PART III. AUDITORY REACTIONS OF FROGS._Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 1 Containing Sixteen Experimental Investigations from the Harvard Psychological Laboratory.

X. HEARING IN THE FROG.

A. Influences of Sounds in the Laboratory.

After determining the simple reaction time of the green frog to

tactual and electrical stimulation, I attempted to do the same in case

of auditory stimuli. In this I was unsuccessful because of failure to

get the animal to give a motor response which could be recorded. The

animal was placed in an experimenting box with a string attached to

one hind leg as in the experiments described in Part II., and after it

had become accustomed to the situation a sound was made. A wide range

of sounds were tried, but to none except the croak of another frog was

a motor reaction frequently given. Even a loud noise, such as the

explosion of a large pistol cap, caused a visible motor reaction only

in rare cases. In fifty trials with this stimulus I succeeded in

getting three reactions, and since all of them measured between 230

and 240[sigma] it is perhaps worth while to record the result as

indicative of the auditory reaction time. As these were the only

measurements obtained, I have no satisfactory basis for the comparison

of auditory with other reaction times.

The remarkable inhibition of movement shown by the frog in the

presence of strong auditory stimulation, at least what is for the

human being a strong stimulus, led me to inquire concerning the limits

and delicacy of the sense of hearing in frogs. In the vast quantity of

literature on the structure and functions of the sense organs of the

animal I have been able to find only a few casual remarks concerning

hearing.

In approaching the problem of frog audition we may first examine the

structure of the ear for the purpose of ascertaining what sounds are

likely to affect the organ. There is no outer ear, but the membrana

tympani, or ear drum, covered with skin, appears as a flat disc from 5

to 10 mm. in diameter on the side of the head just back of the eye and

a little below it. In the middle ear there is but one bone, the

columella, forming the connecting link between the tympanum and the

internal ear. The inner ear, which contains the sense organs,

consists of a membranous bag, the chief parts of which are the

utriculus, the sacculus, the lagena, and the three semicircular

canals. The cavity of this membranous labyrinth is filled with a

fluid, the endolymph; and within the utriculus, sacculus and lagena

are masses of inorganic matter called the otoliths. The auditory nerve

terminates in eight sense organs, which contain hair cells. There is

no cochlea as in the mammalian ear. The assumption commonly made is

that vibrations in the water or air by direct contact cause the

tympanic membrane to vibrate; this in turn causes a movement of the

columella, which is transmitted to the perilymphatic fluid of the

inner ear. The sensory hair cells are disturbed by the movements of

the otoliths in the endolymph, and thus an impulse is originated in

the auditory nerve which results in a sensation more or less

resembling our auditory sensation. It is quite probable that the

frog's sense of hearing is very different from ours, and that it is

affected only by gross air vibrations. This conclusion the anatomy of

the ear supports.

Although there does not seem to be a structural basis for a delicate

sense of hearing, one must examine the physiological facts at hand

before concluding that frogs do not possess a sense of hearing similar

to our own. First, the fact that frogs make vocal sounds is evidence

in favor of the hearing of such sounds at least, since it is difficult

to explain the origin of the ability to make a sound except through

its utility to the species. Granting, however, that a frog is able to

hear the croaks or pain-screams of its own species, the range of the

sense still remains very small, for although the race of frogs makes a

great variety of sounds, any one species croaks within a narrow range.

Having satisfied myself that motor reactions for reaction-time

measurements could not be gotten to any ordinary sounds in the

laboratory, I tried the effect of the reflex croaking of another frog

of the same species. In attempting to get frogs to croak regularly, I

tested the effect of removing the brain. The animals are said to croak

reflexly after this operation whenever the back is stroked; but for

some reason I have never been successful in getting the reaction

uniformly. In many cases I was able to make normal animals croak by

rubbing the back or flanks, and to this sound the animals under

observation occasionally responded by taking what looked like an

attitude of attention. They straightened up and raised the head as if

listening. In no case have other motor responses been noticed; and the

above response was so rare that no reaction-time measurements could be

made.

Again, while working with the green frog on habit formation, I one day

placed two animals in a labyrinth from which they could escape by

jumping into a tank of water. Several times when one frog jumped into

the water I noticed the other one straighten up and hold the

'listening' or 'attentive' attitude for some seconds. As the animals

could not see one another this is good evidence of their ability to

hear the splash made by a frog when it strikes the water.

B. Influence of Sounds in Nature.

In order to learn how far fear and artificial conditions were causes

of the inhibition of response to sounds in the laboratory, and how far

the phenomenon was indicative of the animal's inability to perceive

sounds, I observed frogs in their native haunts.

By approaching a pond quietly, it is easy to get within a few yards of

frogs sitting on the banks. In most cases they will not jump until

they have evidence of being noticed. Repeatedly I have noted that it

is never possible to get near to any frogs in the same region after

one has jumped in. In this we have additional proof that they hear the

splash-sound. To make sure that sight was not responsible for this

on-guard condition in which one finds the frogs after one of their

number has jumped into the water, I made observations on animals that

were hidden from one another. The results were the same. I therefore

conclude that the splash of a frog jumping into the water is not only

perceived by other frogs in the vicinity, but that it is a peculiarly

significant sound for them, since it is indicative of danger, and

serves to put them 'on watch.'

A great variety of sounds, ranging in pitch from a low tone in

imitation of the bull frog's croak to a shrill whistle, and in

loudness from the fall of a pebble to the report of a pistol, were

tried for the purpose of testing their effects upon the animals in

their natural environment. To no sound have I ever seen a motor

response given. One can approach to within a few feet of a green frog

or bull frog and make all sorts of noises without causing it to give

any signs of uneasiness. Just as soon, however, as a quick movement is

made by the observer the animal jumps. I have repeatedly crept up very

close to frogs, keeping myself screened from them by bushes or trees,

and made various sounds, but have never succeeded in scaring an animal

into a motor response so long as I was invisible. Apparently they

depend almost entirely upon vision for the avoidance of dangers.

Sounds like the splash of a plunging frog or the croak or pain-scream

of another member of the species serve as warnings, but the animals do

not jump into the water until they see some sign of an unusual or

dangerous object. On one occasion I was able to walk to a spot where a

large bull frog was sitting by the edge of the water, after the frogs

about it had plunged in. This individual, although it seemed to be on

the alert, let me approach close to it. I then saw that the eye turned

toward me was injured. The animal sat still, despite the noise I made,

simply because it was unable to see me; as soon as I brought myself

within the field of vision of the functional eye the frog was off like

a flash.

Many observers have told me that frogs could hear the human voice and

that slight sounds made by a passer-by would cause them to stop

croaking. In no case, however, have such observers been able to assert

that the animals were unaffected by visual stimuli at the same time. I

have myself many times noticed the croaking stop as I approached a

pond, but could never be certain that none of the frogs had seen me.

It is a noteworthy fact that when one frog in a pond begins to croak

the others soon join it. Likewise, when one member of such a chorus is

frightened and stops the others become silent. This indicates that the

cessation of croaking is a sign of danger and is imitated just as is

the croaking. There is in this fact conclusive evidence that the

animals hear one another, and the probability is very great that they

hear a wide range of sounds to which they give no motor reactions,

since they do not depend upon sound for escaping their enemies.

The phenomenon of inhibition of movement in response to sounds which

we have good reason to think the frogs hear, and to which such an

animal as a turtle or bird would react by trying to escape, is thus

shown to be common for frogs in nature as well as in the laboratory.

This inhibition is in itself not surprising, since many animals

habitually escape certain of their enemies by remaining motionless,

but it is an interesting phenomenon for the physiologist. We have to

inquire, for instance, what effects sounds which stimulate the

auditory organs and cause the animal to become alert, watchful, yet

make it remain rigidly motionless, have on the primary organic rhythms

of the organism, such as the heart-beat, respiration, and peristalsis.

It is also directly in the line of our investigation to inquire how

they affect reflex movements, or the reaction time for any other

stimulus--what happens to the reaction time for an electrical

stimulus, for example, if a loud noise precede or accompany the

electrical stimulus.

For the purpose of determining the range of hearing in the frog, I was

driven to study the influence of sounds upon respiration. Although the

animals did not make any detectable movement, not even of an eyelid,

in response to noises, it seemed not improbable that if the sounds

acted as auditory stimuli at all, they would in some degree modify the

form or rate of the respiratory movement.

C. Influence of Sounds on Respiration.[16]

[16] For full discussion of the normal respiratory movements of

the frog see Martin, _Journal of Physiology,_ Vol. 1., 1878,

pp. 131-170.

The method of recording the respiration was the direct transference of

the movement of the throat by means of a pivoted lever, one end of

which rested against the throat, while the other served as a marker on

a revolving drum carrying smoked paper. The frog was put into a small

box, visual stimuli were, so far as possible, excluded and the lever

was adjusted carefully; a record was then taken for at least half a

minute to determine the normal rate of respiration in the absence of

the stimulus whose effect it was the chief purpose of the experiment

to discover. Then, as soon as everything was running smoothly, the

auditory stimulus was given. The following records indicate the

effects of a few stimuli upon the rate of breathing:

1. Stimulus, 100 V. tuning fork.

Number of respirations for 10 cm. _before_ stimulus 18.0, 17.0; number

of respirations for 10 cm. _after_ stimulus 19.0, 17.3.

The records indicate very little change, and contradict one another.

For the same stimulus the experiment was tried of taking the normal

respiration record for a complete revolution of the drum, and then at

once taking the record for the same length of time (about two minutes)

with the tuning-fork vibrating close to the frog. The following result

is typical and proves that the sound has little effect.

Number of respirations in a revolution _before_ stimulus: First rev.

88; second rev. 88. Number of respirations in a revolution _during_

stimulus: First rev. 87; second rev. 88.

Concerning the influence of tuning-fork stimuli more will be said

later in a consideration of the effects of auditory stimuli upon

reactions to visual stimuli.

2. The influence of falling water as an auditory stimulus. Water was

allowed to fall about two feet in imitation, first, of a plunging

frog, and second, of water falling over rocks. In representing the

effect of the stimulus on the rate of respiration, I have given the

distance on the drum covered by the ten complete respirations just

preceding the stimulus and the ten following it.

10 Respirations. 10 Respirations.

_Before_ Stimulus. _After_ Stimulus.

1st Stim. 13.0 cm. 11.8 cm.

2d Stim. 12.7 cm. 12.7 cm.

With a smaller animal.

1st Stim. 5.4 cm. 4.8 cm.

2d Stim. 4.9 cm. 4.7 cm.

Average for 5 5.00 cm. 4.86 cm.

_These records show a marked increase in the rate of respiration just

after the auditory stimulus is given for the first time._ The stimulus

has less effect when repeated after an interval of one or two minutes,

and if repeated several times it finally causes no noticeable change.

On the whole, the sound of falling water seems to arouse the animals

to fuller life. The stimulus appears to interest them, and it

certainly accelerates respiration. This is precisely what one would

expect from a sound which is of special significance in the life of

the animal.

3. In case of a loud shrill whistle inhibition of respiration

resulted. This probably means that the frogs were frightened by the

sound. Falling water served rather to excite their natural-habitat

associations, whereas, the whistle, being an uncommon and unassociated

sound, caused fear. It is evident to the casual observer that the frog

sometimes inhibits and sometimes increases its respiratory movements

when frightened, so the result in this experiment is in no way

surprising. I am by no means certain, however, that a longer series of

observations on several individuals would give constant inhibitory

results. My immediate purpose in the work was to get evidence of

hearing; the respiratory changes were of secondary importance,

although of such great interest that I have planned a more thorough

special study of them for the future.

A few sample results showing the influence of the whistle upon a small

bull-frog follow:

Length of 10 Resps. Length of 10 Resps.

_Before_ Stimulus in cm. _After_ Stimulus in cm.

1st Stim. 6.0 6.7

2d " 5.4 6.0

3d " 5.9 5.8

1st " 4.7 5.4

2d " 4.4 4.6

As a test-check observation for comparison, the influence of a visual

stimulus upon respiration was noted under the same conditions as for

the auditory. Effect of turning on electric light over box.

Length in cm. of 10 Resps. Length in cm. of 10 Resps.

_Before_ Stimulus. _After_ Stimulus.

4.8 4.4

5.3 4.6

4.5 4.0

These results indicate an increase in the respiration rate due to the

visual stimulus.

4. Of the other auditory stimuli used, the pistol-cap explosion gave

very irregular results. For one animal it caused acceleration, for

another inhibition. There is, however, good evidence that the sounds

were heard.

5. The ringing of a bell gave results similer to those for a whistle,

and the sound of a 500 S.V. tuning fork usually caused a slight

increase in the rate of breathing. In these experiments I therefore

have evidence, through their effects upon respiration, of the frog's

ability to hear sounds ranging from 50 V. to at least 1,000 V.

The croak of the green frog ranges from 100 to 200 V., so far as I

have been able to determine. That of the bull frog is lower, from 50

to 75; and in the leopard frog the range is from 80 to 125. The latter

is very different from the green frog in its croaking, in that it

croaks whenever disturbed, whereas, the green frog rarely responds in

that way to a stimulus.

We are now in a position to say that the failure of frogs to give

motor reactions to strong auditory stimuli is not due to their

inability to be affected by the stimuli, but is a genuine inhibition

phenomenon.

XI. THE EFFECTS OF AUDITORY STIMULI ON VISUAL REACTIONS.

Further experimental evidence of hearing was gotten from some work

done to test the influence of sounds upon motor reactions to visual

stimuli. Frogs, like most other amphibians, reptiles and fishes, are

attracted by any small moving object and usually attempt to seize it.

They never, so far as I have noticed, feed upon motionless objects,

but, on the other hand, will take almost anything which moves.

Apparently the visual stimulus of movement excites a reflex. A very

surprising thing to those who are unfamiliar with frog habits is the

fear which small frogs have of large ones. Put some green frogs or

small bull frogs into a tank with large bull frogs, and the little

ones will at once show signs of extreme fear; they jump about in the

most excited manner and try hard to escape. The cause of their fear

soon appears, since it is usually only a few minutes until the little

ones are swallowed by their wide-mouthed, cannibalistic fellows.

It is, moreover, well known that a bit of red flannel fastened to a

hook attracts frogs and is an excellent method of capturing them. Red

seems to be the color which they most readily notice.

This tendency of the frog to attempt to seize any moving object I made

use of to test the value of sounds. By placing a frog in a glass

aquarium which was surrounded by a screen, back of which I could work

and through a small hole in which I was able to watch the animal

without being noticed by it, and then moving a bit of red cardboard

along one side of the aquarium, I could get the frog to jump at it

repeatedly. In each attempt to get the moving object, the animal

struck its head forcibly against the glass side of the aquarium. There

was, therefore, reason to think that a few trials would lead to the

inhibition of the reaction. Experiment discovered the fact that a

hungry frog would usually jump at the card as many as twenty times in

rapid succession.

In this reaction to a visual stimulus there appeared good material for

testing audition. I therefore arranged a 500 S.V. tuning fork over the

aquarium and compared the reactions of animals to the visual stimulus

alone, with that to the visual stimulus when accompanied by an

auditory stimulus. The tuning-fork sound was chosen because it seemed

most likely to be significant to the frog. It is similar to the sounds

made by the insects upon which frogs feed. For this reason one would

expect that the sight of a moving object and the sound of a

tuning-fork would tend to reënforce one another.

The experiments were begun with observations on the effects of moving

objects on the respiration. In case of a normal rate of 54

respirations per minute sight of the red object caused an increase to

58. Then the same determination was made for the auditory stimulus.

The tuning-fork usually caused an increase in rate. In a typical

experiment it was from 65 per minute to 76. The observations prove

conclusively that the 500 S.V. sound is heard. My attention was turned

to the difference of the environment of the ear in its relation to

hearing. Apparently frogs hear better when the tympanum is partially

under water than when it is fully exposed to the air.

Having discovered by repeated trials about how vigorously and

frequently a frog would react to the moving red card, I tried the

effect of setting the fork in vibration a half minute before showing

the card. It was at once evident that the sound put the frog on the

alert, and, when the object came into view, it jumped at it more

quickly and a greater number of times than when the visual stimulus

was given without the auditory. This statement is based on the study

of only two animals, since I was unable to get any other frogs that

were in the laboratory at the time to take notice of the red

cardboard. This was probably because of the season being winter. I

venture to report the results simply because they were so definite as

to point clearly to the phenomenon of the reënforcement of the

visual-stimulus reaction by an auditory stimulus.

Concerning the influence of this combining of stimuli on the reaction

time, I am only able to say that the reaction to the moving object

occurred quicker in the presence of the auditory stimulus. When the

red card was shown it was often several seconds before the frog would

notice it and attempt to get it, but when the sound also was given the

animal usually noticed and jumped toward the moving card almost

immediately.

Unfortunately I have thus far been unable to get chronoscopic

measurements of the reaction times in this reënforcement phenomenon. I

hope later to be able to follow out the interesting suggestions of

these few experiments in the study of reënforcement and inhibition as

caused by simultaneously given stimuli.

A few observations made in connection with these experiments are of

general interest. The frog, when it first sees a moving object,

usually draws the nictitating membrane over the eye two or three times

as if to clear the surface for clearer vision. Frequently this action

is the only evidence available that the animal has noticed an object.

This movement of the eye-lids I have noticed in other amphibians and

in reptiles under similar conditions, and since it always occurs when

the animals have need of the clearest possible vision, I think the

above interpretation of the action is probably correct.

Secondly, the frog after getting a glimpse of an object orients

itself by turning its head towards the object, and then waits for a

favorable chance to spring. The aiming is accurate, and as previously

stated the animal is persistent in its attempts to seize an object.

XII. THE PAIN-SCREAM OF FROGS.

While making measurements of the frog's reaction time to electrical

stimulation, I noticed that after a few repetitions of a 2-volt,

.0001-ampère stimulus an animal would frequently make a very peculiar

noise. The sound is a prolonged scream, like that of a child, made by

opening the mouth widely. The ordinary croak and grunt are made with

closed or but slightly opened mouth. The cry at once reminds one of

the sounds made by many animals when they are frightened. The rabbit,

for example, screams in much the same way when it is caught, as do

also pigs, dogs, rats, mice and many other animals. The question

arises, is this scream indicative of pain? While studying reaction

time I was able to make some observations on the relation of the

scream to the stimulus.

First, the scream is not given to weak stimuli, even upon many

repetitions. Second, it is given to such strengths of an electrical

stimulus as are undoubtedly harmful to the animal. Third, after a frog

has been stimulated with a strong current (two volts), until the

scream is given with almost every repetition, it will scream in the

same way when even a weak stimulus is applied. If, for instance, after

a two-volt stimulus has been given a few times, the animal be merely

touched with a stick, it will scream. It thus appears as if the strong

stimulus increases the irritability of the center for the

scream-reflex to such an extent that even weak stimuli are sufficient

to cause the reaction. Are we to say that the weak stimulus is painful

because of the increased irritability, or may it be concluded that the

reflex is in this case, like winking or leg-jerk or the head-lowering

and puffing, simply a forced movement, which is to be explained as an

hereditary protective action, but not as necessarily indicative of any

sort of feeling. Clearly if we take this stand it may at once be said

that there is no reason to believe the scream indicative of pain at

any time. And it seems not improbable that this is nearer the truth

than one who hears the scream for the first time is likely to think.

The pain-scream is of interest in this consideration of auditory

reactions because it increases the range of sounds which we should

expect frogs to hear if we grant the probability of them hearing their

own voices.

It may be worth while to recall at this point the fact that a whistle

from the human lips--the nearest approach to the pain-scream among the

sounds which were used as stimuli in the experiments on

respiration--caused marked inhibition of respiration. Perhaps this

fact may be interpreted in the light of the pain-scream reaction. I

may add that I have never seen a frog give a motor reaction to the

pain-scream. Thinking it would certainly alarm the animals and cause

them to make some movement which would serve for reaction-time

measurements, I made repeated trials of its effects, but could never

detect anything except respiratory changes.

* * * * *

STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY.

* * * * *

THE POSITION OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SYSTEM OF KNOWLEDGE.

BY HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

The modern efforts to bring all sciences into a system or at least to

classify them, from Bacon to Spencer, Wundt and Pearson have never, if

we abstract here from Hegel, given much attention to those questions

of principle which are offered by the science of psychology. Of course

the psychological separation of different mental functions has often

given the whole scheme for the system, the classification thus being

too often more psychological than logical. Psychology itself,

moreover, has had for the most part a dignified position in the

system; even when it has been fully subordinated to the biological

sciences, it was on the other hand placed superior to the totality of

mental and moral sciences, which then usually have found their unity

under the positivistic heading 'sociology.' And where the independent

position of psychology is acknowledged and the mental and moral

sciences are fully accredited, as for instance with Wundt, psychology

remains the fundamental science of all mental sciences; the objects

with which philology, history, economics, politics, jurisprudence,

theology deal are the products of the processes with which psychology

deals, and philology, history, theology, etc., are thus related to

psychology, as astronomy, geology, zoölogy are related to physics.

There is thus nowhere a depreciation of psychology, and yet it is not

in its right place. Such a position for psychology at the head of all

'Geisteswissenschaften' may furnish a very simple classification for

it, but it is one which cannot express the difficult character of

psychology and the complex relations of the system of mental sciences.

The historical and philological and theological sciences cannot be

subordinated to psychology if psychology as science is to be

coördinated with physics, that is, if it is a science which describes

and explains the psychical objects in the way in which physics

describes and explains the physical objects. On the other hand, if it

means in this central position of mental sciences a science which does

not consider the inner life as an object, but as subjective activity

needing to be interpreted and subjectively understood, not as to its

elements, but as to its meaning, then we should have two kinds of

psychology, one which explains and one which interprets. They would

speak of different facts, the one of the inner life as objective

content of consciousness, as phenomenon, the other of the inner life

as subjective attitude, as purpose.

The fact is, that these two sciences exist to-day. There are

psychologists who recognize both and keep them separated, others who

hold to the one or the other as the only possible view; they are

phenomenalists or voluntarists. Mostly both views are combined, either

as psychological voluntarism with interposed concessions to

phenomenalism or as phenomenalism with the well-known concessions to

voluntarism at the deciding points. Further, those who claim that

psychology must be phenomenalistic--and that is the opinion of the

present writer--do not on that account hold that the propositions of

voluntarism are wrong. On the contrary: voluntarism, we say, is right

in every respect except in believing itself to be psychology.

Voluntarism, we say, is the interpretative account of the real life,

of immediate experience, whose reality is understood by understanding

its meaning sympathetically, but we add that in this way an objective

description can never be reached. Description presupposes

objectivation; another aspect, not the natural aspect of life, must be

chosen to fulfill the logical purposes of psychology: the

voluntaristic inner life must be considered as content of

consciousness while consciousness is then no longer an active subject

but a passive spectator. Experience has then no longer any meaning in

a voluntaristic sense; it is merely a complex of elements. We claim

that every voluntaristic system as far as it offers descriptions and

explanations has borrowed them from phenomenalistic psychology and is

further filled up by fragments of logic, ethics and æsthetics, all of

which refer to man in his voluntaristic aspect. We claim, therefore,

that such a voluntaristic theory has no right to the name psychology,

while we insist that it gives a more direct account of man's real life

than psychology can hope to give, and, moreover, that it is the

voluntaristic man whose purpose creates knowledge and thus creates the

phenomenalistic aspect of man himself.

We say that the voluntaristic theory, the interpretation of our real

attitudes, in short teleological knowledge, alone can account for the

value and right of phenomenalistic psychology and it thus seems unfair

to raise the objection of 'double bookkeeping.' These two aspects of

inner life are not ultimately independent and exclusive; the

subjective purposes of real life necessarily demand the labors of

objectivistic psychology. The last word is thus not dualistic but

monistic and the two truths supplement each other. But this

supplementation must never be misinterpreted as meaning that the two

sciences divide inner experience, as if, for instance, the

phenomenalistic study dealt with perceptions and ideas, the

voluntaristic with feelings and volitions. No, it is really a

difference of logical purpose of treatment and thus a difference of

points of view only; the whole experience without exception must be

possible material for both. There is no feeling and no volition which

is not for the phenomenalist a content of consciousness and nothing

else. There is, on the other hand, no perception and no idea which is

not, or better, ought not to be for the voluntarist a means, an aim, a

tool, an end, an ideal. In that real life experience of which the

voluntarist is speaking, every object is the object of will and those

real objects have not been differentiated into physical things under

the abstract categories of mechanics on the one hand, and psychical

ideas of them in consciousness on the other; the voluntarist, if he is

consistent, knows neither physical nor psychical phenomena.

Phenomenalist and voluntarist thus do not see anything under the same

aspect, neither the ideas nor the will.

This difference is wrongly set forth if the antithesis to voluntarism

is called intellectualism. Intellectualism is based on the category of

judgment, and judgment too is a ideological attitude. Phenomenalism

does not presuppose a subject which knows its contents but a subject

which simply _has_ its contents; the consciousness which has the

thought as content does not take through that the voluntaristic

attitude of knowing it and the psychologist has therefore no reason to

prefer the thought to the volition and thus to play the

intellectualist. If the psychologist does emphasize the idea and its

elements, the sensations, it is not because they are vehicles of

thought but because their relations to physical objects make them

vehicles of communication. The elements of ideas are negotiable and

thus through their reference to the common physical world indirectly

describable; as the elements of ideas are alone in this position, the

psychologist is obliged to consider all contents of consciousness,

ideas and volitions alike, as complexes of sensations.

The antithesis is also misinterpreted, or at least wrongly narrowed,

if it is called voluntarism _versus_ associationism. Recent

discussions have sufficiently shown that the principle of association

is not the only possible one for phenomenalistic theories. If

associationism is identified with objective psychology, all the

well-founded objections to the monopoly of the somewhat sterile

principle of association appear as objections to phenomenalism in

psychology, and voluntaristic theories, especially those which work

with the teleological category of apperception, are put in its place.

But without returning to apperceptionism we can overcome the

one-sidedness of associationism if full use is made of the means which

the world of phenomena offers to theory. The insufficiency of

associationism disappears if the content of consciousness is

considered as variable not only as to quality and intensity but also

as to vividness. This variation of vividness, on the other hand, is no

exception from the psychophysical parallelism as soon as the psychical

process is considered as dependent not only upon the local and

quantitative differences of the sensory process but also upon the

motor function of the central physical process. The one-sidedness of

the physiological sensory theories has been the hidden reason for the

one-sidedness of associationism. The sensory-motor system must be

understood as the physical basis of the psychophysical process and the

variations in the motor discharge then become conditions of those

psychical variations of vividness which explain objectively all those

phenomena in whose interest associationism is usually supplemented by

apperceptionism. The association theory must thus be given up in favor

of an 'action-theory'[1] which combines the consistency of

phenomenalistic explanation with a full acknowledgment of the

so-called apperceptive processes; it avoids thus the deficiency of

associationism and the logical inconsistency of apperceptionism.

[1] H. Münsterberg, 'Grundzüge der Psychologie.' Bd. I.,

Leipzig, 1900, S. 402-562.

Only if in this way the sciences of voluntaristic type, including all

historical and normative sciences, are fully separated from

phenomenalistic psychology, will there appear on the psychological

side room for a scientific treatment of the phenomena of social life,

that is, for sociology, social psychology, folk-psychology, psychical

anthropology and many similar sciences. All of them have been in the

usual system either crowded out by the fact that history and the other

mental sciences have taken all the room or have been simply identified

with the mental sciences themselves. And yet all those sciences exist,

and a real system of sciences must do justice to all of them. A modern

classification has perhaps no longer the right as in Bacon's time to

improve the system by inventing new sciences which have as yet no

existence, but it has certainly the duty not to ignore important

departments of knowledge and not to throw together different sciences

like the descriptive phenomenalistic account of inner life and its

interpretative voluntaristic account merely because each sometimes

calls itself psychology. A classification of sciences which is to be

more than a catalogue fulfills its logical function only by a careful

disentanglement of logically different functions which are externally

connected. Psychology and the totality of psychological, philosophical

and historical sciences offer in that respect far more difficulty than

the physical sciences, which have absorbed up to this time the chief

interest of the classifier. It is time to follow up the ramifications

of knowledge with special interest for these neglected problems. It is

clear that in such a system sciences which refer to the same objects

may be widely separated, and sciences whose objects are unlike may be

grouped together. This is not an objection; it indicates that a

system is more than a mere pigeon-holing of scholarly work, that it

determines the logical relations; in this way only can it indeed

become helpful to the progress of science itself.

The most direct way to our end is clearly that of graphic

representation wherein the relations are at once apparent. Of course

such a map is a symbol and not an argument; it indicates the results

of thought without any effort to justify them. I have given my

arguments for the fundamental principles of the divisions in my

'Grundzüge der Psychologie' and have repeated a few points more

popularly in 'Psychology and Life,' especially in the chapter on

'Psychology and History.' And yet this graphic appendix to the

Grundzüge may not be superfluous, as the fulness of a bulky volume

cannot bring out clearly enough the fundamental relations; the detail

hides the principles. The parallelism of logical movements in the

different fields especially becomes more obvious in the graphic form.

Above all, the book discussed merely those groups which had direct

relation to psychology; a systematic classification must leave no

remainder. Of course here too I have not covered the whole field of

human sciences, as the more detailed ramification offers for our

purpose no logical interest; to subdivide physics or chemistry, the

history of nations or of languages, practical jurisprudence or

theology, engineering or surgery, would be a useless overburdening of

the diagram without throwing new light on the internal relations of

knowledge.

Without now entering more fully into any arguments, I may indicate in

a few words the characteristic features of the graphically presented

proposition. At the very outset we must make it clear that phenomena

and voluntaristic attitudes are not coördinated, but that the reality

of phenomena is logically dependent upon voluntaristic attitudes

directed towards the ideal of knowledge. And yet it would be

misleading to place the totality of phenomenalistic sciences as a

subdivision under the teleological sciences. Possible it would be; we

might have under the sciences of logical attitudes not only logic and

mathematics but as a subdivision of these, again, the sciences which

construct the logical system of a phenomenalistic world--physics

being in this sense merely mathematics with the conception of

substance added. And yet we must not forget that the teleological

attitudes, to become a teleological science, must be also logically

reconstructed, as they must be teleologically connected, and thus in

this way the totality of purpose-sciences might be, too, logically

subordinated to the science of logic. Logic itself would thus become a

subdivision of logic. We should thus move in a circle, from which the

only way out is to indicate the teleological character of all sciences

by starting not with science but with the strictly teleological

conception of life--life as a system of purposes, felt in immediate

experience, and not as the object of phenomenalistic knowledge. Life

as activity divides itself then into different purposes which we

discriminate not by knowledge but by immediate feeling; one of them is

knowledge, that is, the effort to make life, its attitudes, its means

and ends a connected system of overindividual value. In the service of

this logical task we connect the real attitudes and thus come to the

knowledge of purposes: and we connect the means and ends--by

abstracting from our subjective attitudes, considering the objects of

will as independent phenomena--and thus come to phenomenalistic

knowledge. At this stage the phenomenalistic sciences are no longer

dependent upon the teleological ones, but coördinated with them;

physics, for instance, is a logical purpose of life, but not a branch

of logic: the only branch of logic in question is the philosophy of

physics which examines the logical conditions under which physics is

possible.

One point only may at once be mentioned in this connection. While we

have coördinated the knowledge of phenomena with the knowledge of

purposes we have subordinated mathematics to the latter. As a matter

of course much can be said against such a decision, and the authority

of most mathematicians would be opposed to it. They would say that the

mathematical objects are independent realities whose properties we

study like those of nature, whose relations we 'observe,' whose

existence we 'discover' and in which we are interested because they

belong to the real world. All that is true, and yet the objects of the

mathematician are objects made by the will, by the logical will,

only, and thus different from all phenomena into which sensation

enters. The mathematician, of course, does not reflect on the purely

logical origin of the objects which he studies, but the system of

knowledge must give to the study of the mathematical objects its place

in the group where the functions and products of logical thought are

classified. The arithmetical or geometrical material is a free

creation, and a creation not only as to the combination of

elements--that would be the case with many laboratory substances of

the chemist too--but a creation as to the elements themselves, and the

value of the creation, its 'mathematical interest,' is to be judged by

ideals of thought, that is, by logical purposes. No doubt this logical

purpose is its application in the world of phenomena, and the

mathematical concept must thus fit the world so absolutely that it can

be conceived as a description of the world after abstracting not only

from the will relations, as physics does, but also from the content.

Mathematics would then be the phenomenalistic science of the form and

order of the world. In this way mathematics has a claim to places in

both fields: among the phenomenalistic sciences if we emphasize its

applicability to the world, and among the teleological sciences if we

emphasize the free creation of its objects by the logical will. It

seems to me that a logical system as such has to prefer the latter

emphasis; we thus group mathematics beside logic and the theory of

knowledge as a science of objects freely created for purposes of

thought.

All logical knowledge is divided into Theoretical and Practical. The

modern classifications have mostly excluded the practical sciences

from the system, rightly insisting that no facts are known in the

practical sciences which are not in principle covered by the

theoretical sciences; it is art which is superadded, but not a new

kind of knowledge. This is quite true so far as a classification of

objects of knowledge is in question, but as soon as logical tasks as

such are to be classified and different aspects count as different

sciences, then it becomes desirable to discriminate between the

sciences which take the attitude of theoretical interest and those

which consider the same facts as related to certain human ends. But we

may at first consider the theoretical sciences only. They deal either

with the objectified world, with objects of consciousness which are

describable and explainable, or with the subjectivistic world of real

life in which all reality is experienced as will and as object of

will, in which everything is to be understood by interpretation of its

meaning. In other words, we deal in one case with phenomena and in the

other with purposes.

The further subdivision must be the same for both groups--that which

is merely individual and that which is 'overindividual'; we prefer the

latter term to the word 'general,' to indicate at once that not a

numerical but a teleological difference is in question. A phenomenon

is given to overindividual consciousness if it is experienced with the

understanding that it can be an object for every one whom we

acknowledge as subject; and a purpose is given to overindividual will

in so far as it is conceived as ultimately belonging to every subject

which we acknowledge. The overindividual phenomena are, of course, the

physical objects, the individual phenomena the psychical objects, the

overindividual purposes are the norms, the individual purposes are the

acts which constitute the historical world. We have thus four

fundamental groups: the physical, the psychological, the normative and

the historical sciences.

Whoever denies overindividual reality finds himself in the world of

phenomena a solipsist and in the world of purposes a sceptic: there is

no objective physical world, everything is my idea, and there is no

objective value, no truth, no morality, everything is my individual

decision. But to deny truth and morality means to contradict the very

denial, because the denial itself as judgment demands acknowledgment

of this objective truth and as action demands acknowledgment of the

moral duty to speak the truth. And if an overindividual purpose cannot

be denied, it follows that there is a community of individual subjects

whose phenomena cannot be absolutely different: there must be an

objective world of overindividual objects.

In each of the four groups of sciences we must consider the facts

either with regard to the general relations or with regard to the

special material; the abstract general relations refer to every

possible material, the concrete facts which fall under them demand

sciences of their own. In the world of phenomena the general relations

are causal laws--physical or psychical laws; in the world of purposes

theories of teleological interrelations--normative or historical; the

specific concrete facts are in the world of phenomena objects,

physical or psychical objects, in the world of purposes acts of

will--specific norms or historical acts. If we turn first to

phenomena, the laws thereof are expressed in the physical sciences, by

mechanics, physics, chemistry, and we make mechanics the superior as

chemistry must become ultimately the mechanics of atoms. In the

psychological sciences the science of laws is psychology, with the

side-branch of animal psychology, while human psychology refers to

individuals and to social groups. Social psychology, as over against

individual psychology, is thus a science of general laws, the laws of

those psychological phenomena which result from the mutual influence

of several individuals.

On the other hand, we have as the special concrete products of the

laws, the objects themselves, and the most natural grouping of them

may be from whole to part. In the physical world it means that we

start from the concrete universe, turning then to the earth, then to

the objects on the earth, inorganic and organic. There is here no

logical difficulty. Each one of these objects can be considered in

three aspects, firstly as to its structure, secondly as to its special

laws, that is, the special function of the object as related to the

general sciences of physics and chemistry, and thirdly as to its

natural development. If we apply these three methods of study to the

whole universe we have astronomy, astrophysics and cosmology, to the

whole earth, geography, geophysics, geology, to animals, zoölogy,

physiology, comparative anatomy, and so on.

The special phenomena in the framework of the psychological sciences

group themselves in the same logical order, from the whole to the

part. The psychological totality is empirical mankind, and as we

select the earth as the one part of the universe which is the habitat

of man, so our scientific interest must move from the whole psychical

humanity to those phenomena of human life which are the vehicle of our

civilization, from mankind to its most important function, the

association of man; and as we moved from earth to the special objects

on earth, so we may turn from association to the special phenomena

which result from association. If we separated further the inorganic

from the organic, we must here separate the products of

undifferentiated and of differentiated association. The science of

mankind is race psychology, the science of the association of man is

sociology, the science of the results of undifferentiated association

is Völkerpsychologie, folk psychology. The science of products of

differentiated association has no special name; its subject matter is

the whole of historical civilization considered as a psychological

naturalistic phenomenon. As soon as we follow the ramification still

further we have to do with the special kinds of these products, that

is, with the volitions, thoughts, appreciations and beliefs. In the

undifferentiated associations they give us morals and habits,

languages and enjoyments and mythological ideas, while the

individually differentiated association gives political, legal and

economic life, knowledge, art and religion: all of course merely as

causal, not as teleological processes, and thus merely as

psychological and not as historical material. Here, as with the

physical phenomena, the structure, the special laws and the

development must be everywhere separated, giving us three sciences in

every case. For instance, the study of mankind deals with the

differences of mental structure in psychical anthropology, with the

special psychical laws in race psychology and with the development in

comparative psychology. The chief point for us is that social

psychology, race psychology, sociology, folk psychology, etc., are

under this system sharply differentiated sciences and that they do not

at all overlap the real historical sciences. There is no historical

product of civilization which does not come under their method but it

must be conceived as a causal phenomenon, not as related to the

purposes of the real man, and thus even the development means merely a

growing complication of naturalistic processes and not history in the

teleological sense.

We turn to the normative sciences. The general theory of the

overindividual purposes is metaphysics; the special overindividual

acts are those which constitute the normative volitions, connected in

the philosophy of morals, the philosophy of state and the philosophy

of law, those which constitute the normative thoughts and finally

those which constitute the normative appreciations and beliefs,

connected in æsthetics and the philosophy of religion. Especial

interest belongs to the philosophy of thought. We have discussed the

reasons why we group mathematics here and not among the

phenomenalistic sciences. We have thus one science which deals

critically with the presuppositions of thought, _i.e._ the theory of

knowledge or epistemology, which can be divided into the philosophy of

physical sciences, the philosophy of psychological sciences, the

philosophy of normative sciences and the philosophy of historical

sciences. We have secondly the science of the processes of thought

dealing with concepts, judgments and reasoning, _i.e._, logic, and we

have finally the science of those objects which the thought creates

freely for its own purposes and which are independent from the content

of the world, _i.e._, mathematics, which leads to the qualitative

aspect of general mathematics and the quantitative aspect of concrete

mathematics. For our purposes it may be sufficient to separate

externally algebra, arithmetic, analysis and geometry. In this way all

the philosophical sciences find their natural and necessary place in

the system, while it has been their usual lot to form an appendix to

the system, incommensurable with the parts of the system itself, even

in the case that the other scheme were not preferred, to make ethics,

logic, æsthetics, epistemology and metaphysics merely special branches

of positivistic sociology and thus ultimately of biology.

In the historical sciences the general theory which stands over

against the special acts has a special claim on our attention. We may

call it the philosophy of history. That is not identical with the

philosophy of historical sciences which we mentioned as a part of

epistemology. The philosophy of historical sciences deals with the

presuppositions by which historical teleological knowledge becomes

logically possible. The philosophy of history seeks a theory which

connects the special historical acts into a unity. It has two

branches. It is either a theory of the personality, creating a theory

of real individual life as it enters as ideological factor into

history, or it seeks the unity of entire humanity. The theory of

personality shows the teleological interrelation of our purposes; the

theory of humanity shows the teleological interrelation of all

nations. The name philosophy of history has been used mostly for the

theory of humanity only, abstracting from the fact that it has been

often misused for sociology or for the psychology of history or for

the philosophy of historical sciences--but the name belongs also to

the theory of personality. This theory of personality is exactly that

second kind of 'psychology' which does not describe and does not

explain but which interprets the inner teleological connections of the

real man. It is 'voluntaristic psychology' or, as others call it who

see correctly the relation of this science to history, 'historical

psychology.' It is practically 'apperceptionistic psychology.' The

special activities of the historical man divide themselves again into

volitions, thoughts, appreciations and beliefs, with their realization

in the state, law, economical systems, knowledge, art and religion.

Each of these special realizations must allow the same manifoldness in

treatment which we found with the special physical or psychical

objects; we can ask as to structure, relation to the general view and

development. But in accordance with the teleological material the

study of the structure here means 'interpretation,' the study of the

general relations here means study of the relation to civilization,

and the study of the development here means the real history. We have,

thus, for the state or law or economy or knowledge or art or religion

always one science which interprets the historical systems of state,

etc., in a systematic and philological way, one science which deals

with its function in the historical world and one which studies

biographically and nationally the history of state, law, economical

life, science, art or religion.

In the sphere of the practical sciences the divisions of the

theoretical sciences must repeat themselves. We have thus applied

physical, applied psychological, applied normative and applied

historical sciences, and it is again the antithesis of psychological

and of historical sciences which is of utmost importance and yet too

often neglected. The application of physical sciences, as in

engineering, medicine, etc., or the application of normative

knowledge in the sciences of criticism do not offer logical

difficulty, but the application of psychological and historical

knowledge does. Let us take the case of pedagogy or of penology,

merely as illustrations. Is the application of phenomenalistic

psychology or the application of teleological voluntarism in question?

Considering the child, the criminal, any man, as psychophysical

apparatus which must be objectively changed and treated, we have

applied psychology; considering him as subject with purposes, as

bearer of an historical civilization whose personalities must be

interpreted and understood and appreciated, then we need applied

historical knowledge. In the first case the science of pedagogy is a

psycho-technical discipline which makes education mechanical and

deprives the teacher of the teleological attitude of inner

understanding; in the second case it is a science of real education

far removed from psychology. All the sciences which deal with service

in the system of civilization, service as teacher, as judge, as social

helper, as artist, as minister, are sciences which apply the

teleological historical knowledge, and their meaning is lost if they

are considered as psycho-technical sciences only.

LIFE (in its immediate reality, felt as a system of telelogical

| experiences, involving the acknowledgement of other subjects of

| experiences)

|-VOLITION (will aiming towards new experiences).

| |-Individual: _Practical Life._

| |-Overindividual: _Mortality._

|-THOUGHT (will acknowledging the connection of experiences).

| |-Individual: _Judgement_

| |-Overindividual: TRUTH

| |-THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE (connection of experiences determined by

| | | pure experience).

| | |

| | |-KNOWLEDGE OF PHENOMENA (connection of experiences after

| | | | abstracting their will relations).

| | | |-Knowledge of Phenomena Given to Overindividual Consciousness.

| | | | |

| | | | |

| | | | |

| | | | |

| | | | |

| | | |

| | | |-Knowledge of Phenomena given to Indiviual Consciousness.

| | | |-II. PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES.

| | | |-A. GENERAL LAWS.

| | | | |

| | | |

| | | |-B. SPECIAL OBJECTS.

| | | |-1. Mankind.

| | | |-2. Special Functions.

| | | |

| | | |-3. Special Products of Association of Men

| | | | (considered as natural phenomena).

| | | |-Products of Undiffereniated Association of Men

| | | | |

| | | | |

| | | | |

| | | |

| | | |-Products of Individual Differentiation

| | | | (casual phenomenalistic sciences of civilization

| | | | and its development).

| | | |-Volition.

| | | |

| | | |-Thoughts.

| | | |

| | | |-Appreciation.

| | | |

| | | |-Belief.

| | | |-Religion _a, b, c_.

| | |

| | |-KNOWLEDGE OF PURPOSES (connection of experiences in their

| | | telelogical reality).

| | |

| | |-Knowledge of Purposes of the Overindividual Will.

| | | |-III. NORMATIVE SCIENCES

| | | |-A. GENERAL THEORY of absolute values.

| | | |

| | | |-B. SPECIAL ACTS.

| | | |-Volition.

| | | |

| | | |-Thoughts.

| | | | |

| | | | |

| | | |

| | | |-Appreciation.

| | | |

| | | |-Belief.

| | | |-Philosophy of Religion.

| | |

| | |-Knowledge of Purposes of the Individual Will.

| | |-IV. HISTORICAL SCIENCES.

| | |-A. GENERAL THEORY of real life.

| | | |-Philosophy of History.

| | | |-Theory of Personality.

| | | |-Theory of Humanity.

| | |

| | |-B. SPECIAL ACTS (telelogical interpretative sciences of

| | | civilization and history.)

| | |-Volition.

| | | |-Politics, _a, b, c_.

| | | |-Law, _a, b, c_.

| | | |-Economy, _a, b, c_.

| | |

| | |-Thoughts.

| | | |-Science, _a, b, c_.

| | |

| | |-Appreciation.

| | | |-Art, _a, b, c_.

| | |

| | |-Belief.

| | |-Religion, _a, b, c_.

| |

| |-PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE.

| |-APPLIED KNOWLEDGE OF PHENOMENA.

| | |-V. APPLIED PHYSICAL SCIENCES.

| | | |-Technical Sciences.

| | | |

| | | |-Medicine.

| | |

| | |-VI. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES.

| | |-Psychotechnical Sciences.

| | | |-Psychological Pedagogy.

| | | |-Psychological Penology.

| | |

| | |-Psychiatry.

| |

| |-APPLIED KNOWLEDGE OF PURPOSES.

| |-VII. APPLIED NORMATIVE SCIENCES.

| | |-Volition.

| | | |-Politics.

| | | |

| | | |-Law.

| | | | |-Science of Legal Service. (Practical Jurisprudence.)

| | | |

| | | |-Economy.

| | | |-Science of Social Service.

| | |

| | |-Thoughts.

| | | |-Science of Teaching. (Education.)

| | |

| | |-Appreciation.

| | | |-Science of Artistic Production.

| | |

| | |-Belief.

| | |-Science of Religious Service. (Practical Theology.)

| |

| |-VIII. APPLIED HISTORICAL SCIENCES.

| |-Volition.

| | |-Criticism of State.

| | |-Criticism of Law.

| |

| |-Thoughts.

| | |-Criticism of Science.

| |

| |-Appreciation.

| | |-Criticism of Art.

| |

| |-Belief.

| |-Criticism of Religion.

|-APPRECIATION (will resting in isolated experiences).

| |-Individual: _Enjoyment._

| |-Overindividual: _Beauty._

|-BELIEF (will resting in the supplements of experience).

|-Individual: _Creed._

|-Overindividual: _Religion.

NOTE: The letters _a, b, c_ below the sciences of Special Objects and

Special Acts indicate the three subdivisions that results from the

threefold aspects;--of structure(_a_), of relation to the general laws

or theories(_b_), and of development(_c_). With regards to physical

phenomena, for instances, we have astronomy(_a_), astrophysics(_b_),

and cosmology(_c_); or geography(_a_), geophysics(_b_), geology(_c_);

or botany(_a_), plant physiology(_b_), phylogenetic development of

plants(_c_). In the same way for psychical objects; for instance:

structural sociology(_a_), functional sociology(_b_), comparative

sociology(_c_); or structure (grammar and syntax) of languages(_a_),

psychology of languages(_b_), comparative study of languages(_c_).

With regard to the telelogical historical sciences the study of

structure takes on here the character of intrepretation; the relation

to the general view is here the dependence on civilization and the

development is here the real history. We have thus, for instance, the

intepretation of Roman law(_a_), dependence of Roman law upon

civilization(_b_), history of Roman law(_c_).

End of Project Gutenberg's Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 1, by Various

Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 1 Containing Sixteen Experimental Investigations from the Harvard Psychological Laboratory. · 第 3 / 3 章