to the first and permanent interests of society, the instinct is
fostered instead of being checked. The policy of the law to cherish
it is what dispenses indulgence to an excess of force requisite
to preserve it and palliates an unnecessary homicide. If human
institutions could so blunt this sense as to effectuate a law which
should forbid blow for blow not threatening death, the introduction
of slavery, to a great degree, would be already prepared. If,
however, the degradation should stop at this point, still there
would be a very ample scope for this powerful sense to act in, and
a dangerous attack, or a blow menacing death, being out of the
customary sufferance, would call up, in vigor, the unsubdued though
mutilated sense, and surprise it into action. It is not the object
of the law, in its regulation of the relation of master and slave,
to destroy any portion of the instinct of self-preservation. On the
contrary, it would be rejoiced to preserve it entire, but this is
inconsistent with the subjection of the slave, without which he is
valueless. If this instinct were permitted to be displayed by the
slave as by a freeman, the authority of the master would be at an
end. Hence it is that when it is not so essential to be curbed it
is allowed to enjoy a wider range; as, in respect of strangers who
have no right to assume any authority, it is permitted to turn many
degrees toward the condition of freemen. Hence it is, too, that
whenever the law, for the purpose of sustaining the relation of the
several parts of society deemed essential to the peace and safety
of the whole, tolerates its partial suppression, it provides the
best possible security against any abuse likely to occur because of
its required extinction. Thus it gives to the wife the protection of
love and identity of welfare; to the child the shield of affection;
to the apprentice the guaranty of a penal bond; and to the slave the
guard of interest. In general, in proportion as these securities
are weaker, that of the law itself ought to be stronger; and, in
proportion as the subjection in the one or the other of these
relations is required to be greater or less, so must the suppression
of this instinct be greater or less. The subjection in the relation
of slavery ought to be greater, and so ought the extinction of the
instinct to be greater than in any of the other relations. It is
the legal duty of all who are subjects in any one of them to adapt
and conform this instinct to the extent necessary to maintain the
relation; and if any one do not, he shall not plead its want of
subjection in excuse of a deed occasioned by his neglect of duty.
If an apprentice, being under lawful correction, shall resist and
slay his master, it is murder, and not manslaughter, because the
law cannot admit that he was provoked. If a slave be under any
correction, with or without cause from his master, provided it do
not threaten death or great bodily harm, and he resist and kill his
master, this is murder likewise, and for the same reason, as the law
requires this degree of submission from him. But if the apprentice
be unlawfully beaten and he resist and kill his master, it is not
murder, because the law hath not required him to extinguish his
instinct of preservation to such an extent, and therefore it admits
that he was provoked; so, if a slave be beset by his master in a
manner to threaten death and he slay his master, this cannot be
murder, because the law hath not required him to extinguish his
instinct to so great a degree, and, therefore, it admits that he
was provoked. In a word, in those bounds within which the law has
enjoined it as a duty to curb the instinct of self-preservation, we
are not allowed to display it, and if we do, the law cannot hear
the defense of provocation; but all display of it, out of these
bounds, is admissible and is the effect of legal provocation. The
law demands it as a duty that we should tame our passions to suit
the conditions which it has assigned us. It supposes that this duty
will become habitual and consequently easy of performance, and that
we will conform ourselves to its requirements. This, and this alone,
is the true foundation of all the distinction between the master and
the apprentice, between the freeman and the slave.
But having conformed ourselves to a given and required degradation,
to an enjoined submission, we are ready by our very nature and
habits to resist any degradation or submission greatly beyond that
which we have learned to acquiesce in as a duty. When a slave is
required to bare his back to the rod, he does it because it is
usual; but when he is required to stand as a target for his master's
gun, he is startled--no idea of duty sustains the requirement
and the unquelled portion of his instinct rouses his passions to
resistance.
Human institutions are inadequate to the task of settling a
condition in society which shall impart to its members the highest
perfection of philosophic fortitude and the lowest degradation of
animal existence--which shall blend into harmony the reasonable man
and the passionless brute.
When it is declared that a slave is a reasonable or human creature,
and that he is the subject of felony at common law; that murder and
manslaughter both may be perpetrated on his person, that himself
may commit both, it would seem to result that he was acknowledged
to possess the infirmities common to his species. That they must
be palliated in some cases, even when the master is the victim, I
hope I have satisfactorily shown. And now I come to the deliberate
conclusion that the only difference caused by the relation consists
in the fact that there are some acts of the slave which constitute
provocation that would not if done by a freeman; some which would
constitute provocation to the master which would not to a stranger;
and on the contrary, that a slave is not permitted to be provoked at
many acts done by a stranger freeman which would constitute a lawful
provocation if done by a fellow-slave; and that a great variety of
acts done by the master shall not be sufficient cause of provocation
which, if done by a stranger, would be so deemed, but that in not a
single relation in which the slave is placed by law is he debarred
in every case of violence to his person from feeling and pleading a
legal provocation.
If I have been successful in showing that the deceased greatly
abused his authority by shooting at the prisoner, and that the act
was calculated to produce a resentment not unreasonably conceived,
the inference in law is irresistible that if the prisoner,
immediately on being shot, had turned and slain the deceased, it
could not have been more than manslaughter; and the only important
point now remaining to be discussed is whether the interval of
time between the reception of the injury and the commission of the
homicide enhances the guilt of the deed. The law would be vain and
nugatory as a rule of action if it should allow that the passions
may be justly provoked and yet refuse to allow a reasonable time
for their subsidence. When it says that reason may be dethroned it
is never guilty of the solecism of holding the judgment accountable
till reason can be reseated. Whether there may have been sufficient
time for that important operation of the faculties, is a question
often dependent on the circumstances of the case. The continuance
of the original exciting causes and the addition of subsequent
stimulants being necessarily calculated to prevent the restoration
of reason, may prolong the time till they cease to exist; nor even
then, at the very moment of their cessation, does the law demand
that the bosom shall return to its calm and tranquillity. Such an
instantaneous repose is no more to be looked for, in the tempest of
the passions, than it is in the storms of the ocean, whose angry
waves are often seen to run mountain high long after the dark cloud
hath passed away, and the raving wind hath fled from the conflict,
leaving its enraged victim heaving with agitation beneath a tranquil
and sunny heaven.
The time in this case was but six or eight minutes, and the wound
calculated to produce death. If the exciting cause of provocation
had here ceased, it would be a rigid and unnatural rule, to
require, at the expiration of this short period, the presence of
a responsible judgment; for it is perfectly apparent, that in
proportion to the severity of the injury received, will be the
length of time which nature demands to adjust the shaken balance of
the mind. The prisoner had much cause to suspect that his wound
would prove fatal; and no man, either bond or free, laboring under
the excitement incident to such a situation, could, so soon, have
quelled his fury and recalled his scattered senses. But these few
moments were not allowed to be moments of rest and thought to the
wounded man. They were moments of flight and active pursuit; flight,
by a man, dangerously shot, his wounds bleeding in profusion, and
chafed into agony by the friction of his clothes and the motions
of his body; pursuit by a man who had meditated and attempted a
deadly injury; who called to his aid three more men, ready to
execute his purposes, whatever they might be, and who was well aware
of the mangled condition of his victim, and who, under the full
conviction of his shot proving fatal, cheered his comrades of the
chase, by the unfeeling exclamation, "He can't run far." Let it be
remembered, too, that the prisoner, during this space of time, had
run a distance of five or six hundred yards; that he was overtaken
by a man who, in moments perfectly cool, when compared with those
in which he captured the prisoner, had not hesitated to shoot him
at a distance of a few rods, and by what logic can we arrive at the
conclusion, either that the prisoner had enjoyed opportunity to
regain his judgment, or that he had not every reason to apprehend
from the deceased the finishing stroke to his life? How could he be
trusted, with every passion inflamed to madness, who in cooler times
had violated every duty as a man, had deliberately prepared himself
to take the life of his fellow-man, and, as a superintendent, had,
for trifling cause, attempted to destroy valuable property entrusted
to his care? In no part of the slave's conduct does he evince a
disposition to seek a conflict. He takes every occasion to avoid it.
When he is headed, he does not hesitate to turn his course, and flee
from an encounter.
Upon the whole, I cannot bring my mind to the conclusion, that
this case is of higher grade than manslaughter, if of that; and
whatever may be the prisoner's fate, I am free to declare, and
with the most sincere candor, that I do not recognize in his
conduct the moral depravity of a murderer, nor any high degree of
inaptitude to the condition of slavery. He was disobedient, it is
true, and ran to avoid chastisement. Three-fourths of our slaves
occasionally do this. He slew his overseer, it is true, after
having been dangerously shot, pursued and overtaken. The tamest and
most domestic brute will do likewise. And I feel that if he must
expiate the deed under the gallows, he will be a victim, not of
his own abandoned depravity, but a sacrifice offered to the policy
which regulates the relation of slavery among us. But before he
is sacrificed, it may be useful to inquire into that policy. The
interests of society demand that it should be fixed, and permanently
fixed, that the master may know the extent of his authority, and the
slave prepare himself to its accommodation.
No question can be more delicate, or attended with so many bad
consequences if settled in error. It would be next to impossible
for the judiciary to adjust this relation adversely to any strong
and deliberate opinion entertained by the public mind. The momentum
of this feeling, acting through the juries of the country and the
spirit of the Legislature, would be too powerful, successfully to
be encountered by the courts. And in whatsoever decided current
it might run, it would, finally, bear into its channel all
interpretations of the law.
By a timely and judicious administration of the law, however,
in relation to this subject, the courts may effect much in the
formation of public opinion, and at this time they may exert the
opportunities afforded by their situation, in a most happy manner to
impart fixedness and stability to those principles which form the
true basis of the policy. They have of late frequently announced
from the bench the progression of humanity in this relation, and
their clear conviction that the condition of the slave was rapidly
advancing in amelioration, under the benign influence of Christian
precept and the benevolent auspices of improving civilization. It
is believed that these convictions were founded in truth, and the
various laws on the statute books bring ample testimony to the
fact. As far as slavery has been the subject of legislation for
the last ninety years, it has been undergoing a gradual revolution
in favor of the slave, and it is confidently asserted, not adverse
to the best interests of the master, or of the security of the
public. In a popular government we can nowhere look for more correct
information of the state of the public mind, upon a subject
deeply interesting to the people at large, than in their laws. The
history of the legislation of the State for the last century on
this subject, during which more than a dozen principal acts have
been passed at intervals, is a history of a gradual progression in
the improvement of the condition of the slave, in the protection
of his person, his comforts, and those rights not necessary to
be surrendered to his master. The length of time in which this
evidence of a common sentiment has been continuing in one course,
is irrefutable testimony of its being the true and deliberate sense
of the community. Very lately the whole subject came before the
Legislature; and though it was at a time when the public mind was
inflamed and alarmed at a recent and yet reeking massacre, they
did not relax the laws made for their protection, nor render their
lives or persons less secure. From the Act of 1741, which put the
life of the slave, on trial, in the hands of three justices and four
freeholders, down to that of 1831, which secures, beyond doubt,
the right of the slave to a jury of slave owners, there will be
found, without a solitary retrograde, one continued, persevering,
and unbroken series of laws, raising the slave higher and higher in
the scale of moral being. To the period of 1794, the character of
the acts, though they are not numerous, nor strongly marked with
exclusive benefit to the slave, is evincive of an intent to afford
protection, where before it was weak.
It is not possible that there can be found, anywhere, a plainer
manifestation of a decided intent to raise the consideration
and standing of the slave than is expressed in these acts of
the Legislature. Will the Court disappoint this unequivocal
intention? Will they rebuke the spirit of the age and strike back
this unfortunate race of men, advancing from the depths of misery
and wretchedness to a higher ground under the shield of so much
legislation enacted in their behalf?
Our laws furnish incontestable evidence of what is the enlightened
sentiment of the State. The history of other nations affords a
body of luminous information to instruct us what that sentiment
should be; and I feel no small pleasure in believing that the
legislative policy of our past and present day most fully accords
with that course which the long tried experience of bygone ages has
distinctly marked out as the wiser and better one.
Upon this subject the Baron Montesquieu has gathered the choicest
materials of every age, clime, and nation. With a mind, formed in
the mould of patience itself; strong by nature and enriched with a
philosophic cultivation, he hath executed the task of analysis with
the most profound and discriminating sagacity. With no object in
view but the advancement of political knowledge, he hath unmasked
all the forms of government, traced to the fountain the principles
of their action, and exposed to the meanest capacity the deep-hidden
reasons of all the diversified relations of man, and the true genius
of the laws necessary to support them.
In his _Spirit of Laws_, Vol. I, p. 291 _et seq._, to 298, he
treats of the subject of slavery, and informs us as the result of
his inquiries that in governments whose policy is warlike, and the
citizens ever ready with arms in their hands to quell attempts to
regain liberty, slaves may be treated with great rigor and severity
without the hazard of servile wars; but that in republics, where
the policy is essentially pacific, and the citizens devoted to the
arts of peace and industry, the treatment of slaves should be mild
and humane; that the power of the master should not be absolute, and
that the slave should be put within the keeping of the law. If that
candid and ingenious writer be not deceived in his conclusions, he
has given us a hint for the regulation of our domestic servitude,
the neglect of which may lead to the most fatal sequel. Our
government is perhaps the most pacific on earth, and the citizens
most addicted to the pursuits of civilized life. How inconsistent,
then, will it be in us to adopt a policy in relation to our slaves
which must be either yielded up or must change the habits and
character of our people, and ultimately our form of government, with
the blessing of liberty itself.
We may not expect that the danger of servile wars will only operate
to arm the citizens generally in their own defense. The recent
insurrection may show, indeed, the formation of numerous companies
of yeomanry for the purpose of being always ready to meet and
vanquish the earliest movements of insurrectionary slaves; but a
little observation at this time, so soon, too, after the panic
that gave rise to these preparations, will serve to show that at
the present moment there remains scarcely a single one of the many
associations which were then formed. They grew up with the panic,
and they have vanished with it. It must be apparent, then, if ever
ready arms are necessary to our safety, they must be lodged in hands
not filled with other occupations, but responsible to the public
for efficiency and dispatch. In other words, if a display of force
be requisite to chain down the spirit of insurrection or stop the
bloody career of its actual march, a standing army, which will leave
the great body of citizens to pursue their favorite occupations of
peace in perfect security, will be the loud demand of the community.
How certainly such a permanent association of armed men, first
formed to preserve the relations of our slavery, will ultimately
introduce a civil slavery over the whole land, the experience of
other nations, and the warning of our own Constitution, will most
fearfully answer. I know it has been frequently said, and with
some it is a favorite idea, that the more cruel the master, the
more subservient will be the slave. This precept is abhorrent to
humanity, and is a heresy unsupported by the great mass of historic
experience. The despair of individuals cannot last forever; neither
will that of a numerous people afflicted with common wrongs, and
exchanging a common sympathy. Rome had no servile wars till her
masters had outraged every feeling of justice and benevolence and
made their slaves drink the cup of unmitigated cruelty to its last
drop; nor had she any, that I remember, after the first Christian
prince of the empire had relaxed the intolerable degradations of
that unfortunate class of her people.
I feel and acknowledge, as strongly as any man can, the inexorable
necessity of keeping our slaves in a state of dependence and
subservience to their masters. But when shooting becomes necessary
to prevent insolence and disobedience, it only serves to show the
want of proper domestic rules, but it will never supply it; and
never can a punishment like this effect any other purpose than to
produce open conflicts or secret assassinations.
In adjusting the balance of this delicate subject, let it not
be believed that the great and imminent danger is in overloading
the scale of humanity. The courts must pass through Scylla and
Charybdis; and they may be assured that the peril of shipwreck is
not avoided, by shunning with distant steerage, the whirlpool of
Northern fanaticism. That of the South is equally fatal. It may not
be so visibly seen, but it is as deep, as wide, and as dangerous.
[Illustration: J. JOHNSTON PETTIGREW.]
JAMES JOHNSTON PETTIGREW.
BY MRS. C. P. SPENCER.
James Johnston Pettigrew, late a Brigadier-General in the army of
the Confederate States, was born at Lake Scuppernong, in Tyrrell
county, North Carolina, upon the 4th day of July, 1828. His family
is of French extraction. At an early period, however, one branch
of it emigrated to Scotland, where it may be traced holding lands
near Glasgow about the year 1492. Afterwards a portion of it
removed to the northern part of Ireland. From this place James
Pettigrew, the great-grandfather of the subject of this sketch,
about the year 1732, came into Pennsylvania, and, some twenty
years afterwards, into North Carolina. About 1770 this gentleman
removed to South Carolina, leaving here, however, his son Charles,
who was a resident successively of the counties of Granville,
Chowan, and Tyrrell. Charles Pettigrew was subsequently the first
Bishop-elect of the Protestant Episcopal Church in this Diocese.
He died in 1807, and his memory survives fragrant with piety,
charity, and an extended usefulness. His son, Ebenezer, succeeded
to his estates and reputation, devoting his life to the successful
drainage and cultivation of the fertile lands which he owned and to
the government of the large family of which he was the head. Mr.
Pettigrew resisted every solicitation presented by his neighbors for
the employment of his talents in public service. Upon one occasion
alone was his reluctance overcome. In 1835 he was chosen by a very
flattering vote to represent his district in the Congress of the
United States. At that election he received the rare compliment
of an almost unanimous vote from his fellow-citizens of Tyrrell,
failing to obtain but three votes out of more than seven hundred. He
could not be prevailed upon to be a candidate at a second election.
Mr. Pettigrew married Miss Shepard, a daughter of the distinguished
family of that name seated at New Bern. She died in July, 1830,
when her son James Johnston was but two years of age. Ebenezer
Pettigrew lived until July, 1848, having witnessed with great
sensibility the very brilliant opening of his son's career among the
contemporary youth of the land.
After his mother's death the child was taken to the home of his
grandmother at New Bern, and there remained until he was carried
into Orange county to pursue his education. Owing to an unfortunate
exposure whilst an infant, young Pettigrew became a delicate
boy, but by diligent and systematic exercise he gradually inured
his constitution to endure without harm extraordinary fatigue
and the extremes of weather. He was a member of various schools
at Hillsborough from the year 1836, enjoying the advantages of
instruction by Mr. Bingham for about four years previous to becoming
a student at the University. During this period the state of his
health required him to be often at home for several months together.
He was a member of the University of North Carolina during a full
term of four years, graduating there at the head of his class in
June, 1847. From early childhood young Pettigrew had been noted as
a boy of extraordinary intellect. At all the schools he was easily
first in every class and in every department of study. He seemed to
master his text-books by intuition. They formed the smallest portion
of his studies, for his eager appetite for learning ranged widely
over subjects collateral to his immediate tasks. Nor did they always
stop here. His father was amused and gratified upon one occasion to
observe the extent to which he had profited by his excursions among
the medical books of an eminent physician at Hillsborough, of whose
family he was an inmate at the age of fourteen. In the class-room
at the University he appeared in reciting rather to have descended
to the level of the lesson than to have risen up to it. Student
as he was, and somewhat reserved in demeanor, he was nevertheless
very popular with his fellows, and the object of their enthusiastic
admiration.
Anecdotes were abundant as to the marvelous range of his
acquirements, and the generosity and patience with which he
contributed from his stores even to the dullest applicant for aid.
Nor was it only in letters that he was chief. A fencing-master, who
happened to have a class among the collegians, bore quite as decided
testimony to his merits in fencing as he had obtained from the
various chairs of the faculty respecting his proficiency in their
several branches.