FROM PUEBLA TO CHURUBUSCO.
On the 7th of August, 1847, the advance of General Scott's army, Twiggs'
division, the engineer company leading, left Puebla and commenced the
forward movement into the valley of Mexico. The company served with that
division, until Worth's division was placed in the lead during the
turning movement made by the army around Lake Chalco. In that movement
the engineer company was at the head of Worth's division.
The road ran between the western border of the lake and a high range of
hills which, in some places, rose from the water's edge. The road was
narrow and rough; and had been obstructed by rolling immense masses of
stone upon it from the almost overhanging cliffs. These obstructions
were of considerable height; they completely blocked our way; and at
several points ditches had been cut across the road.
General Worth directed the Light Battalion, under Colonel C. F. Smith,
to advance and drive off the Mexicans who were firing upon us--ordered
me to make the road passable for artillery and wagons as soon as
possible--and notified me that the leading brigade would assist in that
work when called upon. I immediately asked for a detail of 500 men; put
them to work, at once, under the direction of the officers and men of
the engineer company, and everything was progressing rapidly, when, to
my surprise, Lieutenant J. C. Pemberton, aide to General Worth, came up
to me and insisted that the whole character of the operations should be
changed. Whilst he was elaborating his views I cut him short by asking
if he had any orders for me from General Worth. In the meanwhile the
latter had reached the front, without either Pemberton or I being aware
of his presence. Before the aide had time to reply to my question,
General Worth, in a very peremptory tone called out "Come away from
there Mr. Pemberton, and let Mr. Smith alone. This is his business--not
yours".
In a few hours, the road was put in such condition that, by the use of
drag-ropes and men at the wheels, we were enabled to pass artillery and
wagons over the obstructions; and the column moved on without further
material delay.
After reaching San Augustine, and passing beyond, the forward movement,
now on the main road, or causeway, leading from Acapulco to the city of
Mexico, was checked by fortifications about six hundred yards in our
front. These fortifications crossed the road at San Antonio, and were
occupied by the enemy in large force. The afternoon of the 18th of
August, was spent in reconnoitring that position.
About 3 A. M., on the 19th, I received an order to return to San
Augustine with the engineer company and its train. In making our way
from the head of Worth's division, along the main road, towards the
rear, it was somewhat difficult to arouse the men of that division, who
were sleeping on the road, and get them to clear the way for the passage
of our wagons.
No explanation of the order for our return had been given. Just after
the dawn of day, and before we were clear of the division, two soldiers
on the side of the road, were lighting a fire for the purpose of
preparing coffee. As we passed them, one said to the other: "We are not
going to fight to-day: Twiggs's division is going to fight". The other
of the two replied, sneeringly: "What do you know about it?" To which
the first answered: "Don't you see those young engineer officers, with
the engineer company and their wagons? They are going back, to be sent
on another road with Twiggs's division, we are not going to fight
to-day". As we passed out of hearing of the two soldiers I said to
McClellan, who was riding by my side: "Did you hear that?" He answered
"Yes and I consider it the handsomest compliment that could be paid to
the engineer company. The private soldiers of this army understand that
we are sent where the hardest work and hardest fighting are to be
done--and always at the head of the leading division".
We reached San Augustine a little after sunrise, August 19. I will now
quote direct from my official report of these operations.
"Orders were [at once] received, from the headquarters of the army,
directing me to report to Captain R. E. Lee, of the Corps of Engineers,
with the company under my command, and [I] was ordered by Captain Lee to
take ten of my men, and select certain tools from the general engineer
train, in addition to those carried along with the company. I turned
over the command of the engineer company to Lieutenant McClellan, who,
under the direction of Captain Lee, proceeded at once to commence the
work on the road from San Augustine to Contreras." "In about one hour
and a half, I rejoined the command with the necessary implements for [a
large working force in] opening the road. Captain Lee directed me to
retain the men I then had with me, and to take charge of a certain
section of the road, to bring forward my wagons as rapidly as possible,
and to see that the road was practicable before I passed any portion of
it. At this time my company was divided into five sections, each under
an engineer officer directing operations on [different portions of] the
road".
AT CONTRERAS. General Scott, in his official report, says, "By
three o'clock, this afternoon, [August 19th.] the advanced divisions
came to a point where the new road could only be continued under the
direct fire of 22 pieces of the enemy's artillery [most of them of large
calibre] placed in a strong entrenched camp to oppose our operations,
and surrounded by every advantage of ground, besides immense bodies of
cavalry and infantry".
In my official report it is stated that; "The head of the column having
halted, I reached the front in time to receive instructions from Captain
Lee to halt the company, collect the scattered parties, and to examine
the road inclining to the left, while he went to the right. Lieutenants
McClellan and Foster had been for some hours detached. Having gone about
four hundred yards, I heard just ahead sharp firing of musketry; and
immediately after met Captain McClellan, of the topographical engineers,
and Lieutenant McClellan, of the engineer company, returning on
horseback--they had come suddenly on a strong picket, and were fired
upon. Lieutenant McClellan had his horse shot under him. Information of
the enemy's picket being in our vicinity was reported to General Twiggs,
who ordered a regiment of rifles forward. There being several engineer
officers present when the rifles came to the front, I returned to my
company, which had been for a short time left without an officer.
Captain Lee about this time, sent back for Captain Magruder's battery,
which was conducted by Lieutenant Foster, and placed in position by
Lieutenant McClellan".
"The Third Infantry was ordered to support the battery. I moved forward
with this regiment, taking my company and pack mules, loaded with tools,
and placed my command under such shelter as could be found on the left,
near the position occupied by the Third Infantry, and in rear of the
battery. Meeting with Lieutenant McClellan, I directed him still to
remain with the battery, but to order Lieutenant Foster to rejoin the
company. In a few moments this officer reported to me, and brought
information that the troops were preparing to storm the enemy's
position."
"Riley's brigade had moved in advance by our right. Leaving the mules
and tools, I moved the company forward, falling in with the brigade of
General [Persifor] Smith. Captain Lee being present, with his consent, I
requested the General to allow the engineer company to fight in his
brigade. He told me to take the head of the column, and to direct myself
towards a church in a village, on the left of the enemy's
battery--between it and the city. Whilst passing down the hill and
crossing the ravine, the enemy were rapidly appearing [reinforcements
from the direction of the city] on an eminence beyond the church.
General Smith directed me to take my company as an escort, reconnoitre
the village, and find out whether Colonel Riley's brigade was in the
vicinity. I continued some distance beyond the church; and returned
without seeing the brigade under Colonel Riley, which had, as I
understood afterwards, advanced very near [the rear of] the enemy's
battery. The reinforcements of the enemy upon the hill in our front were
rapidly increasing. They had at this time probably ten thousand men, on
the height, formed in line of battle. Towards dark Colonel Riley's
brigade returned and joined the troops under the command of General
Smith: too late, however, to allow time for forming the troops to attack
the enemy [on the hill] in our front. Lieutenant McClellan joined me
about this time in our movement on the village. Lieutenant Foster, who
was on horseback, became detached with a few of the men, and did not
rejoin me until after the action on the morning of the 20th."
"General Smith, very soon after dark, informed me that the enemy's main
battery would be stormed, [in rear], at daylight on the morning of the
20th. This would open the road for artillery, and our communications
with [the main army under] General Scott would be re-established. I
received orders to hold the engineer company ready to move at 3 A. M.
and to take my place on the right of the rifles. On the morning of the
20th there was considerable delay in the movement of the brigade [raw
troops] under General Cadwallader, by which General Smith's brigade, now
under the command of Major Dimmick, First Artillery, was detained very
nearly an hour. Part of the Eleventh Regiment [Cadwallader's brigade]
lost its way, caused the Voltigeurs to halt, thus throwing the brigade
under Major Dimmick still further from Riley's, which had moved very
soon after 3 o'clock. At the request of General Cadwallader, Major
Dimmick ordered me to turn over the command of my company to the officer
next in rank, and to move forward and conduct the troops that had lost
their way. The whole force was by sunrise, or little after, halted in a
sheltered position in rear of the enemy's battery". (Ex. Doc. No. 1,
Appendix p. 67).
I reported the cause of the delay to General Smith and requested
instructions to rejoin my company; but he said he desired that I should
remain with him for a while. By his order, the three brigades were soon
put in motion. I again asked him to permit me to rejoin my proper
command. He replied "Not yet" and added: "I will soon give you
instructions".
Because of a dense fog the delay in reaching the position in rear of the
Mexican works was no material disadvantage. The fog began to disappear
about the time I reported to General Smith. He was then on a ridge at a
point, about 600 yards in rear of the Mexican works. The three brigades
were passing around the extremity of that ridge, several hundred yards
in rear of the General. All was quiet in the lines of the enemy. There
was another ridge south of the one on which General Smith was standing,
and separated from it by a deep and very narrow valley. The sides of
both ridges were precipitous; their tops sloped gently to the enemy's
line.
General Smith informed me that Riley's brigade would pass partly beyond
the extremity of the second ridge; then face to the left, and attack a
strong Mexican detachment which was in position on that ridge, several
hundred yards in rear of their works. Riley was ordered to drive that
detachment and pursue it closely into the Mexican main lines.
Cadwallader's brigade would go on when Riley faced to the left; and, as
soon as he passed Riley, Cadwallader would also face to the left and
come into action on Riley's right. Smith's own brigade would turn to the
left before reaching the extremity of the second ridge. The Third
Infantry and First Artillery would advance in the deep valley between
the two ridges; whilst the Rifle Regiment, with the engineer company
leading, would ascend the steep slope of the second ridge, and get into
position on the flank, or rear, of the Mexican detachment which Riley
was to attack in front. In the meantime the head of Smith's brigade had
come within view, near the foot of the steep slope of the second ridge,
and was moving towards the Mexican main line.
General Smith pointed out to me the route to be taken to reach the top
of the second ridge; and ordered that the engineer company and rifles
should bear to the right, and on getting near the Mexican detachment,
remain concealed, and quiet, until Riley's brigade became well engaged;
then join in the attack and pursuit of that detachment.
With these specific instructions, I was ordered to rejoin my company;
and Lieutenant Beauregard was directed to take general charge of the
movements of Smith's brigade. When Beauregard and I reached the top of
the second ridge we found we were 50 yards, or less, in rear of the
Mexican detachment, which was facing Riley. All was quiet. In a very
few moments Riley's fire commenced.
The engineer company, followed by the rifle regiment was then forming in
line, under cover, in rear of the Mexican detachment, whose attention
was concentrated on Riley, in their front. We were between that
detachment and the Mexican works. A small portion only of the Rifle
Regiment was in line, when the firing with Riley became very severe, and
the order was given for the engineer company and rifles to rise and fire
into the backs of the enemy. That fire was very destructive. The
Mexicans were astounded; faced squarely about, and in a moment
precipitately retreated.
In my official report it is stated that: "Colonel Riley's advance became
engaged with a very strong picket, some 300 yards or more from the rear
of the [enemy's] battery, near the crest of the ridge; the engineers and
rifles came up at once in position to take the picket in rear, delivered
a deadly volley within 50 yards, cheered and rushed on. The enemy's
force fled; the head of our column crossed the line of their retreat,
which brought the right of the column [engineer company and rifles]
conducted by Lieutenant Beauregard, in contact with the Seventh
Infantry, which formed the left of Colonel Riley's brigade. I went into
the enemy's battery with the colors of the Seventh Infantry, my company
immediately behind me. The enemy, or at least a portion of them, stood
to their guns well, and delivered a fire of grape into our troops when
the head of the column was within 25 yards of their pieces. Our troops
followed the retreating enemy without halting until they were beyond the
reach of our musketry. Lieutenant Beauregard then strongly advised that
the troops be halted and formed. A short time afterwards General Twiggs,
came up. The pursuit was resumed. At San Angel we had an unimportant
skirmish". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 68).
The following additional quotations from my official report are not
deemed irrelevant:
"In the action of the morning of the 20th--the battle of Contreras--my
men acted with great gallantry; their promptness in obeying every order,
and the effect with which they used their muskets, entitle them all to
the highest praise. In my report to the chief engineer in the field, I
shall make special mention of all who, to my knowledge, particularly
distinguished themselves. I will mention here, First Sergeant D. H.
Hastings, of the engineer company, who, by his gallant conduct and
soldiery bearing, in this action, richly deserves promotion to the rank
of commissioned officer in the army. Sergeant Hastings was slightly
wounded by my side in the battery. Sergeant [S. H.] Starr attracted my
particular attention by his gallant and efficient conduct. Sergeant
Starr was the ranking non-commissioned officer with the detachment of
the engineer company which accompanied Colonel Harney's command at the
battle of Cerro Gordo. I would recommend him for promotion [to the grade
of commissioned officer in the army]."
"Artificer W. H. Bartlett attracted my particular attention by [his]
cool and steady gallantry, Artificer A. S. Read shot the color bearer of
the Twelfth Regiment of artillery, and secured the color."
"Lieutenant Foster was at this time, as I have before remarked, detached
with a portion of the company; and, at the head of his men, led the
Ninth and Twelfth Regiments of Infantry in their attack on the flank of
the retreating column at Contreras."
"Lieutenant McClellan, frequently detached, and several times in command
of the engineer company, is entitled to the highest praise for his cool
and daring gallantry, on all occasions, in the actions of both the 19th
and 20th." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 69.)
In the pursuit, we passed through the village of San Angel; and near
that place, were again halted. During that halt, I noticed a large, high
building, in an extensive open field, five or six hundred yards to the
North. I was satisfied that from the top of that building, with a
powerful field glass, which was a portion of the engineer company
equipment, I would be able to get a good view of the level country for
miles around, and obtain quite definite knowledge of the positions and
movements of the main Mexican forces.
I communicated my wishes to Major Loring; and asked him if he felt
authorized to support the engineer company, with the Rifle Regiment, in
a close reconnaissance of the building I pointed out. He laughingly
replied: "I have been directed by General Smith to follow you and your
company--of course I will go with you".
We had not proceeded more than two hundred yards towards the building
when we were overtaken by Lieutenant Van Dorn, Aide to General Smith,
who brought an order requiring the Rifle Regiment and the engineer
company to return to the head of the column on the road. I told Van Dorn
the purpose I had in view, asked him to explain the matter to General
Smith, and expressed my conviction that he would approve the movement,
when he knew its object. Van Dorn replied: "General Smith was very
peremptory. I am directed to see that you and Major Loring, with your
respective commands, return at once". On our way back, Van Dorn said
that General Pillow had reached the front and taken control; and his
belief was that General Pillow had ordered General Smith to recall the
engineer company and the Rifle Regiment. A short time thereafter we
moved from San Angel to Coyoacan, where the head of the column again
halted; and was soon joined by General Scott.
There is good reason to believe that observations, which could easily
have been made from the roof of the high building above referred to,
would have resulted in obtaining such information in regard to the
Mexican position at the Convent of Churubusco and at the _tete-de-pont_,
as would have enabled General Scott to complete the rout of the Mexican
Army without incurring the additional loss of nearly one thousand men in
killed and wounded.
AT CHURUBUSCO. The following quotations are taken from my
official report:
"Between 12 and 1 o'clock, P. M., [August 20, 1847] I received orders to
move, from the village of [Coyoacan] immediately after the rifle
regiment, on a road intersecting the road from San Antonio to Mexico, in
order to cut off the enemy already retreating from San Antonio.
"I had not gone two hundred yards when I received orders to countermarch
and move on another route intersecting the road from San Antonio to the
city nearer to Mexico. [The latter road led nearly due east, parallel to
the front of the earthworks at the Convent, distant from those works
about 250 yards]. The regiment of riflemen continued on the road on
which I first started. [This road led south-east from Coyoacan]. The
company took its place [again] at the head of the column [Twiggs's
division]. The column was halted by General Twiggs, and I was directed
by him to send an officer in advance to see the position of a battery
reported to be not far in front. Lieutenant McClellan was sent on one
road; and Lieutenant Stevens of the engineers, was directed by General
Twiggs, to take another. Both officers soon returned and reported a
battery in front of a convent, the roof and steeples of which were in
plain view of the head of the column and within 700 yards. The roof was
crowded with troops; the battery was masked by intervening trees and
corn-fields. General Twiggs then directed these officers to make a
closer reconnaissance and ordered my company as an escort. Having
proceeded 500 yards, we saw [Mexican] troops on our right, left, and in
front. A lancer was taken prisoner. Lieutenant Stevens directed me to
take the prisoner to the general and request an additional escort of two
companies. We were at this time about 300 yards from the battery, but it
was still almost masked from view. I delivered the prisoner and the
message to General Twiggs, and returned at once to my company which I
had left in charge of Lieutenant Foster. Lieutenant Stevens joined
General Twiggs whilst I was with him. When I resumed command of the
company, Lieutenant McClellan reported to me that _our troops were
already engaged in our front_; having, apparently, turned the battery
and convent by our right. One of General Twiggs's staff, [Lieutenant W.
T. H. Brooks, A. A. Adjutant General, Twiggs's division,] was present
and informed us that the rifles with Captain Lee of the engineers, were
reconnoitring the same works, and had gone to our right considerably
farther from the battery than we then were. We all concurred in opinion
that the rifles were engaged with a vastly superior force. There was at
this time no firing of artillery. I ordered Lieutenant McClellan to
report the result of his observations to General Twiggs. He did so, and
on the recommendation of Lieutenants Stevens and McClellan, in which I
concurred, the First Regiment of Artillery was ordered to support the
rifles. The firing on the right increased; it was evident that several
thousands of the enemy were pouring a heavy musketry fire into our
troops on the right. The tops of the convent and the surrounding walls
were lined with troops; the roof was literally covered. Lieutenant
Stevens was of opinion that a few rounds of grape would disperse these
masses and relieve our troops already engaged [on the right] from a
destructive plunging fire. He went back to the general, leaving myself
the senior engineer then in front of the [convent] battery. The fire had
now become very brisk upon my [reconnoitring] party; having placed the
company under the best shelter at hand, with Lieutenant Foster I
proceeded to examine the works to determine the number, character and
position of the pieces of artillery. Nothing heavier than a 4 or
6-pounder had yet been fired." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 69.)
In my official report it is further stated that: "The troops had become
engaged in our front within ten minutes after a reconnaissance had been
ordered by General Twiggs, and before the officer whom I was escorting
had been able to make a single observation".
In my official copy of that report, I find the following sentence, which
is not in the printed report:
"Deeply do I regret that the attack, in advance of the reconnoitring
party, precipitated the attack on our side, and involved us in action
against we knew not what".
The force which became engaged, far to our right--before the
reconnaissance, supported by the engineer company, fairly commenced,
was the advance of Worth's division pursuing the Mexicans who had
abandoned their strong works at San Antonio.
Captain James L. Mason, engineer of Worth's division, says, in his
official report, that the works attacked by that division, and "so
gallantly stormed, had not been reconnoitred".
The engineers in front of the convent, being informed that the rifles
with Captain Lee had gone to our right considerably farther from the
battery, advised that the rifles be supported by an additional regiment.
The same engineers advised that one gun be sent to the front to drive
the Mexicans from the roof of the convent, and thus relieve our troops
on the right from a destructive plunging fire.
The additional escort of two companies, asked for by the reconnoitring
engineers, had not come to the front. After Lieutenant Stevens had gone
back to General Twiggs, to have one gun with a few rounds of proper
ammunition sent forward for the purpose of clearing the roof of the
convent, the firing in our front, on the San Antonio road, had
materially increased; and the fire from the convent, upon the engineer
company, was becoming troublesome. There had been, to me, unexpected
delay in bringing the one gun forward; and I determined, as already
stated, to place the men under the best shelter at hand, and endeavor to
make, in person, a closer examination of the works.
Resuming quotations from my official report--it is therein stated:
"At this time the First Artillery came up to where I was. The lamented
and gallant Burke, at the head of the leading company, asked which
direction they were to take. I inquired what were his orders. He said
that the regiment was ordered to support the Rifles. I pointed to the
smoke, which was all we could see by which to determine the position of
our troops engaged in a corn-field on our right; told him that they
reached their present place by moving farther to the rear, out of range
of the works; and remarked to him that the fire through which he would
have to pass in the direction he was going was very severe. He replied
that they were ordered to move by that road to support the Rifles. The
First Artillery filed by and soon encountered, at a distance of 150
yards from the enemy, the heaviest fire of artillery and musketry,
followed almost immediately after [by that] brought to bear upon
Taylor's battery, which had been ordered to fire upon the convent; and,
in selecting a place suitable for managing the guns, had most
unfortunately been placed, entirely exposed, directly in front of a well
constructed battery with heavy pieces firing in embrasure."
"As the First Artillery filed by me, I ordered my company to be formed,
determined to go on with the reconnaissance; and if possible, send back
to the general, [Twiggs,] accurate information in reference to the works
of the enemy and the position of our own troops, which at that time I
could not understand. In moving forward, I was opposite the centre of
the [First] Artillery which inclined more to the left, toward the
battery, whilst I kept nearer the [principal road leading almost due
east from Coyoacan]. The ground was level, but some shelter was afforded
to small bodies of men, by the ditches, maguey plant, etc. I ordered my
men to separate, to shelter themselves as much as possible, [and] to
keep within supporting distance of me. I proceeded about two hundred
yards. I ordered every man to shelter himself in a small ditch which was
fortunately near us; immediately after I heard the fire of Taylor's
battery passing directly over my head. [When that fire commenced we
were] in the corn-field, about half-way between Taylor's battery and the
enemy. Requiring my command to lie close, with Lieutenant Foster, I made
my way to an old ruined wall in the open space east of the corn-field,
and from that position sent Lieutenant Foster to General Twiggs to
report the extent of the line engaged on the right, that we were
directly in front of the works [which were now in plain view], and that,
in my opinion, the whole force under General Twiggs's command should
turn the enemy's position by our left. Another battery [of the enemy]
was seen distinctly to our right and far in rear of the Churubusco
battery, apparently enfilading our line engaged on the right. General
Twiggs had already sent Colonel Riley's brigade to turn the position by
our left, and take the battery by the gorge. When Lieutenant Foster
returned, I withdrew the company to a position of more safety, and
joined General Smith and Lieutenant Stevens, who were near the place
from which I started with the First Artillery. I remained there [under
General Smith's order] until after the action." (Ex. Doc. No. 1,
Appendix, pp. 70-71.)
That point was about 300 yards south-west of the convent. There were
several adobe houses near, and from it a road along which there were
some huts, led to the convent, and another road, almost due east, passed
in front of the convent. In moving forward I had kept nearer the latter
road, the First Artillery nearer the former. The point I reached in the
open, east of the corn-field, was within less than 100 yards of the
works at the convent, and there was every indication that these works
did not extend along the western side of that building.
The place at which I joined General Smith and Lieutenant Stevens, after
I returned from beyond the corn-field, was that at which it had been
proposed to place one gun, under cover of the adobe hut; run it out by
hand; fire, and run it under shelter again to reload. By this means, a
few rounds of grape, canister, and shrapnel, could have cleared the roof
of the convent.
In more senses than one, the firing of Taylor's battery through the
ranks of the engineer company, in the corn-field, was a surprise to me.
I learned from Lieutenant Stevens that, when he applied for one gun to
be sent to the front, those in authority had deemed it best to send
forward a whole battery, and place it in an open field, square in front
of the fortifications.
The battle of Churubusco was commenced, and mostly fought, haphazard,
against the front of the Mexican fortified lines, without giving time
for proper reconnaissance.
General Scott, in his official report of the battle, says: "Lieutenant
Stevens of the engineers, supported by Lieutenant G. W. Smith's company
of sappers and miners, of the same corps, was sent to reconnoitre the
strongly fortified church or convent of San Pablo in the hamlet of
Churubusco--one mile off [from Coyoacan]. Twiggs with one of his
brigades [Smith's, less the rifles] and Captain Taylor's field battery,
were ordered to follow and to attack the convent. Major Smith, senior
engineer, was despatched to concert with Twiggs the mode of attack, and
Twiggs's other brigade [Riley's] I soon ordered to support him." (Ex.
Doc. No. 1, p. 309.)
Major John L. Smith, senior engineer, says: "Lieutenant Stevens in the
reconnaissance of the position of Churubusco, was assisted by Lieutenant
McClellan and escorted by the company of sappers and miners. This
company also participated in the operations of the right [of Twiggs's
division]". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 353.)
Major Dimmick, commanding the First Regiment of Artillery, says: "About
12 o'clock, M., the battalion was ordered to attack the position of the
enemy at the church, reported by the engineers at the time to have but
one piece of artillery. The point of attack selected by the senior
engineer officer was masked by a corn-field, in front of which I
deployed the battalion and ordered it to advance, when almost instantly
a shower of musketry, grape and round shot poured upon us, under which
the battalion advanced".
"The right had advanced to within one hundred yards of a regular bastion
front, the curtain of which had four pieces in embrasure, besides nearly
a thousand infantry, both of which kept up such a constant stream of
fire that I could not advance further in line; I therefore ordered the
men to cover themselves as well as possible. The left of the battalion
advanced to within seventy yards of the work, being exposed to the fire
of two pieces of artillery, _en barbette_, in addition to the fire of a
considerable force of infantry and some of them still nearer, so that
they had a destructive fire on the cannoniers and infantry; which
position the battalion maintained until the enemy were driven from their
guns and bastion, when they were followed into their work and
surrendered." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 78.)
Captain Francis Taylor, commanding light battery, says: "On reaching
Churubusco, we came in sight of a church, where the enemy was posted,
having, as was supposed, an entrenched battery thrown across the road.
Troops were soon thrown forward to attack this place; and, after a short
time, I was ordered to place the battery in a position where it was
thought I could drive the enemy from the roof and walls of the church,
and sustain the other troops in their efforts to carry this place by
storm. On taking the position assigned me, I found we were exposed to a
most terrible fire of artillery and musketry, of a regular entrenchment,
covering the front of the church to which we were opposite, and which
the intervening Indian corn hid from our sight at the time. Here I
opened my battery, and it was served with great precision for about an
hour and a half, notwithstanding it was exposed, during that time, to a
constant shower of grape, round shot, shell and musketry. At last,
finding my loss was becoming very great, and having succeeded in driving
the enemy from the roof and walls of the church, and given to our troops
such support as was in my power, I determined to withdraw the pieces".
(Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 73).
The connection between the reconnaissance of the engineers, and the
operations of the First Artillery and Taylor's battery at Churubusco,
has already been described in extracts taken from my official report.
In his official report, General Persifor F. Smith says: "Lieutenant G.
W. Smith, in command of the engineer company, and Lieutenant McClellan,
his subaltern, distinguished themselves throughout the whole of the
three actions [19th and 20th at Contreras; and at Churubusco]. Nothing
seemed to them too bold to be undertaken, or too difficult to be
executed; and their services as engineers were as valuable as those they
rendered in battle at the head of their gallant men. Lieutenant Foster,
being detached from his company during the action at Contreras, did not
fall under my notice; but in the action on the 19th and at Churubusco,
he was equally conspicuous for his gallantry". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 332).
General Twiggs, in his official report, says: "To Lieutenant G. W.
Smith, of the engineers, who commanded the company of sappers and
miners, I am under obligations for his services on this and on other
occasions. Whenever his legitimate duties with the pick and spade were
performed, he always solicited permission to join in the advance of the
storming party with his muskets, in which position his gallantry, and
that of his officers and men, was conspicuously displayed at Contreras
as well as Cerro Gordo." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 325.)