_Phrenology is useful, because it forms the most correct basis of a
system of mental philosophy._
In a previous number of this Journal (see Art. I, page 161), we entered
somewhat at length upon the discussion of the above proposition. We
there contrasted the merits of phrenology, as the _true science of the
mind_, with other systems of mental philosophy, particularly Dugald
Stewart’s. We pointed out several important defects which have hitherto
existed in every system of mental science. We stated that all writers on
the philosophy of the mind had committed the following mistakes. First,
_they leave out of view almost entirely all connection of the mind with
the brain_; and, secondly, _they make their own individual consciousness
the chief and principal source of information_. And that, from these
two radical defects in their premises, they have fallen into numerous
errors. Among others, _they do not recognise all the primitive faculties
of the mind_; and throughout all their writings, _they confound primitive
faculties of the mind with modes of activity_.
Another radical defect in the systems of previous writers on mental
science is, _When they admit and treat of the elementary faculties of the
mind, they consider them merely as existing by themselves, and disregard
almost entirely the influence of combination_.
This defect is similar to what would appear in that system of chemistry
which should contain only a physical description of elements of matter,
without saying any thing of the various substances which they form in
combination. Thus the chemist might describe oxygen by itself. He might
say it is a gas, colourless, heavier than common air, a supporter of
combustion and animal life, and many other things equally important,
interesting, and true; and if such facts were all that is known of this
substance, they should be received and appreciated according to their
value. But how much is added to our knowledge, when we are informed
that oxygen enters into combination with almost every other element of
matter? That in one combination it forms the deadly poison; in another,
the refreshing cordial. That united with nitrogen in one proportion, it
constitutes the air we breathe; in another, it forms the nitrous oxyde,
a substance producing the most remarkable effects of exhilaration; in a
third proportion, the nitrous oxyde, which, coming in contact with our
lungs, produces instant death; and in a fourth, one of the most powerful
agents in nature. That with hydrogen it forms the valuable substance
called water; and in other various combinations, acids so valuable in the
arts and all the economy of civilised life.
Much likewise might be said, which would be interesting and true, of
acids—of their general properties—their sour taste—their effects on
vegetable blues, &c.; but how imperfect would be the description which
should fail to give us not only the elements of which each is composed,
but the nature of those substances which they form in compositions?
We have room only for a single example to illustrate the truth of our
position. We select the mental power termed by Dr. Brown “_anger_;”
in phrenology, “Combativeness.” In his description of this feeling,
Dr. Brown is truly eloquent. His organ of Combativeness must have been
large, or he could not have described the feeling with such vividness and
accuracy.
“There is a principle in our mind,” says he, “which is to us like a
constant protector; which may slumber, indeed, but which slumbers only
at seasons when its vigilance would be useless; which awakes, therefore,
at the first appearance of unjust intentions, and which becomes more
watchful and more vigorous in proportion to the violence of the attack
which it has to dread. What should we think of the providence of nature,
if, when aggressions were made against the weak and unarmed, at a
distance from the aid of others, there were instantly and uniformly, by
the intervention of some wonder-working power, to rush into the hand of
the defenceless a sword or other weapon of defence? And yet this would
be but a feeble assistance, if compared with that which we receive from
those simple emotions which Heaven has caused to rush, as it were,
into our mind for repelling every attack. What would be a sword in the
trembling hand of the infirm, of the aged—of him whose pusillanimous
spirit shrinks at the very appearance not of danger merely, but even
of arms by the use of which danger might be averted, and to whom,
consequently, the very sword which he scarcely knew how to grasp would
be an additional cause of terror? The _instant anger_ which arises, does
more than many such weapons. It gives the spirit which knows how to make
a weapon of every thing, or which itself without a weapon does what even
a thunderbolt would be powerless to do in the shuddering grasp of a
coward. When anger rises, fear is gone. There is no coward, for all are
brave.”—_Brown’s Lects. Hedge’s ed._ vol. ii. p. 32.
This is a correct description, as far as it goes, of the feeling or
emotion which may be termed _instant anger_, and which depends on
Combativeness. But he confines himself to the simple emotion as it
rises in view of provocation or insult, or any threatened injury. It
is true he speaks of resentment being “too long protracted,” (which
depends on Destructiveness, and this is another example of confounding
primitive elements of the mind with each other,) and _disproportionate
to the offence; transferred from the guilty to the innocent; rising too
soon_, when it _should be entirely suppressed_; and as _not confined to
the individual aggrieved_; but it is all in such a manner as to show
conclusively that he thinks the subject exhausted with a description of
what in common language is usually termed _anger_. But phrenology teaches
that the element of the mind, which is at the foundation of anger, is
“an active impulse exerting an influence on the mental constitution,
independent of unjust attacks.” Dr. Brown has confined his description of
the faculty to one mode of manifestation or activity, which is precisely
analogous to the case we have supposed above from chemistry. But how
imperfect is the description till we are told that this elementary
feeling is the basis not only of _anger_ or _resentment_ at injury, but
constitutes in every mind, according to its strength, the propensity
to oppose; that it aids the good man to carry through his plans of
benevolence, as well as the bad to execute his purposes of malice; that
united with deficient intellect and weak moral sentiment, it makes the
quarrelsome, vaunting boxer, while in a different combination it is an
important element in the character of the unflinching philanthropist;
that it not only gives boldness to the soldier on the field of battle,
and fills with indignation the mind of an injured person, but imparts
energy to the messenger of peace, and even enables gentle and virtuous
woman better to fulfil the important duties of her station. We want to
know what is that element of mind which is the _basis of anger_, and then
the influence of this element in all its varieties of combination.
We are not aware that this representation is in the least open to the
charge of exaggeration. Nor is the defect of which we speak confined
to the system of Dr. Brown. It extends to all the systems of the old
philosophers, and almost to every part of those systems; nor could their
principles of investigation and the data they had at command, or which
they would use, furnish any remedy. If they went to the extent of their
powers or their data, we should not complain; and yet if there are
additional helps or data, why should we not employ them?
There is one more topic connected with this part of the subject upon
which we would remark, viz. the _nomenclature of phrenology_. We cannot
better introduce what we have to say, than by quoting the language of Dr.
Whately, published in the second number of this Journal, page 47.
“I am convinced that, even if all connection of the brain with the mind
were regarded not merely as doubtful, but as a perfect chimera, still
the treatises of many phrenological writers, especially yours,” (Mr.
Combe’s,) “would be of great value, from their employing a metaphysical
nomenclature far more accurate, logical, and convenient, than Locke,
Stewart, and other writers of their schools.”
Higher authority on this subject than Dr. Whately could not be cited.
But the testimony of many persons of high authority might be quoted.
Even the opponents of phrenology will express their admiration of its
classification and nomenclature; and that, too, while they profess entire
unbelief in the truth of the system, not reflecting that this excellency
is an important argument in favour of its truth. Simplicity and clearness
are only attributes of _truth_; and the principle is without exception,
that of two systems, that which is most simple and clear is most
accordant with truth. Such ever has, and ever will be, the verdict of
mankind.
Without claiming perfection for phrenology in regard to _classification_
and _nomenclature_, we think its advantages in this respect to mental
science will be incalculable. Every writer on metaphysics usually tills
some scores of pages on the importance of being precise in the use of
language, and the danger of employing terms in a loose and careless
manner; and no one who looks at the history of metaphysical science will
consider such cautions as unnecessary. One half or three fourths of the
controversies which have taken place in reference to the philosophy of
the mind, have doubtless arisen from a misunderstanding of _terms_. This
is true not only in regard to subjects purely metaphysical, but many
controversial treatises on religious doctrines would never have been
inflicted on the world, had the parties understood each other. We do not
claim for a knowledge of phrenology the quality of a sovereign universal
remedy for those evils. There are many subjects of controversy not
directly connected with the science; and difference of opinion as often
arises from difference of feeling as from difference in intellectual
apprehension. Even phrenologists, equally well versed in the principles
of their science, will sometimes have different views. But with them,
controversies and discussions do not arise from a misunderstanding of
language. Although there is still _terra incognita_ within the limits of
the system, and many indefinite points, some of which probably never will
be settled in our mortal state, yet the harmony of phrenologists on the
science of the mind is scarcely surpassed by that of other philosophers
on the science of matter; and even where only a partial acquaintance with
the science is possessed, such is the clearness of its classification
and the definitions of its terms, that misunderstanding in relation to
subjects legitimately involving such language is almost necessarily
excluded from minds of ordinary discipline and capacity.
We entirely accord with the opinion of Dr. Whately, that if the science
were regarded “as a perfect chimera,” still the “employing a metaphysical
nomenclature,” to which it has given rise, “would be of great value.”