In their critical censure, though Mr. Burke may find himself humbled by

it as a writer, as a man, and as an Englishman, he finds matter not only

of consolation, but of pride. He proposed to convey to a foreign people,

not his own ideas, but the prevalent opinions and sentiments of a

nation, renowned for wisdom, and celebrated in all ages for a

well-understood and well-regulated love of freedom. This was the avowed

purpose of the far greater part of his work. As that work has not been

ill received, and as his critics will not only admit, but contend, that

this reception could not be owing to any excellence in the composition

capable of perverting the public judgment, it is clear that he is not

disavowed by the nation whose sentiments he had undertaken to describe.

His representation is authenticated by the verdict of his country. Had

his piece, as a work of skill, been thought worthy of commendation, some

doubt might have been entertained of the cause of his success. But the

matter stands exactly as he wishes it. He is more happy to have his

fidelity in representation recognized by the body of the people than if

he were to be ranked in point of ability (and higher he could not be

ranked) with those whose critical censure he has had the misfortune to

incur.

It is not from this part of their decision which the author wishes an

appeal. There are things which touch him more nearly. To abandon them

would argue, not diffidence in his abilities, but treachery to his

cause. Had his work been recognized as a pattern for dexterous argument

and powerful eloquence, yet, if it tended to establish maxims or to

inspire sentiments adverse to the wise and free Constitution of this

kingdom, he would only have cause to lament that it possessed qualities

fitted to perpetuate the memory of his offence. Oblivion would be the

only means of his escaping the reproaches of posterity. But, after

receiving the common allowance due to the common weakness of man, he

wishes to owe no part of the indulgence of the world to its

forgetfulness. He is at issue with the party before the present, and,

if ever he can reach it, before the coming generation.

The author, several months previous to his publication, well knew that

two gentlemen, both of them possessed of the most distinguished

abilities, and of a most decisive authority in the party, had differed

with him in one of the most material points relative to the French

Revolution: that is, in their opinion of the behavior of the French

soldiery, and its revolt from its officers. At the time of their public

declaration on this subject, he did not imagine the opinion of these two

gentlemen had extended a great way beyond themselves. He was, however,

well aware of the probability that persons of their just credit and

influence would at length dispose the greater number to an agreement

with their sentiments, and perhaps might induce the whole body to a

tacit acquiescence in their declarations, under a natural and not always

an improper dislike of showing a difference with those who lead their

party. I will not deny that in general this conduct in parties is

defensible; but within what limits the practice is to be circumscribed,

and with what exceptions the doctrine which supports it is to be

received, it is not my present purpose to define. The present question

has nothing to do with their motives; it only regards the public

expression of their sentiments.

The author is compelled, however reluctantly, to receive the sentence

pronounced upon him in the House of Commons as that of the party. It

proceeded from the mouth of him who must be regarded as its authentic

organ. In a discussion which continued for two days, no one gentleman of

the opposition interposed a negative, or even a doubt, in favor of him

or his opinions. If an idea consonant to the doctrine of his book, or

favorable to his conduct, lurks in the minds of any persons in that

description, it is to be considered only as a peculiarity which they

indulge to their own private liberty of thinking. The author cannot

reckon upon it. It has nothing to do with them as members of a party. In

their public capacity, in everything that meets the public ear or public

eye, the body must be considered as unanimous.

They must have been animated with a very warm zeal against those

opinions, because they were under no _necessity_ of acting as they did,

from any just cause of apprehension that the errors of this writer

should be taken for theirs. They might disapprove; it was not necessary

they should _disavow_ him, as they have done in the whole and in all the

parts of his book; because neither in the whole nor in any of the parts

were they directly, or by any implication, involved. The author was

known, indeed, to have been warmly, strenuously, and affectionately,

against all allurements of ambition, and all possibility of alienation

from pride or personal pique or peevish jealousy, attached to the Whig

party. With one of them he has had a long friendship, which he must ever

remember with a melancholy pleasure. To the great, real, and amiable

virtues, and to the unequalled abilities of that gentleman, he shall

always join with his country in paying a just tribute of applause. There

are others in that party for whom, without any shade of sorrow, he bears

as high a degree of love as can enter into the human heart, and as much

veneration as ought to be paid to human creatures; because he firmly

believes that they are endowed with as many and as great virtues as the

nature of man is capable of producing, joined to great clearness of

intellect, to a just judgment, to a wonderful temper, and to true

wisdom. His sentiments with regard to them can never vary, without

subjecting him to the just indignation of mankind, who are bound, and

are generally disposed, to look up with reverence to the best patterns

of their species, and such as give a dignity to the nature of which we

all participate. For the whole of the party he has high respect. Upon a

view, indeed, of the composition of all parties, he finds great

satisfaction. It is, that, in leaving the service of his country, he

leaves Parliament without all comparison richer in abilities than he

found it. Very solid and very brilliant talents distinguish the

ministerial benches. The opposite rows are a sort of seminary of genius,

and have brought forth such and so great talents as never before

(amongst us at least) have appeared together. If their owners are

disposed to serve their country, (he trusts they are,) they are in a

condition to render it services of the highest importance. If, through

mistake or passion, they are led to contribute to its ruin, we shall at

least have a consolation denied to the ruined country that adjoins us:

we shall not be destroyed by men of mean or secondary capacities.

All these considerations of party attachment, of personal regard, and of

personal admiration rendered the author of the Reflections extremely

cautious, lest the slightest suspicion should arise of his having

undertaken to express the sentiments even of a single man of that

description. His words at the outset of his Reflections are these:--

"In the first letter I had the honor to write to you, and which at

length I send, I wrote neither _for_ nor _from_ any description of men;

nor shall I in this. My errors, if any, are _my own_. My reputation

_alone_ is to answer for them." In another place he says, (p. 126,[7])

"I have _no man's_ proxy. I speak _only_ from _myself_, when I disclaim,

as I do with all possible earnestness, all communion with the actors in

that triumph, or with the admirers of it. When I assert anything else,

as concerning the people of England, I speak from observation, _not from

authority_."

To say, then, that the book did not contain the sentiments of their

party is not to contradict the author or to clear themselves. If the

party had denied his doctrines to be the current opinions of the

majority in the nation, they would have put the question on its true

issue. There, I hope and believe, his censurers will find, on the trial,

that the author is as faithful a representative of the general sentiment

of the people of England, as any person amongst them can be of the ideas

of his own party.

The French Revolution can have no connection with the objects of any

parties in England formed before the period of that event, unless they

choose to imitate any of its acts, or to consolidate any principles of

that Revolution with their own opinions. The French Revolution is no

part of their original contract. The matter, standing by itself, is an

open subject of political discussion, like all the other revolutions

(and there are many) which have been attempted or accomplished in our

age. But if any considerable number of British subjects, taking a

factious interest in the proceedings of France, begin publicly to

incorporate themselves for the subversion of nothing short of the

_whole_ Constitution of this kingdom,--to incorporate themselves for the

utter overthrow of the body of its laws, civil and ecclesiastical, and

with them of the whole system of its manners, in favor of the new

Constitution and of the modern usages of the French nation,--I think no

party principle could bind the author not to express his sentiments

strongly against such a faction. On the contrary, he was perhaps bound

to mark his dissent, when the leaders of the party were daily going out

of their way to make public declarations in Parliament, which,

notwithstanding the purity of their intentions, had a tendency to

encourage ill-designing men in their practices against our Constitution.

The members of this faction leave no doubt of the nature and the extent

of the mischief they mean to produce. They declare it openly and

decisively. Their intentions are not left equivocal. They are put out of

all dispute by the thanks which, formally and as it were officially,

they issue, in order to recommend and to promote the circulation of the

most atrocious and treasonable libels against all the hitherto cherished

objects of the love and veneration of this people. Is it contrary to the

duty of a good subject to reprobate such proceedings? Is it alien to the

office of a good member of Parliament, when such practices increase, and

when the audacity of the conspirators grows with their impunity, to

point out in his place their evil tendency to the happy Constitution

which he is chosen to guard? Is it wrong, in any sense, to render the

people of England sensible how much they must suffer, if, unfortunately,

such a wicked faction should become possessed in this country of the

same power which their allies in the very next to us have so

perfidiously usurped and so outrageously abused? Is it inhuman to

prevent, if possible, the spilling _their_ blood, or imprudent to guard

against the effusion of _our own?_ Is it contrary to any of the honest

principles of party, or repugnant to any of the known duties of

friendship, for any senator respectfully and amicably to caution his

brother members against countenancing, by inconsiderate expressions, a

sort of proceeding which it is impossible they should deliberately

approve?

He had undertaken to demonstrate, by arguments which he thought could

not be refuted, and by documents which he was sure could not be denied,

that no comparison was to be made between the British government and the

French usurpation.--That they who endeavored madly to compare them were

by no means making the comparison of one good system with another good

system, which varied only in local and circumstantial differences; much

less that they were holding out to us a superior pattern of legal

liberty, which we might substitute in the place of our old, and, as they

describe it, superannuated Constitution. He meant to demonstrate that

the French scheme was not a comparative good, but a positive evil.--That

the question did not at all turn, as it had been stated, on a parallel

between a monarchy and a republic. He denied that the present scheme of

things in France did at all deserve the respectable name of a republic:

he had therefore no comparison between monarchies and republics to

make.--That what was done in France was a wild attempt to methodize

anarchy, to perpetuate and fix disorder. That it was a foul, impious,

monstrous thing, wholly out of the course of moral Nature. He undertook

to prove that it was generated in treachery, fraud, falsehood,

hypocrisy, and unprovoked murder.--He offered to make out that those who

have led in that business had conducted themselves with the utmost

perfidy to their colleagues in function, and with the most flagrant

perjury both towards their king and their constituents: to the one of

whom the Assembly had sworn fealty; and to the other, when under no sort

of violence or constraint, they had sworn a full obedience to

instructions.--That, by the terror of assassination, they had driven

away a very great number of the members, so as to produce a false

appearance of a majority.--That this fictitious majority had fabricated

a Constitution, which, as now it stands, is a tyranny far beyond any

example that can be found in the civilized European world of our age;

that therefore the lovers of it must be lovers, not of liberty, but, if

they really understand its nature, of the lowest and basest of all

servitude.

He proposed to prove that the present state of things in France is not a

transient evil, productive, as some have too favorably represented it,

of a lasting good; but that the present evil is only the means of

producing future and (if that were possible) worse evils.--That it is

not an undigested, imperfect, and crude scheme of liberty, which may

gradually be mellowed and ripened into an orderly and social freedom;

but that it is so fundamentally wrong as to be utterly incapable of

correcting itself by any length of time, or of being formed into any

mode of polity of which a member of the House of Commons could publicly

declare his approbation.

If it had been permitted to Mr. Burke, he would have shown distinctly,

and in detail, that what the Assembly calling itself National had held

out as a large and liberal toleration is in reality a cruel and

insidious religious persecution, infinitely more bitter than any which

had been heard of within this century.--That it had a feature in it

worse than the old persecutions.--That the old persecutors acted, or

pretended to act, from zeal towards some system of piety and virtue:

they gave strong preferences to their own; and if they drove people from

one religion, they provided for them another, in which men might take

refuge and expect consolation.--That their new persecution is not

against a variety in conscience, but against all conscience. That it

professes contempt towards its object; and whilst it treats all religion

with scorn, is not so much as neutral about the modes: it unites the

opposite evils of intolerance and of indifference.

He could have proved that it is so far from rejecting tests, (as

unaccountably had been asserted,) that the Assembly had imposed tests of

a peculiar hardship, arising from a cruel and premeditated pecuniary

fraud: tests against old principles, sanctioned by the laws, and binding

upon the conscience.--That these tests were not imposed as titles to

some new honor or some new benefit, but to enable men to hold a poor

compensation for their legal estates, of which they had been unjustly

deprived; and as they had before been reduced from affluence to

indigence, so, on refusal to swear against their conscience, they are

now driven from indigence to famine, and treated with every possible

degree of outrage, insult, and inhumanity.--That these tests, which

their imposers well knew would not be taken, were intended for the very

purpose of cheating their miserable victims out of the compensation

which the tyrannic impostors of the Assembly had previously and

purposely rendered the public unable to pay. That thus their ultimate

violence arose from their original fraud.

He would have shown that the universal peace and concord amongst

nations, which these common enemies to mankind had held out with the

same fraudulent ends and pretences with which they had uniformly

conducted every part of their proceeding, was a coarse and clumsy

deception, unworthy to be proposed as an example, by an informed and

sagacious British senator, to any other country.--That, far from peace

and good-will to men, they meditated war against all other governments,

and proposed systematically to excite in them all the very worst kind of

seditions, in order to lead to their common destruction.--That they had

discovered, in the few instances in which they have hitherto had the

power of discovering it, (as at Avignon and in the Comtat, at Cavaillon

and at Carpentras,) in what a savage manner they mean to conduct the

seditions and wars they have planned against their neighbors, for the

sake of putting themselves at the head of a confederation of republics

as wild and as mischievous as their own. He would have shown in what

manner that wicked scheme was carried on in those places, without being

directly either owned or disclaimed, in hopes that the undone people

should at length be obliged to fly to their tyrannic protection, as some

sort of refuge from their barbarous and treacherous hostility. He would

have shown from those examples that neither this nor any other society

could be in safety as long as such a public enemy was in a condition to

continue directly or indirectly such practices against its peace.--That

Great Britain was a principal object of their machinations; and that

they had begun by establishing correspondences, communications, and a

sort of federal union with the factious here.--That no practical

enjoyment of a thing so imperfect and precarious as human happiness must

be, even under the very best of governments, could be a security for the

existence of these governments, during the prevalence of the principles

of France, propagated from that grand school of every disorder and every

vice.

He was prepared to show the madness of their declaration of the

pretended rights of man,--the childish, futility of some of their

maxims, the gross and stupid absurdity and the palpable falsity of

others, and the mischievous tendency of all such declarations to the

well-being of men and of citizens and to the safety and prosperity of

every just commonwealth. He was prepared to show, that, in their

conduct, the Assembly had directly violated not only every sound

principle of government, but every one, without exception, of their own

false or futile maxims, and indeed every rule they had pretended to lay

down for their own direction.

In a word, he was ready to show that those who could, after such a full

and fair exposure, continue to countenance the French insanity were not

mistaken politicians, but bad men; but he thought that in this case, as

in many others, ignorance had been the cause of admiration.

These are strong assertions. They required strong proofs. The member who

laid down these positions was and is ready to give, in his place, to

each position decisive evidence, correspondent to the nature and quality

of the several allegations.

In order to judge on the propriety of the interruption given to Mr.

Burke, in his speech in the committee of the Quebec Bill, it is

necessary to inquire, First, whether, on general principles, he ought to

have been suffered to prove his allegations? Secondly, whether the time

he had chosen was so very unseasonable as to make his exercise of a

parliamentary right productive of ill effects on his friends or his

country? Thirdly, whether the opinions delivered in his book, and which

he had begun to expatiate upon that day, were in contradiction to his

former principles, and inconsistent with the general tenor of his public

conduct?

They who have made eloquent panegyrics on the French Revolution, and who

think a free discussion so very advantageous in every case and under

every circumstance, ought not, in my opinion, to have prevented their

eulogies from being tried on the test of facts. If their panegyric had

been answered with an invective, (bating the difference in point of

eloquence,) the one would have been as good as the other: that is, they

would both of them have been good for nothing. The panegyric and the

satire ought to be suffered to go to trial; and that which shrinks from

if must be contented to stand, at best, as a mere declamation.

I do not think Mr. Burke was wrong in the course he took. That which

seemed to be recommended to him by Mr. Pitt was rather to extol the

English Constitution than to attack the French. I do not determine what

would be best for Mr. Pitt to do in his situation. I do not deny that

_he_ may have good reasons for his reserve. Perhaps they might have been

as good for a similar reserve on the part of Mr. Fox, if his zeal had

suffered him to listen to them. But there were no motives of ministerial

prudence, or of that prudence which ought to guide a man perhaps on the

eve of being minister, to restrain the author of the Reflections. He is

in no office under the crown; he is not the organ of any party.

The excellencies of the British Constitution had already exercised and

exhausted the talents of the best thinkers and the most eloquent writers

and speakers that the world ever saw. But in the present case a system

declared to be far better, and which certainly is much newer, (to

restless and unstable minds no small recommendation,) was held out to

the admiration of the good people of England. In that case it was surely

proper for those who had far other thoughts of the French Constitution

to scrutinize that plan which has been recommended to our imitation by

active and zealous factions at home and abroad. Our complexion is such,

that we are palled with enjoyment, and stimulated with hope,--that we

become less sensible to a long-possessed benefit from the very

circumstance that it is become habitual. Specious, untried, ambiguous

prospects of new advantage recommend themselves to the spirit of

adventure which more or less prevails in every mind. From this temper,

men and factions, and nations too, have sacrificed the good of which

they had been in assured possession, in favor of wild and irrational

expectations. What should hinder Mr. Burke, if he thought this temper

likely at one time or other to prevail in our country, from exposing to

a multitude eager to game the false calculations of this lottery of

fraud?

I allow, as I ought to do, for the effusions which come from a _general_

zeal for liberty. This is to be indulged, and even to be encouraged, as

long as _the question is general_. An orator, above all men, ought to be

allowed a full and free use of the praise of liberty. A commonplace in

favor of slavery and tyranny, delivered to a popular assembly, would

indeed be a bold defiance to all the principles of rhetoric. But in a

question whether any particular Constitution is or is not a plan of

rational liberty, this kind of rhetorical flourish in favor of freedom

in general is surely a little out of its place. It is virtually a

begging of the question. It is a song of triumph before the battle.

"But Mr. Fox does not make the panegyric of the new Constitution; it is

the destruction only of the absolute monarchy he commends." When that

nameless thing which has been lately set up in France was described as

"the most stupendous and glorious edifice of liberty which had been

erected on the foundation of human integrity in any time or country," it

might at first have led the hearer into an opinion that the construction

of the new fabric was an object of admiration, as well as the demolition

of the old. Mr. Fox, however, has explained himself; and it would be too

like that captious and cavilling spirit which I so perfectly detest, if

I were to pin down the language of an eloquent and ardent mind to the

punctilious exactness of a pleader. Then Mr. Fox did not mean to applaud

that monstrous thing which, by the courtesy of France, they call a

Constitution. I easily believe it. Far from meriting the praises of a

great genius like Mr. Fox, it cannot be approved by any man of common

sense or common information. He cannot admire the change of one piece of

barbarism for another, and a worse. He cannot rejoice at the destruction

of a monarchy, mitigated by manners, respectful to laws and usages, and

attentive, perhaps but too attentive, to public opinion, in favor of the

tyranny of a licentious, ferocious, and savage multitude, without laws,

manners, or morals, and which, so far from respecting the general sense

of mankind, insolently endeavors to alter all the principles and

opinions which have hitherto guided and contained the world, and to

force them into a conformity to their views and actions. His mind is

made to better things.

The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. 04 (of 12) · 第 4 / 32 段