command of the army in place of General Johnston, who had been
painfully wounded on the previous day, and immediately addressed
himself to the arduous task of preparing for the decisive encounter,
which could not be long delayed. His "exhibition of grand
administrative talent and indomitable energy in bringing up that
army in so short a time to that state of discipline which maintained
its aggregation during those terrible seven days' fight around
Richmond," says Colonel Chilton, was "his greatest achievement."
The order of battle in the memorable seven days' fight required A.
P. Hill, when Jackson should pass down in rear of Mechanicsville,
to cross at Meadow Bridge and drive the enemy so as to enable D. H.
Hill to pass over the bridge at that village.
In obedience to messages from General Lee and President Davis,
General Hill, after crossing, went forward with the brigade of
Brigadier-General Ripley to cooperate with the division of General
A. P. Hill. At the request of Brigadier-General Pender, Hill
directed Ripley just at dark to act in concert with that dashing
officer in the effort to turn the enemy's position at Ellison's Mill
and drive him from it.
The desperate charge across an open field in the face of a murderous
fire, in which that brave soldier and noble man, Colonel Montford
S. Stokes of the First North Carolina Regiment, fell mortally
wounded, was neither planned by General Hill nor executed under his
directions. (_Official Records_, Series 1, Vol. XI, Part 2, p. 623.)
The suggestion that General Hill deliberately and unnecessarily
rushed those gallant men into danger is unfounded and unjust. The
galling fire that had broken Pender's left called for immediate
action, and in the hurry of the moment it became necessary to
develop the strength of the enemy's position by assault instead of
reconnaissance, but it was done under the orders of General Lee and
the President, not of General Hill.
When on the second day Jackson had effected a junction with Lee,
Hill was selected to relieve his tired troops by passing rapidly to
his left and turning the extreme right of the enemy. A. P. Hill,
Longstreet, Whiting, and Jackson had successively moved upon the
double lines of infantry and artillery posted on the range of hills
behind Powhite Creek from the McGehee to the Gaines house. The
approach of the attacking columns of A. P. Hill and Whiting was in
part over a plain about four hundred yards wide and was embarrassed
by abattis and ditches in front of the first line. The struggle
along the front of these divisions and that of Longstreet had
become doubtful, and almost desperate, when the troops of Jackson
and Hill created a diversion by engaging the extreme right of the
enemy. The first of the lines of entrenchments had been taken, and
Longstreet, Hood, Law, and other brave leaders were moving on the
last stronghold in the enemy's center, when the victorious shouts
of Garland's and G. B. Anderson's Brigades of Hill's Division were
followed by the rapid retreat of the enemy and the surrender,
first of the ridge at the McGehee house, and then of their whole
line. Thus did it fall to the lot of Hill once more to strike the
decisive blow at a critical moment. But claiming for him this
distinction among a host of heroic commanders, it is proper that
I should rely on the evidence of the lamented Garland, who sealed
his devotion to the cause with his heart's blood at South Mountain,
and the corroborating accounts of Hill's superiors, from Jackson to
President Davis, and not on my own assertion.
"The effect of our appearance at this opportune moment upon the
enemy's flank, cheering and charging," said Garland in his report,
"decided the fate of the day. The enemy broke and retreated and
made a second stand, which induced my immediate command to halt
under cover of the roadside and return the fire, when charging
forward again we broke and scattered them in every direction." This
discomfiture uncovered the left of the fortified line and left no
obstacle between Hill and the McGehee house. (_Official Records_,
Series 1, Vol. XI, Part 2, p. 626.)
General Jackson's language is not less unmistakable: "Again pressing
forward, the Federals fell back, but only to select a position for
more obstinate defense, when at dark--under the pressure of our
batteries and the dashing charge of General Hill's infantry, in
which the troops of General C. S. Winder joined--the enemy yielded
the field and fled in confusion." Of the part taken by Hill, General
Lee said in his report (_Official Records_, Series 1, Vol. XI,
Part 2, p. 493): "D. H. Hill charged across the open ground in his
front, one of his regiments having first bravely carried a battery
whose fire enfiladed his advance. Gallantly supported by the troops
on his right, who pressed forward with unfaltering resolution, he
reached the crest of the ridge (above the McGehee house), and after
a sanguinary struggle broke the enemy's line, captured several of
his batteries and drove him in confusion towards the Chickahominy
until darkness rendered further pursuit impossible." Mr. Davis,
in _The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government_, Vol. II, p.
138, adopts the exact language of General Lee. General McClellan
refers to the report of Fitz John Porter, who was in command, for a
detailed account of the affair at Gaines' Mill. Porter admits that
the withdrawal of his line was caused by the retreat on his right,
but insists that the demoralization was due entirely to the stampede
of the Federal cavalry, who were mistaken, as they fell back on
the infantry line, for rebels. More candid, or better informed
than General Porter, the French princes, who served on his staff
on that day, admit that the charge of Hill and the discomfiture of
the enemy's right necessitated the abandonment of their line of
entrenchments. If to double the right flank of an army suddenly
back, so as to expose to an enfilade the flank of his last and
strongest line of entrenchments, is to make his position untenable,
then Hill's charge was indeed decisive of the struggle at Gaines'
Mill.
Crossing the Chickahominy on the night of the 29th, in the advance
of Jackson's Corps, D. H. Hill passed Savage Station, where he took
one thousand prisoners, exclusive of three thousand in and connected
with the Federal Hospital. The progress of Jackson was arrested by
obstructions and the stubborn resistance at White Oak Swamp, and he
failed to effect a junction with Longstreet till after the fight at
Frasier's Farm.
D. H. Hill was again the first to reach and occupy the position
which he was ordered to assume preparatory to a general advance on
Malvern Hill. The other parts of the line were not formed till a
much later hour in the day. General Lee says in his report, of the
battle (_Official Records_, Series 1, Vol. XI, Part 2, p, 496):
"Orders were issued for a general advance at a given signal, but the
causes referred to prevented a proper concert of action among the
troops. D. H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged
the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line; but a
simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place, he found
himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the
overwhelming numbers and numerous batteries of the enemy. Hill was
therefore compelled to abandon a part of the ground he had gained
after suffering severe loss and inflicting heavy damage upon the
enemy."
Prompt, vigilant, and obedient, he was always at his post at the
appointed hour, and with the true conception of soldierly duty,
moved upon order or signal of his superiors without waiting to count
the cost. At Malvern Hill, as at Seven Pines, he charged the enemy
under orders from the commanding general. The persistent pluck of
his brave men, developed to the highest degree of his own unequaled
coolness and courage, enabled him again to take and hold much of the
enemy's outer line till after the last gun was fired.
When Pope had twice been punished by Jackson and driven back upon
the supposed stronghold at Manassas, the transfer of troops from
the Federal army on the Peninsula made it necessary for General Lee
to move with the bulk of his army to the support of his dashing
lieutenant, who had already twice defeated an enemy much stronger
numerically than himself. D. H. Hill, recalled from the command of
his department south of the James, which included his own State, and
placed at the head of his old division, was ordered to watch and
check the movements of McDowell's command, which was still occupying
Fredericksburg, and consequently took no part in the second battle
of Manassas.
Crossing over the Potomac with Longstreet to Fredericktown,
Maryland, when our forces moved from that point south General Hill
was ordered to occupy and hold a pass in the South Mountains, which,
if gained by McClellan, would have enabled him to relieve Harper's
Ferry and possibly to prevent the junction of our scattered army and
destroy the divisions in detail, or drive them precipitately south
of the Potomac with great loss of artillery and transportation.
General Lee's object in crossing the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge
was to induce the enemy, by threatening Washington and Baltimore,
to evacuate Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, and to establish his
own line of communication through the valley, and then by advancing
towards Pennsylvania to draw the enemy away from his own base of
supplies. General Lee had not contemplated making a stand at South
Mountain, probably not at Sharpsburg, or at any point north of the
Potomac; but the continued occupation of Martinsburg and Harper's
Ferry made it necessary to move directly upon the former place
and to invest the latter, where both garrisons ultimately united.
In consequence of the delay in reducing the garrison it became
essential to the safety of Lee's army that McClellan's entire force
should be held in check for a whole day at the pass in the South
Mountains by Hill's depleted division, now numbering only four
thousand, as a glance at the map with a knowledge of the disposition
of Lee's different divisions will show.
Longstreet, with his whole force, estimated at four thousand,
was at Hagerstown, while Jackson had disposed his own command,
including McLaws' and A. P. Hill's Divisions, either with a view to
an attack on Harper's Ferry or to cutting off the retreat of the
force occupying it. Three days later McClellan, according to his
own report, advanced to the attack at Sharpsburg with eighty-seven
thousand men. Of this vast army probably thirty-three thousand
were in the force actually engaged in the assault upon the little
Spartan band of D. H. Hill for five hours, without cessation, before
Longstreet's advance brigade arrived at 3:30 o'clock, which was
followed by others coming up from that time till dark.
The late Justice Ruffin, Colonel of the Thirteenth North Carolina,
standing by the side of the gallant Garland when he was instantly
killed, discovered a moment later that the other regiments of the
brigade had retired, leaving his command surrounded by the enemy.
Facing to the rear in an instant, he ordered his regiment to charge,
and though embarrassed by a painful wound, performed the desperate
feat of cutting his way through the serried ranks of the enemy.
A few moments later that gallant officer was astonished to hear
his intrepid commander express his delight at the discovery that
McClellan's whole army was approaching his front. The explanation
afterwards given was one that could have been safely disclosed
only to a kindred spirit, such as Ruffin had shown himself to be.
Hill then said that he had at first feared the movement upon his
front was a feint, and that the main body of the enemy had passed
through another gap and might be thrown between Jackson and Lee. The
situation was still further embarrassed by the fact that General
Stuart had at daylight withdrawn his command, except the single
regiment of Rosser, which afterwards did its duty so nobly, under
the impression that but a small force was in General Hill's front.
It was "with the stern joy" of an intrepid warrior waiting for the
coming contest, that from an elevated pinnacle of the mountain he
saw the four advance corps of the grand Army of the Potomac, one of
which was forming at the foot of the mountain. The hour and the man
had met when Lee entrusted to Hill the duty of holding the approach
against that army with his little band of four thousand. From Seven
Pines to Malvern Hill they had never turned their backs upon the
foe. They believed that their leader would require them to endure no
sacrifice or face no danger that was not demanded by the inevitable
exigencies of the situation. With God's help, Hill determined to
save the army, as his chief ordered him to do at any sacrifice,
and, if the emergency had demanded his own life, he would have met
death, not as the decree of fate, but as the Providence of God, who
had brought him face to face with a desperate duty. Captain Seaton
Gales, the gallant Adjutant-General of George B. Anderson on that
memorable day, summarized the important results of this battle as
follows:
"It may be safely said that in its consequences, in the
accomplishments of predetermined objects, and in the skillful
disposition of small numbers to oppose overwhelming odds, it is
without a parallel in the war. The division, unaided until a
late hour in the afternoon, held in check the greater portion of
McClellan's vast army endeavoring with battering-ram impetus to
force its way through the narrow gap, and thereby afforded time
for the concentration of our various corps, dispersed in strategic
directions, in season for the bloody issue at Sharpsburg."
Imbued with an earnest devotion to the cause, which rose on occasion
to the height of enthusiasm, Hill did not hesitate to denounce
in unmeasured terms those who evaded duty in our armies, when
the conditions were such as to plainly demand the active service
of every able-bodied son of the South. One of his random shots
at the "bomb-proofs" of the Confederacy wounded a gentleman who,
having done nothing in the war worthy to be written, determined to
write something, in the vain hope that it would be read by future
generations. Prompted by petty revenge, he recklessly asserted that
General D. H. Hill had thrown a copy of a general order upon the
ground in his camp at Frederick City, which being afterwards picked
up and handed to McClellan, gave him an idea of the movements and
location of the different portions of Lee's army.
It will appear from an inspection of its contents that on the day
when McClellan attacked Hill at South Mountain, he had reason to
believe, and must have thought, that Longstreet was occupying the
mountains, supported by Hill. But we are not left to conjecture
on that subject. McClellan wrote General Franklin from Frederick
City on the 14th, just after he had read the "lost order," that
Longstreet was to move to Boonsborough, and there halt with D. H.
Hill, and he therefore directed Franklin to make his dispositions
with an eye both to the relief of the garrison at Harper's Ferry
and the capture of Longstreet and Hill. The plan outlined in the
letter is predicated upon the supposition that Longstreet and Hill
were together, and constituted the main body of an army, which he
estimated in another report to General Halleck at one hundred and
twenty thousand. If it were not manifest from this letter that
McClellan was misled by the order, and his opinion corroborated by
the skillful disposition of Hill's troops, his report proves beyond
all question that he thought the force in his front was thirty
thousand strong, composed of Hill's Division, fifteen thousand, with
Longstreet's and a portion of Jackson's command (_Official Records_,
Series 1, Vol. XIX, Part 1, p. 55). The skill of Hill, then, and the
order combined to mislead McClellan by causing him to over-estimate
our strength, and the cautious and dilatory movement which gave
Longstreet time to come up in the afternoon, enabled Hill to escape
with his little band, leaving the whole Army of the Potomac deployed
before him.
The order issued by Lee and sent out from army headquarters was as
follows:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
September 9, 1862.
_Special Orders No. 191._
I. The citizens of Fredericktown being unwilling, while overrun
by members of this army, to open their stores, in order to give
them confidence, and to secure to officers and men purchasing
supplies for benefit of this command, all officers and men of
this army are strictly prohibited from visiting Fredericktown
except on business, in which case they will bear evidence of
this in writing from division commanders. The Provost Marshal
in Fredericktown will see that his guard rigidly enforces this
order.
II. Major Taylor will proceed to Leesburg, Va., and arrange
for transportation of the sick and those unable to walk to
Winchester, securing the transportation of the country for this
purpose. The route between this and Culpeper Court House east of
the mountains being unsafe, will no longer be traveled. Those
on the way to this army already across the river will move up
promptly, all others will proceed to Winchester collectively and
under command of officers, at which point, being the general
depot of the army, its movements will be known and instructions
given by commanding officers regulating further movements.
III. The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the
Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the
advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he
may select, take the route to Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at
the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession
of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as
may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to
escape from Harper's Ferry.
IV. General Longstreet's command will pursue the main road as
far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply
and baggage trains of the army.
V. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General
R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching
Middletown will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday
morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to
capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.
VI. General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing
the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac
at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take
possession of the Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday
morning, Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of
the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as
practicable, co-operate with Generals McLaws and Jackson and
intercept retreat of the enemy.
VII. General D. H. Hill's Division will form the rear guard of
the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve
artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, etc., will precede
General Hill.
VIII. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to
accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and
McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the
route of the army, bringing up all the stragglers that may have
been left behind.
IX. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker,
after accomplishing the objects for which they have been
detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or
Hagerstown.
X. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes
in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their
encampments, to procure wood, etc.
By command of General R. E. Lee.
R. H. CHILTON,
_Assistant Adjutant-General._
[The copy of the "lost order" given by McClellan, as far as it goes,
is the same as the one above set forth, but it does not contain
sections 1 and 2.]
If Pollard's malignant charges, made to detract from the honor and
glory of an achievement so brilliantly executed and so fruitful
of benefit to the cause, were not shown by the most direct proof
from the most honorable men to be false and unfounded, the marked
discrepancy between the order published in the _Official Records_,
as No. 191, copied from General Lee's book of general orders, and
that which McClellan declared in his report to be a _copy_ of the
order sent by him to Washington, suggests to a legal mind a solution
of the dispute which corroborates in the strongest possible manner
the sworn testimony of Major James W. Ratchford, Adjutant-General of
Hill's Division, that the custody of such papers was a part of his
exclusive duty at that time, and that no such order was delivered
to him, with the solemn statement of General Hill that he never
saw or read a copy of the order in question, except one purporting
to have been sent through General Jackson, to whose corps he was
attached when it was issued, and which he still preserved among
his private papers in 1886. It will be observed that the first of
the two paragraphs, omitted in what purports to be the copy of the
order that fell into the possession of the enemy, forbade the troops
stationed around Frederick City from entering that town without
permission, and the second directed that the sick and disabled of
the army should be removed to Winchester. Halleck's correspondence
with McClellan on the same day, September 13, 1862 (_Official
Records_, Series 1, Vol. XIX, Part 1, p. 41), evinces the greatest
apprehension that the movement of the army was aimed at Washington
City, and the demonstrations higher up the Potomac were intended to
distract attention from the real design. Was it not more important
that the chief officer of all the armies should know that Lee's sick
and disabled soldiers were to be moved to Winchester, as the general
depot of the army, and that all recruits, returning or coming for
the first time to the army were to rendezvous at Winchester, than
to learn from the last paragraph of the copy sent him that Lee's
troops were to habitually carry in their regimental wagons axes to
cut wood, etc.? The second paragraph seemed plainly to indicate
that Lee's purpose was what he afterwards declared in his report
to have been his plan--to establish his base of operations by way
of the valley of Virginia and invade or threaten Pennsylvania,
not Washington, after taking Harper's Ferry. (_Official Records_,
Series 1, Vol. XIX. Part 1, p. 145.) This was McClellan's own idea
of Lee's design, and if he could have convinced Halleck of the
correctness of his views there would have been no reason for further
hesitation about weakening the garrison of the capital city to swell
the effective force in the field. McClellan did not get the whole
order and omit a portion of it in his correspondence at the time
because it tended to sustain his view against Halleck. He did not
send his chief the full copy of his order and omit in his report,
written after his removal from command, a section which proved that
he (not Halleck) had divined Lee's purpose from the beginning. The
two paragraphs would not have been omitted in a copy intended for
Hill, because it was Hill's troops that at the time were stationed
nearest to Frederick City, and were prohibited from entering it.
It is evident that General Lee must have sent the whole order to
Hill, and it is equally manifest that McClellan had every reason for
inserting a full copy in his report if he received it.