It will be said that the standard of wellbeing of the German Empire has
advanced _pari passu_ with her foreign trade, and that trade needs a
secure market. Hence the requirement of a rich colonial domain, from
which the German trader can not be excluded by hostile customs laws.
Perhaps we have here an adequate justification for Germany’s Morning
Land aspirations. Germany is an industrial nation; so also are England
and the United States and France, and Russia will soon become one. Now,
is it not inevitable that the trade of the industrial nations shall be
directed toward the non-industrial? That is, towards the tropics and
the subtropical belts? The argument is trite, but it looks reasonable
enough to deserve consideration.
Germany is indeed an industrial nation, and so are we. But the German
industries are not the same as ours, nor can they ever be the same, so
long as the German genius and natural environment continue to differ
from ours. So long as difference exists, some German goods will command
our markets, whether we pursue protectionist policies or not. Germany
need not write our laws for us in order to control our markets; she
has an indefeasible title to those markets so long as she maintains
superiority in supplying our needs. And the same thing is true of
the markets of England and France and Russia. They take German goods
eagerly, in vast quantities. Wipe out Germany’s trade with industrial
states, and her commerce is practically at an end.
The trade between nations of rich and varied industries is alone
capable of indefinite expansion. Yet the delusion persists that a
nation’s closed trade with a subject state is somehow of superior
importance. Such trade is admittedly incapable of great development.
Only semi-barbarous peoples will submit to foreign control of their
trade; and such peoples produce little beyond the requirements of home
consumption, and therefore, having hardly anything to sell, can buy
but little. But colonial trade, meagre as it is, may be monopolized
and made to yield large profits. The trade between industrial nations,
since it is essentially competitive, diffuses its benefits throughout
the trading nations. Hence these benefits are easily overlooked. The
rapid enrichment of a few houses engaged in the colonial trade gives
visible evidence of national gain.
Out of the overestimation of the value of the colonial trade arises,
unquestionably, some part of the international jealousies now working
out their nature upon the field of battle. Control of the trade of the
Levant would advance the general welfare of the German people in very
limited measure; but it would greatly enrich a small number of traders,
and this very fact of the concentration of the gains gives them added
potency in determining political relations.
V
The colonial trader was once the chief cause of wars, and he still
contributes his quota to international misunderstanding and hostility.
But there is another interest that has grown to far greater importance
in the colonial domain. This we may describe as the concessionary
interest. Vast fortunes have been accumulated, in the semi-barbarous
belt, by the exploitation of natural resources and works of public
utility. The Land of the Morning would be exceptionally rich in
concessions to the nationals of any imperial state. There are oil
fields and mines to open, railways and irrigation works to construct.
Some of these opportunities are already in German possession; their
security, however, depends upon continued exercise, by Germany, of
influence upon the Ottoman government. That government is notoriously
shifty, and the interests involved will never be wholly safe until the
Levant is a German colony.
The concessionary interest, like the colonial trading interest, offers
chances of sudden wealth. The former, however, is far more vulnerable
than the latter. The fixed investment of the concessionary is far
greater than that of the trader. Hence, while the colonial trading
interest thrives best with the support of the home government, to the
concessionary interest such support is indispensable. Politics is a
necessary part of the concessionary business.
How far is the concessionary interest identical with the national
interest? Let us consider what difference it makes to you and me
whether the Pearson interests, or the Waters-Pierce interests, control
the oil fields of Mexico. If the Pearson interests, several great
fortunes will be constituted in England; if the Waters-Pierce, similar
fortunes will be constituted here. In either case the money will lie at
an infinite distance from you and me. Still, we are patriots, and would
rather have it here than in England.
Patriotism aside, the great fortune here will pay income tax to our
own treasury. Its spending will afford many golden crumbs to fellow
citizens of ours. The exploitation of the oil fields will require much
machinery, for which, under Waters-Pierce control, the first bid would
be offered to our own industry. Many young men of our nationality would
find employment as engineers, foremen, superintendents. Undoubtedly, it
is better for the national interest to have the concession in national
hands.
But what is the magnitude of the concessionary interest, and how
many votes should it have on questions of peace and war? Of the
whole capital of Great Britain, not one-fifth consists in foreign
investments; and of that fifth scarcely a quarter can be concessionary.
One-tenth of Germany’s capital is invested abroad; probably not a fifth
of that is concessionary. Of our own capital one part in a hundred is
in foreign investments, of which one-half is in Mexico. Not nearly all
of that half is concessionary. It did not prove to be enough to go to
war over.