The first essay of the Genealogy consists of an essay on "Good and
Evil, Good and Bad." The line of attack is double, being first
etymological, and secondly historical.
Without going into philological exactitudes, it is, we think, fairly
safe to follow Nietzsche in his theory that the word "good" and its
analogues were originally applied to designate those qualities which
were peculiar to the governing aristocratic classes, albeit qualities
by no means susceptible of the title of "ethical" goodness. Physical
valour being in primitive times the most valuable asset of the
community, it is not unnatural that that quality should be held in
universal esteem. We would remark, however, in passing, that though
Nietzsche professes to make a flying expedition into the domain of
early Greek ethics, which would appear, according to his teachings, to
be represented as an ideal system worthy of modern imitation, he is
apparently oblivious to the fact that the spirit of cunning prudence,
of which he so emphatically disapproves, was one of the most admired
qualities of primitive Greece.
On the general question, however, we may perhaps supplement Nietzsche's
by Spencer's argument on the meaning of the English word "good,"
which, as is notorious, has the double meaning of "ethical" and
"efficient." Instructive, however, though this argument is, it cannot
be said to clinch the question, since, even in the times of ancient
Greece, there were not wanting words such as _κάλος, αἴχρος,
ὅσιος_ to denote, albeit mostly in æsthetic terminology, that ethical
meaning, of which the word _ἄγαθος_ fell so signally short.
In other words, to use Nietzschean terminology, the ethical taint even
then existed, though in a less virulent form.
The other line of attack, however, is more serious, and penetrates to
the very core of the modern moral system with its savage onslaught on
Christianity. What is Christianity, says Nietzsche, but the revolt
of the slaves in the sphere of morals? Our philosopher's suggestion,
of course, that Christianity was a deliberate stratagem on the part
of a revengeful Israel to square accounts with the conqueror, has,
on the face of it, no claim to serious consideration as anything
but a poetic thought. The fact, however, that Christianity from its
beginning catered avowedly for the poor, the weak, the oppressed, the
inefficient, is admittedly true, whatever disputes may range as to the
inferences to be drawn from this fact. And that the accusation of being
a slave-morality is something more than empty abuse, is substantiated
by the numerous slaves who did, in fact, subscribe to the infant
creed. It is, moreover, not without its interest to watch nowadays a
recurrence of the same phenomenon. Just, indeed, as at present the
proletariate are _ipso facto_ ready to believe, quite apart from any
question of any economic justification of the doctrine, in the genuine
iniquity of the rich capitalist, so in the early Christian era the
proletariate were not reluctant to put their faith in the saying, that,
"it was as easy for a camel to go through the eye of a needle as for
a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven." The difference, however,
between modern and ancient Christianity stands out clearly from the
fact that though this identical creed is invoked with something
approaching equal facility on the sides both of the angels and the
devils, it is, on the whole, now identified with the richer and more
prosperous classes.
It must, however, be frankly admitted that Nietzsche somewhat
overshoots the mark, both in dubbing the history of the world a
conflict between the two ideals, of Rome and Judæa, the egoistic and
altruistic ideals, and in asseverating that the primitive "beast of
prey prowling avidly after booty and victory" was the only type of the
human species worthy of admiration, and that the tamed modern species
is but a diseased distortion. We will deal later with the lacuna
caused in Nietzsche's philosophy by his refusal to recognise the true
significance of the Aristotelian doctrine that man is a _ζῶον
πολιτικον_ when we show that even from his own standpoint the modern
state of man is preferable to the primal. Suffice it for the present
to say that, however large a part of the truth Nietzsche captured with
this potent theory, there remains a not inconsiderable part which still
eluded him.