CHAPTER XVIII.

It was soon clear to Newcastle that Fox after all might not suffice, and

that Pitt must be again approached. The King, then in Hanover and beyond

Newcastle's control, was negotiating new treaties of subsidy on behalf

of his German dominions; one with Hesse-Cassel for a contingent of

12,000 men to act in defence of Hanover or Great Britain, the other with

Russia for an army of 40,000 men for the defence of Hanover. It was

terrible for the Duke to contemplate what Pitt might say and do with

regard to such unpopular and indefensible instruments. Moreover, Pitt

was now supported by the court, every day more and more important, of

Leicester House. It was probably Hardwicke, who as the moving brain of

the Cabinet saw the vital importance of securing Pitt, and who was, we

think, sincerely favourable to Pitt's pretensions, if only from hatred

of Fox, who suggested these negotiations; and it was his son Charles

Yorke who entered upon them. Yorke was to act as a skirmisher, to get in

touch with Pitt, and to report on the temper in which he found him. They

met on July 6 (1755), and talked over the abortive conference with

Walpole. Pitt declared that he had then waived the immediate bestowal of

the Secretaryship of State, but had asked not merely that Newcastle

should speak on his behalf before the King left for Hanover, and urge

that he was the proper person to lead the debates in the House of

Commons; but that Lady Yarmouth should also be interested in his cause,

so that she might use her influence with the King during their stay

abroad.

Of Newcastle himself he spoke with supreme disdain. It was a waste of

time to bring him assurances of friendship and confidence from

Newcastle. All that was over. He would never owe Newcastle a favour, he

would accept nothing as an obligation to Newcastle. This is not in

Yorke's account, because probably it would be shown to Newcastle. But it

comes authentically enough from Pitt's brother-in-law, James Grenville,

to Bubb. If Newcastle were really in earnest, he would say that he could

listen to no proposition but this: 'This is our policy; and the post of

Secretary of State, in which you shall support it, is destined for you.'

Yorke reported to his father, and Hardwicke saw Pitt on August 8 (1755),

with power to offer a seat in the Cabinet. After compliments, to use

Eastern language, which were usually the preface of such interviews, in

which both parties assured each other of high mutual esteem, which Pitt

went so far on this occasion as to declare for Newcastle, in strange

contrast with his language to Yorke, they came at once to the point.

Before he could take what was required, 'a clear, active, and cordial

part in support of the King's measures in the House of Commons,' Pitt

desired to know what those measures might be. Hardwicke at once

specified them. 'Twas all open and above board; the support of the

maritime and American war, in which we were going to be engaged, and the

defence of the King's German dominions, if attacked on account of the

English cause. The maritime and American war he came roundly into, tho'

very orderly, and allowed the principle and obligation of honour and

justice as to the other, but argued strongly as to the practicability of

it. That subsidiary treaties would not go down; the nation could not

hear' (obviously 'bear') them. That they were a connection and a chain,

and would end in a general plan for the Continent which the country

would (obviously 'could') not possibly support.' Then he went into

financial considerations. The maritime and American war would alone add

two millions a year to the National Debt, which could not bear an

addition of one million. He would treat Hanover like any other foreign

dependency of the British Crown; the worst that could happen was that it

should be occupied by the enemy for a time and restored at a peace, and

that then compensation might be given to the King. As to the subsidies,

Hessian and Russian, he asked questions but did not commit himself. But

he inquired, with peculiar emphasis, what others, such as Fox, Legge,

Lee, and Egmont, thought of them. At last he said he must consult his

friends, one of whom, Legge, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he was

about to visit. But why, asked Hardwicke, should he not see Newcastle

himself? 'With all my heart, if he would see me,' replied Pitt. To the

offer of a seat in the Cabinet he said neither yea nor nay, but he was,

thought Hardwicke, gratified by the overture.[282]

One cannot but note the strange contrast between Pitt's language about

Newcastle to Hardwicke and that which he had used to Yorke. 'He

expressed great regard for your Grace and me.' But this was the base

coinage in political use at that time, and Pitt had by this time become

a master of dissimulation. Fox hated Newcastle to the full as much as

did Pitt. In truth, every one seems to have secretly hated or despised

him, or both; a melancholy reward for an industrious ministerial

existence. But so great was his political influence that scarce any one

could afford to say so.

One Minister was now, however, to display a rare courage, and to oppose

both the King and his Minister on a critical point. In the middle of

August, after the conversation with Hardwicke, the treaty of subsidy

with Hesse-Cassel arrived for the necessary confirmations. When it came

before Legge as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he, no doubt with the

connivance of Pitt, flatly refused his signature. Newcastle had always

distrusted Legge, as, indeed, he distrusted everybody, and had given him

the seals of the Exchequer with great reluctance. He was now aghast. War

was imminent; the King would soon return with his pockets full of odious

treaties of subsidy; Fox was still a malcontent; Legge was in open

revolt; it was evident that he must face the formidable interview with

Pitt. So he expressed the necessary wish, though one may guess his

reluctance, and Pitt saw the Duke on September 2 (1755) for two hours

and a half. The record of this interview is contained in a long letter

from Newcastle to Hardwicke,[283] couched in the quavering notes of a

distracted Minister. It begins with a wail of despair, the reluctant

acknowledgment of the paramount importance of Pitt. 'I never sat down to

write to your lordship with more melancholy apprehensions for the

Publick than at present. I see nothing but confusion and it is beyond me

to point out a remedy.'

This was the result of Pitt's verbal refusal to join him, made by a

Minister who held the great mass of the House of Commons in the hollow

of his hand, who clung to office as to life, and yet, though he knew

Pitt was indispensable to its retention, would not once more, as in

1746, face his Sovereign and say so. Nothing can better illustrate the

trembling plank on which the Duke was content to walk, wavering and

helpless, depending only on Hardwicke's counsel and his own jobs. He did

not dare face the King, he was bullied by the disorderly chiefs in the

House of Commons, and he was always chaffering, but always afraid. So he

and his like are satisfied to bear the yoke for the semblance of power.

All began smoothly between Pitt and the Duke, all was apparently open,

friendly, and civil; but when Newcastle referred to the conversation

with Hardwicke, he was taken aback by finding that Pitt declared that

nothing had passed that was material. He thus compelled Newcastle to

recapitulate the points of policy, no doubt for purposes of comparison.

So the Duke had to state that the eve of the King's departure had been

too troubled to lay Pitt's claim before his Majesty; for an address

against the journey had been threatened in the House of Commons and

actually proposed in the House of Lords. But that when alarming events

had happened in America, Hardwicke and he had represented to the King

the urgent necessity of forming a system in the House of Commons, which

means, it may be presumed, abandoning the plan of conducting the House

without a leader, and of enlisting Pitt as an active Minister there.

That thereupon the King had graciously expressed his readiness to admit

Pitt to his Cabinet. Pitt received this offer coolly, and proceeded at

once to larger issues.

As to the King's voyage he spoke with unsparing candour. The King had

nearly ruined himself by his unpardonable departure to Hanover at such a

crisis. He should only have been allowed to go there over the dead

bodies of his people. 'A King abroad at this time, without one man about

him that has an English heart, and only returning to bring home a packet

of subsidies.'

Of course, he proceeded to say with scarcely disguised sarcasm, the

King's countenance was more to him than any other consideration. But if

it was expected that he should take an active and efficient part in

Parliament he must observe that a mere summons to the Cabinet would not

be sufficient. In his present office he could silently acquiesce in

ministerial measures. But activity could only be exercised in a

responsible situation.

Then he took a line which was clear, bold, and statesmanlike. The whole

machinery of the House of Commons was, he said, paralysed by the plan of

leaving it without a responsible Minister. That plan must be abandoned.

The House could not perform its proper functions without a responsible

Minister, even though a subordinate one, who should have access to the

Sovereign and to the royal confidence. For that purpose the leader or

agent must have a responsible office of _advice_ as well as of

_execution_. 'That was the distinction he made throughout his whole

conversation. He would support the measures which he himself had

advised, but would not like a lawyer talk from a brief. That it was

better plainly to tell me so at first.'

This surely was no inordinate claim from indisputably the first member

of the House of Commons, whom the King had kept at bay for so many

years, and to keep whom still in subjection every possible manoeuvre,

childish or cunning, was being adopted. 'Why,' said he bluntly to

Newcastle, 'cannot you bring yourself to part with some of your sole

power?' This of course produced voluble asseverations from the Duke.

Sole power! What an idea! He had no conception of what Pitt could mean.

He was in his present place, not by his own choice, far from it! but by

the King's command, and, though he was devoted to the King, he would

retire to-morrow if he was distasteful to the House of Commons. (This

was a safe promise, for, as we have seen, the House of Commons was with

but few exceptions at his absolute disposal.) Pitt replied that he

himself had no objections to a Peer as First Lord of the Treasury, but

there must be men of ability and responsibility in the House of Commons,

a Secretary of State and a Chancellor of the Exchequer, that they must

be sufficiently supported, and they must have access to the Crown, not a

nominal, but an habitual, free, familiar access. In speaking of the

Chancellor of the Exchequer he burst out into so enthusiastic a eulogy

of Legge, 'the child, and deservedly the favourite child of the Whigs,'

that Newcastle suspected that all this was concerted between his

rebellious Chancellor of the Exchequer and his insubordinate Paymaster.

Pitt and the Duke next proceeded to analyse their own expressions; a

task which the statesmen of that day seem to have avoided, to our

detriment, as much as possible. Newcastle had spoken of the proposed

seat in the Cabinet as a designation. 'What did this mean?' asked Pitt.

'Did it mean the seals of Secretary of State, though not immediately?'

The Duke was obliged to shuffle out, for in truth he had no power to

promise any such thing. Designation only meant that the seat in the

Cabinet would design him as the King's man of confidence. 'Then the

Secretaryship of State is not intended,' was the fierce rejoinder. The

Duke replied that he was not authorised to offer more than a seat in the

Cabinet. If, rejoined Pitt, 'the Secretaryships of State are to remain

as they are, there is an end of any question of my giving active support

to the Government in the House of Commons.'

They had arrived at an impassable barrier, Pitt would take nothing but

the seals which the King would not give him, and Newcastle was

determined not to force on another crisis with the King on account of

Pitt; whom, in truth, he dreaded little less as a colleague than as a

foe. So they turned to matters of public policy, 'and then,' writes the

hapless Minister, 'nothing can equal my astonishment and concern.' He

tried Pitt first with the Hessian Treaty, and then with the Russian. For

the Hessian Treaty the Duke characteristically urged every reason but

the true one, and for the Russian that it was the fruit of four years of

negotiation, and that it would seem strange to drop it now. But Pitt was

obdurate. He would be no party to a system of subsidies. If the Duke of

Devonshire attacked the Hessian subsidy in the House of Lords, as was

his intention, Pitt would echo the attack in the House of Commons. If

the Russian Treaty were dropped he might acquiesce in the Hessian from

regard for the King; as, for the same reason, he would always speak with

the utmost respect of Hanover. But no consideration would make him

support both, or a system of subsidies. It was his regard for the King,

presumably, which impelled him to make a further suggestion, which

Newcastle did not venture to transmit even to Hardwicke. Out of the

fifteen millions sterling that the King was said to have saved why,

asked Pitt, should he not give Hesse 100,000_l._, and Russia

150,000_l._, to be out of these bad bargains? Newcastle was driven to

his usual resource of the Chancellor, and suggested a conference with

him in the ensuing week. Pitt agreed to this with, we may presume, a

shrug of the shoulders.

Neither in truth expected anything from such a meeting, for the pleas

and the powers had both been exhausted. Newcastle realised this, and

ends his remarkable record of the conversation with a despairing glance

at his own prospects. What was he to do? There were as usual three

courses to pursue. The first, which he should infinitely prefer, would

be his own retirement. This is a common cant of ministers, and with

Newcastle it was more than usually insincere. Fox, he said, might

succeed him at the Treasury, and Pitt for a session at any rate would

have to acquiesce. The second would be for Newcastle, remaining First

Minister, to throw himself into the arms of the Pitt group, with Pitt

as Secretary of State and Legge at the Exchequer. But the King would

never hear of this. Newcastle puts it significantly thus: 'Whether this

is in any shape practicable, I leave to your Lordship and all who know

the King to determine.' The third course was the one adopted, 'to accept

Mr. Fox's proposal, made by my Lord Granville,' the first allusion that

we have to this particular negotiation. Fox was to be the real,

efficient, and trusted leader of the House of Commons. But there must be

conditions. Cumberland, the patron of Fox, must give his support, so

must Devonshire and Hartington. There must be a new Chancellor of the

Exchequer, and Fox must act cordially with the person whom the King

might appoint to that office. Murray, and indeed every one, must put

their shoulders to the wheel and exert themselves on behalf of the

Administration. Lastly, it might be necessary to take in the venal but

inevitable Bubb.

Hardwicke answered Newcastle's report without a moment's delay, in a

shrewd letter.[284] His first remark was that Pitt had taken much higher

ground with the Duke than with him, perhaps because the bad news from

the Ohio had made the Paymaster deem himself more valuable and

necessary. He doubted whether the praises of Legge were sincere; they

were probably intended to indicate a closer connection between them than

really existed. But Hardwicke went straight to the two main points. The

first was the general principle that the King must have a recognised

Minister, what he called oddly enough 'a Minister with the King' in the

House of Commons. The other question was whether Pitt should be

Secretary of State.

As to the first, if the Minister is to be subordinate, that is, not the

Premier, he sees no great harm in it. 'For I have long been convinced,'

continues the sagacious man, 'that whoever your Grace shall make use of

as your first man and man of confidence in the House of Commons, you

will find it necessary, if he be a man of reputation and ability

accompanied with the ambition naturally incident to such a character, I

say under those circumstances, your Grace will find it necessary to

invest him with more power than, from the beginning, you thought fit to

impart either to Mr. Legge or Sir Thomas Robinson.'

From this we may gather that the Chancellor had never believed in the

plan of a leaderless House of Commons. How indeed could he, as a man of

sense, much more as a man of rare capacity? Such a plan could only be

deemed possible by an alien King and a mountebank Minister. As to the

personal point, Hardwicke is not less acute. Pitt, he declares, has

stiffened his demand since their interview. Pitt, he is convinced,

intended to draw from the Duke a promise that it should be made a point

with the King that he should be made Secretary of State within a given

time; and so, when he failed in this, he proceeded to discuss measures

in a more peremptory tone than he would otherwise have employed.

'Now,' says Hardwicke, 'this comes to a point which you and I have often

discussed together. Whether you can think it right or bring yourself to

declare to him that you really wish him in the Secretary's office, and

will in earnest recommend him to the King on that foot.'

This inestimable sentence throws a flood of light on Newcastle's

professions to Pitt, and on the reality of the efforts that Newcastle

had employed to soften the King. It is clear, we think, from this secret

utterance that Newcastle had been sincere in neither case.

Hardwicke urges that the Duke should close with Pitt. He thinks that if

Newcastle were loyally to give this assurance Pitt 'would close and take

his active part immediately.' Without this he is sure that Pitt believes

'that the intention is to have the use of his talents without gratifying

his ambition.' In writing this Hardwicke of course knew, as Newcastle

knew, that Pitt's apprehension was well founded. 'My poor opinion,'

continues the Chancellor, 'is that without it all further meetings and

pourparlers with this gentleman will be vain. Your heart can only

dictate to you whether you should do it or not.'[285] Justly distrusting

the Duke's heart, the Chancellor proceeds to appeal to his instincts. He

discards, of course, the idea of Newcastle's resignation. A friend,

consulted on such a point, rarely deems it decent to do otherwise;

certainly no confidant of Newcastle's could have done so and retained

his intimacy.

As to relying on Pitt and Legge, he agrees that nothing but the pressure

of necessity could make the King adopt this course. Of course he does

not say that the Duke could at any moment bring about this pressure,

though that no doubt was the case. Newcastle, by his Parliamentary

influence, could always produce a deadlock, as was soon to be proved.

But Newcastle could, thinks Hardwicke, have Pitt without Legge. If Pitt

had the seals he would not insist on Legge.

The third course is that urged by Granville: to take Fox on Granville's

conditions, which we may safely presume to have been those afterwards

adopted. Hardwicke insinuates objections. Fox has the strong protection

of Cumberland and the personal inclination of the King, but his election

will be profoundly distasteful to Leicester House. Pitt, on the other

hand, has 'no support at Court, and the personal disinclination of the

King. He must therefore probably depend, at least for a good while, upon

those who bring him thither.' Then comes the sentence about Fox and

Leicester House which conveys a hint that Pitt, on the contrary, is well

there. It is impossible to be more adroit. Hardwicke knew that Newcastle

was fully aware that he hated Fox, and so put his objections in this

indirect and skilful way. He failed, probably because Newcastle felt

that to accept Fox would at any rate not necessitate a critical struggle

with the King, and that Fox himself was more malleable.

Of all strange confidants it was Bubb whom Pitt, on leaving Newcastle,

proceeded to take into his inmost counsels. There are always parasites

of this kind in politics, universally mistrusted, and yet constantly

taken into confidence on grounds of convenience. Always sympathetic,

always warm, always ready to betray at the first symptom of personal

advantage, they are nevertheless useful parts of the political machine,

and not so contemptible as might appear. They profess little, they

deceive nobody except for a fleeting moment, and they are employed,

with full knowledge of their character, to sound others and report the

result, to suggest from their own base experience, to bring statesmen

into relation with necessary people, and do the work with which

statesmen will not soil their hands. But they are perilous and slippery

agents, they attract in the warmth of the moment excessive confidence,

and while these indiscretions are still ringing in their ears they are

already in the tents of the enemy. Still, such as they are, they will

always exist, and always be utilised, for they are part of the fatality

of politics.

So to Bubb Pitt betook himself on the day after that on which he had

seen Newcastle, and gave a spirited account of the interview. He then

spoke fully of his relations with Fox, in which really lay the key to

the situation. He wished well to Mr. Fox, he did not complain of him,

but he could not act with him; they could not co-operate because they

were not on the same ground. Fox was not independent (_sui juris_), but

he was. He had been ready during the last session to go all lengths

against the Duke of Newcastle; but when it came to the pinch Fox always

failed him (under the constraint, it may be presumed, of the Duke of

Cumberland). _Fox had risen on his shoulders_;[286] he did not blame him

for it. Fox had taken the smooth part, and left him the brunt; he did

not complain. Fox, too, lived with his greatest enemies, Carteret,

Stone, and Murray. And Newcastle had told him that Fox had recently

offered himself to his Grace. Bubb declared that this was false, to his

knowledge. Pitt replied that no one knew better than himself how great a

liar Newcastle could be, and that if Fox denied this he should readily

take his word against the Duke's. But all that he had recapitulated

showed how impossible it was for two men to act together who stood on so

different a footing as Fox and himself.

Bubb now scented business of the kind to which he himself was addicted,

and broke in with, 'As we who are to unite in this attack _are to part

no more_,'[287] it would be proper to think what was to be held out to

the confederates if they succeeded.

Pitt declined to enter into this premature traffic, 'it would look too

like a faction, there was no country in it'; but expressed himself, in

the fashion of the day, with warmth and confidence as to Bubb himself.

He thought Bubb of the greatest consequence; nothing was too good for

such a man; no one was more listened to in the House and in the country.

He wished to be connected with Bubb in the strictest sense politically,

as he already was by marriage.[288]

Bubb demurely records these confidences, and was left happy; glad to

find, as he writes, that he should receive such support in an opposition

which, on patriotic and conscientious grounds, he must have pursued even

had he stood alone.[289]

Once more we have to deplore the hapless destinies of political alliance

and of Parliamentary twins, united in bonds of principle, who are to

part no more. This conversation took place on September 3 (1755). On

November 20 Pitt was dismissed, because of his adherence to the

virtuous course which Bubb had resolved to pursue without flinching,

even if isolated, with or without Pitt. Bubb records the removal in a

terse entry of his diary, and the next, not less terse, records his

acceptance of a lucrative post tendered by Newcastle. History has to

note some such incidents, but we know of none so cynically and

complacently narrated by the renegade himself.

Hardwicke made one last desperate effort to move Pitt, but without

success. He writes to Newcastle on September 15 (1755): 'I have had a

long conversation with the _gentleman_ your Grace knows, but with little

effect. I talked very fully and strongly to him upon every part of the

case, both as to _persons_ and _measures_. He made great professions of

his regard and firm attachment to your Grace and me, but adhered to his

_negative_. He puts that negative upon two things: His objections to the

two treaties of subsidy ... his other objection arose from _Mr. F._,

with whom he declared he could not act.'[290]

On this scene, coming more and more into prominence as the King became

older, and as the Prince of Wales, or rather Bute and his clique, waxed

bolder, appears the mysterious and elusive influence of Leicester House.

It is difficult to trace or measure this combination, except in the

naked fact of an old King and a young heir, nor is it easy to trace the

connection of Pitt with this party. Every movement in Leicester House

was jealously watched by the politicians, much as a late Sultan is said

to have tracked the movements of the least menial of his dethroned and

secluded predecessor. We read of the Princess being stirred to wrath by

her father-in-law's project of marrying her son to the daughter,

supposed to be active and ambitious, of a woman she detested. Then there

is the suspicion that the Heir Apparent was surrounded by persons who

were more or less Jacobite; Bute himself having, it was presumed,

Jacobite leanings. But the King at once desisted with rare good sense

from any idea of the projected marriage, though no doubt it would have

given him pleasure. And the danger of an Hanoverian sovereign becoming a

Jacobite under any influence seems too fantastic for a pantomime. The

real apprehension was no doubt that Leicester House might shake off the

domination and destroy the long monopoly of the Whigs, as indeed it

eventually did. And certainly Leicester House, with the throne full in

view, was becoming more and more inclined to assert itself. Human nature

and family relations had, as usual in such cases, much to do with the

matter. The Hanoverian Kings did not love their heirs apparent. George

the First hated his, but he had no other son to love, and indeed little

capacity for loving, except mistresses who found favour with no one

else. George the Second hated his with a peculiar hatred, and was thus

able to devote what fatherly affection he had to give to his second son,

the Duke of Cumberland. These parental preferences, however justifiable,

do not tend to affection between sons. And so there was no love lost

between Prince Frederick and his family on the one side, and Duke

William on the other. These feelings, as is usually the case, survived,

when Frederick died, with increasing intensity between the widow and her

brother-in-law. She saw him on the right hand of the King, enjoying all

his confidence, as was natural, and herself and her bashful son of no

account; so that a new jealousy was added to the original rancour.

Understanding these facts, we are able to follow the course of Pitt. Fox

was essentially the Duke of Cumberland's man, and so by the force of

circumstances Pitt became allied, but not at this moment closely allied,

to Leicester House. He had been a friend and servant of the dead Prince

of Wales, then had quarrelled with him, but the original brand was not

altogether effaced. Now he was the one champion whom the faction of the

late Heir Apparent could adopt; and so the politicians began to see

behind Pitt the influence of the coming King, his mother, and their

favourite. Thus, when Newcastle had to make the option between Fox and

Pitt, it was not merely the choice between two rival orators, but

between two rival Courts, the Old and the New. We may be sure that no

element in this business was more essentially present to the Minister's

mind.

All this seems petty but essential; but all was petty then, as is proved

by the mere fact of Newcastle being at the head of the Ministry and

master of the House of Commons; and it is all essential to the reader

who would understand the history of those times, because the

complication of these byways and intrigues is so extreme. There was the

King with Lady Yarmouth and Cumberland; there were Newcastle and

Hardwicke, with the House of Commons at their feet, and anxious to

remain at their feet if that were possible; there was the influence of

Cumberland apart from the King, and represented by Fox; there was

Bedford, powerful from his property and connections, with a clique

hungry for office; there was Pitt with his Grenville relations, who were

ready to give him their support, but not less ready to withdraw it if

something better should offer. And around and below these was the great

shifting mass of politicians by profession and cupidity, the

parliamentary Zoroastrians, who worshipped the rising sun, when they

could discern it; the sun which should shed upon them office, salary,

and titles; striving, sweating, cringing, as Bubb, the most shameless of

them all, emphasises in capital letters, 'AND ALL FOR QUARTER-DAY.' It

was through this scene of confusion and intrigue that Pitt had to thread

his way, not very scrupulously; for he had always lived in this society,

had lost whatever thin illusions he had ever possessed, and followed the

clues which his experience had taught him to prize. He played the game.

[Sidenote: Nov. 13, 1755.]

The meeting of Parliament took place two months afterwards and that

period was spent by Newcastle and Hardwicke in arranging to discard Pitt

and Legge, and to lean on Cumberland and Fox. Newcastle did not yield to

Fox without reluctance, for it was, in Pitt's words, parting with some

of his sole power. In his helplessness and despair he even offered to

cede his place to Granville, who as Carteret had been his most detested

bugbear, but who had now subsided into a quiescent President of the

Council. Granville refused with a laugh, and preferred to conduct the

negotiation with Fox. Fox had to him the merit of keeping out Pitt,

whose former denunciations he had neither forgotten nor forgiven. So he

had first endeavoured to inspire Murray to face, and now Fox to

supplant Pitt. With a flash of his old diplomacy he was able to bring

together the two mistrustful parties, on terms which Newcastle had

curtly refused in the first insolence of his power, but which now, at

the instance of Hardwicke as we have seen, he had to concede. The insane

plan of a leaderless House of Commons, left like sheep on a barren moor,

owned by an absentee Duke secluded in the Treasury, was to be abandoned.

Fox was to be Secretary of State, leader of the House of Commons in name

and in fact, and what was far more than either, he was authorised to

announce that he represented the full influence of the King in the House

'to help or to hurt.' When the two shepherds, the old and the new,

burning with mutual hatred and distrust, met to ratify the conditions,

Fox suggested sardonically that it would be best that this should be the

last time on which they should meet to agree, that there should be a

final settlement, or none at all, meaning that it should be honest and

complete. Newcastle, no doubt with a wry face, agreed. 'Then,' said Fox,

'it shall be so'; though indeed it was not. Fox stipulated for the

admission or promotion of five persons, the only memorable ones of whom

were George Selwyn, whose lovable and humorous personality has survived

that of many more eminent contemporaries, and Hamilton, who is the only

man, except the less-known Hawkins, who is remembered by a single

speech. Chesterfield, on hearing of the reconstitution of the Ministry,

observed with his habitual shrewdness that Newcastle had turned out

everybody else and had now turned himself out. Fox at once repented of

his adhesion, for Stone, Newcastle's confidant, informed him that had he

not joined them the Ministry would have instantly resigned.[291] But

now he had to content himself with negotiating through Rigby with the

Bedford group, which he hoped to bring into office for the purpose of

wrecking the administration.

Robinson made less than no difficulties in accommodating himself to the

new pretensions. He only yearned to return to the Great Wardrobe of

which he had been Master. And so with a pension of 2000_l._ a year,

fixed upon luckless Ireland, he vanishes into space, with the natural

remark that he had never looked on his seven children with so much

satisfaction as on the completion of these domestic arrangements.

Lord Chatham, His Early Life and Connections · 第 18 / 22 章