our capacities in signifying the eternity of God by days and years,
which are terms belonging to time, whereby we measure it (Ps. cii. 27).
But we must no more conceive that God is bounded or measured by time,
and hath succession of days, because of those expressions, than we
can conclude him to have a body, because members are ascribed to
him in Scripture, to help our conceptions of his glorious nature and
operations. Though years are ascribed to him, yet they are such as
cannot be numbered, cannot be finished, since there is no proportion
between the duration of God, and the years of men. “The number of his
years cannot be searched out, for he makes small the drops of water;
they pour down rain according to the vapor thereof” (Job xxxvi. 26,
27). The numbers of the drops of rain which have fallen in all parts
of the earth since the creation of the world, if subtracted from the
number of the years of God, would be found a small quantity, a mere
nothing, to the years of God. As all the nations in the world compared
with God, are but as the “drop of a bucket, worse than nothing, than
vanity” (Isa. xl. 15); so all the ages of the world, if compared with
God, amount not to so much as the one hundred thousandth part of a
minute; the minutes from the creation may be numbered, but the years
of the duration of God being infinite, are without measure. As one day
is to the life of man, so are a thousand years to the life of God. The
Holy Ghost expresseth {a287} himself to the capacity of man, to give
us some notion of an infinite duration, by a resemblance suited to the
capacity of man.[557] If a thousand years be but as a day to the life
of God, then as a year is to the life of man, so are three hundred
and sixty‑five thousand years to the life of God; and as seventy years
are to the life of man, so are twenty‑five millions four hundred and
fifty thousand years to the life of God. Yet still, since there is no
proportion between time and eternity, we must dart our thoughts beyond
all those; for years and days measure only the duration of created
things, and of those only that are material and corporeal, subject to
the motion of the heavens, which makes days and years.[558] Sometimes
this eternity is expressed by parts, as looking backward and forward;
by the differences of time, “past, present, and to come” (Rev. i. 8),
“which was, and is, and is to come” (Rev. iv. 8).[559] Though this
might be spoken of anything in being, though but for an hour, it was
the last minute, it is now, and it will be the next minute; yet the
Holy Ghost would declare something proper to God, as including all
parts of time; he always was, is now, and always shall be. It might
always be said of him, he was, and it may always be said of him, he
will be; there is no time when he began, no time when he shall cease.
It cannot be said of a creature he always was, he always is what
he was, and he always will be what he is; but God always is what he
was, and always will be what he is; so that it is a very significant
expression of the eternity of God, as can be suited to our capacities.
1. His eternity is evident, by the name God gives himself (Exod. iii.
14): “And God said unto Moses, I am that I am; thus shalt thou say
to the children of Israel, ‘I Am hath sent me unto you.’” This is
the name whereby he is distinguished from all creatures; I Am, is his
proper name. This description being in the present tense, shows that
his essence knows no past, nor future; if it were _he was_, it would
intimate he were not now what he once was; if it were _he will be_,
it would intimate he were not yet what he will be; but _I Am_; I
am the only being, the root of all beings; he is therefore, at the
greatest distance from not being, and that is eternal. So that _is_
signifies his eternity, as well as his perfection and immutability.
As _I Am_ speaks the want of no blessedness, so it speaks the want
of no duration; and therefore the French, wherever they find this
word Jehovah, in the Scripture, which we translate Lord, and Lord
eternal, render it the Eternal,――I am always and immutably the same.
The eternity of God is opposed to the volubility of time, which is
extended into past, present and to come. Our time is but a small drop,
as a sand to all the atoms and small particles of which the world is
made; but God is an unbounded sea of being. “I Am that I Am;” _i. e._
an infinite life; I have not that now, which I had not formerly;
I shall not afterwards have that which I have not now; I am that in
every moment which I was, and will be in all moments of time; nothing
can be added to me, nothing can be detracted from me; there is nothing
superior to him, which can detract from him; nothing desirable {a288}
that can be added to him. Now if there were any beginning and end of
God, any succession in him, he could not be “I Am;”[560] for in regard
of what was past, he would not be; in regard of what was to come, he
is not yet; and upon this account a heathen argues well;[561] of all
creatures it may be said they were, or they will be; but of God it
cannot be said anything else but _est_, God is, because he fills an
eternal duration. A creature cannot be said to be, if it be not yet,
nor if it be not now, but hath been.[562] God only can be called
“I Am;” all creatures have more of not being, than being; for every
creature was nothing from eternity, before it was made something
in time; and if it be incorruptible in its whole nature, it will be
nothing to eternity after it hath been something in time; and if it be
not corruptible in its nature, as the angels, or in every part of its
nature, as man in regard of his soul; yet it hath not properly a being,
because it is dependent upon the pleasure of God to continue it, or
deprive it of it; and while it is, it is mutable, and all mutability
is a mixture of not being. If God therefore be properly “I Am,” _i. e._
being, it follows that he always was; for if he were not always, he
must, as was argued before, be produced by some other, or by himself;
by another he could not; then he had not been God, but a creature;
nor by himself, for then as producing, he must be before himself, as
produced; he had been before he was. And he always will be; for being
“I Am,” having all being in himself, and the fountain of all being to
everything else, how can he ever have his name changed to I am not.
2. God hath life in himself (John v. 26): “The Father hath life in
himself;” he is the “living God;” therefore “steadfast forever” (Dan.
vi. 26). He hath life by his essence, not by participation. He is a
sun to give light and life to all creatures, but receives not light
or life from anything; and therefore he hath an unlimited life, not
a drop of life, but a fountain; not a spark of a limited life, but a
life transcending all bounds. He hath life in himself; all creatures
have their life in him and from him. He that hath life in himself doth
necessarily exist, and could never be made to exist; for then he had
not life in himself, but in that which made him to exist, and gave
him life. What doth necessarily exist therefore, exists from eternity;
what hath being of itself could never be produced in time, could not
want being one moment, because it hath being from its essence, without
influence of any efficient cause. When God pronounced his name, “I Am
that I Am,” angels and men were in being; the world had been created
above two thousand four hundred years; Moses, to whom he then speaks,
was in being; yet God only is, because he only hath the fountain of
being in himself; but all that they were was a rivulet from him. He
hath from nothing else, that he doth subsist; everything else hath its
subsistence from him as their root, as the beam from the sun, as the
rivers and fountains from the sea.[563] All life is seated in God,
as in its proper throne, in its most perfect purity. God is life; it
is in him originally, radically, therefore eternally. He is a pure
act, nothing but vigor and act; he hath by his nature that life which
others have by his grant; {a289} whence the Apostle saith (1 Tim. vi.
16) not only that he is immortal, but he hath immortality in a full
possession; fee simple, not depending upon the will of another, but
containing all things within himself. He that hath life in himself,
and is from himself, cannot but be. He always was, because he received
his being from no other, and none can take away that being which was
not given by another. If there were any space before he did exist,
then there was something which made him to exist; life would not then
be in him, but in that which produced him into being; he could not
then be God, but that other which gave him being would be God.[564]
And to say God sprung into being by chance, when we see nothing in
the world that is brought forth by chance, but hath some cause of
its existence, would be vain; for since God is a being, chance, which
is nothing, could not bring forth something; and by the same reason,
that he sprung up by chance, he might totally vanish by chance. What a
strange notion of a God would this be! such a God that had no life in
himself but from chance! Since he hath life in himself, and that there
was no cause of his existence, he can have no cause of his limitation,
and can no more be determined to a time, than he can to a place. What
hath life in itself, hath life without bounds, and can never desert
it, nor be deprived of it; so that he lives necessarily, and it is
absolutely impossible that he should not live; whereas all other
things “live, and move, and have their being in him” (Acts xvii. 28);
and as they live by his will, so they can return to nothing at his
word.
3. If God were not eternal, he were not immutable in his nature. It
is contrary to the nature of immutability to be without eternity; for
whatsoever begins, is changed in its passing from not being to being.
It began to be what it was not; and if it ends, it ceaseth to be what
it was; it cannot therefore be said to be God, if there were neither
beginning or ending, or succession in it (Mal. iii. 6): “I am the Lord,
I change not;” (Job xxxvii. 23): “Touching the Almighty, we cannot
find him out.” God argues here, saith Calvin, from his unchangeable
nature as Jehovah, to his immutability in his purpose. Had he not been
eternal, there had been the greatest change from nothing to something.
A change of essence is greater than a change of purpose. God is a
sun glittering always in the same glory; no growing up in youth; no
passing on to age. If he were not without succession, standing in one
point of eternity, there would be a change from past to present, from
present to future. The eternity of God is a shield against all kind
of mutability. If anything sprang up in the essence of God that was
not there before, he could not be said to be either an eternal, or an
unchanged substance.
4. God could not be an infinitely perfect Being, if he were not
eternal. A finite duration is inconsistent with infinite perfection.
Whatsoever is contracted within the limits of time, cannot swallow up
all perfections in itself. God hath an unsearchable perfection. “Canst
thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty
unto perfection?” (Job xi. 7.) He cannot be found out: he {a290} is
infinite, because he is incomprehensible. Incomprehensibility ariseth
from an infinite perfection, which cannot be fathomed by the short
line of man’s understanding. His essence in regard of its diffusion,
and in regard of its duration, is incomprehensible, as well as his
action: if God, therefore, had beginning, he could not be infinite;
if not infinite, he did not possess the highest perfection; because a
perfection might be conceived beyond it. If his being could fail, he
were not perfect; can that deserve the name of the highest perfection,
which is capable of corruption and dissolution? To be finite and
limited, is the greatest imperfection, for it consists in a denial of
being. He could not be the most blessed Being if he were not always
so, and should not forever remain so; and whatsoever perfections he
had, would be soured by the thoughts, that in time they would cease,
and so could not be pure affections, because not permanent; but “He
is blessed from everlasting to everlasting” (Ps. xli. 13). Had he a
beginning, he could not have all perfection without limitation; he
would have been limited by that which gave him beginning; that which
gave him being would be God, and not himself, and so more perfect than
he: but since God is the most sovereign perfection, than which nothing
can be imagined perfecter by the most capacious understanding, He is
certainly “eternal;” being infinite, nothing can be added to him,
nothing detracted from him.
5. God could not be omnipotent, almighty, if he were not eternal.
The title of almighty agrees not with a nature that had a beginning;
whatsoever hath a beginning was once nothing; and when it was nothing,
could act nothing: where there is no being there is no power. Neither
doth the title of almighty agree with a perishing nature: he can
do nothing to purpose, that cannot preserve himself against the
outward force and violence of enemies, or against the inward causes
of corruption and dissolution. No account is to be made of man,
because “his breath is in his nostrils” (Isa. ii. 22); could a better
account be made of God, if he were of the like condition? He could not
properly be almighty, that were not always mighty; if he be omnipotent,
nothing can impair him; he that hath all power, can have no hurt. If
he doth whatsoever he pleaseth, nothing can make him miserable, since
misery consists in those things which happen against our will.[565]
The almightiness and eternity of God are linked together: “I am Alpha
and Omega, the beginning and ending, saith the Lord, which was, and
which is, and which is to come, the Almighty” (Rev. i. 8): almighty
because eternal, and eternal because almighty.
6. God would not be the first cause of all if he were not eternal;
but he is the first and the last; the first cause of all things, the
last end of all things:[566] that which is the first cannot begin to
be; it were not then the first; it cannot cease to be: whatsoever is
dissolved, is dissolved into that whereof it doth consist, which was
before it, and then it was not the first. The world might not have
been; it was once nothing; it must have some cause to call it out of
nothing: nothing hath no power to make itself something; there {a291}
is a superior cause, by whose will and power it comes into being,
and so gives all the creatures their distinct forms.[567] This power
cannot but be eternal; it must be before the world; the founder must
be before the foundation; and his existence must be from eternity; or
we must say nothing did exist from eternity:[568] and if there were no
being from eternity, there could not now be any being in time. What we
see, and what we are, must arise from itself or some other; it cannot
from itself: if anything made itself, it had a power to make itself;
it then had an active power before it had a being; it was something
in regard of power, and was nothing in regard of existence at the same
time. Suppose it had a power to produce itself, this power must be
conferred upon it by another; and so the power of producing itself,
was not from itself, but from another; but if the power of being was
from itself, why did it not produce itself before? why was it one
moment out of being?[569] If there be any existence of things, it is
necessary that that which was the “first cause,” should “exist from
eternity.” Whatsoever was the immediate cause of the world, yet the
first and chief cause wherein we must rest, must have nothing before
it; if it had anything before it, it were not the first; he therefore
that is the first cause, must be without beginning; nothing must be
before him; if he had a beginning from some other, he could not be
the first principle and author of all things; if he be the first cause
of all things, he must give himself a beginning, or be from eternity:
he could not give himself a beginning; whatsoever begins in time was
nothing before, and when it was nothing, it could do nothing; it could
not give itself anything, for then it gave what it had not, and did
what it could not. If he made himself in time, why did he not make
himself before? what hindered him? It was either because he could
not, or because he would not; if he could not, he always wanted power,
and always would, unless it were bestowed upon him, and then he could
not be said to be from himself. If he would not make himself before,
then he might have made himself when he would: how had he the power
of willing and nilling without a being? Nothing cannot will or nill;
nothing hath no faculties; so that it is necessary to grant some
eternal being, or run into inextricable labyrinths and mazes. If we
deny some eternal being, we must deny all being; our own being, the
being of everything about us; unconceivable absurdities will arise.
So, then, if God were the cause of all things, he did exist before
all things, and that from eternity.
III. Eternity is only proper to God, and not communicable. It is as
great a madness to ascribe eternity to the creature, as to deprive the
Lord of the creature of eternity.[570] It is so proper to God, that
when the apostle would prove the deity of Christ, he proves it by his
immutability and eternity, as well as his creating power: “Thou art
the same, and thy years shall not fail” (Heb. i. 10‒12). The argument
had not strength, if eternity belonged essentially to any but God; and
therefore he is said only to have “immortality” (1 Tim. vi. 16): all
other things receive their being from him, and can be deprived {a292}
of their being by him: all things depend on him; he of none: all other
things are like clothes, which would consume if God preserved them not.
Immortality is appropriated to God, _i. e._ an independent immortality.
Angels and souls have an immortality, but by donation from God, not
by their own essence; dependent upon their Creator, not necessary in
their own nature: God might have annihilated them after he had created
them; so that their duration cannot properly be called an eternity,
it being extrinsical to them, and dependent upon the will of their
Creator, by whom they may be extinguished; it is not an absolute and
necessary, but a precarious immortality. Whatsoever is not God, is
temporary; whatsoever is eternal, is God. It is a contradiction to say
a creature can be eternal; as nothing eternal is created, so nothing
created is eternal. What is distinct from the nature of God cannot
be eternal, eternity being the essence of God. Every creature, in the
notion of a creature, speaks a dependence on some cause, and therefore
cannot be eternal. As it is repugnant to the nature of God not to be
eternal, so it is repugnant to the nature of a creature to be eternal;
for then a creature would be equal to the Creator, and the Creator, or
the Cause, would not be before the creature, or effect.[571] It would
be all one to admit many gods, as many eternals; and all one to say,
God can be created, as to say a creature can be uncreated, which is
to be eternal.
1. Creation is a producing something from nothing. What was once
nothing, cannot therefore be eternal; not being was eternal; therefore
its being could not be eternal, for it should be then before it was,
and would be something when it was nothing. It is the nature of a
creature to be nothing before it was created; what was nothing before
it was, cannot be equal with God in an eternity of duration.
2. There is no creature but is mutable, therefore not eternal. As
it had a change from nothing to something, so it may be changed from
being to not being. If the creature were not mutable, it would be most
perfect, and so would not be a creature, but God; for God only is most
perfect. It is as much the essence of a creature to be mutable, as
it is the essence of God to be immutable. Mutability and eternity are
utterly inconsistent.
3. No creature is infinite, therefore not eternal: to be infinite in
duration is all one as to be infinite in essence. It is as reasonable
to conceive a creature immense, filling all places at once, as eternal,
extended to all ages; because neither can be without infiniteness,
which is the property of the Deity.[572] A creature may as well be
without bounds of place, as limitations of time.
4. No effect of an intellectual free agent can be equal in duration
to its cause. The productions of natural agents are as ancient often
as themselves; the sun produceth a beam as old in time as itself;
but who ever heard of a piece of wise workmanship as old as the wise
artificer? God produced a creature, not necessarily and naturally, as
the sun doth a beam, but freely, as an intelligent agent. The sun was
not necessary; it might be or not be, according to the {a293} pleasure
of God. A free act of the will is necessary to precede in order of
time, as the cause of such effects as are purely voluntary.[573] Those
causes that act as soon as they exist act naturally, necessarily, not
freely, and cannot cease from acting. But suppose a creature might
have existed by the will of God from eternity; yet, as some think,
it could not be said absolutely, and in its own nature to be eternal,
because eternity was not of the essence of it. The creature could not
be its own duration; for though it were from eternity, it might not
have been from eternity, because its existence depended upon the free
will of God, who might have chose whether he would have created it or
no. God only is eternal; “the first and the last, the beginning and
the end;” who, as he subsisted before any creature had a being, so he
will eternally subsist if all creatures were reduced to nothing.