Our doctors of the day are not so fond of quoting the opinions of this

ancient sage as they are of imitating his conduct: first, because it

might appear that they are not as great inventors as they would be

thought; and next, because, unfortunately for his fame, he was not

successful. It is a remark liable to as few exceptions as any generality

can be, that they who applaud prosperous folly and adore triumphant

guilt have never been known to succor or even to pity human weakness or

offence, when they become subject to human vicissitude, and meet with

punishment instead of obtaining power. Abating for their want of

sensibility to the sufferings of their associates, they are not so much

in the wrong; for madness and wickedness are things foul and deformed in

themselves, and stand in need of all the coverings and trappings of

fortune to recommend them to the multitude. Nothing can be more

loathsome in their naked nature.

Aberrations like these, whether ancient or modern, unsuccessful or

prosperous, are things of passage. They furnish no argument for

supposing _a multitude told by the head to be the people_. Such a

multitude can have no sort of title to alter the seat of power in the

society, in which it ever ought to be the obedient, and not the ruling

or presiding part. What power may belong to the whole mass, in which

mass the natural _aristocracy_, or what by convention is appointed to

represent and strengthen it, acts in its proper place, with its proper

weight, and without being subjected to violence, is a deeper question.

But in that case, and with that concurrence, I should have much doubt

whether any rash or desperate changes in the state, such as we have seen

in France, could ever be effected.

I have said that in all political questions the consequences of any

assumed rights are of great moment in deciding upon their validity. In

this point of view let us a little scrutinize the effects of a right in

the mere majority of the inhabitants of any country of superseding and

altering their government _at pleasure_.

The sum total of every people is composed of its units. Every individual

must have a right to originate what afterwards is to become the act of

the majority. Whatever he may lawfully originate he may lawfully

endeavor to accomplish. He has a right, therefore, in his own

particular, to break the ties and engagements which bind him to the

country in which he lives; and he has a right to make as many converts

to his opinions, and to obtain as many associates in his designs, as he

can procure: for how can you know the dispositions of the majority to

destroy their government, but by tampering with some part of the body?

You must begin by a secret conspiracy, that you may end with a national

confederation. The mere pleasure of the beginner must be the sole guide;

since the mere pleasure of others must be the sole ultimate sanction, as

well as the sole actuating principle in every part of the progress.

Thus, arbitrary will (the last corruption of ruling power) step by step

poisons the heart of every citizen. If the undertaker fails, he has the

misfortune of a rebel, but not the guilt. By such doctrines, all love to

our country, all pious veneration and attachment to its laws and

customs, are obliterated from our minds; and nothing can result from

this opinion, when grown into a principle, and animated by discontent,

ambition, or enthusiasm, but a series of conspiracies and seditions,

sometimes ruinous to their authors, always noxious to the state. No

sense of duty can prevent any man from being a leader or a follower in

such enterprises. Nothing restrains the tempter; nothing guards the

tempted. Nor is the new state, fabricated by such arts, safer than the

old. What can prevent the mere will of any person, who hopes to unite

the wills of others to his own, from an attempt wholly to overturn it?

It wants nothing but a disposition to trouble the established order, to

give a title to the enterprise.

When you combine this principle of the right to change a fixed and

tolerable constitution of things at pleasure with the theory and

practice of the French Assembly, the political, civil, and moral

irregularity are, if possible, aggravated. The Assembly have found

another road, and a far more commodious, to the destruction of an old

government, and the legitimate formation of a new one, than through the

previous will of the majority of what they call the people. Get, say

they, the possession of power by any means you can into your hands; and

then, a subsequent consent (what they call an _address of adhesion_)

makes your authority as much the act of the people as if they had

conferred upon you originally that kind and degree of power which

without their permission you had seized upon. This is to give a direct

sanction to fraud, hypocrisy, perjury, and the breach of the most sacred

trusts that can exist between man and man. What can sound with such

horrid discordance in the moral ear as this position,--that a delegate

with limited powers may break his sworn engagements to his constituent,

assume an authority, never committed to him, to alter all things at his

pleasure, and then, if he can persuade a large number of men to flatter

him in the power he has usurped, that he is absolved in his own

conscience, and ought to stand acquitted in the eyes of mankind? On this

scheme, the maker of the experiment must begin with a determined

perjury. That point is certain. He must take his chance for the

expiatory addresses. This is to make the success of villany the

standard of innocence.

Without drawing on, therefore, very shocking consequences, neither by

previous consent, nor by subsequent ratification of a _mere reckoned

majority_, can any set of men attempt to dissolve the state at their

pleasure. To apply this to our present subject. When the several orders,

in their several bailliages, had met in the year 1789, (such of them, I

mean, as had met peaceably and constitutionally,) to choose and to

instruct their representatives, so organized and so acting, (because

they were organized and were acting according to the conventions which

made them a people,) they were the _people_ of France. They had a legal

and a natural capacity to be considered as that people. But observe,

whilst they were in this state, that is, whilst they were a people, in

no one of their instructions did they charge or even hint at any of

those things which have drawn upon the usurping Assembly and their

adherents the detestation of the rational and thinking part of mankind.

I will venture to affirm, without the least apprehension of being

contradicted by any person who knows the then state of France, that, if

any one of the changes were proposed, which form the fundamental parts

of their Revolution, and compose its most distinguishing acts, it would

not have had one vote in twenty thousand in any order. Their

instructions purported the direct contrary to all those famous

proceedings which are defended as the acts of the people. Had such

proceedings been expected, the great probability is, that the people

would then have risen, as to a man, to prevent them. The whole

organization of the Assembly was altered, the whole frame of the

kingdom was changed, before these things could be done. It is long to

tell, by what evil arts of the conspirators, and by what extreme

weakness and want of steadiness in the lawful government, this equal

usurpation on the rights of the prince and people, having first cheated,

and then offered violence to both, has been able to triumph, and to

employ with success the forged signature of an imprisoned sovereign, and

the spurious voice of dictated addresses, to a subsequent ratification

of things that had never received any previous sanction, general or

particular, expressed or implied, from the nation, (in whatever sense

that word is taken,) or from any part of it.

After the weighty and respectable part of the people had been murdered,

or driven by the menaces of murder from their houses, or were dispersed

in exile into every country in Europe,--after the soldiery had been

debauched from their officers,--after property had lost its weight and

consideration, along with its security,--after voluntary clubs and

associations of factious and unprincipled men were substituted in the

place of all the legal corporations of the kingdom arbitrarily

dissolved,--after freedom had been banished from those popular

meetings[25] whose sole recommendation is freedom,--after it had come to

that pass that no dissent dared to appear in any of them, but at the

certain price of life,--after even dissent had been anticipated, and

assassination became as quick as suspicion,--such pretended ratification

by addresses could be no act of what any lover of the people would

choose to call by their name. It is that voice which every successful

usurpation, as well as this before us, may easily procure, even without

making (as these tyrants have made) donatives from the spoil of one part

of the citizens to corrupt the other.

The pretended _rights of man_, which have made this havoc, cannot be the

rights of the people. For to be a people, and to have these rights, are

things incompatible. The one supposes the presence, the other the

absence, of a state of civil society. The very foundation of the French

commonwealth is false and self-destructive; nor can its principles be

adopted in any country, without the certainty of bringing it to the very

same condition in which France is found. Attempts are made to introduce

them into every nation in Europe. This nation, as possessing the

greatest influence, they wish most to corrupt, as by that means they are

assured the contagion must become general. I hope, therefore, I shall be

excused, if I endeavor to show, as shortly as the matter will admit, the

danger of giving to them, either avowedly or tacitly, the smallest

countenance.

There are times and circumstances in which not to speak out is at least

to connive. Many think it enough for them, that the principles

propagated by these clubs and societies, enemies to their country and

its Constitution, are not owned by the _modern Whigs in Parliament_, who

are so warm in condemnation of Mr. Burke and his book, and of course of

all the principles of the ancient, constitutional Whigs of this kingdom.

Certainly they are not owned. But are they condemned with the same zeal

as Mr. Burke and his book are condemned? Are they condemned at all? Are

they rejected or discountenanced in any way whatsoever? Is any man who

would fairly examine into the demeanor and principles of those

societies, and that too very moderately, and in the way rather of

admonition than of punishment, is such a man even decently treated? Is

he not reproached as if in condemning such principles he had belied the

conduct of his whole life, suggesting that his life had been governed by

principles similar to those which he now reprobates? The French system

is in the mean time, by many active agents out of doors, rapturously

praised; the British Constitution is coldly tolerated. But these

Constitutions are different both in the foundation and in the whole

superstructure; and it is plain that you cannot build up the one but on

the ruins of the other. After all, if the French be a superior system of

liberty, why should we not adopt it? To what end are our praises? Is

excellence held out to us only that we should not copy after it? And

what is there in the manners of the people, or in the climate of France,

which renders that species of republic fitted for them, and unsuitable

to us? A strong and marked difference between the two nations ought to

be shown, before we can admit a constant, affected panegyric, a

standing, annual commemoration, to be without any tendency to an

example.

But the leaders of party will not go the length of the doctrines taught

by the seditious clubs. I am sure they do not mean to do so. God forbid!

Perhaps even those who are directly carrying on the work of this

pernicious foreign faction do not all of them intend to produce all the

mischiefs which must inevitably follow from their having any success in

their proceedings. As to leaders in parties, nothing is more common than

to see them blindly led. The world is governed by go-betweens. These

go-betweens influence the persons with whom they carry on the

intercourse, by stating their own sense to each of them as the sense of

the other; and thus they reciprocally master both sides. It is first

buzzed about the ears of leaders, "that their friends without doors are

very eager for some measure, or very warm about some opinion,--that you

must not be too rigid with them. They are useful persons, and zealous in

the cause. They may be a little wrong, but the spirit of liberty must

not be damped; and by the influence you obtain from some degree of

concurrence with them at present, you may be enabled to set them right

hereafter."

Thus the leaders are at first drawn to a connivance with sentiments and

proceedings often totally different from their serious and deliberate

notions. But their acquiescence answers every purpose.

With no better than such powers, the go-betweens assume a new

representative character. What at best was but an acquiescence is

magnified into an authority, and thence into a desire on the part of the

leaders; and it is carried down as such to the subordinate members of

parties. By this artifice they in their turn are led into measures which

at first, perhaps, few of them wished at all, or at least did not desire

vehemently or systematically.

There is in all parties, between the principal leaders in Parliament and

the lowest followers out of doors, a middle sort of men, a sort of

equestrian order, who, by the spirit of that middle situation, are the

fittest for preventing things from running to excess. But indecision,

though a vice of a totally different character, is the natural

accomplice of violence. The irresolution and timidity of those who

compose this middle order often prevents the effect of their

controlling situation. The fear of differing with the authority of

leaders on the one hand, and of contradicting the desires of the

multitude on the other, induces them to give a careless and passive

assent to measures in which they never were consulted; and thus things

proceed, by a sort of activity of inertness, until whole bodies,

leaders, middle-men, and followers, are all hurried, with every

appearance and with many of the effects of unanimity, into schemes of

politics, in the substance of which no two of them were ever fully

agreed, and the origin and authors of which, in this circular mode of

communication, none of them find it possible to trace. In my experience,

I have seen much of this in affairs which, though trifling in comparison

to the present, were yet of some importance to parties; and I have known

them suffer by it. The sober part give their sanction, at first through

inattention and levity; at last they give it through necessity. A

violent spirit is raised, which the presiding minds after a time find it

impracticable to stop at their pleasure, to control, to regulate, or

even to direct.

This shows, in my opinion, how very quick and awakened all men ought to

be, who are looked up to by the public, and who deserve that confidence,

to prevent a surprise on their opinions, when dogmas are spread and

projects pursued by which the foundations of society may be affected.

Before they listen even to moderate alterations in the government of

their country, they ought to take care that principles are not

propagated for that purpose which are too big for their object.

Doctrines limited in their present application, and wide in their

general principles, are never meant to be confined to what they at

first pretend. If I were to form a prognostic of the effect of the

present machinations on the people from their sense of any grievance

they suffer under this Constitution, my mind would be at ease. But there

is a wide difference between the multitude, when they act against their

government from a sense of grievance or from zeal for some opinions.

When men are thoroughly possessed with that zeal, it is difficult to

calculate its force. It is certain that its power is by no means in

exact proportion to its reasonableness. It must always have been

discoverable by persons of reflection, but it is now obvious to the

world, that a theory concerning government may become as much a cause of

fanaticism as a dogma in religion. There is a boundary to men's

passions, when they act from feeling; none when they are under the

influence of imagination. Remove a grievance, and, when men act from

feeling, you go a great way towards quieting a commotion. But the good

or bad conduct of a government, the protection men have enjoyed or the

oppression they have suffered under it, are of no sort of moment, when a

faction, proceeding upon speculative grounds, is thoroughly heated

against its form. When a man is from system furious against monarchy or

episcopacy, the good conduct of the monarch or the bishop has no other

effect than further to irritate the adversary. He is provoked at it as

furnishing a plea for preserving the thing which he wishes to destroy.

His mind will be heated as much by the sight of a sceptre, a mace, or a

verge, as if he had been daily bruised and wounded by these symbols of

authority. Mere spectacles, mere names, will become sufficient causes to

stimulate the people to war and tumult.

Some gentlemen are not terrified by the facility with which government

has been overturned in France. "The people of France," they say, "had

nothing to lose in the destruction of a bad Constitution; but, though

not the best possible, we have still a good stake in ours, which will

hinder us from desperate risks." Is this any security at all against

those who seem to persuade themselves, and who labor to persuade others,

that our Constitution is an usurpation in its origin, unwise in its

contrivance, mischievous in its effects, contrary to the rights of man,

and in all its parts a perfect nuisance? What motive has any rational

man, who thinks in that manner, to spill his blood, or even to risk a

shilling of his fortune, or to waste a moment of his leisure, to

preserve it? If he has any duty relative to it, his duty is to destroy

it. A Constitution on sufferance is a Constitution condemned. Sentence

is already passed upon it. The execution is only delayed. On the

principles of these gentlemen, it neither has nor ought to have any

security. So far as regards them, it is left naked, without friends,

partisans, assertors, or protectors.

Let us examine into the value of this security upon the principles of

those who are more sober,--of those who think, indeed, the French

Constitution better, or at least as good as the British, without going

to all the lengths of the warmer politicians in reprobating their own.

Their security amounts in reality to nothing more than this,--that the

difference between their republican system and the British limited

monarchy is not worth a civil war. This opinion, I admit, will prevent

people not very enterprising in their nature from an active undertaking

against the British Constitution. But it is the poorest defensive

principle that ever was infused into the mind of man against the

attempts of those who will enterprise. It will tend totally to remove

from their minds that very terror of a civil war which is held out as

our sole security. They who think so well of the French Constitution

certainly will not be the persons to carry on a war to prevent their

obtaining a great benefit, or at worst a fair exchange. They will not go

to battle in favor of a cause in which their defeat might be more

advantageous to the public than their victory. They must at least

tacitly abet those who endeavor to make converts to a sound opinion;

they must discountenance those who would oppose its propagation. In

proportion as by these means the enterprising party is strengthened, the

dread of a struggle is lessened. See what an encouragement this is to

the enemies of the Constitution! A few assassinations and a very great

destruction of property we know they consider as no real obstacles in

the way of a grand political change. And they will hope, that here, if

antimonarchical opinions gain ground as they have done in France, they

may, as in France, accomplish a revolution without a war.

They who think so well of the French Constitution cannot be seriously

alarmed by any progress made by its partisans. Provisions for security

are not to be received from those who think that there is no danger. No!

there is no plan of security to be listened to but from those who

entertain the same fears with ourselves,--from those who think that the

thing to be secured is a great blessing, and the thing against which we

would secure it a great mischief. Every person of a different opinion

must be careless about security.

I believe the author of the Reflections, whether he fears the designs of

that set of people with reason or not, cannot prevail on himself to

despise them. He cannot despise them for their numbers, which, though

small, compared with the sound part of the community, are not

inconsiderable: he cannot look with contempt on their influence, their

activity, or the kind of talents and tempers which they possess, exactly

calculated for the work they have in hand and the minds they chiefly

apply to. Do we not see their most considerable and accredited

ministers, and several of their party of weight and importance, active

in spreading mischievous opinions, in giving sanction to seditious

writings, in promoting seditious anniversaries? and what part of their

description has disowned them or their proceedings? When men,

circumstanced as these are, publicly declare such admiration of a

foreign Constitution, and such contempt of our own, it would be, in the

author of the Reflections, thinking as he does of the French

Constitution, infamously to cheat the rest of the nation to their ruin

to say there is no danger.

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