perfections. Immutability and eternity are linked together; and,
indeed, true eternity is true immutability; whence eternity is
defined the possession of an immutable life. Yet immutability differs
from eternity in our conception; immutability respects the essence
or existence of a thing; eternity respects the duration of a being in
that state, or rather, immutability is the state itself;[591] eternity
is the measure of that state. A thing is said to be changed, when it
is otherwise now in regard of nature, state, will, or any quality than
it was before; when either something is added to it, or taken from it;
when it either loses or acquires. But now it is the essential property
of God, not to have any accession to, or diminution of, his essence
or attributes, but to remain entirely the same. He wants nothing;
he loses nothing; but doth uniformly exist by himself, without any
new nature, new thoughts, new will, new purpose, or new place. This
unchangeableness of God was anciently represented by the figure of
a cube, a piece of metal or wood framed four‑square, when every side
is exactly of the same equality; cast it which way you will, it will
always be in the same posture, because it is equal to itself in all
its dimensions.[592] He was therefore said to be the centre of all
things, and other things the circumference; the centre is never moved,
while the circumference is; it remains immovable in the midst of the
circle; “There is no variableness nor shadow of turning with him”
(James i. 17). The moon hath her spots, so hath the sun; there is a
mixture of light and darkness; it hath its changes; sometimes it is
in the increase, sometimes in the wane; it is always either gaining
or losing, and by the turnings and motions, either of the heavenly
bodies or of the earth, it is in its eclipse, by the interposition of
the earth between that and the sun. The sun also hath its diurnal and
annual motion; it riseth and sets, and puts on a different face; it
doth not always shine with the noon‑day light; it is sometimes veiled
with clouds and vapors; it is always going from one tropic to another,
whereby it makes various shadows on the earth, and produceth the
various seasons of the year; it is not always in our hemisphere, nor
doth it always shine with an equal force and brightness in it. Such
shadows and variations have no place in the eternal Father of Lights;
he hath not the least spot or diminution of brightness; nothing can
cloud him or eclipse him.
For the better understanding this perfection of God, I shall premise
three things.
1. The immutability of God is a perfection. Immutability considered
in itself, without relation to other things, is not a perfection. It
is the greatest misery and imperfection of the evil angels, that they
are immutable in malice against God; but as God is infinite in essence,
infinitely good, wise, holy; so it is a perfection necessary to his
nature, that he should be immutably all this, all excellency, {a318}
goodness, wisdom, immutably all that he is; without this he would be
an imperfect Being. Are not the angels in heaven, who are confirmed
in a holy and happy state, more perfect than when they were in a
possibility of committing evil and becoming miserable? Are not the
saints in heaven, whose wills by grace do unalterably cleave to God
and goodness, more perfect than if they were as Adam in Paradise,
capable of losing their felicity, as well as preserving it? We count a
rock, in regard of its stability, more excellent than the dust of the
ground, or a feather that is tossed about with every wind; is it not
also the perfection of the body to have a constant tenor of health,
and the glory of a man not to warp aside from what is just and right,
by the persuasions of any temptations?
2. Immutability is a glory belonging to all the attributes of God.
It is not a single perfection of the Divine nature, nor is it limited
to particular objects thus and thus disposed. Mercy and justice have
their distinct objects and distinct acts; mercy is conversant about
a penitent, justice conversant about an obstinate sinner. In our
notion and conception of the Divine perfections, his perfections
are different: the wisdom of God is not his power, nor his power his
holiness, but immutability is the centre wherein they all unite. There
is not one perfection but may be said to be and truly is, immutable;
none of them will appear so glorious without this beam, this sun of
immutability, which renders them highly excellent without the least
shadow of imperfection. How cloudy would his blessedness be if it were
changeable! How dim his wisdom, if it might be obscured! How feeble
his power, if it were capable to be sickly and languish! How would
mercy lose much of its lustre, if it could change into wrath; and
justice much of its dread, if it could be turned into mercy, while the
object of justice remains unfit for mercy, and one that hath need of
mercy continues only fit for the Divine fury! But unchangeableness is
a thread that runs through the whole web; it is the enamel of all the
rest; none of them without it could look with a triumphant aspect. His
power is unchangeable: “In the Lord Jehovah is everlasting strength”
(Isa. xxvi. 4). His mercy and his holiness endure forever: he never
could, nor ever can, look upon iniquity (Hab. i. 13). He is a rock in
the righteousness of his ways, the truth of his word, the holiness of
his proceedings, and the rectitude of his nature. All are expressed
Deut xxxii. 4: “He is a rock, his work is perfect, for all his ways
are judgment; a God of truth, and without iniquity; just and right
is he.” All that we consider in God is unchangeable; for his essence
and his properties are the same, and, therefore, what is necessarily
belonging to the essence of God, belongs also to every perfection of
the nature of God; none of them can receive any addition or diminution.
From the unchangeableness of his nature, the apostle (James i. 17)
infers the unchangeableness of his holiness, and himself (in Mal.
iii. 6) the unchangeableness of his counsel.
3. Unchangeableness doth necessarily pertain to the nature of God. It
is of the same necessity with the rectitude of his nature; he can no
more be changeable in his essence than he can be unrighteous in his
actions. God is a necessary Being; he is necessarily what he is, and,
{a319} therefore, is unchangeably what he is. Mutability belongs to
contingency. If any perfection of his nature could be separated from
him, he would cease to be God. What did not possess the whole nature
of God, could not have the essence of God; it is reciprocated with the
nature of God. Whatsoever is immutable by nature is God; whatsoever is
God is immutable by nature. Some creatures are immutable by his grace
and power. God is holy, happy, wise, good, by his essence; angels
and men are made holy, wise, happy, strong, and good, by qualities
and graces.[593] The holiness, happiness, and wisdom of saints and
angels, as they had a beginning, so they are capable of increase
and diminution, and of an end also; for their standing is not from
themselves, or from the nature of created strength, holiness, or
wisdom, which in themselves are apt to fail, and finally to decay;
but from the stability and confirmation they have by the gift and
grace of God. The heaven and earth shall be changed; and after that
renewal and reparation they shall not be changed. Our bodies after the
resurrection shall not be changed, but forever be “made conformable
to the glorious body of Christ” (Phil. iii. 21); but this is by the
powerful grace of God: so that, indeed, those things may be said
afterwards rather to be unchanged than unchangeable, because they are
not so by nature, but by sovereign dispensation. As creatures have not
necessary beings, so they have not necessary immutability. Necessity
of being, and, therefore, immutability of being, belongs by nature
only to God; otherwise, if there were any change in God, he would be
sometimes what he was not, and would cease to be what he was, which is
against the nature, and, indeed, against the natural notion of a Deity.
Let us see then,
I. In what regards God is immutable. II. Prove that God is immutable.
III. That this is proper to God, and incommunicable to any creature.
IV. Some propositions to clear the unchangeableness of God from
anything that seems contrary to it. V. The use.
I. In what respects God is unchangeable.
1. God is unchangeable in his essence. He is unalterably fixed in
his being, so that not a particle of it can be lost from it, not a
mite added to it. If a man continue in being as long as Methuselah,
nine hundred and sixty‑nine years; yet there is not a day, nay, an
hour, wherein there is not some alteration in his substance. Though
no substantial part is wanting, yet there is an addition to him by
his food, a diminution of something by his labor; he is always making
some acquisition, or suffering some loss: but in God there can be no
alteration, by the accession of anything to make his substance greater
or better, or by diminution to make it less or worse. He who hath not
being from another, cannot but be always what he is: God is the first
Being, an independent Being; he was not produced of himself, or of
any other, but by nature always hath been, and, therefore, cannot by
himself, or by any other, be changed from what he is in his own nature.
That which is not may as well assume to itself a being, as he who
hath and is all being, have the least change from what he is. Again,
because he is a Spirit, he is not subject to those mutations which
are found in corporeal and bodily natures; because he is an {a320}
absolutely simple Spirit, not having the least particle of composition;
he is not capable of those changes which may be in created spirits.
(1.) If his essence were mutable, God would not truly be; it could
not be truly said by himself, “I Am that I Am” (Exod. iii. 14), if
he were such a thing or Being at this time, and a different Being at
another time. Whatsoever is changed properly is not, because it doth
not remain to be what it was; that which is changed was something, is
something, and will be something. A being remains to that thing which
is changed; yet though it may be said such a thing is, yet it may be
also said such a thing is not, because it is not what it was in its
first being; it is not now what it was, it is now what it was not; it
is another thing than it was, it was another thing than it is; it will
be another thing than what it is or was. It is, indeed, a being, but
a different being from what it was before. But if God were changed,
it could not be said of him that he is, but it might also be said of
him that he is not; or if he were changeable, or could be changed, it
might be said of him he is, but he will not be what he is; or he may
not be what he is, but there will be or may be some difference in his
being, and so God would not be “I Am that I Am;” for though he would
not cease utterly to be, yet he would cease to be what he was before.
(2.) Again: if his essence were mutable, he could not be perfectly
blessed, and fully rejoice in himself. If he changed for the better,
he could not have an infinite pleasure in what he was before the
change, because he was not infinitely blessed; and the pleasure of
that state could not be of a higher kind than the state itself, or,
at least, the apprehension of a happiness in it. If he changed for
the worse, he could not have a pleasure in it after the change; for
according to the diminution of his state would be the decrease of his
pleasure. His pleasure could not be infinite before the change, if
he changed for the better; it could not be infinite after the change,
if he changed for the worse. If he changed for the better, he would
not have had an infinite goodness of being before; and not having an
infinite goodness of being, he would have a finite goodness of being;
for there is no medium between finite and infinite. Then, though the
change were for the better, yet, being finite before, something would
be still wanting to make him infinitely blessed; because being finite,
he could not change to that which is infinite; for finite and infinite
are extremes so distant, that they can never pass into one another;
that is, that that which is finite should become infinite, or that
which is infinite should become finite; so that supposing him mutable,
his essence in no state of change could furnish him with an infinite
peace and blessedness.
(3.) Again: if God’s essence be changed, he either increaseth or
diminisheth.[594] Whatsoever is changed, doth either gain by receiving
something larger and greater than it had in itself before, or gains
nothing by being changed. If the former, then it receives more than
itself, more than it had in itself before. The Divine nature cannot
be increased; for whatsoever receives anything than what it had in
itself before, must necessarily receive it from another, because {a321}
nothing can give to itself that which it hath not. But God cannot
receive from another what he hath not already, because whatsoever
other things possess is derived from him, and, therefore, contained
in him, as the fountain contains the virtue in itself which it conveys
to the streams; so that God cannot gain anything. If a thing that is
changed gain nothing by that change, it loseth something of what it
had before in itself; and this loss must be by itself or some other.
God cannot receive any loss from anything in himself; he cannot will
his own diminution, that is repugnant to every nature. He may as well
will his own destruction as his own decrease: every decrease is a
partial destruction. But it is impossible for God to die any kind
of death, to have any resemblance of death, for he is immortal, and
“only hath immortality” (1 Tim. vi. 16), therefore impossible to be
diminished in any particle of his essence; nor can he be diminished by
anything in his own nature, because his infinite simplicity admits of
nothing distinct from himself, or contrary to himself. All decreases
come from something contrary to the nature of that thing which doth
decrease. Whatsoever is made less than itself, was not truly _unum_,
one and simple, because that which divides itself in separation was
not the same in conjunction. Nor can he be diminished by any other
without himself; because nothing is superior to God, nothing stronger
than God which can oppress him. But whatsoever is changed is weaker
than that which changeth it, and sinks under a power it cannot
successfully resist; weakness belongs not to the Deity.[595] Nor,
lastly, can God change from a state wherein he is, to another state
equal to the former, as men in some cases may do; for in passing from
one state to another equal to it, something must be parted with which
he had before, that some other thing may accrue to him as a recompense
for that loss, to make him equal to what he was. This recompense then
he had not before, though he had something equal to it. And in this
case it could not be said by God “I Am that I Am,” but I am equal to
what I was; for in this case there would be a diminution and increase
which, as was showed, cannot be in God.
(4.) Again: God is of himself, from no other.[596] Natures, which
are made by God, may increase, because they began to be; they may
decrease, because they were made of nothing, and so tend to nothing;
the condition of their original leads them to defect, and the power
of their Creator brings them to increase. But God hath no original;
he hath no defect, because he was not made of nothing: he hath no
increase, because he had no beginning. He was before all things, and,
therefore, depends upon no other thing which, by its own change, can
bring any change upon him. That which is from itself cannot be changed,
because it hath nothing before it, nothing more excellent than itself;
but that which is from another as its first cause and chief good, may
be changed by that which was its efficient cause and last end.[597]
2. God is immutable in regard of knowledge. God hath known from
all eternity all that which he can know, so that nothing is hid from
him. He knows not at present any more than he hath known {a322} from
eternity: and that which he knows now he always knows: “All things are
open and naked before him” (Heb. iv. 13). A man is said to be changed
in regard of knowledge, when he knows that now which he did not know
before, or knows that to be false now which he thought true before,
or has something for the object of his understanding now, which he had
not before. But,
(1.) This would be repugnant to the wisdom and omniscience which
belongs to the notions of a Deity. That cannot be God that is not
infinitely wise; that cannot be infinitely wise that is either
ignorant of, or mistaken in, his apprehension of any one thing. If God
be changed in knowledge, it must be for want of wisdom; all change of
this nature in creatures implies this defect preceding or accompanying
it. Such a thought of God would have been unworthy of him that is
“only wise,” that hath no mate for wisdom (1 Tim. i. 17); none wise
beside himself. If he knew that thing this day which he knew not
before, he would not be an “only wise” Being; for a being that did
know everything at once might be conceived, and so a wiser being
be apprehended by the mind of man. If God understood a thing at one
time which he did not at another, he would be changed from ignorance
to knowledge; as if he could not do that this day which he could
do to‑morrow, he would be changed from impotence to power. He could
not be always omniscient, because there might be yet something still
to come which he yet knows not, though he may know all things that
are past. What way soever you suppose a change, you must suppose a
present or a past ignorance; if he be changed in his knowledge for
the perfection of his understanding, he was ignorant before; if his
understanding be impaired by the change, he is ignorant after it.
(2.) If God were changeable in his knowledge, it would make him unfit
to be an object of trust to any rational creature. His revelations
would want the due ground for entertainment, if his understanding
were changeable; for that might be revealed as truth now which might
prove false hereafter, and that as false now which hereafter might
prove true; and so God would be an unfit object of obedience in regard
of his precepts, and an unfit object of confidence in regard of his
promises. For if he be changeable in knowledge he is defective in
knowledge, and might promise that now which he would know afterwards
was unfit to be promised, and, therefore, unfit to be performed.
It would make him an incompetent object of dread, in regard of his
threatenings; for he might threaten that now which he might know
hereafter were not fit or just to be inflicted. A changeable mind and
understanding cannot make a due and right judgment of things to be
done, and things to be avoided; no wise man would judge it reasonable
to trust a weak and flitting person. God must needs be unchangeable
in his knowledge; but, as the schoolmen say, that, as the sun always
shines, so God always knows; as the sun never ceaseth to shine, so God
never ceaseth to know. Nothing can be hid from the vast compass of his
understanding, no more than anything can shelter itself without the
verge of his power. This farther appears in that,
1st. God knows by his own essence. He doth not know, as we {a323}
do, by habits, qualities, species, whereby we may be mistaken at one
time and rectified at another. He hath not an understanding distinct
from his essence as we have, but being the most simple Being, his
understanding is his essence; and as from the infiniteness of his
essence we conclude the infiniteness of his understanding, so from
the unchangeableness of his essence, we may justly conclude the
unchangeableness of his knowledge. Since, therefore, God is without
all composition, and his understanding is not distinct from his
essence, what he knows, he knows by his essence, and there can then be
no more mutability in his knowledge than there can be in his essence;
and if there were any in that, he could not be God, because he would
have the property of a creature. If his understanding then be his
essence, his knowledge is as necessary, as unchangeable as his essence.
As his essence eminently contains all perfections in itself, so his
understanding comprehends all things past, present, and future, in
itself. If his understanding and his essence were not one and the same,
he were not simple, but compounded: if compounded, he would consist of
parts; if he consisted of parts, he would not be an independent Being,
and so would not be God.
2d. God knows all things by one intuitive act. As there is no
succession in his being, so that he is one thing now and another
thing hereafter; so there is no succession in his knowledge. He knows
things that are successive, before their existence and succession, by
one single act of intuition; by one cast of his eye all things future
are present to him in regard of his eternity and omnipresence; so that
though there is a change and variation in the things known, yet his
knowledge of them and their several changes in nature is invariable
and unalterable. As imagine a creature that could see with his eye
at one glance the whole compass of the heavens, by sending out beams
from his eye without receiving any species from them, he would see the
whole heavens uniformly, this part now in the east, then in the west,
without any change in his eye, for he sees every part and every motion
together; and though that great body varies and whirls about, and is
in continual agitation, his eye remains steadfast, suffers no change,
beholds all their motions at once and by one glance. God knows all
things from eternity, and, therefore, perpetually knows them;[598] the
reason is because the Divine knowledge is infinite,[599] and therefore,
comprehends all knowable truths at once. An eternal knowledge
comprehends in itself all time, and beholds past and present in the
same manner, and, therefore, his knowledge is immutable: by one simple
knowledge he considers the infinite spaces of past and future.
3d. God’s knowledge and will is the cause of all things and their
successions.[600] There can be no pretence of any changeableness of
knowledge in God; but in this case, before things come to pass, he
knows that they will come to pass; after they are come to pass, he
knows that they are past, and slide away. This would be something if
the succession of things were the cause of the Divine knowledge, as it
is of our knowledge; but on the contrary, the {a324} Divine knowledge
and will is the cause of the succession of them: God doth not know
creatures because they are; but they are because he knows them: “All
his works were known to him from the beginning of the world” (Acts xv.
18). All his works were not known to him, if the events of all those
works were not also known to him; if they were not known to him, how
should he make them? he could not do anything ignorantly. He made them
then after he knew them, and did not know them after he made them.
His knowledge of them made a change in them; their existence made no
change in his knowledge. He knew them when they were to be created,
in the same manner that he knew them after they were created; before
they were brought into act, as well as after they were brought into
act; before they were made, they were, and were not; they were in the
knowledge of God, when they were not in their own nature; God did not
receive his knowledge from their existence, but his knowledge and will
acted upon them to bring them into being.