just the cause of that king may be who is driven from the throne either
by his subjects or by a foreign usurper, his aides are not obliged to
support _an eternal war_ in his favor. After having made ineffectual
efforts to restore him, they must at length give peace to their people,
and come to an accommodation with the usurper, and for that purpose
treat with him as with a lawful sovereign. Louis the Fourteenth,
exhausted by a bloody and unsuccessful war, offered at Gertruydenberg to
abandon his grandson, whom he had placed on the throne of Spain; and
when affairs had changed their appearance, Charles of Austria, the rival
of Philip, saw himself, in his turn, abandoned by his allies. They grew
weary of exhausting their states in order to give him the possession of
a crown which they believed to be his due, but which, to all appearance,
they should never be able to procure for him."--Book II. ch. xii. §§
196, 197.
DANGEROUS POWER.
[Sidenote: All nations may join.]
"It is still easier to prove, that, should this formidable power betray
any unjust and ambitious dispositions by doing the least injustice to
another, every nation may avail themselves of the occasion, and join
their forces to those of the party injured, in order to reduce that
ambitious power, and disable it from so easily oppressing its neighbors,
or keeping them in continual awe and fear. For an injury gives a nation
a right to provide for its future safety by taking away from the
violator the means of oppression. It is lawful, and even praiseworthy,
to assist those who are oppressed, or unjustly attacked."--Book III. ch.
iii. § 45.
SYSTEM OF EUROPE.
[Sidenote: Europe a republic to preserve order and liberty.]
"Europe forms a political system, a body where the whole is connected by
the relations and different interests of nations inhabiting this part of
the world. It is not, as anciently, a confused heap of detached pieces,
each of which thought itself very little concerned in the fate of
others, and seldom regarded things which did not immediately relate to
it. The continual attention of sovereigns to what is on the carpet, the
constant residence of ministers, and _the perpetual negotiations, make
Europe a kind of a republic, the members of which, though independent,
unite, through the ties of common interest, for the maintenance of order
and liberty_. Hence arose that famous scheme of the political
equilibrium, or balance of power, by which is understood such a
disposition of things as no power is able absolutely to predominate or
to prescribe laws to others."--Book III. ch. iii. § 47.
"Confederacies would be a sure way of preserving the equilibrium, and
supporting the liberty of nations, did all princes thoroughly understand
their true interests, and regulate all their steps for the good of the
state."--Ibid. § 49.
CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY.
[Sidenote: To be moderate.]
"Instead of the pillage of the country and defenceless places, a custom
has been substituted more humane and more advantageous to the sovereign
making war: I mean that of contributions. Whoever carries on _a just
war[41] has a right of making the enemy's country contribute to the
support of the army, and towards defraying all the charges of the war_.
Thus he obtains a part of what is due to him, and the subjects of the
enemy, on submitting to this imposition, are secured from pillage, and
the country is preserved. But a general who would not sully his
reputation is to moderate his contributions, and proportion them to
those on whom they are imposed. An excess in this point is not without
the reproach of cruelty and inhumanity: if it shows less ferocity than
ravage and destruction, it glares with avarice."--Book III. ch. ix. §
165.
ASYLUM.
"If an exile or banished man is driven from his country for any crime,
it does _not_ belong to the nation in which he has taken refuge to
punish him for a fault committed in a foreign country. For Nature gives
to mankind and to nations the right of punishing only for their defence
and safety (§ 169): whence it follows that he can only be punished by
those he has offended.
"But this reason shows, that, if the justice of each nation ought in
general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed in its own
territories, we ought to except from this rule the villains who, by the
quality and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public
security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race.
Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession may be exterminated
wherever they are seized; for they attack and injure all nations by
trampling under foot the foundations of their common safety. Thus
pirates are brought to the gibbet by the first into whose hands they
fall. If the sovereign of the country where crimes of that nature have
been committed reclaims the authors of them in order to bring them to
punishment, they ought to be restored to him, as to one who is
_principally_ interested in punishing them in an exemplary manner: and
it being proper to convict the guilty, and to try them according to some
form of law, this is a _second_ [not sole] reason why malefactors are
usually delivered up at the desire of the state where their crimes have
been committed."--Book I. ch. xix. §§ 232, 233.
"Every nation has a right of refusing to admit a stranger into the
country, when he cannot enter it without putting it in evident danger,
or without doing it a remarkable prejudice."[42]--Ibid. § 230.
FOREIGN MINISTERS.
"The obligation does not go so far as to suffer at all times perpetual
ministers, who are desirous of residing with a sovereign, though they
have nothing to negotiate. It is natural, indeed, and very agreeable to
the sentiments which nations owe to each other, that these resident
ministers, _when there it nothing to be feared from their stay_, should
be friendly received; but if there be any solid reason against this,
what is for the good of the state ought unquestionably to be preferred:
and the foreign sovereign cannot take it amiss, if his minister, who has
concluded the affairs of his commission, and has no other affairs to
negotiate, be desired to depart.[43] The custom of keeping everywhere
ministers continually resident is now so strongly established, that the
refusal of a conformity to it would, without _very good reasons_, give
offence. These reasons may arise from _particular_ conjunctures; but
there are also common reasons always subsisting, and such as relate to
_the constitution of a government and the state of a nation_. The
republics have often very good reasons of the latter kind to excuse
themselves from continually suffering foreign ministers who _corrupt the
citizens in order to gain them over to their masters, to the great
prejudice of the republic and fomenting of the parties_, &c. And should
they only diffuse among a nation, formerly plain, frugal, and virtuous,
a taste for luxury, avidity for money, and the manners of courts, these
would be more than sufficient for wise and provident rulers to dismiss
them."--Book IV. ch. v. § 66.
FOOTNOTES:
[38] This is the case of France:--Semonville at Turin,--Jacobin
clubs,--Liegeois meeting,--Flemish meeting,--La Fayette's
answer,--Clootz's embassy,--Avignon.
[39] The French acknowledge no power not directly emanating from the
people.
[40] By the seventh article of the Treaty of TRIPLE ALLIANCE, between
France, England, and Holland, signed at the Hague, in the year 1717, it
is stipulated, "that, if the kingdoms, countries, or provinces of any of
the allies are disturbed by intestine quarrels, or _by rebellions, on
account of the said successions_," (the Protestant succession to the
throne of Great Britain, and the succession to the throne of France, as
settled by the Treaty of Utrecht,) "or _under any other pretext
whatever_, the ally thus in trouble shall have full right to demand of
his allies the succors above mentioned": that is to say, the same
succors as in the case of an invasion from any foreign power,--8,000
foot and 2,000 horse to be furnished by France or England, and 4,000
foot and 1,000 horse by the States-General.
By the fourth article of the Treaty of QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE, between
England, France, Holland, and the Emperor of Germany, signed in the year
1718, the contracting powers "promise and oblige themselves that they
will and ought to maintain, guaranty, and defend the right of succession
in the kingdom of France, according to the tenor of the treaties made at
Utrecht the 11th day of April, 1713; ... and this they shall perform
_against all persons whosoever who may presume to disturb the order of
the said succession_, in contradiction to the previous acts and treaties
subsequent thereon."
The above treaties have been revived and confirmed by every subsequent
treaty of peace between Great Britain and France.--EDIT.
[41] Contributions raised by the Duke of Brunswick in France. Compare
these with the contributions raised by the French in the
Netherlands.--EDIT.
[42] The third article of the Treaty of Triple Alliance and the latter
part of the fourth article of the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance
stipulate, that no kind of refuge or protection shall be given to
rebellious subjects of the contracting powers.--EDIT.
[43] Dismission of M. Chauvelin.--EDIT.
END OF VOL. IV.