature, since there is no greater
disproportion can possibly be between one thing and another than there
is between finite and infinite. God must not only then be compounded,
but have parts of the greatest distance from one another in nature;
but God, being the most simple being without the least composition,
both must be equally infinite: if, then, his essence be not infinite,
his power and wisdom cannot be infinite, which is both against
scripture and reason. Again, how should his essence be finite, and
his perfections be infinite, since nothing out of himself gave them
either the one or the other?[659] Again, either the essence can be
infinite, or it cannot; if it cannot, there must be some cause of
that impossibility; that can be nothing without him, because nothing
without him can be as powerful as himself, much less too powerful for
him; nothing within him can be an enemy to his highest perfection;
since he is necessarily what he is, he must be necessarily the
most perfect being, and therefore necessarily infinite, since to be
something infinitely is a greater perfection than to be something
thing finitely:[660] if he can be infinite he is infinite, otherwise
he could be greater than he is, and so more blessed and more perfect
than he is, which is impossible: for being the most perfect Being, to
whom nothing can be added, he must needs be infinite.
3. If, therefore, God have an infinite essence, he hath an infinite
presence. An infinite essence cannot be contained in a finite place,
as those things which are finite have a bounded space wherein they are;
so that which is infinite hath an unbounded space; for, as finiteness
speaks limitedness, so infiniteness speaks unboundedness; and if
we grant to God an infinite duration, there is no difficulty in
acknowledging an infinite presence: indeed, the infiniteness of God is
a property belonging to him in regard of time and place; he is bounded
by no place, and limited to no time. Again, infinite essence may as
well be everywhere, as infinite power reaches everything; it may as
well be present with every being, as infinite power in its working may
be present with nothing to bring it into being. Where God works by his
power, he is present in his essence; because his power and his essence
cannot be separated; and therefore his power, wisdom, goodness, cannot
be anywhere where his essence is not: his essence cannot be severed
from his power, nor his power from his essence; for the power of
God is nothing but God acting, and the wisdom of God nothing but God
knowing. As the power of God {a381} is always, so is his essence――as
the power of God is everywhere, so is his essence: whatsoever God is,
he is alway, and everywhere. To confine him to a place, is to measure
his essence; as to confine his actions, is to limit his power; his
essence being no less infinite than his power and his wisdom, can be
no more bounded than his power and wisdom; but they are not separable
from his essence, yea, they are his essence. If God did not fill the
whole world, he would be determined to some place, and excluded from
others; and so his substance would have bounds and limits, and then
something might be conceived greater than God; for we may conceive
that a creature may be made by God of so vast a greatness as to fill
the whole world, for the power of God is able to make a body that
should take up the whole space between heaven and earth, and reach
to every corner of it. But nothing can be conceived by any creature
greater than God; he exceeds all things, and is exceeded by none. God,
therefore, cannot be included in heaven, nor included in the earth;
cannot be contained in either of them; for, if we should imagine
them vaster than they are, yet still they would be finite; and if his
essence were contained in them, it could be no more infinite than the
world which contains it, as water is not of a larger compass than the
vessel which contains it. If the essence of God were limited, either
in the heavens or earth, it must needs be finite, as the heaven and
earth are; but there is no proportion between finite and infinite; God,
therefore, cannot be contained in them. If there were an infinite body,
that must be everywhere; certainly, then, an infinite Spirit must be
everywhere; unless we will account him finite, we can render no reason
why he should not be in one creature as well as in another. If he
be in heaven, which is his creature, why can he not be in the earth,
which is as well his creature as the heavens?
_Reason II._ Because of the continual operation of God in the world.
This was one reason which made the heathen believe that there was an
infinite Spirit in the vast body of the world, acting in everything,
and producing those admirable motions which we see everywhere in
nature: that cause which acts in the most perfect manner, is also in
the most perfect manner present with its effects.
God preserves all, and therefore is in all; the apostle thought
it a good induction (Acts xvii. 27), “He is not far from us, for in
him we live.” _For_ being as much as _because_, shows, that from his
operation he concluded his real presence with all: it is not, His
virtue is not far from every one of us, but He, his substance, himself;
for, none that acknowledge a God will deny the absence of the virtue
of God from any part of the world. He works in everything, everything
lives and works in him; therefore he is present with all:[661] or
rather, if things live, they are in God, who gives them life. If
things live, God is in them, and gives them life; if things move, God
is in them, and gives them motion; if things have any being, God is in
them, and gives them being; if God withdraws himself, they presently
lose their being, and therefore some have compared the creature to
the impression of a seal upon the water, that cannot be preserved
but by the presence of the seal. As his presence was actual {a382}
with what he created, so his presence is actual with what preserves,
since creation and preservation do so little differ; if God creates
things by his essential presence, by the same he supports them; if
his substance cannot be disjoined from his preserving power, his power
and wisdom cannot be separated from his essence; where there are the
marks of the one, there is the presence of the other; for it is by his
essence that he is powerful and wise; no man can distinguish the one
from the other in a simple being; God doth not preserve and act things
by a virtue diffused from him. It may be demanded whether that virtue
be distinct from God; if it be not, it is then the essence of God; if
it be distinct it is a creature, and then it may be asked, how that
virtue which preserves other things, is preserved itself; it must
be ultimately resolved into the essence of God, or else there must
be a running _in infinitum_: or else,[662] is that virtue of God a
substance, or not? Is it endued with understanding, or not? If it hath
understanding, how doth it differ from God? If it wants understanding,
can any imagine that the support of the world, the guidance of all
creatures, the wonders of nature, can be wrought, preserved, managed
by a virtue that hath nothing of understanding in it? If it be not
a substance, it can much less be able to produce such excellent
operations as the preserving all the kinds of things in the world,
and ordering them to perform such excellent ends; this virtue is,
therefore, God himself――the infinite power and wisdom of God; and
therefore, wheresoever the effects of these are seen in the world, God
is essentially present: some creatures, indeed, act at a distance by a
virtue diffused. But such a manner of acting comes from a limitedness
of nature, that such a nature cannot be everywhere present and extend
its substance to all parts. To act by a virtue, speaks the subject
finite, and it is a part of indigence: kings act in their kingdoms by
ministers and messengers, because they cannot act otherwise; but God
being infinitely perfect, works all things in all immediately (1 Cor.
xii. 6). Illumination, sanctification, grace, &c., are the immediate
works of God in the heart, and immediate agents are present with
what they do: it is an argument of the greater perfection of a being,
to know things immediately, which are done in several places, than
to know them at the second hand by instruments; it is no less a
perfection to be everywhere, rather than to be tied to one place
of action, and to act in other places by instruments, for want of a
power to act immediately itself. God, indeed, acts by means and second
causes in his providential dispensations in the world, but this is
not out of any defect of power to work all immediately himself; but he
thereby accommodates his way of acting to the nature of the creature,
and the order of things which he hath settled in the world. And when
he works by means, he acts with those means, in those means, sustains
their faculties and virtues in them, concurs with them by his power;
so that God’s acting by means doth rather strengthen his essential
presence than weaken it, since there is a necessary dependence of the
creatures upon the Creator in their being and acting; and what they
are, they are by the power of God; what they act, they act in the
power of God, concurring {a383} with them; they have their motion in
him as well as their being: and where the power of God is, his essence
is, because they are inseparable; and so this omnipresence ariseth
from the simplicity of the nature of God; the more vast anything is,
the less confined. All that will acknowledge God so great, as to be
able to work all things by his will, without an essential presence,
cannot imagine him upon the same reason, so little as to be contained
in, and bounded by any place.
_Reason III._ Because of his supreme perfection. No perfection is
wanting to God; but an unbounded essence is a perfection; a limited
one is an imperfection. Though it be a perfection in a man to be wise,
yet it is an imperfection that his wisdom cannot rule all the things
that concern him; though it be a perfection to be present in a place
where his affairs lie, yet is it an imperfection that he cannot be
present everywhere in the midst of all his concerns; if any man could
be so, it would be universally owned as a prime perfection in him
above others: is that which would be a perfection in man to be denied
to God?[663] as that which hath life is more perfect than that which
hath not life; and that which hath sense is more perfect than that
which hath only life as the plants have; and what hath reason, is more
perfect than that which hath only life and sense, as the beasts have;
so what is everywhere, is more perfect than that which is bounded in
some narrow confines: if a power of motion be more excellent than to
be bed‑rid, and swiftness in a creature be a more excellent endowment
than to be slow and snail‑like, then to be everywhere without
motion, is inconceivably a greater excellency than to be everywhere
successively by motion. God sets forth his readiness to help his
people and punish his enemies, or his omnipresence, by swiftness, or
“flying upon the wings of the wind” (Ps. xviii. 10): the wind is in
every part of the air, where it blows; it cannot be said that it is
in this or that point of the air where you feel it, so as to exclude
it from another part of the air where you are not; it seems to possess
all at once. If the Divine essence had any bounds of place, it would
be imperfect, as well as if it had bounds of time; where anything hath
limitation, it hath some defect in being; and therefore if God were
confined or concluded, he would be as good as nothing in regard of
infiniteness. Whence should this restraint arise? there is no power
above him to restrain him to a certain space; if so, then he would
not be God, but that power which restrained him would be God: not from
his own nature, for the being everywhere implies no contradiction to
his nature; if his own nature determined him to a certain place, then
if he removed from that place, he would act against his nature; to
conceive any such thing of God is highly absurd. It cannot be thought
God should voluntarily impose any such restraint or confinement upon
himself; this would be to deny himself a perfection he might have; if
God have not this perfection, it is either because it is inconsistent
with his nature; or, because he cannot have it; or, because he will
not. The former cannot be; for if he hath impressed upon air and
light a resemblance of his excellency, to diffuse themselves and fill
so vast a space, is such an excellency {a384} inconsistent with the
Creator more than the creature? whatsoever perfection the creature
hath, is eminently in God. “Understand, O ye brutish among the people:
and ye fools, when will you be wise? He that planted the ear, shall he
not hear? he that formed the eye, shall he not see? he that teacheth
man knowledge, shall not he know?” (Ps. xciv. 8, 9.) By the same
reason he that hath given such a power to those creatures, air and
light, shall not he be much more filling all spaces of the world? It
is so clear a rule, that the Psalmist fixes a folly and brutishness
upon those that deny it; it is not therefore inconsistent with
his nature, it were not then a perfection but an imperfection; but
whatsoever is an excellency in creatures, cannot in a way of eminency
be an imperfection in God; if it be then a perfection, and God want it,
it is because he cannot have it; where, then, is his power? How can he
be then the fountain of his own Being? If he will not, where is his
love to his own nature and glory? since no creature would deny that to
itself which it can have, and is an excellency to it; God, therefore,
hath not only a power or fitness to be everywhere, but he is actually
everywhere.
_Reason IV._ Because of his immutability. If God did not fill all
the spaces of heaven and earth, but only possess one, yet it must
be acknowledged that God hath a power to move himself to another. It
were absurd to fix God in a part of the heavens, like a star in an
orb, without a power of motion to another place. If he be therefore
essentially in heaven, may he not be upon the earth if he please, and
transfer his substance from one place to another? to say he cannot,
is to deny him a perfection which he hath bestowed upon his creatures;
the angels, his messengers, are sometimes in heaven, sometimes on
the earth; the eagles, meaner creatures, are sometimes in the air
out of sight, sometimes upon the earth. If he doth move, therefore,
and recede from one place and settle in another, doth he not declare
himself mutable by changing places?――by being where he was not before,
and in not being where he was before? He would not fill heaven and
earth at once, but successively; no man can be said to fill a room,
that moves from one part of a room to another; if therefore any in
their imaginations stake God to the heavens, they render him less than
his creatures; if they allow him a power of motion from one place to
another, they conceive him changeable; and in either of them they own
him no greater than a finite and limited Being; limited to heaven, if
they fix him there; limited to that space to which they imagine him
to move.