PHORMIO'S VICTORY IN THE CORINTHIAN GULF--WITH SOME INTRODUCTORY
REMARKS ON THE ATHENIAN SEA-SERVICE.
The maritime glory of ancient Athens has scarcely been regarded by
Englishmen with the attention and sympathy which our own national
interest and pride in the rule of the waves might be expected to
create.
Our boast of trusting to our wooden walls is a literal translation of
the Athenian statesman's maxim, which inspired his country's
successful resistance to her Persian invader. Athens, like England,
made herself, by her fleets, felt and feared in every region of the
then known world. Like England, she won herself, beyond sea, an empire
far disproportioned to the scanty extent of her domestic territory;
and she held that empire, and defied all the assaults of combined
enemies by land, so long as, and no longer than, she maintained her
ascendency on the ocean.
In the palmy days of Athens every Athenian was a seaman. A state,
indeed, whose members, of an age fit for service, at no time exceeded
thirty thousand, and whose territorial extent did not equal half
Sussex, could only have acquired such a naval dominion as Athens once
held, by devoting, and zealously training, all its sons to service in
its fleets.[8] The resident aliens, and some of the slaves, were also
compelled to row in the Athenian galleys; foreign mariners were
sometimes hired; but the staple of the crews consisted of free
citizens of Athens, members of the sovereign republic, which they
served with hearts and hands in the cause of her aggrandisement;
zealously executing the decrees Which they themselves had voted, and
each of them (as Herodotus remarked) feeling that what he wrought he
wrought for himself, and striving to do the work thoroughly.[9]
[8] See _Thucyd._ i. 143, and _Xenoph. de Repub. Ath._ i. 19.
[9] See the remarkable passage in Herodotus (_Terpsichore_, 78) where
he describes the change in the spirit of the Athenians after they had
got rid of the yoke of the Pisistratidæ, and felt the full vigour of
the free institutions which Cleisthenes had perfected for them.
We look back with just national pride on the energy which our country
displayed, and the resources which she called into action during the
fearful struggles of the last war. We dwell with honest complacency on
the narrative that tells us how, when, after the rupture of the peace
of Amiens, our Great Enemy menaced invasion, England, besides her
preparations by land, put forth her might "on the element she calls
her own. She covered the ocean with five hundred and seventy ships of
war of various descriptions. Divisions of her fleet blocked up every
French port in the Channel; and the army destined to invade our shores
might see the British flag flying in every direction on the horizon,
waiting for their issuing from the harbour, as birds of prey may be
seen hovering in the air above the animal which they design to pounce
upon:"[10] while, at the same time, along Indian seas, and by the
shores of continents of whose existence the Ancients dreamed not, our
squadrons commanded every coast that could supply an enemy's ship to
chase, or an enemy's colony to capture. Yet, if we take into
consideration the comparative populations and territories of the two
states, we shall find instances in Greek history of Athens making
exertions to secure her independence, and naval supremacy, which
surpass even those which are the just boast of Britain. We may pass
over the day of Salamis, when all Athens was on ship-board; nor need
we, for this purpose, do more than glance at her armaments at the
fatal siege of Syracuse, and in the other death-struggles of the
Peloponnesian war. There is an original inscription still preserved in
the Louvre, which attests the energies of Athens at another crisis of
her career, not, indeed, more intense or exciting than those which we
have alluded to, but more interesting to Englishmen, from the variety
of the, scenes of operation, on which Athens then, like England in
modern wars, at once sought conquests abroad, and repelled enemies at
home. At the period we now advert to (B. C. 457) an Athenian armament
of two hundred galleys was engaged in a bold though unsuccessful
expedition against Egypt. The Athenian crews had landed, had won a
battle; they had then re-embarked and sailed up the Nile, and were
busily besieging the Persian garrison in Memphis. As the complement of
a trireme galley was at least two hundred men, we cannot estimate the
forces then employed by Athens against Egypt at less than forty
thousand men. At the same time she kept squadrons on the coasts of
Phœnicia and Cyprus, and yet maintained a home-fleet that enabled
her to defeat her Peloponesian enemies at Cecryphalea and Ægina,
capturing in the last engagement seventy galleys. This last fact may
give us some idea of the strength of the Athenian home-fleet that
gained the victory: and by adopting the same ratio of multiplying
whatever number of galleys we suppose to have been employed, by two
hundred, so as to gain the aggregate number of the crews, we may form
some estimate of the forces which this little Greek state then kept on
foot. Between sixty and seventy thousand men must have served in her
fleets during that year. Her tenacity of purpose was equal to her
boldness of enterprise. Sooner than yield or withdraw from any of
their expeditions, the Athenians at this very time, when Corinth sent
an army to attack their garrison at Megara, did not recall a single
crew or a single soldier from Ægina or from abroad; but the lads and
old men, who had been left to guard the city, fought and won a battle
against these new assailants. The inscription which we have referred
to, is graven on a votive tablet to the memory of the dead, erected in
that year by the Erechthean tribe, one of the ten into which the
Athenians were divided. It shows, as Thirlwall has remarked,[11] "that
the Athenians were conscious of the greatness of their own efforts;"
and in it this little civic community of the ancient world still
"records to us with emphatic simplicity, that its slain fell in
Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phœnicia, at Haliæ, in Ægina, and in Megara,
_in the same year_."
[10] Scott's _Life of Napoleon_.
[11] _History of Greece_, vol. iii. p. 26, n.
Of course, in order to man and keep afoot such armaments as these,
Athens employed large numbers of her subject-allies, of hired
mariners, and also of slaves. But, as has been marked before, her own
citizens formed the staple of her forces. In the periods, indeed, of
her deepest distress, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, when
her dreadful defeats in Sicily must have diminished the serviceable
part of her free population, and swept off the flower of her youth,
"as if the spring-time were taken out of the year," she was compelled
to fill her fleets with a far larger proportion of slaves and hired
foreigners. And then her enemies, by the offer of higher pay, could
half unman the Athenian ships, and improve their own complements on
the very eve of decisive operations.[12]
[12] Plutarch in _Vitâ Lysandri_.
Themistocles was the great founder of the Athenian navy. He first
taught Athens to disregard the land, and to look on the sea as her
national element of empire. His enemies said of him that he took the
spear out of his countrymen's grasp, and replaced it with the oar.[13]
But the contemporary historian explicitly attests[14] that the
salvation of Greece from Persia arose from the Athenians having become
a sea-faring people: and it was Themistocles who made them so.
[13] Plutarch in _Vitâ_.
[14] Herodotus _Polyhymnia_, 144.
He persuaded his fellow-countrymen to devote the produce of their
silver mines to building a fleet, instead of dividing it among
themselves. This fleet, well exercised in contests with Ægina, was the
nucleus of the navy of Athens, that taught the Greeks how to fight and
conquer at Artemisium and Salamis. These victories, and the equally
successful sea-fights in which Cimon afterwards led the Greeks
against the remnants of the Persian navy on the Asiatic coasts, raised
the zeal of the Athenians for their sea service to the highest pitch.
And when they had acquired the supremacy over the Greek islanders and
cities of the coasts of the Ægean, they gained and sedulously employed
fresh resources for augmenting the number of their galleys, and
improving their own skill as mariners. For no nation was ever more
thoroughly aware than the Athenians of the importance of assiduous
training and perfect discipline in naval warfare. Their great orator,
Pericles, mainly encouraged them to resist the combined powers of
Lacedæmon and her allies, by reminding them of their long practice in
seamanship compared with that of their enemies, who were more
numerous, and might be equally brave, but never could equal their
skill. He truly told them that seamanship is an art not to be acquired
off-hand by landsmen, or to be picked up as a mere minor
accomplishment, but that it requires long practice, uninterrupted by
other occupations. "Athens had devoted herself to this since the
invasion of the Medes; she had not, indeed, perfected herself; but the
reward of her superior training was the rule of the sea--a mighty
dominion, for it gave her the rule of much fair land beyond its waves,
safe from the idle ravages with which the Lacedæmonians might harass
Attica, but never could subdue Athens."[15]
[15] See the speech of Pericles at the end of the first book of
Thucydides, and also the great speech in the second book.
An ancient Athenian trireme would make a poor figure beside a modern
line-of-battle ship, the most majestic product of human skill and
daring. Still, as we have seen, the number of men employed on board a
naval armament in the old times far exceeded the united complements of
a modern fleet. The slaughter in action was far greater, and, from the
nature of the conflict, more depended upon discipline and seamanship,
comparatively with mere animal courage, than is the case even in the
sea-fights of the present time. The ancients contended in long light
galleys, the prows of which were armed with sharp strong beaks, for
the purpose of staying in an adversary's timbers, and more effectually
running her down. Inexperienced crews sought only to grapple with an
enemy, and to decide the affair by boarding. But the more
highly-disciplined mariners avoided this unscientific mode of closing,
in which numbers and brute force were sure to prevail, and sought by
skill and speed, by manœuvring round their antagonists, by
wheeling, halting, backing, and charging exactly at the right moment,
to avoid the shocks intended for themselves, and to run an opponent
down by taking her amidships or on the quarter, or to dash away and
shatter part of her oars.
If we can picture to ourselves two hostile squadrons of modern
steam-boats, without artillery, seeking to destroy each other
principally by running down, we shall gain an idea in many respects
analogous to the idea of a sea-fight of antiquity. But we must
remember that the motive power of the old war-galleys, when
contending, came entirely from oars, sails not being used in action:
so that the efficiency of the manœuvres depended on the skill and
nerve of the whole crew, and not merely on the excellence of machinery
and the dexterity of one or two officers. Of the two hundred men who
made the usual complement of a Greek trireme, at least four-fifths
pulled at the oar; the proportion of mariners being continually
diminished in the best navies, as they trusted more and more to
swiftness and tactics, and less to hand-to-hand fighting. They pulled
in three tiers, ranged one above another, the lowest having, of
course, the shortest oars and lightest work; better men being required
for the middle tier, and the most powerful and skilled rowers being
alone fit to work the long oars of the upper rank.
The probable mode of arranging the tiers of oars, so that the higher
should sufficiently overstretch the lower, so as not to interfere in
stroke with them, is excellently explained by Mitford in an appendix
to the eighth chapter of his second volume. Adopting the views of
General Melville, and illustrating them by a description of
war-galleys actually in use among the islanders of the Pacific,
Mitford says:--"Along the waist of the galley, from a little above the
water's edge, a gallery projected at an angle of about forty-five
degrees. In this the upper rowers were disposed, checkered with the
lower. Space for them being thus gained, partly by elevation, partly
by lateral projection, those of the highest tier were not too much
above the water to work their oars with effect."
The system, too, of rowing with outriggers, which has lately been
adopted in the boat-races on the Tyne, and thence in those of the
Thames and Cam, suggests another mode by which sufficient sweep and
space might have been gained for the oars of the upper tier, to keep
them from clashing with those below them.
A galley thus manned, and built exclusively for speed, (for the
war-ships seldom or never pushed across the open sea, but coasted
along from point to point, landing their crews for meals and sleep,)
must have moved with immense velocity and power. The boat-races at
Cambridge, in which six or seven-and-twenty eight-oared boats may be
seen contending close together, can give some faint idea of the speed
with which a squadron of the old triremes must have rushed through the
sea, and of the noise and wave which must have been raised in the
water, by the displacing transit of such large and rapid bodies, and
by the simultaneous lashing of so many thousand oars. One can
understand the alarm with which their charge must have been watched by
unpractised antagonists, and the shrinking back frequently caused,
φοβω ῥοθιου και νεων δεινοτητος.[16] Steady
bravery and alertness were therefore, essential qualities in the whole
crew. For, if but a few of the oarsmen got frightened, and
consequently pulled out of time, or if they failed to back water, to
ease off, or to give all the way they could, exactly at the word of
command, the calculated speed, or curve, or check, on the faith of
which a manœuvre was attempted by the captain and steerer, would not
be supplied; the manœuvre would fail; and the galley, instead of
taking an antagonist at advantage, would herself lie at the mercy of
some other of the enemy's ships that might be near enough to seize the
moment of her confusion. Accordingly, besides assiduously training
their men to the use of the oar in rough as well as smooth water, the
Athenian admirals inculcated as a seaman's prime duties order and
silence in action, (Εν τω εργω κοσμον και σιγην
περι πλειστου ἡγεισθε.)[17] To be steady and patient in
the presence of the enemy until the signal for engaging was given; to
listen attentively for the word of command as passed on by the boatswains
(κελευϛαι) to the various banks of oars; to, obey each command
instantly, unhesitatingly, and quietly; to keep time, to back
promptly, and, in charging, to throw the utmost amount of physical
power into each stroke of the oar, were the qualities that
distinguished the able Athenian seaman. Impatience, clamour, clumsy
and uneven rowing, slowness and confusion in catching and obeying
signals, and flurried unsteadiness in the heat of battle, betrayed the
inexperience of the crews with which the Peloponnesians manned their
fleets in the early years of their great war with Athens; though
probably each Dorian among them was constitutionally as brave as any
Athenian, and might have excelled him in an encounter with spear and
shield on land.
[16] Thucyd., iv. 10.
[17] Speech of Phormio to his crews before the second battle in the
Gulf.--Thucyd. ii. 89.
However skilfully the triremes might be manœuvred, it was
impossible to prevent their sometimes getting foul of their
adversaries. And, for the hand-to-hand fighting which this involved, a
small body of fully armed soldiers (Επιβαται, or Marines,
according to our modern term) served on board each galley. There were
also a few bowmen or slingers for galling the enemy as opportunity
offered. And although the oarsmen must, of course, have been
unencumbered with armour, each seems to have been furnished with some
light weapons, a cutlass probably and javelin, to play his part with
in the exigencies which continually occurred during an action at sea.
For we must bear in mind that, when we read of the ancient galleys
running each other down in action, we are not to suppose that the
struck galley was instantly sunk by the shock. On the contrary, almost
every account in the classics of a sea-fight proves that this was
seldom or never the case. From the peculiarly light build of the
triremes, and probably also from the effect of the lateral galleries
in which the upper rowers were disposed, one of these vessels would be
a long time before it foundered, even after receiving such a shock as
to water-log it, and to leave it shattered and perfectly unmanageable.
While the wreck thus kept above water, the crew clung to it in the
hope of being rescued by successful friends. Sometimes, even after
thus being run down, the crew would make a desperate effort, and carry
their apparently triumphant opponent by boarding. A memorable instance
of this is recorded by Herodotus as having occurred at the battle of
Salamis, where a Samothracian galley in the Persian service was
charged and run down by an Æginetan; "but the Samothracians, being
javelin-men, sent a shower of darts at the marines who assailed them
from the ship which had run them down, cleared her deck, and boarded
and took possession of her."[18]
[18] Herod., _Urania_, 90.
A mere successful charge, therefore, against an enemy's galley did not
necessarily determine the fate of her crew; a flight or two of
javelins and arrows were probably thrown in, especially if any
resistance was shown, and then the victorious vessel generally moved
of in search of fresh opponents until the event of the day was finally
decided. The conquerors then had the easy task of rowing up and down
among the half-swamped prizes, killing or taking off the men as
prisoners, and towing the wrecks away in triumph, to be patched up or
not for service, according to the extent of their respective damages.
The ascendancy is obvious, which skill and discipline must have
exercised in such contests over equal courage and superior numbers.
Often as this was displayed, the first victory of Phormio in the
Corinthian gulf in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, as
narrated by Thucydides, is one of the most splendid instances of it
that history supplies. The Corinthians and other confederates of
Sparta had prepared an armament of forty-seven galleys and a large
number of transports on the Achaian side of the gulf, for the purpose
of effecting a descent on the opposite coast of Acarnania, a country
then in alliance with Athens. Phormio, the Athenian admiral who
commanded in those seas, had only twenty galleys, with which he
watched their movements from Chalcis and the river Evenus on the
Ætolian coast. The Peloponnesians, notwithstanding their superiority
in numbers, sought to avoid an action, and endeavoured to push across
the gulf in the night. But the Athenians were too vigilant, and came
up with them in the middle of the passage just about day-break. The
gulf is of considerable width in the part where the rival fleets
encountered, though immediately to the eastward it narrows into a mere
strait between the two opposite capes, each of which the Greeks called
the Promontory of Rhion. Thus intercepted, and forced to fight, the
Peloponnesian commanders drew up their fleet in a way which they hoped
would neutralise the superior skill and swiftness of the Athenian
galleys. The great object in a sea-fight was to charge an opponent
amidships, or on the stern, or on some defenceless part. Of course, as
long as the enemy kept their line with the bows opposed to all their
assailants, this was impossible. The favourite manœuvre then was
cutting the line, (Διεκπλους.) The assailing galley dashed
rapidly between two of her adversaries; and then, smartly wheeling
round, sought to charge one of them in rear, or on the quarter while
turning. To prevent this, various tactics were adopted. Sometimes, for
instance, the assailed fleet was drawn up in two or more lines of
squadrons placed checker-wise behind each other. On the present
occasion, the Peloponnesians formed in a circle, placing the
transports and a picked squadron of five of their best war-ships in
the middle, and with the rest of their galleys ranged outside, with
their sterns toward the centre, so as to present all round a front of
armed beaks to the enemy, and make a flank or rear attack impossible.
But as our Nelson dealt with Villeneuve, so Phormio dealt with them. A
novel mode of defence was overpowered by a novel mode of attack. The
Athenian admiral formed his line-of-battle ahead, and rowed round
them, continually threatening to charge, and cooping them into a
narrower and narrower space, but having strictly enjoined his captains
not to begin the engagement till he gave the signal. For he reckoned
on the Peloponnesian galleys soon getting unsteady in their stations,
and running foul of each other, so as to give, a favourable
opportunity for charging them. And he also waited for the springing up
of the east wind, which commonly blew out of the straits about
sunrise; feeling sure that the enemy would never keep their array
perfect in rough water. Even as he had anticipated, so fared it with
the Peloponnesians. The wind came down upon them, and caught them
(το πνευμα κατηει.) Their ships, already closely packed, fell
foul of each other. The crews had to fend off, and mutual abuse and
shouting confused the fleet, and drowned the officers' commands. The
unpractised rowers also, as the water grew rougher, when they gave a
stroke, could not clear their oars from the waves; (τας κωπας
αδυνατοι οντες εν κλυδωνιω αναφερειν,) a
difficulty which any one will appreciate, who learned to row on a river,
and who remembers how many crabs he caught, when he afterwards first
tried to pull a sea-oar in a fresh breeze. The helmsmen thus had no
sufficient steerage-way on their ships; and any attempt at manœuvring
became hopeless. When they were completely disordered, Phormio gave
the signal to his captains, and the Athenian galleys, dashing forward,
gained an easy victory, capturing twelve ships, one of which they
dedicated to Poseidon.
This battle is the subject of the following lines, which are intended
to be taken as composed by one of the Athenians who served on board
Phormio's galley. The metre is the splendid measure invented by Mr
Mitchell for the rendering of the Aristophanic Tetrameter Anapest.