THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).
The Schleswig-Holstein Difficulty--Austria favours a
Settlement--Bismarck's Terms rejected--His high-handed
Proceedings--Convention of Gastein--Bismarck at Biarritz--The
Italian Treaty--Question of Disarmament--Fresh Austrian
Proposals--Bismarck advocates Federal Reform--La Marmora's
Perplexity--He abides by Prussia--Efforts of the Neutral
Powers--Failure of the projected Congress--Rupture of the Gastein
Convention--The War begins--The rival Strengths--Distribution
of the Prussian Armies--Collapse of the Resistance in North
Germany--Occupation of Dresden--The Advance of the Prussian
Armies--Battle of Küniggrätz--Cession of Venetia--Italian
Reverses--The South German Campaign--Occupation of Frankfort--The
Defence of Vienna--French Mediation--The Preliminaries of
Nikolsburg--Treaty of Prague--Conditions awarded to Bavaria and the
Southern States--The Secret Treaties--Their Disclosure--Humiliation
of the French Emperor--His pretended Indifference.
While the strife of parties was raging in the lobbies of the House of
Commons during the Reform debates of 1866, a warfare of a more decisive
kind was in course of preparation in Germany. Its connection with English
history, however, being of the slightest, we shall confine ourselves to a
brief notice. At the close of 1864 the first symptom of ill-will between
the allied Powers that had cut with the sword the Schleswig-Holstein
knot made itself apparent. To Austria every day during which the joint
occupation was prolonged brought fresh cause of trouble and anxiety.
However long she might keep her troops in the duchies, not an acre of
soil, she knew well, could ever fall to her share; the expense of the
occupation was considerable; and a quarrel with Prussia must instantly, as
she clearly foresaw, render her position untenable. Her policy, therefore,
was to get the Schleswig-Holstein question settled as soon as possible
and settled in the way that would least benefit Prussia, and be most for
the advantage of Austria's position in Germany. The Austrian Government
thought that they saw their way to such a satisfactory settlement when
they observed the continued loyalty and enthusiasm with which the German
population of the duchies clung to the Prince whom they regarded as their
rightful Duke, and also noted the strength of the desire that animated
the Governments of the middle and many of the minor German States to
favour the erection of an independent State and disappoint the ambition
of Prussia. The Prussian Minister seemed himself to waver in the face of
the compact opposition which the disclosure of the designs of Prussia
upon the duchies had called forth, though he secured a declaration from
the Prussian jurists that the claims of the Augustenburg candidate were
invalid. In February, 1865, he sent a despatch to Vienna, in which he
expressed the willingness of the King that Schleswig-Holstein should
become an independent German State, but upon condition that its military
force should be at the disposal of Prussia, and that to the same Power
certain fortresses in the duchies, with suitable territory attached
to them, should be made over. These proposals were rejected by Count
Mensdorff and the German Diet. Bismarck thereupon proceeded to fresh
aggressions. Prussia transferred her naval station on the Baltic from
Dantzic to Kiel, and declared her intention of fortifying the harbour:
the Austrian commissioner protested, and ordered up two Austrian ships
of war to Kiel; yet his Government gave way, and Prussia established
herself firmly at that important harbour. Bismarck also ejected from
Schleswig-Holstein the Prince of Augustenburg. It was clearly seen at
Vienna that the plan of joint administration would no longer work: if war
was to be staved off, some different _modus vivendi_ must be established
in the duchies. But the Minister was moving too fast for his master,
accordingly, a meeting was arranged between the King of Prussia and the
Emperor of Austria at Gastein, in Tyrol. Hither came the Sovereigns in
August, attended by their chief Ministers; an understanding was speedily
arrived at, and the Convention of Gastein was the result.
By this convention, dated August 14th, 1865, it was agreed that the
joint occupation should cease; that--although the right of sovereignty
of either Power over both duchies, as acquired by the Treaty of Vienna,
remained inviolate--Austria should for the future confine her troops and
officials to Holstein, and Prussia hers to Schleswig; that the Powers
would propose to the Diet to erect Rendsburg into a Federal fortress; that
the duchies should join the Zollverein, or German Customs-union; and that
the Emperor of Austria should cede to the King of Prussia his sovereign
rights over Lauenburg, acquired by the before-cited Treaty of Vienna,
in exchange for the sum of 2,500,000 Danish rix-thalers. The Prussian
Chambers, the members of which were still for the most part favourable to
the Augustenburg claim, disliked this convention, and let it be understood
that they would not vote the money required for the purchase of Lauenburg;
but the King of Prussia paid the stipulated sum out of his private purse,
and the convention was carried into effect without delay, Austrian troops
withdrawing from Schleswig, and Prussian troops withdrawing from Holstein.
General Manteuffel was appointed Prussian Governor of Schleswig, and
Austria placed General von Gablenz in the similar post in Holstein.
Bismarck was still determined on war. One point alone was doubtful
and disquieting--what would France do in the event of war breaking
out between Prussia and Austria, especially if Italy took part in the
contest? Count Bismarck resolved to seek an interview with Napoleon, in
order, if possible, to gain some security that France would be neutral.
What passed in the interviews between him and Napoleon at Biarritz is
variously stated; but the result proved that the success of the Prussian
statesman was complete. On his return through Paris, Bismarck saw the
Italian Minister, the Chevalier Nigra, and told him that war between
Prussia and Austria was inevitable. "He showed himself full of confidence
that France would not be hostile to it;" and so deeply had he reflected
on all the conditions of the political problem, so keenly did he realise
the importance to Prussia of the Italian alliance, in distracting the
attention and dividing the forces of Austria, that he playfully said to
Nigra that "if Italy did not exist, it would be necessary to invent her."
The French Emperor is supposed to have approved of the project of alliance
between Prussia and Italy; and it is certain that he looked forward with
pleasure to the severance of Venetia from the Austrian Empire as one
result of the anticipated war. But how was France to be indemnified if
she observed a friendly neutrality? There can be no doubt that Bismarck,
in spite of his later denials, held out such hopes of territorial
extension for France, either on the side of the Rhine, or in the form
of an annexation of Luxemburg or some part of Belgium, to be actively
aided by Prussia, as induced the French Emperor to regard the Prussian
programme with favour and hopeful anticipation, and readily to give the
desired promise of neutrality. Napoleon would the less care to exact a
distinct promise from Bismarck in regard to territorial indemnification,
because he, like the rest of Europe at the time, did not share in the
superb confidence which the negotiator expressed of the ability of Prussia
to overpower Austria; he must have reckoned on the war lasting for a
considerable time, with mutually exhaustive results, in which case France
might play the part of a mediator, and, while performing that dignified
office, not lose sight of her own interests in the general re-adjustment.
Step by step, as though by an inevitable destiny, or unalterable
concatenation of events, the fatal hour drew on. At the end of March
General Govone was in Berlin, charged by the Italian Prime Minister,
General La Marmora, with the duty of negotiating a treaty of alliance,
offensive and defensive, with Prussia. That Italy would forego the
opportunity which a rupture between Prussia and Austria afforded her
of obtaining by force the Venetian territories of the latter Power, was
hardly to be expected; for such a chance, once let slip, might never
occur again. But to Prussia also the alliance of Italy was of the highest
importance. With her vast superiority of population, Austria, could her
military force have been wholly concentrated against Prussia, though she
might have lost battles, could not have been crushed and compelled to
yield; such a consummation was only rendered possible by the division
and dilution of her strength necessitated by the attack of Italy upon
Venetia. Could even Austria have been content to cede Venetia itself, and
take Venetia's money value, she might have rid herself of her Transalpine
foe and employed her whole strength in Bohemia. Secret overtures had been
made at Vienna by the Italian Premier, in the autumn of 1865, for the
cession of Venetia by purchase; but the Emperor conceived his military and
ancestral honour to be involved and absolutely rejected the proposal. On
April 8th the treaty of alliance between Prussia and Italy was signed at
Berlin. Prussia, under it, reserved to herself the right of declaring war
within three months, in which case Italy bound herself to attack Austria;
but Prussia did not bind herself to declare war in Germany, or to help
the Italians on their own ground, if Austria attacked Italy. Each Power
bound itself not to make peace separately from the other, and to continue
the war till Italy had gained Venetia and Prussia secured a corresponding
augmentation of territory in Germany. Already--between March 29th and
31st--orders had been issued for the mobilisation of the whole Prussian
army, and the necessary movements were effected with extraordinary
celerity. Austria, though she had commenced her preparations earlier,
was soon distanced by her opponent, and, when the war broke out, her
arrangements were still far from complete. The King of Italy published a
decree on the 25th of March, increasing the Italian army by 100,000 men.
For several weeks after the treaty between Prussia and Italy had been
signed, continual diplomatic fencing was maintained on the part of the
two Governments. First there were criminations and recriminations on the
question of priority of armaments. On the 6th of April a note from the
Prussian Foreign Office was sent to Vienna, insisting on the magnitude
of the Austrian preparations, which could not be adequately accounted
for by the alleged apprehension of disturbances in Bohemia, and ending
with the declaration that nothing was farther from the views of the
King than an offensive war. Yet only two days after this, as we have
seen, the alliance was concluded with Italy. Nevertheless, there was a
basis of truth in the statement as to the King of Prussia's inclinations:
he was, in truth, earnestly, almost superstitiously, averse from being
the first to resort to arms; and Bismarck had infinite trouble to bring
his royal master up to the point of commencing the war. Accordingly the
negotiations were conducted in a conciliatory tone. The real feelings of
Count Bismarck we learn from a telegram from Count Barral, the Italian
Minister at Berlin, sent on the previous day to the Italian Premier,
General La Marmora, and published by the latter in his remarkable work,
entitled, "A Little More Light on the Political and Military Events of
the Year 1866." Count Barral telegraphed, "The impression of the General
[Govone] and myself is, that Bismarck is disappointed by the Austrian
proposition, and visibly discouraged by the new pacific phase upon which
the conflict is about to enter." But now Count Mensdorff found himself in
a difficulty. The attitude of the Italian army on the frontiers of Venetia
was believed at Vienna to have grown so menacing that it was impossible
for Austria to replace matters on a peace footing in Venetia, short of
a positive understanding with Italy similar to that which seemed on the
point of being concluded with Prussia. We have the distinct assurance of
General La Marmora, in the work just quoted, that at this time Italy had
made no concentrations of troops whatever--had, in fact, taken no warlike
step of any kind. But he admits that the impression to the contrary which
prevailed at Vienna was a _bonâ fide_ one, and accounts for its existence
in a very curious manner. It was, he thinks, the British Government--the
warm and importunate advocate of European peace--which, misled by
reports from English diplomatic agents in Italy, who had imagined some
inconsiderable movements of troops that were really directed against
brigands to be part of a scheme for concentrating the Italian army near
the frontier, had conveyed, of course, with the most friendly intentions,
this false information to the Austrian Cabinet. However this may have
been, the effect of the erroneous persuasion as to Italian armaments,
which Austria had taken up, in overclouding the prospects of peace was
soon apparent.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRÄTZ. (_See p._ 427.)]
Besides disarmament, two other important subjects were debated in the
correspondence between Austria and Prussia in these critical weeks.
One related to Schleswig-Holstein, the other to the reform of the
Confederation. Anxious to withdraw from her hazardous position in the
duchies, but to make her withdrawal in such a way as would augment her
popularity with the minor German States, Austria invited the Prussian
Government, in a note dated April 26th, to make in the Diet a joint
declaration that the two Powers would cede the rights acquired by them
under the Treaty of Vienna to that claimant of the sovereignty of the
duchies whom the Diet recognised as having a predominant right to the
succession. Although some collateral offers, such as that Prussia should
have full and permanent possession of certain strategic points in the
duchies, at Kiel and elsewhere, were added to the main proposal, in order
to make it more palatable to the condominant Power, Count Mensdorff
probably expected a refusal, and he was not disappointed. Count Bismarck,
in his reply (May 7th), professed in the strongest terms Prussia's
intention to adhere faithfully to the Treaty of Vienna and the Gastein
Convention, but maintained that by those instruments the intervention of
any third party, not excepting the Diet, in the affairs of the duchies was
precluded. The note went on to say that Prussia, while repudiating the
interference of any third party, was always ready to treat with Austria as
to the conditions on which she would be disposed to cede her share of the
rights accruing to her by the Treaty of Vienna. King William's hesitation
was fast disappearing.
The other subject discussed was the reform of the Confederation. The
Prussian Envoy proposed in the Diet on the 9th of April that, within a
period to be precisely fixed, the Diet should decree the convocation of
a National Assembly to be elected by universal and direct suffrage, for
the purpose of receiving and deliberating on the proposals of the German
Governments for the reform of the Confederation. This proposition, which
caused great surprise and excitement in Germany, was referred by a Dietal
vote of the 21st of April to a committee of nine; at the same time the
Diet requested Prussia to state the nature of the proposals which it
intended to submit to the Assembly when convened. Count Bismarck sharply
replied (April 27) that the determination of the date at which such a
Parliament or Assembly should meet was of the essence of the Prussian
proposition; the modes of procedure habitual to the Diet would, he knew,
lead to the indefinite adjournment and final miscarriage of the project;
however, he would bring under the notice of the committee such information
as would show to what regions of political life the Prussian proposals
would extend. This promise he redeemed on the 11th of May by laying before
the Committee of the Diet the heads of the changes that Prussia deemed
necessary. These included the completion of the central power by means
of a freely elected German Parliament, the concession to the central
power so reorganised of a wide legislative competency, the removal of all
fetters on German trade, an improved military system, and the formation
of a German navy. Bavaria, as chief of the secondary States, acceded to
the proposal on condition that both parties should disarm. Promises were
given, but as Austria declined to discontinue her preparations against
Italy, Bismarck was able to charge her with insincerity.
Italy, though she had enlarged her army, had not made any distinctly
warlike preparations before the appearance of General La Marmora's
circular of the 27th of April. From that time war was looked upon as
inevitable; and in order to enlist the national feeling more fully in
its favour, a decree was published at Florence on May 8th ordering the
formation of twenty volunteer battalions, to be placed under the immediate
command of Garibaldi. But the Italian Premier was in sore perplexity. He
thoroughly distrusted Bismarck, whom he thought quite capable of patching
up a peace with Austria and leaving Italy in the lurch, and he had
received tempting offers from Paris. On the 5th of May General La Marmora
received a telegram in cipher from Paris, of which the first words were,
"Decipher for yourself." After he had done so, he found the purport of the
telegram (which was from the Chevalier Nigra) to be this--that Austria
was willing to cede Venetia to the Emperor Napoleon, who would at once
transfer it to the King of Italy, on condition that she should be left
free to recoup herself at the expense of Prussia. La Marmora telegraphed
back that his first impression was that it was a question of honour and
good faith for Italy not to break her engagements with Prussia. Again
(May 6th) came the tempting voice from Paris, saying that the Emperor had
told Nigra that Prince Metternich was formally authorised to sign the
cession of Venetia in exchange for a simple promise of neutrality. If his
resolution had been momentarily shaken, other telegrams soon arrived, of
a nature to confirm him in it. On May 6th Count Barral telegraphed that
he had been just informed by Count Bismarck that the Prussian army might
now be regarded as entirely mobilised; and on the 9th Nigra telegraphed
from Paris that Govone had just arrived from Berlin, and was under the
full conviction that Prussia had absolutely decided to draw the sword, at
latest, towards the beginning of June, and would, in any case, declare
war if Italy were attacked. Setting against the risks of war the odium
which the acceptance of the French proposal, involving as it did a direct
breach of faith with Prussia, would bring down upon the young Italian
kingdom, and the painful and inconvenient consequences that might ensue
from Italy's debt of obligation to France being so greatly extended, the
Italian Premier wisely determined to be true to his first faith; and the
project for the cession of Venetia to France vanished for the present into
space.
The efforts of neutral and friendly Powers were, of course, not wanting to
the cause of peace. From the beginning of May the project of a Congress of
the five great Powers, together with Italy and the German Confederation,
to discuss the three European questions of the most urgent interest--the
cession of Venetia, the fate of Schleswig-Holstein, and the reform of the
German Confederation--had found favour with the Emperor Napoleon. Russia
had cordially accepted the scheme, and Britain also was favourable to
it, though with a proviso that marks the progress which Lord Russell,
through sad experience and many failures, had made in his diplomatic
education. For, although the actual Foreign Minister at this time was
the Earl of Clarendon, yet the _empressement_ with which the British
Government, at the outset of the negotiations, volunteered a statement
that its interference would in no possible circumstances be carried beyond
the limits of persuasion, evidently bespeaks the hand of the Minister
whose previous attempts at a dictatorial intervention had failed so
disastrously. The Marquis d'Azeglio telegraphed on May 11th from London,
that "England accepted the Congress in principle, and also the bases which
France proposed with reference to the three urgent questions, but refused
categorically to bind herself to impose any decision of the kind otherwise
than by persuasion."
Some time elapsed before the three mediating Powers could arrive at a
precise understanding as to the form in which the Congress should be
proposed to Prussia and Austria. Of the three topics for discussion,
the first was described by France as "the cession of Venetia;" this was
afterwards modified to "the question of Venetia"; but even in this form
the Russian Government considered that there was something in the phrase
wounding to the susceptibilities of Austria, and obtained the consent of
France to the substitution of the words, "difference between Austria and
Italy." Everything at last appeared to be in train; it was arranged that
the Congress should be held in Paris, and that the principal Ministers
for Foreign Affairs in the different States should attend it. Bismarck,
knowing the settled resolve of the Emperor Napoleon to facilitate and
promote the cession of Venetia to Italy, was not disposed to refuse the
invitation to the Congress; he said to those around him that it would end
in nothing and that they would simply adjourn from the Congress-chamber to
the battle-field; and he told Count Barral (May 26th) that the Congress
was a vain _simulacrum_, and that he saw no human power capable of
preventing war. Yet even Bismarck, three days later, was confounded by
the insistance with which France appeared to labour to avert war, and
said to Barral, in a tone of deep dissatisfaction, "The Emperor of the
French now wishes for peace at any price." To go to war against the will
of France was, as Bismarck had before admitted to Govone, hardly within
the bounds of possibility. An unfriendly neutrality west of the Rhine
would have compelled a concentration of Prussian troops in Westphalia and
Rhineland which would have left her too weak to contend with Austria in
Saxony or Bohemia. On the 28th of May, notes, couched in almost identical
terms, from the Governments of France, Britain, and Russia, communicated
to the Powers at variance the proposal of the mediating Courts for
the convocation of a Congress. Count Bismarck, while stipulating that
the proceedings should be brief, and that the opening of the Congress
should not be delayed if the representatives of the Confederation were
not nominated in time, accepted the proposal for Prussia, but he took
an opportunity of declaring to the French Ambassador, M. Benedetti, in
vehement and impassioned tones, that the position of affairs was become
intolerable and must be brought to a close at all risks. Italy also
agreed to the Congress, as well she might, knowing the settled opinion
and desire of the Emperor Napoleon with regard to the cession of Venetia.
For Austria, the desirable course was not so clear. If she rejected the
Congress, she alienated the good opinion of the neutral Powers. Yet
if she accepted it, she knew that she could expect no good from its
deliberations. The Chevalier Nigra wrote to La Marmora, on the 24th of
May, that the French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, had assured him
that it was "well understood between the three neutral Powers that the
Congress should discuss the cession of Venetia." Beyond question the
existence of this "understanding" was known at Vienna; the Austrian
statesmen knew that they would enter a Congress the members of which had
already made up their minds on the one subject of discussion that vitally
affected her interests and her honour. It is true that Austria had a
month before offered to cede Venetia; but at that time she reckoned on
compensation. If Italy could be induced by the cession to stand neutral,
Austria hoped to overrun and annex Silesia. Yet to refuse the Congress
absolutely was not to be thought of. Austria, therefore, hit upon a
middle course; she professed a readiness to send a plenipotentiary to the
Congress, but only on condition that no combination should be discussed
which would result in an extension of territory for any one of the States
invited. Such a limitation--especially when the preconceived views of the
neutral Powers are remembered--was felt on all sides to render the project
of a Congress nugatory, and it was accordingly dropped.
Simultaneously Austria invited the Diet to take the affairs of
Schleswig-Holstein under its direction, and convoked the Holstein estates.
In reply Count Bismarck sent a despatch, on June 3rd, to Vienna, renewing
the protest that had been made by the Prussian Envoy in the Diet against
the infraction by Austria of the Convention of Gastein, and declaring
that Prussia now considered herself justified in reverting to the basis
of the Treaty of Vienna, and that the Government had consequently placed
the defence of its condominate rights in the hands of General Manteuffel.
At the same time, the Prussian Minister addressed a circular to the
Prussian representatives at all foreign Courts, accusing Austria of giving
direct provocations to Prussia, with the manifest intention of settling
the matters in dispute by an appeal to arms. This circular was couched
in terms of the bitterest invective and sufficiently indicated that all
prospect of accommodation was renounced. Already General von Gablenz
had retreated from Holstein before Manteuffel into Hanover. Thereupon
Austria demanded from the Diet the mobilisation of the Federal armies,
whereupon the Prussian representative, declaring the union dissolved,
withdrew from Frankfort, after handing in his plan of reform. Diplomatic
relations between Austria and Prussia were suspended on June 12th; on the
15th Bismarck requested Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Cassel to disarm. They
declined and the war began.
The forces ranged against each other at the opening of the war of 1866 may
be briefly exhibited in tabular form, thus:--
Prussian army (exclusive of depôt and garrison
troops) 351,000
Armies of German States allied with Prussia 28,600
Italian army 240,840
-------
Total 620,440
Artillery: Prussian guns, 1,092; Italian guns, 480: total, 1,572.
Austrian army:--Infantry, 321,140; cavalry,
26,621; artillery, 24,601; engineers and pioneers,
11,194: total 383,556
Armies of German States allied to Austria 160,586
-------
Total 544,142
Artillery: Austrian guns, 1,036; German guns, 360: total.
1,396.
Thus, merely reckoning the field armies on both sides, the accession of
Italy threw a decided preponderance, even of numbers, into the scale of
Prussia. Austria, to oppose the Italian army, was obliged to keep 150,000
of her best troops south of the Alps; had one-third of these stood in line
at Königgrätz, the fortune of the day would probably have been different.
In the special and scientific services Prussia had an additional
superiority over Austria; she had 30,000 cavalry, 35,000 artillery, and
18,000 pioneers, while the Austrian strength in each of these branches
was considerably smaller. Besides, the Austrian system was thoroughly
obsolete, and its organisers had neglected to adopt the needle-gun despite
its proved superiority in the Danish war. The Prussian army, thanks to
Von Roon and Von Moltke, had been raised, on the contrary, to the highest
degree of efficiency.
The forces of the Prussians, which were formed into three armies, were
distributed in the following manner. The First Army, commanded by Prince
Frederick Charles, the King's nephew, consisted of three infantry and one
cavalry corps, numbering 120,000 men; its headquarters were at Görlitz,
close to the eastern frontier of Saxony. The Second Army, commanded by
the Crown Prince, contained the Guards corps and three others, numbering
125,000 men; the headquarters were at Neisse in Silesia, being purposely
placed so far to the south in order to induce a belief that the objective
of this army was Olmütz or Brünn, and to disguise as long as possible the
real design of leading it across the mountains into Bohemia. The Third
Army was that of the Elbe, commanded by General Herwarth von Bittenfeld,
whose headquarters were at Halle; it numbered about 50,000 men, including
cavalry. Besides these three armies, which were all designed to act
against Austria, special forces to the number of about 60,000 men were
prepared to invade Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, and afterwards to operate
against the forces of the southern States friendly to Austria, as
circumstances should direct. The forces that were to attack Hanover were
under the command of Lieutenant-General von Falkenstein, the military
governor of Westphalia. Those that were detailed against Hesse-Cassel
were commanded by General Beyer, whose headquarters were at Wetzlar, the
chief town of a small Prussian _enclave_, surrounded by the territories of
Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, and Hesse-Darmstadt.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF LANGENSALZA. (_See p._ 426.)]
In the North of Germany the campaign was brief indeed, although it
opened with a Prussian reverse. Through some mismanagement the real
superiority of force which the Prussians could bring to bear against the
Hanoverians was not made available, and Major-General Flies, the Prussian
commander, was about to attack an army considerably more numerous than
his own. Misleading reports as to the movements both of the Bavarians and
Hanoverians had reached Von Falkenstein at Eisenach. He therefore ordered
Goeben with his division to watch the Bavarians, who were supposed to be
advancing from the south, and despatched Manteuffel towards Mühlhausen,
a town between Göttingen and Langensalza, under the erroneous belief
that the Hanoverians were now retreating northwards, and meant to seek
a strong position among the Harz Mountains. The Hanoverian general,
Arenttschildt, entertained no such intention, but, expecting to be
attacked from Gotha, he had drawn up his little army on the northern bank
of the Unstrut, a marshy stream that runs past Langensalza in a general
easterly direction, to join the Saale near Leipsic. The Prussians advanced
gallantly, drove in the Hanoverian outposts on the right or south bank
of the Unstrut, and attempted to cross the river. But the Hanoverian
artillery, judiciously posted and well served, defeated this attempt. A
number of partial actions, in which great bravery was exhibited on both
sides, occurred in different parts of the field. The Prussians, however,
being decidedly over-matched, were unable to gain ground; and about one
o'clock General Arenttschildt ordered his brigade commanders to cross
the Unstrut and assume the offensive. This was done--ineffectually for
a time on the Hanoverian left, where the swampy nature of the ground by
the river presented great obstacles to an advance--but with complete
success on their right, where General Bülow drove the Prussians steadily
before him, and was able to use his superior cavalry with considerable
effect. The excellent military qualities of the Prussian soldier, and the
deadly rapidity of fire of the needle-gun, prevented the retreat from
becoming a disaster. However, General Flies had no choice but to order a
general retreat, and fall back in the direction of Gotha. Two guns and
two thousand stand of arms fell into the hands of the victors, whose
cavalry continued the pursuit till half-past four, making many prisoners.
The Hanoverian situation, however, was really desperate, and on the
arrival of the main body of the Prussians the Hanoverians were compelled
to capitulate. The King fled into Austria, but his ally the Elector of
Hesse-Cassel was made a prisoner of war.
On June 16th Prince Frederick Charles, moving from Görlitz, crossed the
Saxon frontier, and advanced upon Dresden. A junction was effected with
Herwarth near Meissen, and both marched to Dresden, which was occupied
without opposition on the 18th. By the 20th of June, the whole of Saxony
(with the exception of the virgin fortress of Königstein in the Saxon
Switzerland) was in the hands of the Prussians. The war had lasted but
five days, and already the vigour and rapidity with which Prussia dealt
her blows had secured for her advantages of inestimable value. Her right
flank was now secure from attack through the prostration of the power of
Hanover and Hesse-Cassel; the prestige and the terror of her arms were
greatly enhanced by the occupation of the beautiful capital of Saxony;
and the conquest of that kingdom had rendered possible the union of two
Prussian armies, and secured a corresponding shortening and strengthening
of her lines. The Saxon army retreated into Bohemia, and joined the main
body of the Austrians under General Benedek.
The Prince broke up his headquarters at Görlitz on the 22nd of June, and
marched thence with the main body of the First Army direct for Zittau,
the last town in Saxony towards Bohemia. The passes through the mountains
were found to be undefended; in fact, the rapid movements of the Prussians
had left no time for Benedek to take the necessary measures. Count Clam
Gallas, in command of the 1st Austrian Corps, was defeated in a series
of battles, extending from the 26th to the 29th of June, and driven
behind Gitschin. While the First Army and the Army of the Elbe were thus
advancing from the north, the Second Army was moving from Silesia, in
circumstances of far greater difficulty and peril, to effect a junction
with them in Bohemia. After a defeat at Trautenau, the Crown Prince
established communications with Prince Frederick Charles, the movements
of the three armies being directed by telegraph from Berlin by Moltke,
the chief of the staff. On the 30th the King of Prussia, accompanied by
Count Bismarck and General Moltke, left Berlin, and reached headquarters
at Gitschin on the 2nd of July. Thus the First Army and the Army of the
Elbe were brought into communication with the Army of Silesia; and the
imminent peril which had existed of an attack by Benedek, in overwhelming
force, upon one of these invading armies, before the other was near
enough to help it, was now at an end. Military authorities are agreed in
casting great blame on the generalship of Benedek. That he did not take
the initiative by an advance into Saxony was probably not his fault; but
if compelled to receive the attack, it was manifestly his policy, as he
knew the Prussians to be advancing on two sides, to detain one of their
armies by a detachment, with orders to throw all possible difficulties in
its path, while avoiding a pitched battle; but to fall upon the other with
the full remaining strength of his own army, and endeavour to inflict upon
it, while isolated, a crushing defeat. He had been thwarted by the energy
of the Crown Prince's attack, and, seeing that the campaign was lost,
had telegraphed to the Emperor on the 1st of July that a catastrophe was
inevitable unless peace was made.
The position which Benedek had taken up, on a mass of rolling hilly
ground, the highest point of which is marked by the village and church
of Chlumetz, bounded on the west by the Bistritz, and on the east by the
Elbe, and with the fortress of Königgrätz in its rear, would have been
an exceedingly good one, had he had no other army but that of Frederick
Charles to think of. As against the First Army, the line of the Bistritz,
with its commanding ridge, its woods affording shelter for marksmen, and
the difficulties presented by the (in places) marshy character of its
valley, presented a defensive position of the first order. But Benedek had
to reckon also with the army of the Crown Prince, and this he well knew;
for an Austrian force had been driven out of Königinhof by the Prussian
Guards on the evening of the 29th. Prince Frederick Charles attacked at
daybreak, advancing through the village of Sadowa, and for hours sustained
an unequal struggle with the superior forces of the Austrians. Herwarth
was also, about one o'clock, checked in his advance. The First Army could
do no more; it was even a question whether it could hold its ground; and
the Prussian commanders on the plateau of Dub turned many an anxious
glance to the left, wondering why the columns of the Crown Prince did not
make their appearance. The King himself frequently turned his field-glass
in that direction. The heavy rain that had fallen prevented the march of
the Crown Prince from being marked by those clouds of dust that are the
usual accompaniment of a moving army. Some Austrian guns about Lipa, it
is true, appeared to be firing towards the north, but it was not certain
that they were not directed against some movement of Franzecky's division.
Yet all this time two corps belonging to the army of the Crown Prince had
been in action since half-past twelve with the Austrian right, and one of
them was pressing forward to the occupation of ground the defence of which
was vital to the continued maintenance of its position by the Austrian
army. Their onslaught on Benedek's right at once decided the battle, and,
effecting a retreat across the Elbe with the utmost difficulty, he fled
eastwards, leaving 18,000 on the field and 24,000 prisoners.
The Emperor, seeing his capital threatened, and the empire menaced with
dissolution, determined to rid himself of one enemy by removing the ground
of dispute. He accordingly ceded Venetia to the Emperor of the French,
with the understanding that it was to be transferred to the King of Italy
at the conclusion of the war. Napoleon accepted the cession, and from
that time was unremitting in his endeavours to bring hostilities to a
termination. His proposal of an armistice was accepted in principle by
the King of Prussia, with the reservation that the preliminaries of peace
must first be recognised by the Austrian Court. Meanwhile the Italians had
suffered decisive defeats at the hands of the Austrians. La Marmora, who
took command, crossed the Mincio with 120,000 men, but was defeated by the
Archduke Albrecht with smaller numbers upon the field of Custozza (June
24th), and compelled to fall back in disorder. A naval action at Lissa off
the Istrian coast also terminated in a complete victory for the Austrians
under Admiral Tegethoff.
The course of events in the western portion of the theatre of war must
now be briefly described. It will be remembered that, for the purpose of
sudden and simultaneous operations against Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, a
considerable Prussian force had been collected--drawn partly from the Elbe
duchies, partly from the garrisons of neighbouring fortresses--and placed
under the command of General Vogel von Falkenstein. After the surrender
of the Hanoverians on the 29th of June, this force was concentrated
about Gotha and Eisenach, and was free to act against the armies that
had taken the field in the cause of Austria and the Diet farther
south. Falkenstein had two separate armies in his front--the Bavarians
under their Prince Charles, now numbering upwards of 50,000 sabres and
bayonets, with 136 guns, and the 8th Federal Corps, commanded by Prince
Alexander of Hesse and numbering little short of 50,000 men, with 134
guns. Devoid of co-operation, they suffered a series of defeats at the
hands of Falkenstein and Manteuffel in a campaign marked by small battles
and intricate manœuvres. On the 16th of July the Prussians marched into
Frankfort with all military precautions, a regiment of cuirassiers with
drawn swords leading the way. They posted two guns in the great square,
and stacked their arms there and in the Zeil. Late at night they broke
into groups, and went to the different houses, on which, without previous
consultation with the municipality, they had been billeted, forcing their
way in without ceremony wherever a recalcitrant householder was found.
It was observed that especially large numbers of soldiers were billeted
on the houses of those citizens who were known to be anti-Prussian in
their politics. One of these, Herr Mumm, was required to lodge and feed
15 officers and 200 men. General Falkenstein took up his quarters in the
town, having issued a proclamation announcing that, by orders of the King
of Prussia, he had assumed the government of the imperial city, together
with Nassau, and the parts of Bavaria that were in Prussian occupation.
He at once imposed upon the citizens a war contribution of 7,000,000
gulden (about £600,000), besides 300 horses, and other contributions in
kind. The Burgomaster Fellner and the Syndic Müller visited this modern
Brennus, to endeavour to obtain some diminution of the impost; but they
were only treated to a Prussian version of the classic declaration, "_Væ
Victis_." Falkenstein roughly told the burgomaster that he used the rights
of conquest; and is said to have threatened that if his demands were not
promptly complied with, the city should be given up to pillage. Thus Count
Bismarck paid off his old scores against the German Diet.
Meanwhile the victorious career of Prussia was carrying her arms without
a check to the banks of the Danube and under the walls of Vienna.
Marshal Benedek, after having put the Elbe between the Prussians and
his exhausted troops, had to decide instantly what was to be done. An
armistice was thought of; and Von Gablenz was sent on a mission to the
Prussian headquarters to see if one could be obtained; but on this, and
on a subsequent visit made with the same object, he failed. Benedek found
that his army was so disorganised and disheartened by the defeat of the
3rd of July, that it was idle to think of defending the line of the Elbe.
He resolved, therefore, to retire within the lines of the fortress of
Olmütz, and there re-form his broken ranks and recruit his dilapidated
resources. But the press and populace of Vienna clamoured vehemently for
his dismissal from the post of Commander-in-Chief; and this was presently
done, though not in such a manner as to disgrace him. The Archduke
Albrecht, the victor of Custozza, was appointed to the command of the
Austrian Army of the North, with General von John for his Chief of the
Staff. Benedek was left in command at Olmütz, with orders to send all
the corps lately under his command, as soon as they were ready for the
field again, by rail to Vienna, there to be united under the Archduke for
the defence of the capital. The junction was effected, but the Prussian
advance was alarmingly rapid, and on the 20th of July the advance-posts of
Herwarth were within fifteen miles of Vienna.
Another battle lost--and with inferior numbers, inferior arms, and
inferior strategy, the Austrians could not reasonably count on
victory--must have laid Austria utterly prostrate at the feet of
Prussia, and would probably have resulted, considering the difficult and
exasperating constitutional questions at that time still unsettled between
the Emperor's government and the subject kingdoms, in her dismemberment
and political degradation. From this fate Austria was saved, not by the
moderation of Prussia, but by the firm and friendly mediation of France.
The Prussians, both officers and soldiers, were eager to march on to
the assault of Vienna, though the Government was deterred by the facts
that Hungary was still intact, and the Italian army paralysed by the
dissensions of its commanders. But France, having accepted Venetia as a
pledge that she would discharge the office of mediator, discharged it
effectually. That description of mediation, to which Lord Russell was so
much attached, which proclaimed beforehand that it would employ no other
agency but "persuasion," did not commend itself to the French mind. It
is absurd to suppose that Count Bismarck would have paid any attention
to the pleadings of Benedetti had he not well understood that France was
mediating sword in hand. On this point the Count's own frank declaration,
made in the Prussian Lower House in the December following the war--though
its immediate reference is to the question of Schleswig--does not permit
us to remain in doubt. He said: "In July last France was enabled, by the
general situation of Europe, to urge her views more forcibly than before.
I need not depict the situation of this country at the time I am speaking
of. You all know what I mean. Nobody could expect us to carry on two wars
at the same time. Peace with Austria had not yet been concluded; were we
to imperil the fruits of our glorious campaign by plunging headlong into
hostilities with a new, a second enemy? France, then, being called on by
Austria to mediate between the contending parties, as a matter of course
did not omit to urge some wishes of her own upon us." Everything seems to
show that Austria owed to France, at this critical moment, her continued
existence as a great Power.
But for the time the negotiations hung fire, as Napoleon declined to
recognise the federation of all Germany under Prussian leadership, even
though Bismarck hinted that France should be allowed to annex Belgium by
way of compensation. On the 17th of July the King of Prussia arrived at
Nikolsburg, a place about forty miles to the north of Vienna, close to
the frontier line of Moravia and Lower Austria. Benedetti was already at
Nikolsburg, empowered by the Emperor of Austria to agree to an armistice
of five days, nearly upon the conditions originally proposed by Prussia,
viz. that Austria should withdraw all her troops, except those in
garrisons, to the south of the Thaya; in other words, abandon all Moravia
except the fortress and entrenched camp of Olmütz, to the Prussians.
On these conditions an armistice was concluded at Nikolsburg, to take
effect from noon on the 22nd of July, and to last till noon on the 27th.
It was well understood on both sides that this armistice was preparatory
to negotiations for peace. These were conducted actively at Nikolsburg,
Austria being represented by General Degenfeld and Count Karolyi; Prussia
by General Moltke and Count Bismarck. Preliminaries of peace between the
two Powers were signed on the 26th of July. The terms agreed to were--That
Austria should cease to be a member of the German Confederation; that
she should pay a contribution of 40,000,000 thalers towards Prussia's
expenses in the war; and that she should offer no opposition to the steps
that Prussia might take with regard to Northern Germany. The principal
measures thus sanctioned were--the annexation of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel,
Nassau, and the portion of Hesse-Darmstadt which lies to the north of
the Main; the concession to Prussia of the reversion of Brunswick on
the death of the Duke then living, who was without issue; the entry of
Saxony into the new North German Confederation about to be formed; and
the grant to Prussia of the supreme military and diplomatic leadership in
that Confederation. The Prussian armies were to be withdrawn beyond the
Thaya on the 2nd of August, but were to occupy Bohemia and Moravia till
the conclusion of the final treaty of peace, and to hold Austrian Silesia
until the war indemnity was paid. It was with great difficulty that the
Emperor Francis Joseph wrung from the King of Prussia his consent to the
continued independence of Saxony. But the little kingdom and its monarch
had stood so nobly by Austria during the war that honour demanded of the
Emperor that he should not permit them to be sacrificed, even though, by
insisting, he risked the re-opening of hostilities.
[Illustration: COUNT VON MOLTKE.]
The definitive treaty of peace between Austria and Prussia was signed at
Prague on the 23rd of August. Austria was represented in the negotiation
by Baron Brenner, and Prussia by Baron Werther, Bismarck having been
obliged to return to Berlin to be present at the opening of the Chambers.
In substance the treaty did little more than put into precise and legal
form the stipulations agreed to at Nikolsburg. The article respecting
Venetia declared that, "his Majesty the Emperor of Austria on his part
gives his consent to the union of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom with
the kingdom of Italy, without imposing any other condition than the
liquidation of those debts which have been acknowledged charges on the
territories now resigned in conformity with the Treaty of Zurich." The
fifth article transferred to Prussia all the rights that Austria had
acquired in the Elbe duchies under the Treaty of Vienna; but the influence
of the French Emperor, who would not miss what seemed to him so good an
opportunity for the application of his favourite principle of the popular
vote, obtained the addition of a clause providing that "the people of the
northern district of Schleswig, if by free vote they express a wish to be
united to Denmark, should be ceded to Denmark accordingly." With regard to
Saxony, the King of Prussia declared himself willing (Article VI.), "at
the desire of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria," to allow the territory
of that kingdom to remain within its existing limits, reserving to himself
the right of settling in a separate treaty the share to be contributed by
Saxony towards the expenses of the war, and the position which it should
eventually hold within the North German Confederation. This separate
treaty was not concluded till the 21st of October of the same year. Under
it Saxony retained little more than a nominal independence. She agreed to
pay a war contribution of 9,000,000 thalers, to give up all her telegraphs
to Prussia, and to enter the North German Confederation; her troops were
to form an integral portion of the North German army, under the supreme
command of the King of Prussia; Königstein, her strongest fortress, was
to be given up to Prussia, and Dresden to be held by a garrison half
Prussian, half Saxon. While Prussia was stipulating for the cessation
of all common interests between her and Austria, and for the exclusion
of the latter from Germany, the question naturally rose: What relations
are to subsist hereafter between Prussia and the other South German
States--such as Bavaria and Baden--which are neither to join the North
German Confederation, nor yet to be excluded altogether from Germany?
This question was answered in the fourth article of the treaty, in which
the Emperor of Austria, after promising to recognise the North German
Confederation which Prussia was about to form, "declares his consent that
the German States situated to the south of the line of the Main should
unite in a league, the national connection of which with the North German
Bund is reserved for a further agreement between both parties, and which
will have an international independent existence." The Treaty of Prague
further settled that from the war indemnity of 40,000,000 thalers which
Austria had agreed to pay, a sum of 15,000,000 thalers should be deducted
on account of war expenses claimed by the Emperor from the duchies of
Schleswig and Holstein, and a further sum of 5,000,000 thalers on account
of the maintenance of the Prussian troops in the Austrian States which
they occupied till the conclusion of peace. The remaining net indemnity
of 20,000,000 thalers was to be paid within three weeks of the exchange
of ratifications. This sum, it may be mentioned, amounts to £3,000,000 of
English money. The principal articles of the treaty between Austria and
Prussia having been thus briefly summarised, it now only remains to state
that the ratifications of the treaty were formally exchanged at Prague on
the 29th of August.
The war was over, but the task of establishing the new internal relations
that were henceforth to prevail in Germany remained. Armistices were
agreed to on the 2nd of August between Prussia, on the one hand, and
Bavaria, Baden, Würtemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt, on the other, to last
for three weeks. At first Bavaria was very roughly dealt with. The
Bavarian Ambassador, Baron von der Pfordten, was some days at Nikolsburg
before he could obtain an audience of Count Bismarck. At last (July 27th)
he obtained a few minutes' conversation with the Prussian Minister,
who curtly stated as the terms of peace, the cession of all Bavarian
territory north of the Main to Prussia, the cession of the Bavarian
Palatinate to Hesse-Darmstadt, and the payment of a war indemnity. But
the final treaty of peace, signed at Berlin on the 22nd of August,
was less onerous for Bavaria, it imposed, indeed, a contribution of
30,000,000 gulden; abolished shipping dues on the Rhine and Main, where
those rivers were under Bavarian jurisdiction; and transferred all the
telegraph lines north of the Main to Prussian control; but it required
no such cessions of territory as were exacted by the preliminaries. The
causes of this apparent lenity, which must have puzzled those acquainted
with the Prussian character, will be explained presently. The treaty
with Würtemberg, signed on the 13th of August, imposed a war indemnity
of 8,000,000 florins on that kingdom, and provided for its re-entry
into the Zollverein. A similar treaty with Baden, signed on the 17th
of August, burdened the Grand Duchy with a war indemnity of 6,000,000
gulden. Peace with Hesse-Darmstadt was only concluded on the 3rd of
September. Great resentment was felt in Prussia against the Grand Duke,
who had been throughout a staunch friend to Austria. On the other hand,
the Court of Russia, for family reasons, intervened with urgency on
behalf both of Würtemberg and of Hesse-Darmstadt; and the terms imposed
on these States were consequently more lenient than had been expected.
Darmstadt was required to give up Hesse-Homburg and certain other
portions of its territory to Prussia; it was, however, indemnified to a
considerable extent at the cost of what had been the independent States
of Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort; the general effect being to
consolidate and render more compact the territories both of Prussia and
of Darmstadt, where they were conterminous. Hesse-Darmstadt, moreover,
though, in respect of that portion of her territories which lay south of
the Main, she was a South German State, agreed to enter the North German
Confederation.
Besides the public treaties with the States of South Germany which
have been just described, Prussia concluded with them at the same time
certain secret articles, which were not divulged until months afterwards.
According to these, Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg severally entered
into a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia, with
guarantee of their respective territories, and the concession of the
supreme command in time of war to the King of Prussia. Count Bismarck
knew that he had been playing a perilous game; he had mortified and
exasperated the French Emperor, immediately after the close of the war, by
refusing to cede to him certain demands for the Bavarian Palatinate and
the Hessian districts west of the Rhine. French vanity had been wounded
by the victories, French jealousy had been aroused by the aggrandisement,
of Prussia. The whole North German Confederation did but represent a
population of 25,000,000; if Germany was to be safe against France, she
must be able to dispose at need of the military resources of a population
of at least equal magnitude. Weighing all these things with that profound
forecast which characterised him, Count Bismarck would seem to have
purposely imposed at first harsh conditions on Bavaria in order that he
might obtain, as the price of their subsequent remission, the adhesion of
that kingdom to an arrangement that would bring its excellent soldiers
into line with those of Prussia. Upon all these South German States he
skilfully brought to bear an argument derived from the recent demand of
France for German territory which he promptly divulged--a demand which,
he said, would infallibly be renewed; which it would be difficult in all
circumstances to resist; and which, if it had to be conceded, could hardly
be satisfied except at the expense of one or other of them. Isolated,
they could not resist dismemberment; united with Prussia, and mutually
guaranteeing each other's territories, they were safe.
These secret treaties between Prussia and the South German States first
came to light in April of the following year. Count Beust, who was then
the Austrian Premier, commenting on the disclosure in his despatches to
Austrian representatives at foreign Courts, said that Austria would make
no complaint and ask for no explanations; at the same time, with much dry
significance, he directed their attention to the fact, that the Prussian
Government had actually concluded these treaties with the South German
States before it signed the Treaty of Prague, the fourth article of which
was by them rendered null and meaningless. The Count justly pointed out
that an offensive alliance between two States forced the weaker of the two
to endorse the foreign policy and follow in the wake of the stronger, and
practically destroyed the independence of the former.
For the French Emperor, in spite of the efficacy of the French
intervention in favour of Austria, the events of this year must have been
full of secret mortification. In Mexico, the empire that he had built
up at heavy cost was crumbling to pieces; and he did not feel himself
strong enough on the throne--nor was he, in fact, gifted with sufficient
strength of moral and intellectual fibre--to persevere in the enterprise
against the ill-will of the American Government and the carpings of the
Opposition at home. He made up his mind to withdraw the French troops
from Mexico, and get out of the affair with as little loss of credit
as possible. In spite of checks and disappointments, Napoleon still
wore a bold front, and in his public utterances continued to assume the
oracular and impassable character that had so long imposed on the world.
In the sitting of the Corps-Législatif on the 12th of June an important
letter from the Emperor to M. Drouyn de Lhuys was read, in which it was
declared that France would only require an extension of her frontiers,
in the event of the map of Europe being altered to the profit of a great
Power, and of the bordering provinces expressing by a formal and free vote
their desire for annexation. The last clause was a judicious reservation,
particularly as the doctrine of the popular sovereignty, expressed through
_plébiscites_, was not at all consonant with Prussian ideas, so that
there was no chance of Rhine Prussia, or any part of it, being allowed
the opportunity, supposing it had desired it, of voting for annexation
to France. However, notwithstanding the imperial declaration, the map of
Europe was altered to the profit of a great Power, and France obtained
no extension of territory. Soon after the close of the Austro-Prussian
War, the Emperor asked from the Prussian Government the concession of a
small strip of territory to the extreme south of her Rhenish provinces,
including the valuable coalfield in the neighbourhood of Saarbrück and
Saarlouis, besides acquiescence in the annexations from Bavaria and
Hesse-Darmstadt. This was the last of a series of demands for compensation
dating from 1862, by judiciously playing with which Bismarck had kept
Napoleon quiet during two European wars. Count Bismarck met the request
with a decided refusal, on the ground that the state of national feeling
in Germany rendered the cession of a single foot of German territory to
a foreign Power an impossible proceeding. The Emperor's mortification
must have been extreme; he concealed it, however, and nothing was more
hopeful or optimistic than the tone of the circular which he caused to
be sent on the 16th of September to the French diplomatic agents abroad.
Its object was to convince the nation and all the world that France had
not been humiliated, nor disappointed, nor disagreeably surprised, by the
late events; on the contrary, that she was perfectly satisfied with what
had happened. As to annexations, France desired none in which the sympathy
of the populations annexed did not go with her--in which they had not the
same customs, the same national spirit with herself. From the elevated
point of view occupied by the French Government, "the horizon appeared to
be cleared of all menacing eventualities."
[Illustration: THE PALACE, DRESDEN.]
[Illustration: WAR OFFICE, PALL MALL.]