THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).
The Schleswig-Holstein Question--The Nationalities of Denmark--The
Connection between Schleswig and Denmark--The Declaration of
1846--Incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark--The Rebellion
and its Suppression--The Protocol of London--Defects of the
Arrangement--Danification of the Duchies--A Common Constitution
decreed and revoked--The King's Proclamation--Schleswig
incorporated in Denmark--Federal Execution voted--Russell's
high-handed Diplomacy--Death of Frederick VII.--The Augustenburg
Candidate--Austria and Prussia override the Diet--Russell's abortive
Conference--The Austrian and Prussian Troops advance--Collapse
of the Danes--Russell proposes an Armistice--Russell and M.
Bille--France declines to interfere--Possibilities of Swedish
and Russian Intervention--The Cabinet divided--An Armistice--A
futile Conference--The War resumed--Fate of Denmark is sealed--To
whom do the Spoils belong?--Summary of Events in Mexico and North
America--Southern Filibusters in Canada--Their Acquittal at
Montreal--Excitement in America--The Sentence reversed.
The series of transactions on which we have now to enter is one in regard
to which few Englishmen, even of those most wedded to the principle of
non-intervention, can look back to the part played by their country
without pain and some degree of misgiving. In 1864, Schleswig and
Holstein, provinces that had been dependent on the crown of Denmark
(though under different titles), the first since 1027, the second since
1386, were invaded and overrun by the armed hosts of Austria and Prussia,
and forcibly severed from the Danish crown. This was done in disregard of
the remonstrances and in defiance of the menaces of England, and in spite
of the known disapproval of France. But first for the sake of clearness,
a few geographical details may properly be given. Continental Denmark
consisted, before the war of 1864, of four provinces--Jutland, in the
extreme north; Schleswig to the south of Jutland, bounded on the south by
the river Eider; Holstein between the Eider and the Elbe; and Lauenburg, a
small province to the east of Holstein, lying between it and Mecklenburg.
The language and nationality of Denmark proper are wholly Danish; in
Schleswig the population is pretty nearly divided between those who speak
Danish and those who speak German, the former occupying the northern, the
latter the southern districts of the duchy. Holstein and Lauenburg are
wholly German. In religious profession there was no difference of any
moment throughout the Danish monarchy; Lutheranism was the prevailing
creed of Danes and Germans alike.
Let us now trace back to its origin the connection of the Duchies with
Denmark. In the fourteenth century Schleswig, which had previously been
conquered by Denmark, was ceded to a Count of Holstein, on the condition
that it should never be united to Denmark. Thus the Count-Duke, while
still owing allegiance to the German Empire in respect of Holstein,
did homage to the Sovereign of Denmark for the Duchy of Schleswig. His
line expired in 1375, when it was succeeded by a branch of the House
of Oldenburg. In 1448 Duke Adolf's eldest nephew, Count Christian
of Oldenburg, had been raised to the throne of Denmark, and soon
afterwards, probably not without pressure from his uncle, he confirmed
the Constitution, first made in 1326, to the effect that Schleswig should
never be united to the Danish Crown. Moreover, when, by Adolf's death, the
ducal throne was vacant, the Landrath, or Estates, of Schleswig-Holstein,
with whom by ancient constitutional right the choice of a new ruler
rested, met in 1460, and elected their late Duke's nephew, Christian I.,
King of Denmark, to be their Duke, "not as a King of Denmark, but out
of affection towards his person." A personal union was thus established
between Denmark and Schleswig, which was tolerably well respected during
the next two centuries. The incoming King of Denmark was elected, as a
matter of course, Duke of Schleswig (and also Count of Holstein), provided
that he first swore to ratify the ancient rights and privileges of the
united lands. But the union between Denmark and Schleswig became gradually
closer, and was extended, in 1533, to offensive as well as defensive
alliance. The arrangement was confirmed in 1773, when Schleswig-Holstein
reverted to Denmark under the same conditions as had held good under
Christian I.
After 1773 there is nothing in the relations between Denmark and Schleswig
that need detain us until we come down to the nineteenth century. During
the disruption of the German Empire in 1806 the Duchies were formally
incorporated into his kingdom by Christian VII., and even after 1815
the German Diet declined to interfere at the request of the Holsteiners.
The old Estates having long before come to an end by desuetude, Frederic
VI., in 1831 and 1834, granted separate constitutional Chambers to
Schleswig and Holstein, by which they were accepted and worked till
February, 1848. After 1835, the probability of the extinction of the
male line of the House of Oldenburg, through the eventual death without
issue of Frederic, only surviving son of Christian VIII., became
stronger with each succeeding year. To keep the Danish monarchy together
became, therefore, the one paramount object of Danish statesmanship.
At first the Danish Court thought of persuading or bribing the Duke of
Sonderburg-Augustenburg, representing the younger branch of the elder or
royal line of the House of Oldenburg, to whom, if females were excluded,
both Schleswig and Holstein would descend at the failure of male heirs
in the royal line, to resign his right to the succession. This plan
was abandoned by Christian VIII., who appointed a special commission
to examine the ancient laws, treaties, and other historic documents
in the Danish archives. The result of the commission appeared in the
King's letters patent of 8th July, 1846, in which Christian VIII. stated
it as his firm conviction that, so far as Schleswig was concerned, in
consequence of the letters patent of 1721, and the homage then done, the
succession in Schleswig was now the same as in Denmark, and that he should
exercise and maintain his right accordingly; while, in regard to Holstein,
or certain parts of it, there existed facts militating against an equally
positive opinion.
In the ferment that arose in every capital of Europe after the Revolution
in Paris of February, 1848, a violent Danish national feeling manifested
itself at Copenhagen, and forced the King, Frederic VII., to issue a
proclamation declaring that Denmark and Schleswig were thenceforth to
form an inseparable union under a common free constitution. The Duchies,
incited by a strong democratic and national feeling that had arisen in
Germany, regarded this proclamation as a breach of their Constitution,
and broke out into rebellion. They were aided, but in a hesitating,
irresolute way, by the King of Prussia, and carried on the war with
Denmark with various success to the end of the summer of 1850. By the
end of 1849 Austria had subdued both Hungary and Sardinia, and had now
leisure to look after her interests in Germany. She disapproved of the
advances which Frederic William had made to the German democracy, and of
his making war on Denmark, and convened a meeting of the Diet at Frankfort
with the view of counteracting Prussian schemes. The weak King immediately
yielded, especially as Russia was giving urgently and imperiously the
same advice, abandoned the Duchies, made peace with Denmark (July 2nd,
1850), and actually assisted her in the task of subjugation. The Duchies
resolved to continue the war, but they were defeated in a great battle
and soon afterwards compelled to submit. Schleswig was thus recovered;
but the Danish troops halted on the frontier of Holstein, in obedience to
an article in the Treaty of the 2nd of July, 1850, requiring Denmark to
apply for the intervention of the Bund before resorting to hostilities
against Holstein. This application was made; and, in reply to it, an
Austro-Prussian army, acting in the name of the Bund, marched into
Holstein and required the _de facto_ Government to lay down its arms.
Thus was the whole of Schleswig-Holstein pacified (January 11, 1851); but
military occupation of Holstein was still retained by the German Powers,
pending the attainment of a definitive arrangement for the affairs of the
Duchies. Negotiations were at once opened between the King of Denmark,
on the one part, and Austria and Prussia, representing the Bund, on the
other part, and were protracted through the whole of the year 1851. By the
Protocol of London of August, 1850, and the Treaty of 1852, the succession
to the Kingdom and Duchies was assigned to Prince Christian of Glucksburg;
the integrity of the whole Danish monarchy was declared permanent, but the
rights of the German Confederation in respect of Holstein and Schleswig
were reserved. This arrangement was mainly the work of Lord Palmerston,
and was signed by England, France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark.
Count Vitzthum, in "St. Petersburg and London," declares that it was
imposed upon him by Russia as the price for the Czar's acquiescence in
his coercion of Greece; but there is no reason for supposing that he was
acting otherwise than _proprio motu_.
The matter thus seemed to be settled, but it really was not. For, in
the first place, all that the Princess Louise, niece to Christian VIII.
and wife of Christian of Glucksburg, could surrender to any one was her
right to the succession in Denmark (and possibly in Schleswig); she had
no right whatever to the succession in Holstein, because that could only
pass to male heirs. Secondly, it was highly questionable in law whether
the Princess could execute a valid renunciation of her rights in favour
of one who did not stand next in the order of succession to herself,
without the consent of those whose right intervened between her and him;
but no such consent was ever obtained. Thirdly, the Duke of Augustenburg
might with some reason allege that his abandonment of his rights was not
made freely, but under compulsion, or else one of his sons (as actually
happened) might declare that his father's act did not bind him. Fourthly,
even supposing the renunciation of the Duke of Augustenburg and his family
to be persevered in, there were other Princes of the Sonderburg line
whose rights, at any rate to the Holstein succession, were prior to that
of Prince Christian, and who had not renounced those rights. Fifthly,
and chiefly, the German Confederation was not a party to the Treaty of
London; it was therefore free to resist the arrangement it contained, if
it considered the interests of Holstein and the Bund to require it.
Yet, after all, the arrangements provided by the Treaty of London would
probably have resulted in a solid settlement, had not the relations
between the Danish Government and the German population of the Duchies,
during the eleven years following the Treaty of London, become strained
and embittered to a dangerous extent. For this result Denmark was chiefly
responsible, and it was in flagrant breach of the Treaty of London, by
which Denmark was pledged to observe the ancient rights of the Duchies.
The majority in the Rigsraad was largely influenced by the views of the
Eider Dane party, a set of politicians fanatically bent upon the elevation
and extension of the Scandinavian nationality. This party, unable to expel
from their minds the feelings of animosity which the war had engendered,
regarded the German inhabitants of the Duchies as the population of a
conquered country, and resolved, so far as they dared, and in spite of
the engagements by which their King was bound to Austria and Prussia, to
make them feel and taste their subjection. The protective Danish tariff
was extended to both Duchies, their revenue appropriated to the interests
of the kingdom; their military establishment, hitherto kept separate from
the Danish forces, was incorporated in that army. The best offices in
Schleswig were given to Danes. In the churches and schools of Schleswig
the Danish language was substituted for the German, even in districts
where not one in twenty understood a word of Danish, and the inhabitants
were prohibited from employing private German teachers in their families.
It is therefore abundantly clear that the engagement, by which Denmark
had pledged her word to Austria and Prussia that "the German and Danish
nationalities in Schleswig should meet with equal protection," was not
kept. Nor can it be reasonably doubted that the engagement--"That all
ties of a non-political kind between Holstein and Schleswig should remain
intact"--was not faithfully observed. But, in point of form, it was not
the breach of either of these engagements, but that of a third, binding
Denmark to submit the common Constitution of the monarchy to the previous
examination of the four local Diets, which led directly to the Federal
execution and all its momentous consequences. The sequence of events
was as follows:--A common Constitution for the monarchy was framed in
1854, and having passed the Danish Parliament, was published by Royal
Ordinance (October 2nd, 1855), for the Duchies of Holstein, Schleswig, and
Lauenburg, without any previous consultation of their Diets. The matter
was taken up by the German Federal Diet, which, in 1858, declared that by
Federal law the common Constitution proclaimed in 1855 was illegal, so far
as Holstein and Lauenburg were concerned, because it had not been assented
to by the Legislatures of these States, and decreed a Federal execution in
Holstein in case of the non-abrogation of that Constitution. After many
endeavours to evade compliance, Denmark (November, 1858) did abrogate the
common Constitution, so far as Holstein and Schleswig were concerned.
The execution was accordingly stayed (1860), but on the understanding
that the king and his Holstein subjects would in concert frame some
arrangement by which, in a manner acceptable to them and to the Diet,
Holstein might participate in the common Constitution. But on the 30th of
March, 1863, the king published, of his own mere motion, a proclamation
fixing the future position of Holstein in the monarchy. The ruling idea
of this proclamation was, that since Holstein would not come in to the
common Constitution on Denmark's terms, and since it was backed up by
the Bund in this resolve, it must be allowed to remain outside; while,
as between Denmark and Schleswig, the common Constitution of 1855 should
still be maintained. The most important clause was this: That, as regarded
the common affairs of the monarchy, the legislative power should be
exercised by the king and the Holstein Diet conjointly. The effect of the
proclamation was--or would have been--the severance of the Danish monarchy
into two distinct groups, united by the personal _nexus_ only--the
line of intersection falling between Holstein and Schleswig. When this
proclamation became known in Germany, it aroused a strenuous spirit of
opposition. The Diet, in July, demanded the retractation of the Ordinance
of March 30th, and on the Danish Government's refusal to comply, decreed
that Federal execution should take place with the due forms. So far from
attempting to appease the rising wrath of Germany, the Danish Government
made matters worse by issuing (November 18th) a new Constitution for
Denmark and Schleswig, intended to complete the scheme of government which
the Patent of March 30th had commenced.
On the 7th of December the Diet voted for immediate execution, and
entrusted the fulfilment of its mandate to Saxon and Hanoverian troops.
Denmark then withdrew the Ordinance of March 30th; but the excitement in
Germany had by this time risen to such a point that the execution could no
longer be stayed, though its character was somewhat altered. The Danish
troops quietly marched out of every town of Holstein just before the
Germans marched in. In most places the Danish arms were then taken down,
and the Schleswig-Holstein tricolour was hoisted; but the execution was
completed without bloodshed, and on the last day of the year the troops of
the Bund were facing the Danes along the line of the Eider.
It is now time to ask what part Britain had been taking in the
transactions and negotiations that had resulted in so grave a
complication. In September, 1862, Lord Russell had proposed, with
reference to the dispute between the Bund and Denmark as to the common
Constitution, that the schedule of "common affairs" should be greatly
curtailed, and that a large part of what had been hitherto deemed such
should be placed within the legislative competence of the local Diets.
This proposal Denmark had rejected, on the ground that its adoption
must inevitably lead either to anarchy or to a return to arbitrary
government. Again, in July, 1863, some days after the decree of the Bund
ordering execution in Holstein, Lord Palmerston, then Prime Minister, had
declared, in his place in Parliament, with reference to the proceedings
of the German Powers, that (in certain circumstances) "it would not be
with Denmark alone they would have to contend." This public declaration
inspired the Danes with a firm confidence that England would come to
their assistance in case of need, and doubtless made them resist the
demands of Germany more obstinately. The despatches of Lord Russell
to Lord Bloomfield at Vienna (July 31st) and to Sir Alexander Malet at
Frankfort (September 29th) assume a high--almost a menacing--tone. Taught,
however, by their experience of British intervention in favour of Poland,
German diplomatists were not disturbed by the vehemence of tone that
characterised the despatches from the British Foreign Office. Baron von
der Pfordten, the Bavarian Envoy to the Diet, told Sir Alexander Malet
one day that "he looked on Earl Russell's despatches as so much waste
paper." Still the greater German Powers thought it expedient to proceed
with caution; and as Lord Russell, in a Memorandum dated November 24th,
1863, had said that "should it appear that Federal troops had entered the
Duchy on international grounds, her Majesty's Government might be obliged
to interfere," Austria and Prussia persuaded the Diet to proceed by way of
execution, and not, as Bavaria and other States would have wished, by way
of "_prise de possession_"--a formally hostile and therefore international
act. Up to the end of 1863, then, although British remonstrances had not
met with much attention, the general policy of Great Britain in regard to
Denmark had not suffered a defeat.
[Illustration: LORD PALMERSTON. (_From a Photograph by Fradelle & Young._)]
But even before the execution an event had occurred that aggravated
tenfold the difficulties of the situation. Frederic VII., King of Denmark,
died suddenly on November 15, 1863. On the next day Prince Frederic of
Augustenburg, son of a Duke of Augustenburg who had accepted a sum of
money for his forfeited estates from Denmark in 1852, and agreed not
to oppose the new succession, issued a proclamation, addressed to the
"Schleswig-Holsteiners," in which he claimed the succession to both
Duchies. The minor States of Germany were inclined to support him; for
an independent German State of Schleswig-Holstein would have been an
accession of strength to their party in the Diet, and helped them to
stand their ground against their two great overbearing confederates,
Austria and Prussia. But by this time Count Bismarck, whose one guiding
thought was the aggrandisement of the Prussian monarchy out of all these
complications, had decided upon his policy. For some months in 1863
the minor States had carried matters their own way; and Baron von der
Pfordten, the Bavarian envoy, the ablest exponent of their policy, was for
a time the most powerful man in Germany. But now Bismarck, having secured
the cordial support of Austria by guaranteeing, on the part of Prussia,
the integrity of her possessions, proceeded to take the initiative. On the
28th of December Prussia and Austria proposed to the Diet that since the
new Danish Constitution of the 18th of November amounted to a distinct
violation of the pledge given in 1851-2, not to incorporate Schleswig
with Denmark, nor to take any steps leading thereto, the Diet should,
upon international grounds, order the military occupation of Schleswig,
as a material pledge for the fulfilment by Denmark of her engagements.
Bismarck had probably satisfied himself that no opposition of a material
kind would be offered by England in any circumstances; or else, now that
Prussia was firmly allied with Austria, he did not fear such opposition.
No action was taken by the Diet on this proposal for the moment, and
a few days afterwards it was renewed with greater urgency by the two
Governments, on the ground that the 1st of January, 1864, was the day
on which the new Constitution was fixed to come into force. The minor
States had different views; they wished first to get Duke Frederic firmly
enthroned in Holstein, after which they would have proceeded quietly to
take up the question of Schleswig. When the proposal came to be voted upon
in the Diet (January 14, 1864), a combination of the minor States rejected
it by a majority of 11 to 5. The representatives of Austria and Prussia
then informed the Diet that their Governments intended to carry out the
proposal in spite of the adverse vote.
Yielding to the advice of Lord Russell, the Danes had offered no
resistance to the execution; but when--probably after hearing of the
proposal made to the Diet by Austria and Prussia on the 28th of
December--the Foreign Secretary sent Lord Wodehouse to Copenhagen to
induce the Danish Government to revoke the Constitution of the 18th
of November, the mission was ineffectual. In a despatch of the 31st
of December Lord Russell proposed to the Diet that a conference of
representatives of the Powers who signed the Treaty of London, together
with a representative of the Bund, should meet and take into their
consideration the points in dispute between Denmark and Germany; and that
in the meantime, and until the conference had finished its labours, the
_status quo_ should be maintained. The proposal was received with cold
disapproval by most of the members of the Diet, and Sir Alexander Malet
wrote, a few days afterwards (January 8th, 1864), "there is an absolute
persuasion that England will not interfere materially, and our counsels,
regarded as unfriendly, have no weight."
Prussia and Austria, having announced their intention of acting
independently of the Diet, carried out their plans with energy and
celerity. The Danes saw the gathering storm, yet made no sign of yielding.
The truth is, Denmark reckoned with tolerable confidence on receiving
material aid from the Western Powers, particularly from England; and this
hope was encouraged by the knowledge that Earl Russell was indefatigable
in writing to, and sounding the intentions of, nearly every Court in
Europe, and that in a despatch to Paris he had spoken of "material
assistance" to Denmark to prevent her dismemberment. The Danes also placed
considerable reliance on the strength of the Dannewerke, an immense
system of earthworks, strengthened by forts, but it was carried on the
5th of February. Retreating northwards, the Danes concentrated under
the guns of the fortress of Fredericia, on the borders of Schleswig and
Jutland, and behind the lines of Düppel, which command the approach to
the island of Alsen. On the 7th of February Wrangel, commander of the
Austro-Prussian army, issued a proclamation announcing that Austrian and
Prussian commissioners would administer the civil government of Schleswig,
and ordered that the German language should be thenceforth used in all
branches of the administration. The fortified lines of Düppel were
stubbornly defended by the Danes, and their gradual reduction was not
effected without severe loss to the assailants. On the 18th of April the
last remaining bastions were stormed, and the Prussians became masters of
the place. The main body of the Danish army, or rather garrison, retreated
into Jutland, leaving a pretty strong force to occupy Alsen. Fredericia,
which had been expected to offer a serious resistance, was evacuated soon
after the fall of Düppel, the garrison crossing over into Fünen. The
Prussians, satisfied with having taken Düppel, made for the present no
attempt upon Alsen, and there was a pause in the strife.
The only expedient which seems to have occurred to Earl Russell was to
write (February 10th) to Berlin, urging that the belligerents--the war
having lasted exactly ten days--should agree to an armistice! The request
was, it need hardly be added, ineffectual. But now the Danish Government
took measures formally to remind Lord Russell of the obligations under
which England lay. M. Torben Bille, the Danish Minister in London, in a
despatch, dated February 11th, 1864, stated that his Government indulged
the hope that Earl Russell appreciated the steps which Denmark had taken
with a view to the maintenance of peace, seeing that these steps had been
taken by the Danish Government on the pressing advice of the Cabinet of
London; that, however, the pacific desires of Denmark had been frustrated
by the ambition of Austria and Prussia, and war had actually broken
out; that in this war Denmark, if unaided, must eventually be crushed
by the overwhelming numerical superiority of her opponents; that it was
necessary, therefore, that, while there was yet time, the Powers friendly
to Denmark should come to her aid, "and among those Powers there is none
which the Danish Government address with more confidence than England."
This was a categorical request, and the chilling reply which it elicited
from Lord Russell must have been a bitter mortification to the overmatched
and harassed Danes. After admitting generally that Denmark had followed
the advice of the British Government, without which that Government "could
not have given even its good offices to Denmark to prevent, if possible,
the outbreak of hostilities," Lord Russell remarked that, as to "the
request that friendly Powers should come to the assistance of Denmark,
her Majesty's Government could only say that every step they might think
it right to take in the further progress of this unhappy contest could
only be taken after full consideration and communication with France and
Russia." Such a reply plainly foreshadowed that Great Britain did not
intend to fulfil her engagements if other Powers did not fulfil theirs.
Still there can be no doubt that Government felt a real reluctance to
abandon Denmark to its fate; and if France had shown any zeal in the
matter, it seems not improbable that intervention would have gone the
length of material assistance. But the French Emperor had been not a
little mortified by Lord Russell's abrupt and decided rejection of his
proposal for a general Congress of Powers, made in the autumn of 1863.
That proposal, starting from the assumption that the Treaties of 1815 were
"upon almost all points destroyed, modified, misunderstood, or menaced,"
urged the expediency of a joint endeavour, on the part of the nations of
Europe, "to regulate the present and secure the future in a Congress."
No other European Power, great or small, had absolutely rejected the
Emperor's proposal; most had assented to it on the condition of a previous
definition of the subjects that should be laid before the Congress;
but Lord Russell's unconditional refusal had caused the scheme to fall
through. The feeling of mortification thence arising in the mind of the
French Emperor led him to view the diplomatic efforts of Great Britain on
behalf of Denmark with coldness, and her proposal for a limited Conference
on Danish affairs with little favour. Still France, like Great Britain,
was bound by the Treaty of 1720, and the fidelity of the Danes to the
first Napoleon, and the sufferings which they had undergone in his cause,
constituted a moral claim that ought not to have been lightly disregarded.
But the Emperor was also deeply mortified by the refusal of Great Britain
to interfere on behalf of Poland; accordingly, when Lord Clarendon went to
Paris, he was informed, without much circumlocution, that France did not
intend to stir in the matter of assisting the helpless Danes.
It may, however, be questioned whether, considering the small number of
troops that England could bring into the field, there was any chance of
a material intervention being successful in the face of the numerous
battalions of two great military monarchies. Had both Austria and Prussia
entered into the design of despoiling Denmark with equal heartiness, it
may be admitted that material intervention on our part, though it might
have retarded, would not have prevented, the catastrophe. But this was not
the case; the Austrian Government was acting in the matter rather from a
jealous disinclination to allow Prussia to take the lead and decide by
herself questions in which German feeling was so deeply engaged, than
because it desired to turn Denmark out of a Duchy which had been linked
to it for 800 years. It is also nearly certain that Russia and Sweden,
whose people sided most warmly with Denmark, would have immediately joined
us had we resolved upon giving material aid. Both Russell and Palmerston
wished to risk the chance, but their colleagues declined to countenance
the step. Accordingly no action was attempted, though Palmerston made what
he called "a notch off his own bat" by informing the Austrian Minister,
Count Apponyi, that if the Austrian fleet sailed along the British coast
and went to the assistance of the Prussians in the Baltic, he, for one,
would not endure such an affront. Even this threat produced a strenuous
remonstrance from Lord Granville.
The exertions of the Foreign Secretary to procure the consent of the
belligerents and other great Powers to a Conference were at last crowned
with a certain measure of success. Austria and Prussia agreed to the
Conference but without an armistice. The first meeting was held on the
25th of April, and the prime immediate object of the plenipotentiaries
of the non-belligerent Powers was to obtain a suspension of hostilities.
Denmark at first insisted that during the armistice her fleets should be
allowed to maintain the blockade of the German ports, as an equivalent
for the military occupation of the Duchies; but to this the German Powers
would not consent. Ultimately Denmark, pressed by Lord Russell, consented
to give up the blockade, and an armistice was arranged to last from the
12th of May to the 12th of June. It is painful to trace the course of the
negotiations that followed, and their complete futility may dispense us
from the task of doing so at any considerable length. It soon became clear
that the German Powers deemed the Treaty of 1852 to have been cancelled
by the outbreak of war, and the envoy of the Diet declared that Germany
would not consent to the re-union of the Duchies to Denmark under any
conditions whatever. Austria and Prussia proposed that Schleswig and
Holstein should form an independent single State, under the sovereignty
of Prince Frederick of Augustenburg; but such a solution the Danish
Plenipotentiaries declared to be wholly inadmissible. Lord Russell then
brought forward the English proposal, which was that Holstein, Lauenburg,
and the southern part of Schleswig, as far as the Schlei and the line
of the Dannewerke, should be separated from the Danish monarchy. This
arrangement, to the principle of which the Danish Plenipotentiaries
acceded, would have left Denmark in possession of about three-fourths
of the Duchy of Schleswig. The negotiations being now placed upon the
basis of a partition of territory, the neutral Powers obtained with
great difficulty the extension of the armistice from the 12th to the
26th of June. Austria and Prussia agreed to a partition, but insisted
that the line of demarcation should be traced from Apenrade to Tondern,
thus leaving less than half of the Duchy to Denmark, and depriving her
of the purely Danish island of Alsen. Denmark would not yield this, and
Prussia and Austria would concede no more. On the 18th of June, eight days
before the expiration of the armistice, Lord Russell proposed that the
question of boundary should be referred to the arbitration of a friendly
Power, but to this neither belligerent would consent. Finally, the French
Plenipotentiary proposed that the method of _plébiscite_, or popular vote,
should be resorted to, and that the votes of the communes in Schleswig
should be taken on the question whether they preferred continued union
with Denmark or separation. The Danish Envoy, M. de Quaade, positively
negatived this proposal, which was also extremely unpleasing to Austria,
in whose Italian dominions the application of the principle of the
_plébiscite_ would have instantly terminated her rule. Thus the debates of
the Conference came to an end, having produced no result.
The remainder of this melancholy history may be told in a few words.
Hostilities recommenced, and on the 29th of June the Prussians forced
their way across the narrow sound which divides the island of Alsen from
the mainland, and stormed with great gallantry the fieldworks that had
been thrown up on the opposite shore. The Prussians carried the position,
but the greater part of the Danes made good their escape out of the
island. The strong fortress of Fredericia had previously been abandoned;
the Prussians were preparing to cross to Fünen; and now nothing remained
for the Danes, isolated as they were and without hope of aid, but to
submit. Negotiations were opened immediately at Vienna, and on the 1st
of August the preliminaries of peace were signed, and embodied in the
following October in a formal treaty--the Treaty of Vienna. Denmark ceded
Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, without reserve, to the Emperor
of Austria and King of Prussia. Though thus compelled to ratify her
own spoliation, the brave little kingdom came out of the struggle with
honour, and with an undiminished right to the respect of Europe: it were
much to be wished that of all the neutral Powers that looked on and did
nothing the same could be said. During the second spell of war Russell
made several applications to the Emperor of the French to induce him to
interfere in concert with England. At one moment Napoleon wavered, but
when Russell discovered that his projects embraced the liberation of
Venetia and the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine, he as abruptly
withdrew his overtures. Accordingly the war ended in the complete
humiliation of British diplomacy. But Prussia declined to surrender the
Duchies to the Augustenburg candidate, much to the indignation of the
German Diet, and it was clear that another appeal to arms must occur
before the spoils could be divided.
[Illustration: THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE "ALABAMA" AND THE "KEARSARGE." (_See
p._ 361.)]
Meanwhile, stirring events were in progress in the New World. In Mexico
the Archduke Maximilian, having in an evil hour accepted the fatal gift
of Napoleon, assumed the Imperial crown, and, aided by French bayonets,
proceeded to put down the resistance of the Juarists. But clearly his
position was tenable only whilst the expeditionary corps remained, and
the American Republic was occupied by its internal dissensions. There,
however, the end was in sight, thanks to the overwhelming resources of
the North. It is true that the Confederates snatched marked successes
in the outlying districts of the vast territory, but in Virginia Grant
made good his threat--"I propose to fight it out on this line if it
takes all the summer," and, though Lee's masterly disposal of his forces
thwarted the advance upon Richmond and the capture of Petersburg, the
Confederate strength was being rapidly drained. In Western Virginia
Grant's subordinate, Sheridan, easily held his own against Early and then
proceeded to lay waste the territory. Meanwhile Sherman was executing his
famous march into Georgia, by which he cut his way through the heart of
the enemy's territory, and divided it in twain by a broad belt of wasted
country. His progress was facilitated by the substitution of the rash
Hood for the cautious Johnston, and, thanks to the incapacity of that
general, Savannah, one of the most important towns in the Confederacy, was
Sherman's before the end of the year. The naval transactions comprised
an action between the notorious _Alabama_ and the _Kearsarge_, which
resulted in the former being sunk off Cherbourg, while the capture
of the Mobile forts closed one of the few harbours still open to
blockade-runners. The re-election of President Lincoln for a further term
of office showed that the North was not going to blench when the supreme
crisis was at hand.
An unpleasant incident occurred in the autumn, which, but for the firm
and moderate attitude of Mr. Lincoln, might easily have involved us in
a serious difficulty with the United States. A considerable number of
Confederate refugees had gradually gathered in Canada, men rendered
desperate by the wreck of their property and the misfortunes of their
country. Some twenty-five of these men, in the month of October, crossed
the border into the State of Vermont, and entering the little town
of St. Albans in the dead of night attacked and plundered the bank,
shooting dead several of the townspeople, and escaping back into Canada.
They were soon arrested by the Canadian authorities and the money was
recovered. The case being an important one, it was removed from the
jurisdiction of the magistrates of St. John's to that of the Supreme
Court at Montreal and a writ of _habeas corpus_ was refused. The American
Consul, Mr. Edmonds, was instructed to demand their extradition, but this
was refused on legal grounds and an investigation was instituted into
the affair under the Ashburton Treaty. In the end Judge Coursol decided
that his court had no jurisdiction in the case and ordered the release
of the raiders from custody. The Canadian Government wisely resolved
that so flagrant a miscarriage of justice should not be permitted; in
fact, their law advisers gave it as their opinion that the Judge's
decision was bad in law; and accordingly warrants were issued for the
reapprehension of the criminals. But the news of the Judge's decision,
releasing the raiders, had reached New York before the subsequent
conduct of the Canadian Government was announced, and it aroused, not
unnaturally, great excitement and indignation. However, in his message
to the new Congress (December 6, 1864) Mr. Lincoln expressly stated that
the colonial authorities of Canada were not deemed to be internationally
unjust or unfriendly towards the United States; but that, on the contrary,
there was every reason to expect that, with the approval of the home
Government, they would take the necessary measures to prevent new
excursions across the border. These anticipations were fully justified
by the subsequent conduct of the Canadian Government. A strong force of
militia was stationed at various points along the frontier, several of the
raiders were arrested under the warrant for their re-apprehension, the
Court at Montreal reversed its former decision and declared that it had
jurisdiction, those captured were tried anew, and at least one of them was
adjudged on the evidence to be guilty of robbery and ordered to be given
up to the United States.