THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).
Havelock to the Front--His Advance from Allahabad--Battle
of Futtehpore--Battle of Aong--Battle of Cawnpore--Nana
Sahib's Position--It is turned by Havelock--The Enemy resist
obstinately--The final Charge--Cawnpore reoccupied--Nana Sahib's
Vengeance--Havelock pushes on for Lucknow--Battle of Onao--First
Battle of Busserutgunge--The second Battle--The third--Havelock
recrosses the Ganges--Battle of Bithoor--End of Havelock's first
Campaign--Lord Canning and Jung Bahadoor--Mutiny at Dinapore--Its
Effects--Before Delhi--Attempt to surprise a Convoy--Death of
Barnard--The British Lines attacked--The Assault renewed--The
Remainder of July--Wilson's Discipline--John Lawrence's
Perplexities--Disarmament at Rawul Pindee and Jhelum--Mutiny at
Sealkote--It is avenged by Nicholson--Cooper shoots Sepoys in
Batches--The Drama at Peshawur--Reinforcements for Delhi--Nicholson
arrives--Battle of Nujuffghar--The Crisis in the Siege.
We have seen the rebels assailed at Delhi, and subjected to a siege;
we have seen them become the besiegers of the British at Lucknow, and
triumphant by horrible treachery at Cawnpore. We left Colonel Neill at
Allahabad preparing the way for Havelock; and it is now time to describe
the marvellous career of that general from Allahabad to Cawnpore.
Havelock, as we have said heretofore, reached Calcutta on the 17th of
June, and on the 20th he was appointed to command a movable column
which was to be collected at Allahabad. Five days afterwards he quitted
Calcutta, and on the 28th of June, one day after the bloody business at
Cawnpore, he arrived at Benares. On the 30th he reached Allahabad. That
very day, with the sanction of Sir Patrick Grant, Commander-in-Chief at
Calcutta, the first detachment prepared by Neill marched for Cawnpore. It
consisted of 400 Europeans, 420 natives, chiefly Sikhs, and two guns, the
whole under Major Renaud. Havelock, soon after he arrived, sent 100 men in
a steamer up the Ganges, to cover the right flank, but was himself obliged
to wait, not only for carriage, but for troops, until the 7th of July
before he could start. On the 3rd he learned the state of the Cawnpore
garrison, and found that his duty, instead of saving them, would be first
to recover Cawnpore and then essay to relieve Lucknow. On the 7th of July
he set out to join Renaud, taking with him about 1,000 bayonets, furnished
by the 78th Highlanders, the 64th, the 84th, the Madras Fusiliers and
Braysher's Sikhs, the bulk of whom were with Renaud. Havelock had also
eighteen volunteer horsemen and six guns. Such was the force which, on the
afternoon of the 7th of July, 1857, moved out of Allahabad to perform one
of the most striking campaigns in the history of India.
Major Renaud had pushed onwards about seventy miles towards Cawnpore, and
had halted, according to orders. For Havelock, by dint of a judicious use
of money, had secured excellent information of the enemy's proceedings;
and knowing that Nana Sahib was advancing on Renaud, intent on snapping
him up, Havelock pushed on by forced marches, and joining him on the
night of the 11th, both hastened forward to Belinda, a few miles from
Futtehpore. Lo! the rebels were there. It was now Havelock's chance. He
resolved to force an action, although he had only 1,800 men and eight guns
to match against their 3,500 men and twelve guns.
The Sepoy mutineers were in position across the road. They occupied
ground broken by swamps, groves, and hillocks, as a front line, with the
enclosures of Futtehpore to fall back upon. The Trunk Road ran through the
position, and formed the best line of advance. Havelock put his guns in
the centre, and covered them with 100 riflemen. He disposed of his other
troops in columns preceded by skirmishers, and he put his handful of horse
on the flanks. In this order he advanced. Some of the troops had Enfield
rifles, and with these, deftly used, he struck the rebels at ranges which
filled them with amazement. In ten minutes, says Havelock, the action was
decided, so distressed were they at the fire of the rifle and Maude's
artillery. The enemy at once abandoned three guns. "As we moved forward,"
writes the general, "the enemy's guns continued to fall into our hands,
and then, in succession, they were driven from the garden enclosures, from
a strong barricade on the road, from the town wall, into and through,
out of, and beyond the town." Here they tried to stand; the 2nd Cavalry
charged, and our irregulars fled leaving the volunteers alone; but the
Rifles got into action, and the guns came up, and the rebels bolted
altogether, leaving in our hands eleven guns. We actually did not lose
a single man at the hands of the enemy, but twelve died of sunstroke.
They had been afoot fourteen hours, had fought without food, and now sank
exhausted.
Resting on the 13th, Havelock took three of the captured guns and added
them to his train, and sent 100 Sikhs to guard his communications. At
daybreak on the 15th Havelock's force found itself again in front of the
enemy. He had entrenched the Great Road in front of the village of Aong,
and garnished his line with two guns. This was a strong outpost covering
the main position of the rebels behind the stone bridge over the Pandoo
Nuddy, a stream, now swollen by the rains. It was necessary to pass Aong,
and push on as fast as possible to the bridge. General Havelock divided
his little army into two parts. One part he placed under the orders of
Colonel Tytler. This was destined to assail the enemy. With the other the
general himself guarded his train and baggage from the enemy's horse.
Tytler moved up, the Volunteer Cavalry, under the gallant Barrow, leading
the way. The enemy's guns opened, and the Sepoys, intending to attack
while the troops were forming, advanced with a confident air from their
position to a village. Thereupon Major Renaud, with his Madras Fusiliers,
pounced upon them like lightning and drove them back; but in the combat he
received a mortal wound. Then Tytler closed with the enemy, expelled him
from gardens and buildings and put him to flight, but could not reach his
guns. Havelock, for his share, had beaten off repeated onsets of cavalry,
and these now retired to rejoin their comrades. Halting his men, Havelock
anxiously awaited reports respecting the doings of the enemy on the Pandoo
Nuddy. The news came. The enemy were engaged in strengthening their
position on this river by mining the bridge. The moment was critical, if
they were permitted to succeed in this work, the march of the army would
be arrested for several days. On the other hand, the troops had been on
foot since midnight and had not fed. But Havelock did not hesitate. Two
hours' march under a burning sun brought his band to the bank of the
river. The Sepoys were arrayed beyond the bridge; they were at work under
one of the arches; and they had two 24-pounders, so planted that their
fire swept the Great Road. The plan of attack was soon decided on. Eight
guns were drawn up in positions which enabled them to concentrate their
fire on the bridge. There was a bend in the river at this point, and the
Madras Fusiliers, armed with the Enfield rifle, at once took advantage
of this, by pushing up in open order above and below the bridge, and
from the banks of the river pouring in a hail of bullets on the rebel
artillerymen. This shook the steadiness of the enemy, the fire of our guns
increased his alarm; and when the mine in the bridge was seen to explode,
yet failed to injure the structure, the artillerymen lost heart. As the
fire slackened, Major Stephenson gathered up his Fusiliers, and dashing
at the bridge carried it with a rush and seized the guns. Thereupon the
mutineers took to their heels and made off for Cawnpore.
There was another battle before them. They marched the next morning,
the 16th. Cawnpore was twenty-four miles away. Before them lay an arid
road. The sun was more formidable than the foe. Nana Sahib, alarmed at
the progress of Havelock, and enraged by the repeated defeats of the
mutineers, had concentrated all his forces, about 5,000 men and eight
guns, and had posted them a few miles from Cawnpore, determined there
to give battle. Havelock marched his men sixteen miles, then halted for
three hours, resumed his march at two o'clock, leaving his baggage under
a guard in the village, and quickly came within sight of the enemy. The
mutineer army had been posted with some skill. It was drawn up across
two roads, one leading to the cantonments at Cawnpore, the other being
the Great Trunk Road to Delhi. Each flank rested on a native village;
another village strengthened the centre. All were entrenched or walled.
The Ganges was distant about a mile from the left, and on the right rose
the half-finished embankment for the railway. The rebel infantry were
drawn up in a concave line from flank to flank. Their horse were in a body
on the left, and their guns were so disposed along the line as to sweep
the two roads. About 1,200 yards from the centre of the lines the roads
became one, that is, the cantonment road diverged at this point from the
Trunk Road. Beyond the point of junction a fringe of wood ran towards the
Ganges. In taking up this position the enemy had calculated on a front
attack. He had measured out distances along the roads, and his gunners
stood ready to fire as soon as the British came within range.
But he had to deal with a general versed in warfare. On coming within
sight of the enemy, Havelock took steps to ascertain from the country folk
the nature of the country on both flanks of the rebel host, for he had
resolved to turn one or the other. He found that the enemy's left was the
more assailable. Thus a force marched for about a mile and a half behind
the screen of trees, while the little body of Volunteer Horse showed
themselves on the Trunk Road, as if they were the forerunners of a front
attack.
[Illustration: THE HIGHLANDERS CAPTURING THE GUNS AT CAWNPORE. (_See p._
221.)]
Suddenly the enemy became aware of the object of the manœuvre, as he
caught glimpses, through breaks in the wood, of a column moving behind
the trees. He opened fire. Our troops, without heeding shot and shell,
moved silently on, until they arrived at a point parallel to the rebel
position. Then they wheeled into line. The guns came up and opened fire,
and the Madras riflemen once more spread out and made play with their
splendid weapons. But Havelock was not the man to trifle with an advantage
of position such as he had gained by his skilful march. He ordered an
advance in _échelon_ from the right. The Madras men went first in open
order; the 78th Highlanders came next, then the 64th and 84th combined,
and lastly the Sikhs. There were three 24-pounders on the enemy's left,
well entrenched behind a village. The 78th were launched upon them.
Moving up steadily under a fire of grape, until they were within eighty
yards, their colonel, Hamilton, in front, the bagpipes playing in the
rear, the Highlanders suddenly rent the air with a fierce shout, and,
charging in, carried the village, and captured the guns, breaking the
enemy's left into two parts, hurling one in confusion on the centre, and
shouldering the other to the rear. In the meantime the 64th had come
abreast of the Highlanders, and the Madras Fusiliers, on the other flank,
had successfully encountered and defeated the rebel cavalry. Reforming
the 78th, Havelock rode to the front, and pointing to the rally of the
enemy on his centre round a howitzer, cried, "Now, Highlanders, another
charge like that wins the day." The charge was made, and, with the aid
of the 64th, the gun was captured. The Volunteer Horse, too, making
a daring charge up the road, fell upon the enemy and slew many. The
whole of the British force was now united again after its rough fight.
The position of the enemy and several of his guns had been won, and
our troops, emerging in the rear of it, reformed. The Sepoys had again
rallied, with commendable promptitude, on Suktipore, a village between
the two roads. From this they had to be driven. Havelock's voice was
again heard animating his soldiers to renewed exertions, and again, this
time unsupported by any artillery fire from our side, did those noble
foot soldiers of Britain drive the foe before them. Yet again he rallied,
so stubborn was he in this combat. Nana Sahib, present on the field,
was seen to be encouraging his troops. He brought them up as the sun
was setting, and prepared for a last effort. He still had a 24-pounder
and two pieces of smaller calibre, and with these he commanded our men,
now lying down, awaiting their artillery. The sun went down. There were
about 900 British soldiers, only awaiting a signal from Havelock. "The
final crisis," he writes, "had arrived. My artillery cattle, wearied by
the length of the march, could not bring up the guns to my assistance;
and the Madras Fusiliers, the 64th, 84th, and 78th detachments, formed
in line, were exposed to a heavy fire from the 24-pounder on the road.
I was resolved this state of things should not last; so, calling upon
my men, who were lying down in line, to leap on their feet, I directed
another steady advance. It was irresistible. The enemy sent round shot
into our ranks, until we were within 300 yards, and then poured in grape
with such precision and determination as I have seldom witnessed. But
the 64th, led by Major Stirling and by my aide-de-camp [his son, Henry
Havelock] who had placed himself in their front, were not to be denied.
Their rear showed the ground strewed with wounded; but on they steadily
and silently came; then, with a cheer, charged and captured the unwieldy
trophy of their valour. The enemy lost all heart, and after a hurried fire
of musketry gave way in total rout. Four of my guns came up, and completed
their discomfiture by a heavy cannonade; and as it grew dark, the roofless
barracks of our artillery were dimly descried in advance, and it was
evident that Cawnpore was once more in our possession."
The next morning spies brought in the dreadful news that Nana Sahib had
retreated from Cawnpore after butchering all the prisoners. Havelock
immediately sent forward an advanced guard to test the truth of this, and
as they came up to the old cantonments, an explosion shook the earth. It
was the old magazine which the troopers of the enemy's rear-guard had
fired. The army now entered the place. It was a memorable day, the 17th
of July, when Cawnpore was recovered, for the horrors it brought to light
kindled to an intensity beyond conception the passions of the British
soldiers.
For the first thing done was to visit the entrenchment, and the house in
which the prisoners had been confined. At the sight thereof strong men
wept, and a fierce thirst for vengeance seized them and made them terrible
in battle. From subsequent inquiries, it appeared that Nana Sahib had
preserved the lives of 47 of the women and children from Futtehghur, and
163 of the old Cawnpore garrison. These he kept prisoners. "The captives,"
writes Captain Thomson, "were fed with only one meal a day of dhâl and
chupatties, and these of the meanest sort; they had to eat out of earthen
pans, and the food was served by menials of the lowest caste (_mehter_),
which in itself was the greatest indignity that Easterns could cast upon
them. They had no furniture, no beds, not even straw to lie down upon, but
only coarse bamboo matting of the roughest make. The house in which they
were incarcerated had formerly been occupied as the dwelling of a native
clerk; it comprised two principal rooms, each about twenty feet long and
ten broad, and besides these, a number of dark closets rather than rooms,
which had been originally intended for the use of native servants; in
addition to these, a courtyard, about fifteen yards square."
After the defeat of his troops on the Pandoo Nuddy--that is, on the
15th of July--Nana Sahib ordered all the prisoners to be slain. It must
have been anger and hate and a love of cruelty which prompted this
dastardly act. When our troops arrived, Mr. Sherer, the newly-appointed
magistrate, began an investigation, from which we learn the facts as
nearly as they can be known. "When Mr. Sherer," writes Captain Thomson,
"entered the house of horrors, in which the slaughter of the women had
been perpetrated, the rooms were covered with human gore; articles of
clothing that had belonged to women and children--collars, combs, shoes,
caps, and little round hats--were found steeped in blood; the walls were
spattered with blood, the mats on the floor saturated; the plaster sides
of the place were scored with sword-cuts, and pieces of long hair were all
about the room. No writing was upon the walls, and it is supposed that the
inscriptions, which soon became numerous, were put there by the troops,
to infuriate each other in the work of revenging the atrocities that had
been perpetrated there. There is no doubt that the death of the unhappy
victims was accomplished by the sword, and that their bodies, stripped of
all clothing, were thrown into an adjacent well. A Bible was found that
had belonged to Miss Blair, in which she had written; '27th June--Went to
the boats. 29th.--Taken out of boats. 30th.--Taken to Sevadah Kothi; fatal
day.'" Such was the scene which tore the hearts of our valiant soldiers,
and the recital of which made the whole world shudder. It is related that
the Highlanders, on coming to a body which had been barbarously exposed,
and which was supposed to be that of Sir Hugh Wheeler's daughter, cut off
the tresses, and counting the hairs, swore that for every hair a rebel
should die.
The reaction which followed his great successes, combined with the
critical position in which he found himself, for a moment depressed the
spirit of the undaunted Havelock. Here was this fearful massacre; here was
news from Lucknow of the death of Henry Lawrence; from Delhi, of the death
of General Barnard; from Agra, of a defeat of the troops there; and from
Bithoor, that Nana Sahib had garrisoned that stronghold with 5,000 men.
But one night's brief repose restored to the general his wonted calmness.
Getting news of the march of a reinforcement, under Neill from Allahabad,
he, on the 12th, selected a situation for a fort, commanding the passage
of the Ganges, and prepared all things for an attempt to cut his way to
Lucknow. Meanwhile Nana Sahib had evacuated Bithoor, and crossed into Oude.
On the 29th Havelock marched upon Onao. Here the rebels had occupied
the ground with considerable skill. A deep swamp covered their right.
Onao itself protected their left. In front was a village, and a garden
entrenched like a bastion. In front of the village were enclosures. Thus
the general found that he could not turn the position on either hand.
He was forced to assail it in front. The order was given. With ready
valour the Highlanders and Fusiliers drove the enemy out of the garden.
They fell back on the village; their fire was hot; the 64th had to be
brought up; and, all charging together, the village was stormed and the
guns captured. This enabled Havelock to interpose his force between the
enemy and Onao, towards which town they were hurrying. Firmly lodged on
a piece of dry ground in the midst of swamps, and assailable only on a
narrow front, Havelock saw his advantage, and allowing the enemy to come
near, he shot them to pieces as they crowded on the road. The Oude native
artillery, which had been carefully drilled, behaved with great gallantry;
many gunners served their pieces to the last, and fell beside them under
the rifles of the Fusiliers and the bayonets of the British Linesmen.
Havelock stood victor, and master of fifteen of the enemy's guns.
The troops, after a halt of three hours to rest and eat, once more
marched. The rebels had rallied at Busserutgunge. This was a walled town.
The gate facing our troops was entrenched, and mounted four guns, and
was flanked by towers. The road to Lucknow, running through the place,
emerged at the opposite gate, and then was carried on a causeway through
one of those large pieces of water called jheels. Concentrating a fire
of artillery on the gate, Havelock held the Fusiliers and Highlanders
ready to storm it, while he detached the 64th to the left to turn the
town and cut off the retreat of the enemy. While the guns were in action,
the storming column lay down; but when the fire of the defence slackened,
and the Sepoys, frightened at the flank movement, began to run, the
Highlanders and Fusiliers, with stern shouts, sprang up and carried the
gate at a bound. The enemy fled over the causeway--for the 64th had not
come up--and the battle was won.
But Havelock was destined to disappointment. A mutiny at Dinapore had
prevented the arrival of the 5th and 90th regiments. He had lost nearly
a hundred men on the 29th; a third of his ammunition was expended;
cholera, smiting down scores, was in his camp; he had little or no spare
transport; so, with a bitter feeling, he fell back to Mungulwar. Here
he received five more guns and 257 men, but was obliged to disarm his
native gun Lascars. The enemy--mutineers from Oude and Saugor, in Central
India--was now gathering in force at Bithoor, and Neill was apprehensive
of an attack; but Havelock, determined to try again, told Neill to hold
his communications, and on the 4th of August marched to Onao, and on the
5th once more to Busserutgunge. Here the enemy were again. Knowing the
ground better this time, the general, while he prepared to cannonade the
front of the village, sent a force round their left flank. When this force
emerged, he began the cannonade. The effect was instantaneous. Smitten
by a point-blank fire of shot and shell, the rebels fled. The 64th and
84th dashed into the gate, while the Highlanders and Fusiliers and four
of Maude's guns caught them as they streamed out on to the causeway.
But, with great courage, the enemy rallied again in a village on both
flanks. These were carried in brilliant style. The Sepoys carried off
their cannon, but left 250 men on the field. Havelock could not improve
his victories, because he had no cavalry. This was a fatal defect, as it
gave the enemy time to rally. Our loss--so swift and able had been our
movements--was only two killed and twenty-three wounded.
Yet even now Havelock could not go on. As the Oude folk defended every
post, he felt that he could only reach Lucknow with a force too weak to
break in, much less carry off the garrison. He heard also that the Gwalior
contingent was moving up to the Jumna, and he knew that Nana Sahib was
not far off in Oude, and that the mutineers at Bithoor were growing every
day stronger. Therefore he once more fell back to Mungulwar. The troops
were indignant, but there is no doubt the general was right. His army was
the only force we had between Behar and Delhi, and he was bound not to
throw it away uselessly. He, therefore, drew up at Mungulwar, entrenched
it, and made good his raft bridge over the Ganges, hoping in vain that
reinforcements would arrive. Neill now urged him to send over aid to drive
the enemy from Bithoor, who were meditating offensive operations. Havelock
then resolved to abandon Oude altogether. He had begun to re-cross the
river, when he learned that 5,000 men, with artillery, had occupied
Busserutgunge. He saw that if he retreated under such a threat without
striking a blow, he would lose much of that moral influence his daring
actions had secured. So, before crossing he turned upon his foe. Two
marches brought him up to the position. Again the enemy had made a skilful
choice of position; and again, by skill and courage, our troops thrust
him out of it, with heavy loss to him and little to them. Thus they had
been thrice beaten on this one battlefield. Having struck this heavy blow,
Havelock retreated at once, and on the 13th of August crossed to the right
bank of the Ganges; then the bridge was broken up, and the boats brought
over to the Cawnpore side. Such was the first effort to relieve Lucknow.
It failed; but it is impossible not to admire the devotion and resolution
of the general and his men, who--in spite of such odds as were arrayed
against them--in spite of the fervid heat and its effects fever, cholera,
lassitude--had eight times encountered victoriously the enemy on the field
of battle.
On the 16th he went forth to his ninth action. The rebels at Bithoor were
now to feel the weight of his hand. They were a "scratch pack," from five
regiments, but they had a strong position, and many of them were very
brave men. They were drawn up in fields of sugar-cane, with a village
and an enclosure here and there, and behind a line of breastwork. Behind
these was a stream crossed by a stone bridge. Instead of having this in
their rear, the enemy should have had it in front. No doubt he relied on
his numbers. After a march, under a cloudless August sun, the troops came
up with the enemy, and speedily routed him out of his cane-brakes, but
not before, in some cases, men of the 42nd Native Infantry had crossed
bayonets with the Madras Fusiliers. The real work had now to be done.
Covered by his breastwork, the enemy fought with great obstinacy, keeping
his great guns going, and maintaining a fire of musketry equal, so thought
the general, to that of the Sikhs at Ferozeshah. Our artillery could
not silence the Sepoy guns. There was nothing for it but the bayonet.
Our infantry got the word they loved so much, and charging in upon the
enemy, lifted him clean over the bridge, captured his guns, and put him
to flight. Havelock halted at Bithoor one night, and then returned to
Cawnpore. Before he left he had cleared the town, and had blown up the
remains of the Nana's buildings. The reason for retreating was that the
defeated force might have doubled round upon Cawnpore, and sacked it
in the absence of the troops. This action terminated Havelock's first
campaign. He now learned, to his chagrin, that Sir James Outram had
been appointed to take command of the troops destined for the relief of
Lucknow. Here we must quit for a time this noble soldier, whose services
were inestimable. But before we return to Delhi, we must tell by what
accumulation of stupidities the reinforcements destined for Havelock were
delayed on the road.
The reasons lie in the defective resolution of the Calcutta Government. At
an early stage in the mutiny, Jung Bahadoor, of Nepaul, had offered his
assistance, and Major Ramsay, our agent at his capital, had transmitted
the offer. He proposed to send six regiments of Nepaulese to Benares or
Allahabad. The Government did not like to acquiesce in this destination
of the troops. Benares and Allahabad were too important to be held by
any natives. The proposal was declined; but, after a lapse of some days,
when our prospects grew every moment more gloomy, Jung Bahadoor's offer
was accepted, but he was directed to move on and occupy Goruckpore. Here
he might do good and could do little harm. In this opinion not only the
Calcutta Government, but Mr. Tucker at Benares, and Havelock at Cawnpore
acquiesced, and the last declared that he could not accept aid from the
Nepaulese, unless their women and children and sick were left in some
place as a sort of hostages, so profound was the distrust at this time of
any natives. Lord Canning has been censured with regard to his treatment
of the Nepaulese, but we do not think wisely. His treatment of the Sepoys
at Dinapore, however, does not admit of defence or excuse.
[Illustration: HOW MAJOR TOMBS WON THE VICTORIA CROSS. (_See p._ 227.)]
Dinapore was a military station, ten miles west of Patna, and was the
capital of the province of Behar inhabited by a turbulent population,
numbering 300,000, a large proportion of whom were Mohammedans. There
could be no security in the province until the Dinapore regiments were
disarmed. Nothing would have been easier. In the middle of July, the 5th
Foot, just landed from Mauritius, and half the 37th Foot were on their
way up the Ganges. On their arrival at Dinapore these might have been
landed, and, in conjunction with the 10th Foot, every native might have
been disarmed in an hour. But Lord Canning left it to General Lloyd to say
if the regiments should be disarmed, and General Lloyd had faith in the
Sepoys. Moreover, Lord Canning refused to allow the 5th to land for an
hour at Dinapore. The consequence of throwing the responsibility on Lloyd,
and of refusing to detain the 5th, was very serious. General Lloyd thought
it would be enough to take away from the Sepoys the percussion caps. This
half-measure was executed on the 25th of July, just when Havelock was
preparing to spring into Oude. The Sepoys murmured, threatened, but for
the moment were quieted, and the general, thinking all over, went to lunch
on board a steamer. Suddenly shots were heard. It appeared that when the
Sepoys were ordered to deliver up the caps in their pouches, they fired;
thereupon the 10th marched upon their lines and opened fire. The Sepoys at
once decamped; some ran to the Ganges and tried to cross, but a sharp fire
from a steamer sank their boats. The greater part made off, unpursued,
towards Arrah. Their enterprise was not easy; they had the Sone to cross.
A quick pursuit would have found them seeking boats on its right bank.
No pursuit was made for three days, and in that time they had crossed
the river and entered Arrah. Kour Singh, a large landowner, a man who
exhibited a gun at the Great Exhibition in 1851, joined the mutineers,
supplied boats, counsel, leadership. They marched on Arrah, intending to
plunder the treasury, and crossing the Ganges at Buxar, enter Oude. They
were frustrated by the bravery of some ten civilians and fifty Sikhs,
who held the place with dauntless resolution until they were splendidly
relieved by Major Vincent Eyre.
The effects of the Dinapore mutiny were felt all over Behar. The 12th
Irregulars mutinied, cutting off the heads of Major and Mrs. Holmes;
two companies of Sepoys at Hazareebagh broke out and burnt the station;
magistrates and Europeans fled in all directions, and weeks elapsed,
and a large display of force had to be made, before order was restored.
Moreover, Kour Singh and the broken mutineers went to Nagode and raised
the 50th Native Infantry; and several other regiments and parts of
regiments took fire and exploded. These were the causes that arrested the
march of reinforcements to Havelock, and frustrated his splendid efforts
to reach Lucknow.
To return to Delhi, the reader will remember that at the beginning of
July reinforcements from the Punjab had raised the British army before
that place to 6,600 men. At the same time, however, five native regiments
and a battery of artillery arrived on the left bank of the Jumna opposite
Delhi from Rohilcund. This added upwards of 4,000 fresh men to the rebel
army. With them came Mohamed Bukt Khan from Bareilly, formerly a subahdar
of artillery, now a general of brigade, and, soon after his arrival,
Commander-in-Chief of the Sepoy army. When they came up, the swollen
river had broken the bridge of boats, which was not re-established for
two days. Our forces were so few that we were compelled to look on while
the enemy performed this operation at leisure. In the beginning of July
the new arrivals so raised the spirits of the mutineers that they engaged
in several desperate actions. Their first operation was daring, and a
dangerous one for us. The road to the Punjab, so vital to our safety, was
entirely guarded by native troops, perfectly trustworthy, but in weak
detachments, placed here and there to keep the road clear of marauders.
It was along this road that our sick and wounded were sent to Umballa,
and that our convoys of treasure and ammunition passed to the camp. The
Sepoys, of course, knew this, and were moderately well informed of the
goings and comings of convoys. They had heard that a quantity of treasure
was coming down, and that a number of sick were going up; they resolved
to capture the first and to murder the second. So on the 3rd about 6,000
men of all arms, with several guns, moved out of the Lahore Gate, and went
round our right. They were not unseen. All night they marched, making
for Alipore, one march in the rear of our camp. Here they drove off the
Sikh guard, but found neither sick nor treasure; the former had passed on
the 2nd, the latter, delayed on the road, had not come up. The Sepoys,
instead of pushing for Kurnaul, as they might have done, countermarched
on Delhi. Major Coke, with 1,100 men and 12 guns, had been sent out to
intercept them. Hodson and his horse had been on the look-out, and gave
Coke ample information. But although our troops got within cannon-shot,
and engaged the enemy, they did little except capture an ammunition waggon
and a store cart, and recover the plunder of Alipore. In order to check
these attacks on our line of communications, it was resolved to blow up
all the bridges over the canal except one, and also to destroy part of
an aqueduct, one of the mighty works of the former Mohammedan rulers of
Delhi. These enterprises were effected during the next week, and thus
greater safety was secured for the rear, and the country folk were able to
bring provisions into our markets without danger from the Sepoys.
On the day after the attack on Alipore General Barnard sickened of
cholera, and by night he was dead. Himself a distinguished soldier, and
the son of a more distinguished soldier, Sir Andrew Barnard, he had found
himself in a situation unsuited to his abilities; for having served in
the Crimea as chief of the staff, he had only arrived in India a few
months before the mutiny broke out. He was greatly respected and beloved
in camp, but it must be owned he was hardly fit for the work in hand. He
was succeeded by a seniority general of no mark, who in turn fell ill, and
going off on sick leave, left Brigadier Archdale Wilson in command of the
troops before Delhi.
On the 9th of July the newly-arrived Sepoys again sought to distinguish
themselves by an assault upon our lines. Among the troops from Bareilly
which had just entered Delhi were the troopers of the 8th Irregulars. A
wing of the 9th was in our camp, and many men in it had friends in the
mutinous 8th. The incidents of the day showed that these two regiments
were in communication. "About ten o'clock in the morning," writes Captain
Norman, "the insurgents appeared to be increasing in numbers in the
suburbs on our right, when suddenly a body of cavalry emerged from cover
on the extreme right of our right flank, and charged into camp.... The
troop of Carabineers, all very young, most of them untrained soldiers, and
only thirty-two in number of all ranks, turned and broke, save the officer
and two or three men, who nobly stood. Lieutenant Hills, commanding the
guns, seeing the cavalry come on unopposed, alone charged the head of
the horsemen, to give his guns time to unlimber, and cut down one or two
of the sowars, while the main body of horsemen riding over and past the
guns, followed up the Carabineers, and a confused mass of horsemen came
streaming in at the right of the camp. Major Tombs, whose tent was on
the right, had heard the first alarm, and, calling for his horse to be
brought after him, walked towards the picket just as the cavalry came on.
He was just in time to see his gallant subaltern down on the ground, with
one of the enemy's sowars ready to kill him. From a distance of thirty
yards he fired with his revolver, and dropped Hills's opponent. Hills
got up and engaged a man on foot, who was cut down by Tombs, after Hills
had received a severe sabre-cut on the head. Meanwhile great confusion
had been caused by the inroad of the sowars, most of whom made for the
guns of the native troop of horse artillery, which was on the right of
the camp, calling on the men to join them. The native horse artillerymen,
however, behaved admirably, and called to Major Olpherts' European troop,
which was then unlimbered close by, to fire through them at the mutineers.
The latter, however, managed to secure and carry off some horses, and
several followers were cut down in camp. Captain Fagan, of the artillery,
rushing out of his tent, got together a few men, and followed up some of
the sowars, who were then endeavouring to get away, and killed fifteen of
them. More were killed by some men of the 1st Brigade, and all were driven
out of the camp, some escaping by a bridge over the canal-cut in our
rear. It is estimated that not more than 100 sowars were engaged in this
enterprise, and about thirty-five were killed, including a native officer.
All this time the cannonade from the city, and from many field-guns
outside, raged fast and furious, and a heavy fire of musketry was kept up
upon our batteries, and on the Subzee Mundi pickets from the enclosures
and gardens of the suburbs. A column was therefore formed to dislodge
them, consisting of Major Scott's horse battery, the available men of the
8th and 61st Foot and 4th Sikh Infantry--in all about 700 infantry, and
six guns, reinforced _en route_ by the headquarters and two companies
of the 60th Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. Jones; the infantry
brigade being commanded by Brigadier W. Jones, C.B., and Brigadier-General
Chamberlain directing the whole. As this column swept up through the
Subzee Mundi, Major Reid was instructed to move down and co-operate with
such infantry as could be spared from the main picket. The insurgents
were cleared out of the gardens without difficulty, though the denseness
of the vegetation rendered the mere operation of passing through them a
work of time. At some of the serais, however, a very obstinate resistance
was made, and the insurgents were not dislodged without considerable
loss. Eventually everything was effected that was desired, our success
being greatly aided by the admirable and steady practice of Major Scott's
battery under a heavy fire, eleven men being put _hors de combat_ out of
its small complement. By sunset the engagement was over, and the troops
returned to camp, drenched through with rain, which, for several hours,
had fallen at intervals with great violence. Our loss this day was one
officer and 40 men killed, 8 officers and 163 men wounded, 11 men missing."
Not content with the result of the 9th, the mutineers, on the 14th,
renewed the attack. They moved, as usual, out of the Lahore Gate, and
made for the Subzee Mundi. The position on this side, however, had been
strengthened greatly since the inroad of the troopers on the 9th, and
the Sepoys were easily repelled. The fight became one of artillery and
musketry, each party availing itself of good cover. At length we had to
put an end to it in the usual way. Brigadier Chamberlain formed a column,
and led them against the enemy--literally so; for our troops, not liking
the look of a wall lined with Sepoys, stopped short, instead of charging
at it. Thereupon Chamberlain, spurring his horse, leaped clean over the
wall into the midst of the enemy, daring his own men to follow. They did,
but Chamberlain got hit in the shoulder. Once on the move, our infantry
kept the Sepoys going, and drove them from garden to garden and house
to house up to the walls of Delhi. For this they paid heavily; for when
they began to retire, the Sepoys took heart, and, issuing out, opened
with musketry and grape. Luckily, Hodson, who had seen the column go in,
followed with a few of his horse, and arrived at the moment of peril.
Aided by some officers and the boldest spirits among the European and
Guide Infantry, he stopped the enemy's cavalry, and then retired fighting,
until two guns came up, and soon "drove the last living rebel into his
pandemonium," as they called Delhi in those days. But we lost 15 killed,
and had 150 wounded.
During the remainder of July there were two more actions. The Jhansi
regiments entered Delhi on the 16th; our spies in the city warned the
general of an impending attack; and on the 18th the fresh regiments
began what they boasted should be a four days' fight. There was nothing
in the combat to distinguish it from so many of its predecessors. The
alarm sounded, our troops turned out; the Sepoys, swarming among the
ruins about the Subzee Mundi, retired as soon as they were assailed, and
our men followed them as far as prudence dictated, and then drew off.
The Sepoys did not keep their promise. One day's fighting seemed to have
satisfied them. On the 23rd they sallied from the Cashmere Gate, and tried
to establish a battery near the house called Ludlow Castle; but they were
sharply assailed by a force under Brigadier Showers, and driven into the
city. Unfortunately, in trying to take their guns, the troops got too near
the walls, and suffered accordingly. No other fighting of moment occurred
for the rest of the month; but in the meantime there had been hot work in
the Punjab.
General Wilson, looking for troops from the Punjab, had changed materially
the system of warfare before Delhi. He resolved to make more secure
the position on the ridge, and connected the isolated batteries with a
continuous line of breast-works. He determined to confine himself as
much as possible to a system of resistance, and not give the enemy the
opportunities he appeared to covet of luring our columns under the fire
of the walls. He established a system of reliefs, so that part of the
force got some rest while the bulk was on duty. The result was that the
discipline of the troops, which had been growing somewhat slack, was
rendered more rigorous, and a higher tone was imparted to the whole body.
Rest and food, at stated times, soon improved the health of the army. The
great point was to stand fast until the remaining troops which could be
spared from the Punjab should arrive. We have now to tell what detained
them.
To all suggestions that the siege of Delhi should be abandoned, Sir John
Lawrence had offered instant and peremptory resistance. He would rather
have restored the Peshawur valley to the Afghans than have abandoned
Delhi. As a measure of despair he had even contemplated and discussed the
surrender of the valley. His wisest counsellors were vehemently opposed
to the latter move; they would have preferred the raising of the siege.
Happily neither measure was forced upon him. He was burdened with a vast
responsibility, for by severing the electric wires the Sepoys had made
him Governor-General of the Punjab and the North-West above Agra. Aided
by men like Montgomery, and Edwardes, and Nicholson--supported by such
unflinching lieutenants as Frederick Cooper, Reynell Taylor, Spankie,
Barnes, and Forsyth--he was able to quell his own mutineers, and pour down
on Delhi those reinforcements which enabled Wilson to take it by storm.
That brilliant invention, the movable column, had not been idle during the
month of July. There were five regiments of infantry and two of cavalry
still in arms. Six of these regiments were in stations where there was
not a single European soldier. The problem was how to get their arms. It
was resolved first to deal with the 58th Native Infantry at Rawul Pindee
and the 14th at Jhelum. He had little difficulty with the 58th. At first
they seemed inclined to resist, but soon yielded. The two companies of
the 14th, however, fled. They were pursued by mounted Punjabees, and
those that escaped were brought in by the villagers. At Jhelum there was
a battle. Sir John had sent 260 of the 24th Foot, three guns, and 150
police, all under Colonel Ellice, to disarm the 14th. These were followed
by 700 Mooltanees, partly mounted, and the two bodies joined on the 6th.
On the 7th Ellice sent part of the Mooltanee horse to guard the river, and
with the rest marched towards the station. The 14th had been called under
arms, and as soon as they saw the Europeans moving towards them, they
began to load. Then there was a dropping fire. Presently the Sepoys broke,
the Mooltanees charged, and did some execution, but the mutineers got into
their quarters, and defied the horse. The Mooltanee foot came up. These
were beaten off. The guns arrived, and opened. The Sepoys, well sheltered,
would not budge. Colonel Ellice then arrived with the 24th Foot, and
forming a small column, carried the lines with the bayonet. Ellice being
wounded at the head of his men, Gerard took command. The Sepoys fled into
a fortified village and stoutly resisted every onset. When night fell the
troops were obliged to retire, leaving behind a howitzer, which was taken
by the enemy. In the night the mutineers retreated, but did not escape.
Out of 500 men only fifty were not "accounted for." No fewer than 150
fell in action, 180 were captured by the police, and 120, who reached
Cashmere, were surrendered. But we suffered a loss of 44 killed, and 109
wounded, of whom one-half were Europeans.
[Illustration: BLOWING UP OF THE CASHMERE GATE AT DELHI. (_See p._ 235.)]
Nor was this the worst loss. There were two native regiments at
Sealkote--a few score miles distant east of the Chenab. They had long
been suspected. They might have been disarmed in May, when there were
European troops in the station. Brigadier Brind, the commandant, a brave
old officer, remonstrated against the withdrawal of the 52nd Foot and
Bourchier's European battery to form the movable column. He did not like
to be left with only Hindostanee troops. "He was requested," says Mr.
Montgomery, "to remove the cause of alarm by disarming them. He did not
see his way to do this, and the column marched on." Sir John Lawrence had
directed the ladies of the station and the soldiers' wives and children to
be sent to Lahore. The latter were marched to Lahore under escort; several
of the former remained. Brigadier Brind kept up a show of confidence in
the 46th Native Infantry and the wing of the 9th Cavalry in the station;
but he knew they were mutinous in spirit. The wonder was they had not gone
before. Perhaps they waited for a signal from Delhi, and there is some
evidence that the signal reached the station simultaneously with the news
of the fight at Jhelum on the 7th. Be that as it may, on the 9th all the
native troops mutinied. The officers, roused from sleep, mounted and rode
among the men, but found remonstrance useless. They all made for an old
fort, which Tej Singh, a Sikh chief, had placed at their disposal. But
only some escaped.
Nor was this all. The movable column was at Amritsir. Here were the 59th
Native Infantry. They had shown no symptoms of disaffection; but on the
8th General Nicholson heard of the fight at Jhelum. He saw at once the
peril of the moment, and the duty. On the 9th he disarmed the 59th. It was
only done just in time. On the evening of that day in came a messenger
from Lahore, telling of the mutiny at Sealkote, and directing Nicholson
to march on Gordaspore and intercept the Sealkote men. Nicholson did not
hesitate. Disarming and dismounting the men of the 9th Cavalry, who were
at Amritsir, he set out on the night of the 10th for Gordaspore, and by
daylight he had made twenty-six miles. On the 12th, certain information
came that the mutineers had crossed the Ravee at Trimmoo Ghaut, a ferry
on the river. Nicholson moved out at once, and by noon sighted the rebel
vedettes, men of the 9th Cavalry. The whole had not got over, and some
were still crossing. Covering his front with mounted Punjabee levies,
mere recruits for Hodson's Horse, Nicholson moved up his guns and
infantry. The Sepoys were behind a strip of deep water, passable only by a
bridge. In their rear was the Ravee, growing wider and deeper every hour,
for the snows were melting in the hills, and swelling all the streams. As
Bourchier's guns went over the bridge, down came the men of the 9th at
the charge; the levies fled; the Sepoy skirmishers ran up and opened a
steady fire. But the ugly symptoms soon vanished. The Sepoys had no guns.
They were not soldiers who could stand against the 52nd. In twenty minutes
grapeshot, shrapnel, and rifle-balls silenced the fire of the rebel line.
In half-an-hour the mutineers were in retreat, leaving three or four
hundred killed and wounded on the field. Nicholson had no dragoons, or
there the business would have ended. He caused his few Sikhs to pursue,
and these captured all the baggage and stores which the enemy had brought
to the left bank. In the river there was an island. To cross that night
was impossible. In the night the river rose and caught the rebels in a
trap. On the 11th they had been able to ford the stream; on the 13th it
had risen several feet. The dawn found the enemy prisoners, with the swift
flood of the Ravee rolling around them, and a relentless foe preparing
the means of destroying them. Three days passed before boats could be
procured. On the 16th all was ready. Covered by the fire of seven guns on
the other bank, and headed by Nicholson, the 52nd swept on in line, and in
a few minutes the mutineers went in a crowd to the rear. A few resolute
men died around the gun; others were overtaken in fight and slain; a mob
ran to the end of the island, and those who escaped the bayonet, and swam
over the river, were captured by the villagers. Not more than a hundred
got away into Cashmere, and these we compelled the Maharajah to surrender.
Thus did John Nicholson break in pieces this horde of mutineers, and save
the Punjab between the Jhelum and the Sutlej. On the 22nd the column was
again at Amritsir. Three days afterwards it was again on the march, _en
route_ for Delhi, in earnest this time, for now the Punjab had been made
secure by the disarming of nearly every Hindostanee regiment, and the
raising of new levies among the Punjabees.
But there were still days of peril between the Sutlej and the Indus,
and over the Indus; and before carrying the reader with us to Delhi, to
witness the final strife there, it will be as well to note in passing the
tragic incidents at Lahore and Peshawur.
The disarmed Hindostanees at Meean Meer, near Lahore, writhed under
the degradation which it had been so necessary to inflict upon them.
Frequent reports reached the brigadier that one or more of the regiments
intended to break out and run away, but day after day passed, and there
were no signs, and only the usual precautions were taken. At length,
however, the 26th Native Infantry tried the experiment, and their fate
proved an example to discourage the other regiments. On the 30th of July,
at mid-day, they broke out. They fled up the left bank of the Ravee.
Fortunately, the deputy-commissioner at Amritsir was Mr. Frederick Cooper.
As soon as he heard of the flight of the 26th, he got together some
Punjabee horse and foot, and after a severe march, struck the trail of
the mutineers. He found them in sorry plight. They had swum the river or
floated over on pieces of wood, and were lodged on an island about a mile
from the shore. By stratagem he got them all from the island, and had
them secured with cords. Then they were escorted to the police-station at
Ujnalla, six miles distant, and before they arrived the Sikh infantry came
up. There were 282 prisoners. Sending his Hindostanee troopers back to
Amritsir, Mr. Cooper prepared to execute the whole. On the 1st of August
they were led out in batches of ten; their names were taken down; they
were marched to the place of execution. Two hundred and thirty-seven were
so executed, and forty-five were found dead in the gaol. All the bodies
were thrown into a dry well by men of the lowest caste, and Cooper wrote,
"there is a well at Cawnpore, but there is also a well at Ujnalla." To
read of this execution in cold blood makes one shudder; but those who
have studied the state of the Punjab at that moment will agree with Mr.
Montgomery, that the punishment so sternly inflicted by Mr. Cooper was
"just and necessary." Sir John Lawrence congratulated him on his success,
though privately acknowledging that his despatch was "nauseous." Mr.
Montgomery wrote at the time--"All honour to you for what you have done;
and right well you did it;" and in 1859 solemnly reviewed and justified
the execution. Lord Canning approved.
The drama at Peshawur was equally serious and bloody. In the middle of
August there came a holy man, who sat himself down at the mouth of the
Khyber Pass, hoisted the green flag, and preached what Colonel Edwardes
calls a "crescentade." "The most evident restlessness," writes Colonel
Edwardes, in his report, "pervaded the disarmed regiments; arms were
said to be finding their way into the lines in spite of all precautions,
and symptoms of an organised rise began to appear; General Cotton, as
usual, took the initiative. On the morning of the 28th of August he caused
the lines of every native regiment to be simultaneously searched, the
Sepoys being moved out into tents for that purpose; swords, hatchets,
muskets, pistols, bayonets, powder, ball, and caps, were found stowed
away in roofs, and floors, and bedding, and even drains; and, exasperated
by the discovery of their plans, and by the taunts of the newly-raised
Afridi regiments, who were carrying out the search, the 51st Native
Infantry rushed upon the piled arms of the 18th Punjab Infantry, and
sent messengers to all the other Hindostanee regiments, to tell them of
the rise. For a few minutes a desperate struggle ensued; the 51st Native
Infantry had been one of the finest corps in the service, and they took
the new Irregulars altogether by surprise. They got possession of several
stand of arms, and used them well. Captain Bartlett and the other officers
were overpowered by numbers, and driven into a tank. But soon the Afridi
soldiers seized their arms, and then began that memorable fusilade which
commenced on the parade ground at Peshawur and ended at Jumrood. General
Cotton's military arrangements in the cantonment were perfect for meeting
such emergencies--troops, horse and foot, were rapidly under arms and in
pursuit of the mutineers. Every civil officer turned out with his _posse
comitatus_ of levies or police, and in a quarter of an hour the whole
country was covered with the chase." By these means the regiment was in
thirty-six hours "accounted for." It was 871 strong. The example sufficed.
The disarmed regiments were paralysed by the sudden retribution. Peshawur
was stronger than ever.
At the beginning of August it had been resolved to make a supreme effort
to dispose of Delhi. Nicholson's column, growing stronger at every step,
had already started from Amritsir. A first-class siege train was prepared
in the arsenals of Philour and Ferozepore. It consisted of four 10-inch
mortars, six 24-pounders, eight 18-pounders, and four 8-inch howitzers,
with ample supplies of ammunition. Thus there were _en route_ for Delhi
a powerful column and a splendid siege train. General Wilson's plan
meanwhile was to act on the defensive. He therefore confined himself to
repelling attacks on our position, and to protecting his communications
with Kurnaul. Twice or thrice the enemy tried to bridge the waterways
covering the flank of the Great Road, and so get to Alipore, and clutch
at convoys. But they failed. Three or four times during the month of
August they assailed the ridge, but their failures were costly to them.
On the 7th one of their magazines blew up, and it is said that 500 men
perished in the explosion. On the 8th they again tried to plant a battery
at the house called Ludlow Castle, opposite our left front. General Wilson
resolved to have it. At four in the morning of the 12th Brigadier Showers
led a strong column of infantry down from the ridge, and so well did
he manage that he surprised the enemy, overpowered him, killed several
hundred, and captured and brought off four guns. On the 13th of August
Nicholson's column marched into camp. It consisted of the 52nd Foot, half
the 61st Foot, the 2nd Punjab Infantry, and Bourchier's battery. There
were on the way the 4th Punjab Infantry, half the 1st Belooch Battalion
from Scinde, three companies of the 8th Foot, and several score recruits.
Beside these, the general had to wait for the siege train. Sir John
Lawrence could do no more. These were the last batches of troops he could
spare. They mustered about 4,200 men, of whom 1,300 were Europeans.
In the meantime, alarmed by news of the coming siege-train, the mutineers
sent out 6,000 men and 16 guns, under Bukt Khan, of Rohilcund, to capture
the train. Hearing this, Nicholson girded himself up for a stroke at
them. They moved out on the 24th; he started on the 25th, with 1,600
infantry, 500 horses, and 16 guns. The enemy had marched to Nujuffghur
by the Rhotuck road. The Sepoy position consisted of a serai in their
left centre, where they had four guns; a village in rear on each flank;
a third village, and the town of Nujuffghur. In their rear ran a canal,
crossed by a single bridge, over which they had come from Delhi. Nicholson
determined to carry the serai, thus breaking the left centre of the line;
then swinging round his right, to sweep the enemy's line of guns, and, if
possible, cut him off from the bridge. This plan was energetically carried
out. Detaching the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Lumsden, to
drive the enemy out of Nujuffghur, and Blunt to watch the left, Nicholson
arrayed the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, the 61st Foot, and the 2nd Punjabees
against the serai. There was a crash of musketry, down came the bayonets,
and with a fierce cheer on dashed the line. The Sepoys fought well, and
some crossed bayonets with our men; yet they could not stand against the
impetuous onset, and the serai and guns were won. Changing his front,
Nicholson now turned the line of the remaining guns of the enemy, and
advanced. The Sepoys, although strongly posted, seeing the bridge in
danger, made for it at full speed, and crowded over, pursued by the fire
of our artillery. They succeeded in getting away with three guns, leaving
thirteen in our possession, captured on the field. We also took their camp
and baggage, horses and camels and seventeen full waggons of ammunition.
In the meantime Lumsden had cleared the rebels out of Nujuffghur, and was
moving up to join the main body, when he was ordered to drive a band of
Sepoys out of a village into which they had thrown themselves when cut
off from the bridge. Having no retreat, these men fought desperately. The
61st were sent up, but these, too, suffered heavily before the village
was taken. Halting near the bridge, the sappers blew it up--an important
service--and the troops, who had been afoot all day, slept on the ground
without food. By such an exploit did Nicholson signalise his arrival
before Delhi.
The fate of Delhi was drawing nigh. The old king, after he learned the
truth--a long time kept from him--about the battle of Nujuffghur, suffered
alike from impotent anger and impotent despair. He felt that we must win;
and he felt rightly. The last reinforcements came up in the first week
of September, and with them the siege train. There was now no time to
lose. Cholera and ague were rife in our camp. Not only the malaria from
the swamps, but the fetid odours from dead cattle were more fatal than
the shot of the enemy. Out of 11,000 men, more than a fourth were sick.
Everything--the feverish state of the Punjab, the unhealthiness of the
camp--made it imperative on General Wilson to take Delhi. He had powerful
assistants. Baird Smith was there to direct the engineering operations;
Nicholson to impel and guide; Hodson and Chamberlain and Norman to apply
the spur, if it were needed. At the back of all, the commanding voice of
Sir John Lawrence could be heard from the Punjab. Delhi must be taken out
of hand. Thus the month of August closed, and September began the fourth
of the mutiny and the third of the siege. The crowning act is a little
story by itself, and must have a separate chapter.
[Illustration: HOOSEINABAD GARDENS AND TOMB OF ZANA ALI, LUCKNOW. (_From a
Photograph by Frith & Co., Reigate._)]