THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).
Winter of '55--Napoleon's Shiftiness--Visit of the Czar to
the Crimea--State of the British Army--Sufferings of the
French--Destruction of Sebastopol--The Armistice--Signs
of Peace--Views of Austria and Russia--And of the Emperor
Napoleon--Britain acquiesces in Peace-Walewski's Circular--Austria
proposes Peace--Buol's Despatch--Nesselrode's Circular--The Austrian
Ultimatum--Russia gives way--The Congress fixed at Paris--The
Representatives of the Powers--The Queen's Speech--Speeches of
Clarendon and Palmerston--Views in the German Diet--Meeting
of the Congress--The Armistice--An Imperial Speech--The
Sultan's Firman--Prussia admitted to the Congress--Birth of
the Prince Imperial--The Treaty signed--Its Terms--Bessarabia
and the Principalities--The Three Conventions--The Treaty of
Guarantee--Count Walewski's Four Subjects--The Declaration of
Paris--International Arbitration mooted--The Kars Debate--Debates
on the Peace--General Rejoicings--Cost of the War--Execution of the
Treaty--The Principalities--The two Bolgrads--First Presentation of
the Victoria Cross.
The expedition to Kinburn, the destructive raid of the Allies into
Taman and Fanagoria, the unfruitful marches and counter-marches from
Eupatoria towards Simpheropol, closed the military operations of 1855.
The French--who had taken military possession of the beautiful valley of
Baidar, and had pushed their outposts to the summits of the ridges leading
towards the Belbek--withdrew to the inner slopes, and contented themselves
with watching the main roads, both towards the north and towards the east
and south. The Sardinians remained in their old quarters. French divisions
still occupied the mamelons covering the bridge over the Tchernaya,
supported by their own and the British cavalry. The Highlanders were above
Kamara, but the bulk of the British army was on the plateau in the old
position. There, also, was at least one-half of the French, including the
Imperial Guard, who, however, embarked early in the month of November for
France. In the course of November 18,000 French troops went home, and
they were relieved by fresh troops amounting to 11,162. But the British
Cabinet had learnt with dismay that Napoleon had decided upon withdrawing
100,000 men from the Crimea; further, that the Parisians were demanding
that France should be compensated for her losses by advantages in Northern
Italy, or the left bank of the Rhine. Obviously no dependence could be
placed upon an uncertain ally and a shifty monarch.
[Illustration: NAPOLEON III.
(_From a Photograph by Messrs. W. and D. Downey._)]
Although the Allies in December had upwards of 200,000 men in the
Crimea--the French alone boasted of 141,476 men--undoubtedly a longing for
peace had sprung up in some quarters soon after the fall of Sebastopol.
This the Russians knew. Confident, therefore, that the Allies would not
undertake any large operation, and knowing winter to be at hand, they
held their ground. Moreover, their Emperor had visited his gallant army.
Quitting St. Petersburg in September, soon after the fall of his cherished
city in the south--the stepping-stone from Nicolaief to Constantinople--he
proceeded to Moscow. In his addresses to his army he still imitated the
language of his father; and, while he praised his gallant soldiers as
they deserved to be praised, while he frankly confessed that Russia had
been severely tried, he boldly claimed for his cause the support of the
Deity, and declared his steadfast resolve to defend orthodox Russia, who
had taken up arms for the cause of Christianity. After another visit to
Odessa, the Czar, passing through Nicolaief, went forward by Perekop to
Simpheropol, where he arrived on the 8th of November. To reach his army
he had travelled sixteen hundred miles through his own territory, and
had been nearly two months on the road. By the 12th of November he had
reviewed the army in the Crimea, looked on the ruins of Sebastopol, the
wrecks of his fleet, the camps of his enemies. No doubt his presence
cheered the soldiers who had borne so much at his bidding. For those who
had defended the lines of Todleben he provided a silver medal, to be worn
at the button-hole with the ribbon of St. George. The medal bore the names
of Nicholas and Alexander, and, said the Czar to his soldiers, "I am proud
of you, as he was.... In his name, and in my own, I once more thank the
brave defenders of Sebastopol." But in spite of his pride in his soldiers,
the heart of the Czar must have been sad, for he was a kindly man, and the
aggressive policy of his father--the consequences of which he could not
escape--had cost Russia 500,000 men. The Czar returned to St. Petersburg
by rapid journeys, arriving there on the 19th of November. The Czar had
seen for himself; and when he reached his capital on the Neva he was,
perhaps, in a better frame of mind for receiving those peace propositions
which Austria was already seeking to frame.
The Allies had begun to make ample preparations for the winter. The
weather in 1855-6 was very different from that which had beset them twelve
months before. They also were differently situated: they were triumphant,
and in a secure position. They had the resources of Sebastopol, in
wood and stone at least, wherewith to defend themselves against the
cold and the rain. They had huts and plenty of tents. The British had
abounding supplies of the warmest clothes of all kinds, and most ample
rations--fresh meat and bread three days a week, and pork and biscuit on
the other days. The troops had plenty of time for drill, though they were
still called upon to perform hard work in road-making. Thus they were
employed all day, without being overworked. Their health was so good, that
during this winter the average of the sick was lower than among the troops
at home. Some regiments did not lose a man--some were less fortunate; but
the most afflicted regiments did not lose more than two per cent., and it
was rare indeed that the sick exceeded four per cent. of the whole force.
No army was ever more cared for, or thrived more under good treatment.
And so it really grew stronger as the weeks glided away, until, when
the spring came, Sir William Codrington had under his orders a healthy,
well-drilled force of 70,000 men, ready for any enterprise, and well
provided with all those means and appliances which were wanting in 1854.
Not so our French Allies. Their system broke down. Their losses from
typhus in the first three months of 1856 are something fearful to
contemplate. An epidemic broke out in the French camp in January, and from
that time to the end of March 40,000 Frenchmen died from disease. More
than 5,000 died in the transports or men-of-war on their way from the
Crimea to the Bosphorus. In the Crimean hospitals their men died at the
rate of between 200 and 250 per day. In the hospitals on the Bosphorus the
rate was hardly less. The effective force of the French army on February
1st was 143,000 men. On the 30th of March it was 120,000, of whom only
92,000 were present under arms. These figures are official, showing a loss
in two months of 23,000 men, and they do not account for 28,000 men not
present under arms. But the other returns, on which the statement of the
vast losses mentioned are based, are also official, with this advantage,
that the latter are medical, the former military returns, such as it
was deemed inexpedient to make public. Throughout the war the French
understated their losses from disease and defective arrangements. In
1854-5 they suffered nearly as much as the British; but there was no free
press in France, and no free Parliament, to make known the sufferings and
privations of the soldiers.
In the meantime, both British and French were engaged in blowing up the
forts, docks, basins, and barracks in Sebastopol. The work had been
divided between the two. The French took the northern half of the docks,
the English the southern. These works were so solidly constructed and
so vast that their destruction required almost as much skill as their
construction. The engineers of each nation, however, rivalled each other
in expedients, and in the application of scientific principles to the
end in view. The whole of the work on the docks was completed on the 1st
of February. Fort Nicholas was blown up on the 4th, and Fort Alexander
on the 11th of the same month; and similar processes afterwards laid low
the aqueduct which brought the water of the Tchernaya into the docks and
the great barracks and storehouses in the marine suburb. The Russian
fire, though brisk at times, and often accurate, did not interrupt the
labours of the French and British engineers. By these means the offensive
character of Sebastopol was cut up by the roots, for it was as a great
war-port and arsenal that it was a "standing menace," and at the end of
February it had ceased to be.
On the 28th of February news reached the allied camps that the Governments
sitting in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg had just agreed to a
suspension of hostilities until March 31st. In the course of the day
the French and British generals were officially informed of the fact by
their Governments. The next day the chiefs of the staffs of the three
armies--General Martimprey, General Windham, and Colonel Petikti--met
General Timovief at the Bridge of Traktir on the Tchernaya, and there
these officers debated the limits which it would be desirable to fix as
military frontiers. Thus, just as the weather was becoming suitable for
field operations, the diplomatists managed to chain up the armies, and
having got the representatives of the belligerents round a table at Paris,
they contrived to bring all parties to an agreement, and bring about a
peace. How that was accomplished we have now to learn.
In the early part of the winter of 1855 there were two Powers--Austria
and Russia--eager, and one--France--willing to conclude a peace as soon
as possible. Austria was eager for peace, because another year of war
must have brought her into the field as a belligerent. She could not hope
that the theatre of operations would remain restricted to a corner of the
Crimea, nor, indeed, to the whole of the Crimea; for she knew that if the
war went on, the troops of the Allies would appear either in Southern or
Western Russia. The contest could not go on without raising the question
of Poland as well as Finland; and if the former question were raised,
Austria must take one side or the other. Her engagements with the Allies,
her political necessities, forbade her taking part with Russia. Yet she
was barely prepared to act against her, and would have done so only with
the greatest reluctance. Yet, as will be seen, under certain conditions
and contingencies she did make up her mind to cast in her lot frankly with
the Allies. But what she really wanted was peace, for war to her was not
only full of political dangers, but threatened her with something like
financial ruin. Russia was eager for peace, because she had lost so much
by war. The drain of adult males was enormous. The drain upon the southern
provinces for transport, for horses and cattle, for carts and waggons,
was prodigious. The harvests of Southern Russia and the forage went the
same road. Nor was it only men and transport and food which had been used
up with astonishing prodigality, first by the Emperor Nicholas, and then
by his son, to whom he bequeathed that fatal legacy, a devouring war. The
Russian treasury was empty, and although the credit of Russia had always
been good, still, capitalists were shy, and money was hard to obtain,
could not be obtained, even on terms very unfavourable to the borrower. In
these circumstances, and looking to the energetic preparations of Britain
by land and sea, Russia saw that she could not gain anything, and probably
would lose greatly on all sides, if she were exposed to another year of
war.
On the other side, France was willing to make peace. The Emperor had
gained all that he wanted out of the war. He had displayed the eagles
of the Empire in the face of Europe. He had won glory. Sebastopol had
given to France a military duke. The war had raised France, as Frenchmen
phrased it at the time, to the foremost rank among nations. The Emperor
had figured in war as an ally of Britain. He had visited the Queen at
Windsor, and had taken his place in the chapel of St. George's as a Knight
of the Garter. Moreover, and this was not the least gratifying fact,
Britain had played a secondary part in the Crimea, and she had suffered
a blow from the effects on Persia and Hindostan of the fall of Kars. The
Emperor, it is true, was a faithful ally, and did not spare his army in
the common cause. That must be put down to his credit, although nobody
thinks of claiming credit for Britain because she also was a faithful, not
to say a subservient ally. But, as no one can fail to see, at the close
of 1855 the Emperor had gained all he could gain by the British alliance,
and peace would conduce most to his interest, especially a peace signed
at Paris. He did not like to see the development of the material power of
Great Britain, which was fast outstripping him at sea. He did not wish to
witness the destruction of the maritime fortresses of Russia, still less
to hear that a British army had expelled Russia from Georgia. He thought
that he could make friends with Russia. In the previous November he had
taken the extreme course of concerting terms of peace with Austria without
consulting Britain, and was only partially deterred from these tortuous
courses by the vigorous remonstrance of Lord Palmerston, addressed to the
French Ambassador, in which the Prime Minister declared that Britain would
sooner continue the war alone than accept unsatisfactory conditions.
The British Government and the British people were not so ready or
willing to make peace. The real strength of the British power was only
just beginning to tell. Its armaments, by land and sea, were only just
acquiring bulk and organisation. A strong feeling was very generally held
that the task of curbing the aggressive ambition and checking the greed of
Russia, which the Allies had undertaken, was only half completed. There
was a desire to see Russia expelled from Asia Minor and from Finland, and
to weaken if not overthrow her in Poland, as well as to expel her from
the Crimea, and root up the mighty establishments with which she menaced
Turkey. In this feeling there was some reason. But the statesmen charged
with the conduct of the war could not forget that, although it would
have been just to take that opportunity of diminishing the vast power of
the Czar, yet that the primary object of the war was the safeguarding of
European interests, so seriously menaced in the Black Sea and the Baltic,
and that, providing Russia could be brought to agree to terms securing the
safeguards required, it would be expedient to bring the war to an end.
They felt the impossibility of securing the prolonged co-operation of
France, and the folly of continuing the struggle without her. The British
Government, therefore, was induced to consider terms of peace, and the
people acquiesced with sullen reluctance. Neither wanted war for the sake
of war, or glory for the sake of glory; nor did either want victories to
augment or secure the moral influence of their country in the affairs
in Europe. The reluctance to make peace was due solely to a gnawing
sense that the ambition of Russia had been only partially restrained. In
reality, the injury done to the enemy was greater than the British people
believed it to be; but in the winter of 1855 they did not know how deeply
the blows of the Allies had struck.
It must not, however, be supposed that either of the belligerents allowed
any of the symptoms of their desire for peace to be seen. The lateness of
the season accounted for the languid operations of the Allies after the
fall of Sebastopol. The resolve of the Czar to cling to the north side
of that fortress covered his weakness; and the success of Mouravieff in
Armenia allowed him even to boast that his gains were equal to those of
the Allies. On the surface there was every sign that the war would go on
in the spring more extensively than ever; for not only had the British
prepared hundreds of gun and mortar boats for service in the Baltic--not
only had the British Government raised and drilled a German legion
numbering 17,000 men, and a Turkish contingent under British officers,
20,000 strong, but Austria had increased her army, and the Allies held
frequent councils of war in Paris, with the object of settling plans of
campaigns for 1856. It is true that the Emperor of the French had made a
remarkable speech, as early as the 15th of November, in which he gave some
hints that peace would not be unacceptable. The occasion was the closing
of the Paris Exposition of 1855, an imitation of the London Exhibition
of 1851. Such a gathering in the midst of war the Emperor regarded as a
great example, and as a sign that the war was held to be dangerous only to
those who had been its cause, and by others as a pledge of independence
and security. "Tell your countrymen," he continued--and this is the point
of the speech--"that, if they wish for peace, they must at least openly
express their wishes for or against us; for, in the midst of a great
European conflict, indifference is a bad speculation, and silence is a
mistake." These sentiments told upon Germany. In order to clinch the
effect of these remarks, which were at once an overture and a threat,
Count Walewski was directed to inform all the Courts by circular that the
Emperor meant what he said; that he desired peace, and that the neutral
Powers could help powerfully in bringing it about by openly expressing
their opinions in the actual crisis. There was, therefore, a crisis; and
the crisis involved peace or a continuance of the war.
The Allies had resolved not to make any overtures themselves--that is,
any direct overtures. There was nothing in the public language of Lord
Palmerston, at this time, at all like that which we have seen in the
language of the French Emperor. The British Premier spoke of obtaining the
objects of the war, and so did every public speaker not opposed to the
war from the beginning. It was the French Emperor who hinted that it was
time for some neutral to step in and suggest peace. In these circumstances
Austria, who understood the situation, stepped in to propose peace. She
set her diplomatists to work, and sounded both sides, but more especially
sought to extract from the Allies the terms on which they would agree to
a peace. As the French Emperor was so well disposed to come to terms,
this was not difficult; but he still had to shape his course so as not
to endanger the British alliance, from which he had not yet derived all
the advantages it contained for him. The Emperor, however, had only to
allow his inclination to be felt, and then to drift, or appear to drift,
along the current of British views. Ostensibly the Western Powers were not
engaged in any negotiations for peace; but in reality they did entertain
the proposals of Austria, and gave a general assent to the terms which
that Power undertook to send to St. Petersburg; and this for the sound
reason that it would have been useless for Austria to press upon Russia
the acceptance of terms to which the Western Powers would not agree.
[Illustration: THE CZAR REVIEWING HIS ARMY AT SEBASTOPOL. (_See p._ 146.)]
The Austrian Government selected Count Valentine Esterhazy to carry on
this delicate negotiation with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. He took
his instructions direct from the Emperor Francis Joseph, and they were
formally embodied in a despatch written by Count Buol on the 16th of
December. To his despatch he annexed the "four points" or indispensable
preliminaries, set forth at some length, so as to avoid the chance
of a misunderstanding; but substantially they were these:--1. That
the Russian protectorate in the Danubian Principalities should be
completely abolished, and that these principalities should receive such
an organisation as might be suited to their wants and interests, to be
recognised by the Powers, and sanctioned by the Sultan as suzerain. That,
in exchange for the strong places and territories occupied by the allied
Powers, Russia should consent to the "rectification" of her frontier
with Turkey in Europe. 2. That the freedom of the Danube and its mouths
should be secured efficaciously. 3. That the Black Sea should be open
to merchant ships, and closed to war ships--except a limited number
for coast service--and consequently that no naval or military arsenals
should be created or maintained there. 4. That the immunities of the
Christian subjects of the Porte should be secured without infringing the
independence of the Sultan. To these was added a fifth, of great moment,
as it was, in a measure, the touchstone of Russian sincerity. It was
this:--"The belligerent Powers reserve to themselves the right which
appertains to them of producing in European interest special conditions
over and above the four guarantees." These were tolerably stringent
conditions; and it was easy to see that the fifth, so indefinite in its
nature, would test the sincerity of Russia to the uttermost.
Count Esterhazy arrived in St. Petersburg on the 24th of December. During
his journey a very singular incident had occurred. The Cabinet of Russia
had either guessed, or had been duly informed of, the nature of the trial
to which they would be subjected. The probability is, that the Austrian
Court gave the requisite information unofficially to Count Nesselrode.
That astute politician was not long in making use of the opportunity.
On the 22nd of December, while Count Esterhazy was journeying through
Russian Poland, Count Nesselrode despatched a circular, embodying terms of
peace to which his Government would agree. This was an adroit manœuvre,
as it gave to Russia the appearance of dictating terms of peace. In this
document it was laid down that Russia had always desired peace; that it
was not her fault, but the fault of the Allies, that peace had not been
made in 1855; and that the wish for a prompt and durable peace openly
expressed by the Emperor Napoleon was the dearest wish of the Emperor
Alexander. Russia had, in the summer of 1855, accepted the four points as
a basis, and still accepted them; but they were susceptible of different
interpretations. As long as his enemies appeared resolved to substitute
the right of might for the spirit of justice, the Czar felt bound to
remain silent; but as soon as his Majesty learned that his enemies were
disposed to resume the negotiations for peace, he did not hesitate to
meet them; and he was willing to put the most liberal interpretation on
the third point, relating to the so-called neutralisation of the Black
Sea. The liberal interpretation put by Russia on this point was that no
war-ships should enter the Black Sea except those which, by a separate
agreement between Russia and Turkey, those Powers should think proper to
retain.
The Austrian Envoy was indeed the bearer of something more than
conditions. He carried in his pocket instructions which amounted to
a menace Russia could not afford to despise. If he did not obtain an
acceptance of his conditions within a limited time, he was to quit St.
Petersburg, taking with him the whole of the Austrian Legation. On the
27th he saw Count Nesselrode, read to him the despatch of Count Buol, and
handed in the paper of conditions. The Russian Cabinet fought hard against
the conditions. They wished to modify this Austrian ultimatum--for such
was its real character--and thus sustain that claim to independent action
put forward by Count Nesselrode on the 22nd of December. They wished to
make the Allies accept Kars and the surrounding country for Sebastopol,
Kertch, Kinburn, Eupatoria, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azoff, and parts
of Mingrelia and Imeritia. They wished to avoid the unforeseen demands
that might lurk in the fifth point. They desired to hold fast to the
left bank of the Danube, and keep the Isle of Serpents. But the Czar was
made aware that he could look for no aid from any German Power. France
and Britain had just concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with
Sweden under certain conditions very adverse to Russia; and the Czar,
like the rest of the world, knew it. Sardinia was certain to act with
the Western Powers as long as the war lasted. Even Prussia was drifting
towards the Western Powers. Britain was just acquiring that strength
which would enable her blows to tell in another campaign. This the Czar
knew also, and, moreover, he knew that France would do everything to make
the terms of the treaty as little distasteful as possible. To crown all,
the Austrian Government demanded an unconditional acceptance of the five
points, the alternative being an instant rupture of diplomatic relations.
Count Esterhazy was forbidden to discuss the contents of the ultimatum.
He had simply to demand an answer, yes or no. Russia first sent an
answer to Vienna; but as it was not a categorical reply, but a series of
counter-propositions, Count Buol told the Russian Minister at Vienna that,
unless the ultimatum were accepted on or before the 18th of January, the
whole of the Austrian Embassy would quit St. Petersburg without a moment's
delay.
This was a great deal to bear. The Russian Government delayed their answer
until nearly the last moment. The time for decision allowed to them by
Austria had not quite expired before the Czar made up his mind. The public
anxiety in every capital of Europe was extreme; but while on the Continent
the anxiety was for an affirmative, in England there was a sort of dread
lest an affirmative answer should proceed from the cabinet of the Czar.
Three weeks had passed away in these negotiations on the Neva. On the 16th
of January, 1856, Count Nesselrode informed the Austrian Envoy that the
Czar had given way. Russia had complied with the demand of Austria, and
had given her unconditional assent to the Austrian ultimatum. This was
Count Buol's greatest triumph. The next day the fact was known in every
capital in Europe.
There was another triumph in store for the Emperor Napoleon. When Russia
had accepted the Austrian proposals, it became necessary to determine
where the Conference or Congress of the treaty-making Powers should
be held. This occasioned some little difficulty. There was a talk of
Brussels and Dresden; and it was said that London, Paris, and Vienna
were out of the question. There is little doubt now that it was intended
the Congress should be held in Paris. The Governments took to paying
each other compliments. France suggested London, and Britain suggested
Paris. Russia, for good reasons of her own, settled the amicable dispute
by adopting the suggestion of Britain. Therefore, it was in Paris,
where famous peaces had been made, that this peace was to be made. Then
came another question. Who should sit at this European council? Prussia
put in a claim based on her share in determining the Czar to yield.
But--independently of the fact that Prussia had all along acted like
an ally of Russia, and had only taken engagements hostile to Russia on
behalf of German interests, and therefore would enter the Congress as
a friend of Russia--Prussia had really no right at all to sit with the
belligerent Powers, because she had separated from them in the summer of
1855. Therefore Prussia was not invited to the Paris Congress. The other
Power whose right was for a moment questioned, but only for a moment,
was Sardinia. But Sardinia was a belligerent. One of the inducements
which led her to take an active part in the war was the opportunity of
showing herself as a European Power. For that she had incurred the expense
and the risk. Therefore she was admitted, with the reluctant assent
of Austria. The Powers to be represented at the Congress, therefore,
were Britain, France, Austria, Sardinia, Turkey, and Russia. Each Power
sent a special plenipotentiary, and each plenipotentiary was to be
assisted by the resident ambassador. The British plenipotentiary was the
Earl of Clarendon, assisted by Earl Cowley; France was represented by
Count Walewski and Baron de Bourqueney; Austria sent the cautious and
much-pondering Count Buol and the clever Baron Hübner; Sardinia confided
her interests to her greatest statesman, Count Cavour, whose second was
the Marquis of Villa-marina; Turkey was present in the person of Aali
Pasha, one of her ablest men, and Mehemed Djemil Bey; the Czar sent his
father's friend, Count Orloff, and Baron Brunnow, cool, astute, and
experienced. Some time elapsed before these men--some of them travelling
from the extremities of Europe--could reach Paris; and before they
could meet there was an important step to take. It is usual to frame a
preliminary treaty. In this case, to save time and avoid the chances of
discord, it was agreed, at a meeting of the Ministers of France, Britain,
Austria, Russia, and Turkey, at Vienna, on the 1st of February, that they
should sign a protocol, recording the acceptance of the Austrian proposals
by Russia as a basis of peace, and that this should be regarded as a
preliminary treaty. It was further agreed that the Congress should open
at Paris on the 26th of February.
The British Parliament was opened by Queen Victoria in person on the
31st of January. The public were not certain that the signs of peace
could be depended on. They were doubtful of the sincerity of Russia; they
were eager to hear the explanations of Ministers. The Queen's Speech
was anxiously awaited--the more anxiously because the contents were not
permitted to appear in the newspapers of the morning. While determined to
prosecute the war with vigour, her Majesty said she deemed it her duty
not to decline any reasonable overture promising peace. "Accordingly,"
she continued, "when the Emperor of Austria lately offered to myself and
to my august ally, the Emperor of the French, to employ his good offices
with the Emperor of Russia, with a view to endeavour to bring about an
amicable adjustment of the matters at issue between the contending Powers,
I consented, in concert with my Allies, to accept the offer thus made; and
I have the satisfaction to inform you that certain conditions have been
agreed upon, which I hope may prove the foundation of a general treaty of
peace. Negotiations for such a treaty," her Majesty added, "will shortly
be opened at Paris." And she continued--"In conducting these negotiations,
I shall be careful not to lose sight of the objects for which the war
was undertaken; and I shall deem it right in no degree to relax my naval
and military preparations until a satisfactory peace shall have been
concluded."
When the Address came under debate, Lord Gosford, the mover, expressed
the feeling of the country when he said he found himself reluctantly an
advocate of peace. That sentiment prevailed in both Houses. There were
some who, like Mr. Roebuck, gave utterance to a positive condemnation of
peace. But Mr. Roebuck was only continuing his career as accuser-general.
Lord Clarendon pointed out that when the Austrian Government offered its
good offices to bring about a peace, the British Government could not
refuse them. "However confident," he said, speaking for his colleagues,
"they might have been that another campaign would have increased the
military fame of England, and might have led to a treaty of a different
and more comprehensive character, yet such anticipations would have
been wholly unjustifiable, if they had induced us to prolong the war
when a prospect appeared of obtaining the objects for which the war was
undertaken." On the Continent the common belief was that the British
Government was insincere. This Lord Clarendon denied in explicit terms,
and there is no reason to believe he did not express the sentiment of the
nation. Lord Palmerston was far more emphatic than his Foreign Secretary
in repudiating the notion that Britain desired to go on with the war for
the sake of glory. "No doubt," he said, "the resources of the country
are unimpaired. No doubt the naval and military preparations which have
been making during the past twelve months, which are now going on, and
which will be completed in the spring, will place this country in a
position, as regards the continuance of hostilities, in which it has not
stood since the commencement of the war. We should therefore be justified
in expecting that another campaign--should another campaign be forced
upon us--would result in successes which might perhaps entitle us to
require--perhaps enable us to obtain--even better conditions than those
which have been offered to us, and have been accepted by us. But if the
conditions which we now hope to obtain are such as will properly satisfy
the objects for which we are contending--if they are conditions which we
think it is our duty to accept, and with which we believe the country
will be satisfied--then undoubtedly we should be wanting in our duty, and
should not justify the confidence which the country has reposed in us, if
we rejected terms of that description, merely for the chance of greater
successes in another campaign." The country--that is, the judgment of
the country--approved; but, as Lord Gosford said, with reluctance, much
doubting whether the work undertaken had been finished. The reluctance
sprang from that feeling, and by no means from a thirst for naval and
military glory. The nation accepted the proposal to make peace, trusting,
but not too blindly, that it would be safe and honourable; and whether it
would be so remained to be seen.
In the meantime Russia, who had yielded, but yielded with misgivings,
was very anxious it should be understood that she would not stand any
very stringent development of that fifth point, those special conditions
which the Allies had reserved their right to demand. She would not pay
any indemnity to Turkey; she hoped that no one would think of prohibiting
the re-fortification of the Åland Islands; she even suffered her organs
to talk of keeping Kars and part of Turkish Armenia. But this was all
bravado; the loud talking being intended to cover the fact that Russia
had been worsted, and to make it appear that she would enter Congress
as a Power proposing conditions. Prussia was very busy; very anxious
to be invited to the Congress; very eager to demonstrate that it was
her influence which finally induced the Czar to grant peace to Europe.
Austria did not fail to submit her peace propositions to the German
Diet, and to obtain the assent of that singularly-constituted and
abortive political corporation. Prussia again made a bid for a seat in
the Congress by supporting the proposals of Austria before the Diet; and
Austria, to please the minor German Powers, dwelt on the effect of the
expression of their opinions at St. Petersburg. Count Rechberg, who then
represented Austria at the Diet, expressed his firm conviction that the
right of proposing new conditions reserved in the fifth point would not
be exercised in a sense likely to frustrate the hopes of peace. Neither
Prussia nor the Diet was invited to the Congress; but this mysterious
discussion of the fifth point raised doubts in the minds of the public,
who were not told that the Powers had already determined that there should
be no difficulties, and that peace should be made.
February had nearly passed away before the plenipotentiaries began to
assemble. The Congress met on the 25th of the month, one day earlier than
the time fixed upon provisionally at Vienna. It was a matter of course
that Count Walewski should preside over this meeting. It is the custom
for the Minister of that Sovereign to preside in whose capital a congress
is held. But this was not done without a formal motion, made in this
case by the Austrian Plenipotentiary, and assented to unanimously by all
present. Then the Congress settled what are called the preliminaries--that
is, they gave their sanction to the transaction at Vienna on the 1st of
February. Next they resolved that an armistice should be concluded between
the belligerents, to terminate on the 31st of March unless renewed; but
not to extend to any blockade established or to be established. It was
understood, however, that no hostilities should occur off the coasts of
the enemy. Wherefore the British sent a light squadron again into the
Baltic, but merely as a measure of precaution; and, of course, the Black
Sea and Sea of Azoff remained in the hands of the Allies.
The Emperor Napoleon opened the Session of 1856 on the 4th of
March. He contrasted the state of affairs, the last time he had met
them--"Europe, uncertain, awaiting the issue of the struggle before
taking sides"--with their state at the time he was addressing them, when
the struggle for Sebastopol had been decided in favour of the Allies,
and had brought Europe over to their side openly. As a "fact of high
political significance"--truly, very high to him and his--he reminded
his subservient hearers of the visit of "the Queen of Great Britain" to
his Court, and cited it as "a proof of her confidence in and esteem for
our country." He told them also of the visit of the King of Piedmont--a
visit more significant, if his hearers could only have foreseen--and then
he said:--"These Sovereigns beheld a country some time so disturbed and
fallen from her rank in the councils of Europe, now prosperous, peaceable,
and respected, making war, not with the hurried delirium of passion, but
with that calm which belongs to justice, and all the energy of duty. They
have seen France, which had sent 200,000 men across the sea, at the same
time convoke at Paris all the arts of peace, as if she meant to say to
Europe: 'The present war is but an episode for me, and my strength is
always in great measure directed towards peaceful occupations. Let us
neglect no opportunity of coming to an understanding, and do not force me
to throw into the battlefield the whole resources and power of a great
nation.'" Such was the attitude, as it is called, of the Emperor Napoleon
in the spring of 1856. The alliance with Great Britain, the glories of the
Crimea, the Congress of Paris, had established his throne, and had made
him respectable in the eyes of his people, and for the future dreaded in
Europe.
The scene in Constantinople on the 21st of February was very different
from that in Paris. In the capital of Turkey there had also been a
conference--a conference whereat the British, French, and Austrian
Ministers had assisted the Turks in drawing up a grand Charter for the
Christians. At a solemn meeting in the room of the Grand Council this
charter was read. This firman is a very amazing document, promising almost
more than any Government could perform. It is a sweeping Charter of civil
and religious liberty, surprising to meet with in the latitude of the
Bosphorus. It decreed freedom of religion, admission to the national
schools and to public offices. There were to be mixed tribunals for all
civil and criminal cases where the parties differed in religion, and
open courts. Flogging and torture in prisons were abolished, and the use
of them made penal. As all were liable to taxes, as all were placed on
an equality of rights before the law, so there should be an equality of
duties; and the duty of serving in the army, almost a patent of nobility
in a Moslem State, became one of the duties of the Christians. In addition
to these reforms, the firman provided for the improvement of the mode
of collecting the taxes; for the publication of the Budget; for annual
assembling of a grand council of delegates; for free trade; for the right
of all to hold land. In short, it declared the resolve of the Sultan to
execute very sweeping reforms in all departments of the State, and on all
the great lines of public policy. Clearly this was more than an executive
so weak as that of the Sultan could effect, and remained for the most part
a dead letter. The Emperor of Russia did not fail to make use of this
famous firman, and tell his subjects that one of the reasons that induced
him to make peace was that the Sultan had granted that act of justice,
the want of which led the father of the Czar to make war. These two
documents--the Imperial Speech and the Sultan's firman--mark, the first,
the solid establishment of the personal power of Bonaparte; the second,
the most considerable step yet taken towards the full emancipation and
uplifting of the Christian races in the East.
The Congress of Paris sat seven weeks, opening its proceedings, as we have
seen, on the 25th of February, and closing them on the 16th of April. The
first five weeks were devoted to the discussion of the articles of the
treaty--indeed, they were determined on in the first month; put into final
shape during the last week in March, and signed on the 30th. When the work
was substantially done--that is, on the 12th of March--Prussia was at
length gratified by an invitation to send plenipotentiaries, and to accede
to what had been already determined on. As she had abstained from taking
part in the war, Prussia could have no place in a conference assembled
to settle terms of peace. But as the articles to be negotiated trenched
upon treaties relating to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, to which
Prussia was a party in 1840 and 1841, it was thought fit to invite her to
accede to the conclusions adopted by the other Powers. Prussia, of course,
readily accepted such a pretext for putting the names of her Ministers and
her Sovereign at the foot of a European treaty; and thus on the 18th of
March, at the tenth sitting of the conference, Baron Manteuffel and Baron
Hatzfeld took their seats at the round table in the Hall of Ambassadors.
Thus there were seven Powers represented around that green board at the
closing scenes of a diplomatic conference which was so gratifying to the
Emperor and all Frenchmen. Nor was this the sole piece of good fortune
that befell his Majesty, for on the 16th day of March there came into the
world a Prince Imperial, the only child of the marriage between Louis
Napoleon Buonaparte and Eugénie de Montijo, the bright Spanish beauty
chosen by him when his overtures at imperial and royal Courts went for
nought. As in duty bound, the plenipotentiaries waited on the Emperor
to congratulate him, and Paris, as in duty bound, covered itself with
illuminations.
It was on a Sunday afternoon, a fortnight after this event, that the
treaty of peace was signed by the plenipotentiaries. The Treaty of Paris
was not a very long or complicated document. It consisted of a preamble
and thirty-four articles, and there were attached to it three conventions,
each having the same force as the general treaty. In the preamble the six
Powers declared their intention to establish and consolidate a peace "by
securing, through effectual and reciprocal guarantees, the independence
and integrity of the Ottoman Empire," and, further, they recorded that
Prussia was invited to participate in the arrangements come to. Peace
being established, Russia was to restore Kars and the country occupied
by her troops in Turkish Armenia, and the Allies were to restore the
towns and ports of Sebastopol, Balaclava, Kamiesch, Kertch, Yenikale,
and Kinburn, and all other Russian territory occupied by them. Each
Power was to grant an amnesty to those of their subjects who had been
employed against them, or who had otherwise compromised themselves.
This was done to meet the case of Poles who had taken service with the
Allies. All prisoners of war were to be given up. The whole of the seven
Powers declared formally that the Sublime Porte should be admitted to
participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Europe.
"Their Majesties," the treaty went on (Article VII.), "engage, each on his
part, to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman
Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement,
and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a
question of general interest." If a quarrel arose between the Porte and
one of the Powers, before force was resorted to, the other Powers were
to have an opportunity of preventing by mediation the outbreak of war.
It was then recorded that the Sultan would communicate to each Power
the firman he had issued touching his Christian subjects; but it was
expressly declared that this act of the Sultan did not confer on all, or
any, of the Powers any right to interfere in the internal affairs of his
empire. The Black Sea was "neutralised"; that is, all ships of war, with
recognised exceptions, were prohibited from entering its waters, while it
was to be free to the mercantile marine of every nation. The exceptions
were specified in a convention between Russia and Turkey, annexed to the
general treaty, and equally valid with it. By this convention the two
Powers were each to maintain not more than six steamships of 800 tons,
and four light vessels of 200 tons. It was also provided in the treaty
that no military-maritime arsenal should be maintained by either Power on
the coasts of the Black Sea. Consuls were to be admitted to any port. The
navigation of the Danube was declared to be free, and a commission was to
be appointed to clear the mouths, improve and regulate the navigation,
and pay the expenses out of a shipping rate. Thus the Black Sea was set
apart for commerce and the Danube opened to all the world. This was what,
in the language of diplomacy, was called the neutralisation of the Black
Sea. Russia would not admit that the terms of this treaty applied to the
building-yards of Kherson and Nicolaief, or to the Sea of Azoff; but
Count Orloff gave a promise, which was recorded in the protocols, that
Russia would not build "anywhere on the shores of the Black Sea, or in its
tributaries, or in the waters dependent on it," any ships other than those
allowed by treaty. This was accepted as a binding engagement.
In order to show that the Allies did not exchange the territories held by
them in return for Kars, it was expressly stated that in exchange for the
ports in the Crimea held by the Allies, and the better to secure the free
navigation of the Danube, Russia consented to what was absurdly called
"the rectification of the frontier of Bessarabia." The new frontier was
to start from the river Pruth, at a point where it was not navigable,
and follow a line which would exclude Russia altogether from the Danube,
and take from her the fortress of Ismail and Kilia Nova. A commission
was to trace the new line, and of that we shall have to speak at a later
stage, as it nearly gave rise to a renewal of the war. The remainder of
the treaty provided for the future status of the Danubian Principalities.
They were placed under the collective guarantee of the seven Powers.
Their rights and privileges were to be secured, their laws and statutes
revised, and a commission was to report on their new organisation, after
taking counsel of Divans called for the purpose of expressing the wants
of the people. Finally, the Sultan was to give his sanction to the new
arrangements, and then the Principalities passed under the protection of
the seven Powers. These were the chief stipulations of this remarkable
treaty.
We have said that there were three conventions annexed to the general
treaty. One we have described already. The second, signed by all the
Powers, recorded the declaration of the Sultan that he would continue to
prohibit the entry of ships of war into the Straits of the Dardanelles
and the Bosphorus, and would not admit any so long as he was at peace;
and the other Powers agreed to respect this determination of the Sultan.
There were exceptions, as in the case of ships bearing ambassadors,
admitted by permission of the Sultan, and of ships that the contracting
Powers might send to keep watch over the mouths of the Danube. The third
convention was signed by the Ministers of France, England, and Russia,
and it recorded the undertaking of the Czar "that the Åland Islands shall
not be fortified, and that no military or naval establishments shall be
maintained or created there." We may here remark that the Allies, after
the capture of Bomarsund, offered these islands to Sweden, but that
Sweden, fearing to offend Russia, and apprehensive of the burden they
might prove, declined the gift. The islands lie at the mouth of the Gulf
of Bothnia, off the Swedish capital. It was in the interest of Sweden that
this convention was made.
By this treaty and these conventions the Allies secured the object of
the war, which really was the reduction of the power of Russia. They not
only destroyed Sebastopol and the Black Sea fleet, they prohibited the
revival of fleet or arsenal; they removed Russia from the Danube; they
deprived her altogether of that exclusive protectorate over the Danubian
Principalities which she had extorted from the Porte, and declared
null and void that pretended protectorate over the Christian subjects
of the Sultan to which Nicholas violently laid claim; they gave Turkey
a collective guarantee, and they thus delivered her from the grinding
pressure of Russia, and struck out of the hands of the Czar those two
formidable weapons of coercion--a mighty arsenal and fleet. Without these,
it was thought, an invasion of Turkey from the north would be almost
impossible, and the chances of working down upon Constantinople from the
east--that is, from Kars--would become very slight. Moreover, by newly
organising the Principalities, the Powers provided for the growth of a
national Christian State, one of a group which, when the time comes, will
take the place of the Turk on the Danube, the Bosphorus, and the European
shores of the Levant. In the Baltic the Allies reduced the power of the
Czar, and delivered Sweden from a standing menace. So that, on the whole,
the fruits of the war were considerable, though not so considerable as
they might have been had the war gone on. That peace was then justly made
no rational man will deny; for, although all had not been accomplished,
enough had been done to meet the exigencies of the period.
With these stipulations Britain, Austria, and France were not content.
They took a remarkable step. They, on the 15th of April, signed a treaty
of guarantee. That is to say, they jointly and severally guaranteed the
integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; and declared that "any
infraction of the stipulations" of the general treaty, signed on the 30th
of March, would be considered by these three Powers as a _casus belli_.
This was a very strong measure; and when it became known, as it soon did,
Russia, though offended at a want of confidence, saw that she must not
attempt to wriggle out of the conditions she had subscribed. Nevertheless,
she did, at a later period, succeed in frustrating the intention of that
stipulation which removed her altogether from the Danube, and thrust back
her frontier from its banks and waters.
The Congress of Paris did not restrict its attention to those points which
arose directly out of the war. The Congress indeed sat for a fortnight
after the peace treaty had been concluded, and took some remarkable
steps. On the 8th of April, for instance, Count Walewski, as president,
submitted to the Congress no fewer than four important subjects, and
invited discussion. It was a rather unusual proceeding; but it showed
the tendency, which afterwards became more manifest, to draw all great
questions for settlement to Paris, and to bring about a sort of government
of Europe by congresses. Count Walewski called for the opinions of the
plenipotentiaries on the condition of Greece, Italy, and Belgium, and
suggested a new declaration of maritime law. Greece had been occupied by
the Allies for contumacious conduct; before the troops were withdrawn, the
evils must be remedied. In Italy, France, "the eldest son of the Church,"
occupied Rome--that was abnormal, and the Emperor was ready to withdraw
his troops as soon as he could do so without injuring the interests of the
Pope--a safe promise. Count Walewski hoped Count Buol would say the same
for Austria, whose troops were in the Romagna and Tuscany. Then there was
a violent attack on Belgium. What Count Walewski said on this topic was
that there were outspoken enemies of the Emperor in Belgium, that they
abused the freedom of the press, that this might be dangerous for Belgium,
and that the Powers, perhaps, would be good enough to say that Belgium
must pass severe laws and repress these excesses. This was very uncalled
for, not to say insolent, conduct on the part of the French Minister.
Lord Clarendon and Count Cavour spoke with some freedom, and seemed to
concur with Count Walewski's Italian views, joining in the blows aimed at
Austria and Naples. Count Cavour, indeed, was eloquent on the subject of
the Austrian occupation of the Romagna, and the very tyrannical conduct of
the King of the Two Sicilies. But the other plenipotentiaries seemed to be
rather taken by surprise by the French manœuvre and said little. Even Lord
Clarendon did not repel with sufficient, with any vigour, the unwarranted
attack on Belgium. So that Count Walewski, in summing up the results of
the conversation, could record some sort of hollow agreement as to the
principles he laid down affecting Greece, Italy, and Belgium. In fact,
the object of the French minister was to bring Italy bodily before the
Congress, to pave the way for a policy which was to put a violent end to
Austrian occupation, and leave French occupation as flourishing as it was
when Count Walewski affected to lament its existence before the Congress
of 1856. Italy was introduced to satisfy also the urgent demands of Count
Cavour, who had already begun to meditate on plans for his country's
liberation with the aid of Britain or France. Italy therefore, at the
Congress of 1856, was the shadow of a coming event.
The suggested new declaration on maritime law also took the
plenipotentiaries by surprise. They demanded time, but a week
afterwards--namely, on the 16th of April--they agreed to a declaration
which was annexed to the treaty, and understood to be binding on those who
signed it and on those who might accede to it. The points solemnly set
forth as for the future international law were these:--"1. Privateering
is, and remains, abolished. 2. The neutral flag covers enemies' goods,
with the exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, with the
exception of contraband of war, are not liable to seizure under an enemy's
flag. 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective--that is
to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to
the coast of an enemy." This forms a great landmark in the history of
belligerent and neutral rights. It marks the enlargement of neutral, and
the restriction of belligerent rights; and by many it was thought that the
surrender of the right to take enemies' goods wherever found would prove
injurious, unless accompanied by an abolition of the right of capturing
private property at sea altogether. Certainly Britain surrendered a
great deal to the neutral and non-maritime Powers; and when she had done
so, the greatest, the United States of America, would not accede to the
declaration--would not agree to abolish privateering unless Europe agreed
to abolish the right of capturing private property at sea.
[Illustration: SCENE DURING THE PRESTON STRIKE. (_See p._ 162.)]
Another incident worth notice occurred at this Congress, and chiefly
because it relates to the adoption of a principle for which marked
success cannot yet be claimed. Much moved by the Peace party, Government
permitted Lord Clarendon to propose a sort of arbitration clause. He
observed that the treaty embodied the principle as applied to differences
between the contracting Powers and Turkey. He proposed that the happy
innovation should receive a more general application without prejudice
to the independence of Governments. Count Walewski and Baron Manteuffel
concurred, but Count Buol and Count Orloff gave it merely their personal
assent. "Whereupon," so runs the protocol, "the plenipotentiaries do
not hesitate to express in the name of their Governments the wish that
States between which any serious misunderstanding may arise should, before
appealing to arms, have recourse, as well as circumstances might allow,
to the good offices of a friendly Power. The plenipotentiaries hope
that the Governments not represented at the Congress will unite in the
sentiment which has inspired the wish recorded in the present protocol."
The principle of international arbitration, though generally accepted in
theory, is still far from being reduced to practice.
On the very day when the peace documents were laid before the British
Parliament, April 28th, the Opposition determined to censure the
Government for the loss of Kars. To this end it was necessary to treat the
fate of Kars as a matter entirely under the control of the Government;
to forget that Britain was engaged with Allies, and to assume that the
British Government had shown a deficiency of "foresight and energy."
On that ground Mr. Whiteside, acting for his party, based a motion of
censure. Lord Malmesbury, in the House of Peers, had also given notice
of a similar motion, but found it expedient to withdraw his notice, and
accept battle in the House of Commons. This debate unhappily, like so many
others, was a mere party encounter. The Opposition did not believe that
Kars could have been saved by the British Government in the circumstances;
but they found in the facts of the campaign admirable material for a party
attack. The real causes of the loss of Kars were twofold--the indolence
and corruption of the Turkish Pashas, whose conduct deprived Kars of the
provisions actually collected to victual the place; and the indisposition
of the French Emperor to permit the diversion to Asia of any effective
troops, who might have operated in time to relieve the garrison. Britain,
as happened in all cases where it acted in combination with Imperial
France, played a secondary, one might almost say a subordinate, part. That
is the price it paid for an active alliance with France. Consequently no
effective measures were taken to defend the Turkish frontier in Asia.
The House, not being prepared to censure the Government for deference
to an ally--a deference which could not be avoided without risk to the
alliance--rejected Mr. Whiteside's motion of censure by a majority of 303
to 176.
As a matter of course the peace treaty, when communicated to Parliament,
became a subject of high debate. The Address to her Majesty, agreed to by
both Houses, thanked the Queen for communicating the treaty to Parliament,
and assured her that, while they would have cheerfully supported her had
the war gone on, yet that they had learned with "joy and satisfaction"
that a peace had been concluded on conditions which so fully accomplished
the objects for which the war was undertaken. The Address took note of the
aid given by Powers not belligerents towards the restoration of peace,
and expressed a hope that it would be lasting. The debates in both Houses
were really without life or novelty, and do not concern posterity. The
Opposition only pretended to be dissatisfied. One called it a "base"
peace, yet would not divide against it; and another proposed to omit the
word "joy," yet leave in the word "satisfaction." In fact, the division on
the Kars resolution took the sting out of the Opposition speeches; and
the Address, unaltered, was agreed to without a dissentient. On the 8th
of May thanks were voted to the army and navy; and the Queen sent down a
message to state that she had raised General Williams to the dignity of
a baronet, with the style and title of Sir Fenwick Williams of Kars, and
had resolved to grant him a pension of one thousand pounds a year. This
gave great satisfaction, and met with ready support. On the 29th of May
the Queen's birthday was kept, and London illuminated in celebration of
the peace. Prince Albert inspected the Guards; the Queen held a Drawing
Room; and in the evening--her Majesty and her family witnessing the
spectacle from the balcony of Buckingham Palace--there were four grand and
continuous outbursts of fireworks, from the Green Park, from Hyde Park,
from Primrose Hill, and from Victoria Park. So London rejoiced, and the
towns in the country rejoiced also, that the war was at an end.
We have seen how the war arose, how it was waged, and how the objects
sought were accomplished. It is right that the cost in life and money
should also be recorded. According to Lord Panmure, our total loss up
to the 31st of March, 1856, of killed, dead of wounds and disease, and
discharged, was 22,467 men. The Russian loss was upwards of 500,000. The
cost in money, as estimated by Sir George Lewis, was fifty-three millions.
We increased the funded and unfunded debt by £33,604,263, and we raised
by increased taxation above £17,000,000. But the war left us with very
largely increased establishments; and the peace of Europe has since been
so often threatened that our Chancellors of the Exchequer have not been
able to reduce the expenditure to the comparatively low level of the years
immediately preceding the revival of the French Empire. The navy was
greatly augmented, having been raised from a force of 212 to a force of
590 effective ships of war. The organisation of the army and navy was much
improved; and in 1856 Great Britain stood in a better position as regards
offensive and defensive operations than it had done at any previous period
since the peace of 1815.
The execution of the conditions of the treaty of peace went on for many
months after its conclusion; but ultimately the Danubian Principalities
received a definite organisation, and succeeded, even in spite of the
temporary opposition of Britain, Austria, and the Porte, in obtaining
a united Government by the junction of Wallachia and Moldavia under
the name of Roumania. The new frontier also was traced; but not without
involving Europe in the danger of war. First of all Russia claimed the
Isle of Serpents, off the mouth of the Danube, and occupied it. Admiral
Lyons at once placed it under the watch and ward of a man-of-war. The
object of tracing a new frontier in Bessarabia was to remove Russia from
the Danube. In deciding the line roughly on maps produced by the French
at Paris, it was agreed that the Russian frontier should run to the
south of a place called Bolgrad, it being understood that this Bolgrad
was not on the banks of a lake--Lake Jalpukh--which ran into the Danube.
But the frontier commission found that Bolgrad was actually on the lake.
The maps exhibited were delusive. The place called Bolgrad on these maps
was Bolgrad-Tabak. There had either been a deception practised, or a
misunderstanding on all sides. The Russians, however, insisted on the
letter of the treaty; and strangely enough, the French Government showed
a disposition to support them. But Britain, Austria, and Turkey stood
out. At one moment, in consequence of the lurch of the Imperial mind
towards Russia, war was possible. Better counsels prevailed, and it was
arranged that a conference should sit to decide this knotty point. The
conference sat on the 31st of December, 1856, and the 6th of January,
1857. The result of its secret deliberations was that Russia had to give
up the Isle of Serpents and both Bolgrads; but she gained a considerable
slice of Moldavia, though not on the Danube, as "compensation." The delta
of the Danube reverted to Turkey; the remainder of the ceded territory
to Roumania. The French Emperor supported the Russian demands. It was
owing to the firmness of Lord Palmerston that Russia, in spite of the aid
of the Emperor Napoleon, was restrained from then becoming one of the
river-bordering Powers on the Danube.
By way of a pleasant epilogue to the Crimean War came the first
distribution of the Victoria Cross, a ceremony which took place in Hyde
Park on the 26th of June, 1857. It had long been felt that a distinctive
token was wanted to meet the individual acts of heroism in the army and
navy, and this impression was strengthened by the numerous deeds of valour
by which the struggle for Sebastopol had been rendered illustrious.
Accordingly the Queen had issued a royal warrant in the previous year
by which a new naval and military decoration was instituted, to be
styled "The Victoria Cross," and inscribed "For Valour," which was only
to be issued to men who had especially distinguished themselves in the
presence of the enemy. The destined recipients paraded at an early hour
on the appointed day, and were found to be sixty-two in all, twelve
from the Royal Navy, two from the marines, five from the cavalry, five
from the artillery, four from the engineers, and the remainder from the
line. The popular favourite was Lieutenant John Knox, who after greatly
distinguishing himself in the Fusilier Guards, lost his arm in the attack
on the Redan. Already more than 100,000 people were assembled in the
Park, where a vast semicircle of seats to hold 12,000 had been erected
for the favoured few. It was a glorious morning, when at 10 a.m. the
Queen--accompanied by the Prince Consort, Prince Frederick William of
Prussia, and a brilliant military suite--rode into the Park on a favourite
roan horse. The actual ceremony was of the briefest; the Queen, without
dismounting, pinned the cross upon the breast of each of the men as they
were brought up to her one by one, and in ten minutes the honours had been
bestowed. But the assembled multitude was highly delighted by the march
past of the 4,000 soldiers who had been brought on the ground to give
brilliancy to the occasion, and taken as a whole the brief record in the
Prince Consort's diary--"a superb spectacle"--was amply merited.