[1] _Essays._ By Ralph Waldo Emerson. _Nature_, an Essay, and
_Orations_. By the same.
The genius of America seems hitherto disposed to manifest itself
rather in works of reason and reflection than in those displays of
poetic fervour which are usually looked for in a nascent literature.
And a little consideration would lead us, probably, to expect this.
America presents itself upon the scene, enters into the drama of the
world, at a time when the minds of men are generally awakened and
excited to topics of grave and practical importance. It is not a great
poem that mankind now want or look for; they rather demand a great
work, or works, on human society, on the momentous problems which our
social progress, as well as our social difficulties, alike give rise
to. If on a new literature a peculiar mission could be imposed, such
would probably be the task assigned to it.
The energetic and ceaseless industry of the people of America, the
stern and serious character of the founders of New England, the
tendency which democracy must necessarily encourage to reason much and
boldly on the interests of the community,--would all lead us to the
same anticipation; so far as any anticipation can be warranted,
regarding the erratic course and capricious development of literary
genius.
The first contribution, we believe, our libraries received from
America, was the half theological, half metaphysical treatise on the
Will by Jonathan Edwards. This follower of Calvin is understood to
have stated the gloomy and repulsive doctrines of his master with an
unrivalled force of logic. Such is the reputation which _Edwards on
the Will_ enjoys, and we are contented to speak from reputation. The
doctrine of necessity, even when intelligently applied to the circle
of human thoughts and passions, is not the most inviting tenet of
philosophy. It is quickly learned, and what little fruit it yields is
soon gathered. But when combined with the theological dogma, wrung
from texts of scripture, of predestination; when the law of necessity
supposed to regulate the temper and affairs of the human being in this
little life, is converted into a divine sentence of condemnation to a
future and eternal fate--it then becomes one of the most odious and
irrational of tenets that ever obscured the reason or clouded the
piety of mankind. We confess, therefore, that we are satisfied with
re-echoing the traditional reputation of Jonathan Edwards, without
earning, by perusal of his work, the right to pronounce upon its
justice.
The first contribution, also, which America made to the amount of our
knowledge, was of a scientific character, and, moreover, the most
anti-poetical imaginable. As such, at least, it must be described by
those who are accustomed to think that a peculiar mystery attached to
one phenomenon of nature more than another, is essentially poetic.
Several poets, our Campbell amongst the number, have complained that
the laws of optics have disenchanted the rainbow; but the analysis of
Newton is poetry itself compared to that instance of the daring and
levelling spirit of science which Franklin exhibited, when he proved
the lightning to be plain electricity; took the bolts of Jupiter,
analysed them, bottled them in Leyden jars, and experimented on them
as with the sparks of his own electrical machine.
As the first efforts of American genius were in the paths of grave and
searching inquiry, so, too, at this present moment, if we were called
upon to point out amongst the works of our trans-Atlantic brethren,
our compatriots still in language, the one which, above all others,
displayed the undoubted marks of original genius,--it would be a prose
work, and one of a philosophical character we should single out:--we
should point to the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson.
The Americans are frequently heard to lament the absence of
nationality in their literature. Perhaps no people are the first to
perceive their own character reflected in the writings of one of their
countrymen; this nationality is much more open to the observation of a
foreigner. We are quite sure that no French or German critic could
read the speculations of Emerson, without tracing in them the spirit
of the nation to which this writer belongs. The new democracy of the
New World is apparent, he would say, in the philosophy of one who yet
is no democrat, and, in the ordinary sense of the word, no politician.
For what is the prevailing spirit of his writings? Self-reliance, and
the determination to see in the man of to-day, in his own, and in his
neighbour's mind, the elements of all greatness. Whatever the most
exalted characters of history, whatever the most opulent of
literatures, has displayed or revealed, of action or of thought,--the
germ of all lies within yourself. This is his frequent text. What does
he say of history? "I have no expectation that any man will read
history aright, who thinks that what was done in a remote age, by men
whose names have resounded far, has any deeper sense than what he is
doing to-day." He is, as he describes himself, "an endless seeker of
truth, with no past at his back." He delights to raise the individual
existing mind to the level, if not above the level, of all that has
been thought or enacted. He will not endure the imposing claims of
antiquity, of great nations, or of great, names. "It is remarkable,"
he says, "that involuntarily we always read as superior beings.
Universal history, the poets, the romancers, do not, in their
stateliest pictures, in the sacerdotal, the imperial palaces, in the
triumphs of will or of genius, anywhere make us feel that we intrude,
that this is for our betters, but rather is it true that in their
grandest strokes, there we feel most at home. _All that Shakspeare
says of the king, yonder slip of a boy that reads in the corner, feels
to be true of himself._"
Neither do the names of foreign cities, any more than of ancient
nations, overawe or oppress him. Of travelling, he says, "I have no
churlish objection to the circumnavigation of the globe, for the
purposes of art, of study, and benevolence, so that the man is first
domesticated, or does not go abroad with the hope of finding somewhat
greater than he knows. He who travels to be amused, or to get somewhat
which he does not carry, travels away from himself, and grows old even
in youth among old things. In Thebes, in Palmyra, his will and mind
have become old and dilapidated as they. He carries ruins to ruins.
Travelling is a fool's paradise. We owe to our first journeys the
discovery that place is nothing. At home, I dream that at Naples, at
Rome, I can be intoxicated with beauty, and lose my sadness. I pack my
trunk, embrace my friends, embark on the sea, and at last wake up in
Naples, and there beside me is the stern fact, the sad self,
unrelenting, identical, that I fled from. I seek the Vatican and the
palaces. I affect to be intoxicated with sights and suggestions, but I
am not intoxicated. My giant goes with me wherever I go."
In a still higher strain he writes, "There is one mind common to all
individual men. Every man is an inlet to the same, and to all of the
same. He that is once admitted to the right of reason is made a
freeman of the whole estate. What Plato has thought he may think; what
a saint has felt he may feel; what at any time has befallen any man he
can understand. Who hath access to this universal mind, is a party to
all that is or can be done, for this is the only and sovereign agent."
This passage is taken from the commencement of the Essay on History,
and the essay entitled "Nature," opens with a similar sentiment. He
disclaims the retrospective spirit of our age that would "put the
living generation into masquerade out of the faded wardrobe of the
past." He will not see through the eyes of others. "Why should not we
also," he demands, "enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why
should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight, and not of
tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of
theirs? The sun shines to-day also! Let us demand our own works, and
laws, and worship."
In the Essay on Self-reliance--a title which might over-ride a great
portion of his writings--he says: "Our reading is mendicant and
sycophantic. In history, our imagination makes fools of us, plays us
false. Kingdom and lordship, power and estate, are a gaudier
vocabulary than private John and Edward in a small house and common
day's work: but the things of life are the same to both: the sum total
of both is the same. Why all this deference to Alfred, and
Scanderberg, and Gustavus? Suppose they were virtuous: _did they wear
out virtue?_" And in a more sublime mood he proceeds: "Whenever a mind
is simple, and receives a divine wisdom, then old things pass
away,--means, teachers, texts, temples fall. Whence, then, this
worship of the past? The centuries are conspirators against the sanity
and majesty of the soul.... Man is timid and apologetic. He is no
longer upright. He dares not say 'I think,' 'I am,' but quotes some
saint or sage. He is ashamed before the blade of grass or the blowing
rose. These roses under my window make no reference to former roses,
or to better ones; they are for what they are; they exist with God
to-day. There is no time to them. There is simply the rose,--perfect
in every moment of its existence. But man postpones or remembers; he
does not live in the present, but with reverted eye laments the past,
or, heedless of the riches that surround him, stands on tiptoe to
foresee the future. He cannot be happy and strong until he, too, lives
with nature in the present, above time."
Surely these quotations alone--which we have made with the additional
motive of introducing at once to our readers the happier style and
manner of the American Philosopher--would bear out the French or
German critic in their views of the nationality of this author. The
spirit of the New World, and of a self-confident democracy, could not
be more faithfully translated into the language of a high and abstract
philosophy than it is here. We say that an air blowing from prairie
and forest, and the New Western World, is felt in the tone and spirit
of Emerson's writings; we do not intend to intimate that the opinions
expressed in them are at all times such as might be anticipated from
an American. Far from it. Mr Emerson regards the world from a peculiar
point of view, that of an idealistic philosophy. Moreover, he is one
of those wilful, capricious, though powerful thinkers, whose opinions
it would not be very easy to anticipate, who balk all prediction, who
defy augury.
For instance, a foreigner might naturally expect to find in the
speculations of a New England philosopher, certain sanguine and
enthusiastic views of the future condition of society. He will not
find them here. Our idealist levels the past to the present, but he
levels the future to the present also. If with him all that is old is
new, so also all that is new is old. It is still the one great
universal mind--like the great ocean--ebbing, flowing, in tempest now,
and now in calm. He will not join in the shout that sees a new sun
rising on the world. For ourselves, (albeit little given to the too
sanguine mood) we have more hope here than our author has expressed.
We by no means subscribe to the following sentence. The measure of
truth it expresses--and so well expresses--bears but a small
proportion to the whole truth. "All men plume themselves on the
improvement of society, and no man improves. Society never advances.
It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other. It undergoes
continual changes: it is barbarous, it is civilised, it is
christianised, it is rich, it is scientific; but this change is not
amelioration. For every thing that is given, something is taken.
Society acquires new arts and loses old instincts. What a contrast
between the well-clad, reading, writing, thinking American, with a
watch, a pencil, and a bill of exchange in his pocket, and the naked
New Zealander, whose property is a club, a spear, a mat, and an
undivided twentieth of a shed to sleep under. But compare the health
of the two men, and you shall see that his aboriginal strength the
white man has lost. If the traveller tell us truly, strike the savage
with a broad axe, and in a day or two the flesh shall unite and heal
as if you struck the blow into soft pitch, and the same blow shall
send the white to his grave. The civilised man has built a coach, but
has lost the use of his feet. He is supported on crutches, but loses
so much support of muscle. He has got a fine Geneva watch, but he has
lost the skill to tell the hour by the sun. A Greenwich nautical
almanac he has, and so being sure of the information when he wants it,
the man in the street does not know a star in the sky. The solstice he
does not observe; the equinox he knows as little; and the whole bright
calendar of the year is without a dial in his mind. His notebooks
impair his memory; his libraries overload his wit; the insurance
office increases the number of accidents; it may be a question whether
machinery does not encumber; whether we have not lost by refinement
some energy, by a christianity (entrenched in establishments and
forms) some vigour of wild virtue. _For every stoic was a stoic; but
in Christendom where is the Christian?_"
A French critic has designated Emerson the American Montaigne, struck,
we presume by his independence of manner, and a certain egotism which
when accompanied by genius is as attractive, as it is ludicrous
without that accompaniment. An English reader will be occasionally
reminded of the manner of Sir Thomas Brown, author of the "Religio
Medici." Like Sir Thomas, he sometimes startles us by a _curiosity_ of
reflection, fitted to suggest and kindle thought, although to a dry
logician it may seem a mere futility, or the idle play of imagination.
Of course this similarity is to be traced only in single and detached
passages; but we think we could select several quotations from the
American writer which should pass off as choice morsels of Sir Thomas
Brown, with one who was familiar with the strain of thought of the old
Englishman, but whose memory was not of that formidable exactness as
to render vain all attempt at imposition. Take the following for an
instance:--"I hold our actual knowledge very cheap. Hear the rats in
the wall, see the lizard on the fence, the fungus under foot, the
lichen on the log. What do I know sympathetically, morally, of either
of these worlds of life? As long as the Caucasian man--perhaps
longer--these creatures have kept their council beside him, and there
is no record of any word or sign that has passed from the one to the
other.... I am ashamed to see what a shallow village tale our
so-called history is. How many times we must say Rome, and Paris, and
Constantinople. What does Rome know of rat or lizard? What are
Olympiads and Consulates to these neighbouring systems of being?"
Or this:--"Why should we make it a point to disparage that man we are,
and that form of being assigned to us? A good man is contented. I love
and honour Epaminondas, but I do not wish to be Epaminondas. I hold it
more just to love the world of this hour, than the world of his hour.
Nor can you, if I am true, excite me to the least uneasiness by saying
'he acted and thou sittest still.' I see action to be good, when the
need is, and sitting still to be also good. Epaminondas, if he was the
man I take him for, would have sat still with joy and peace, if his
lot had been mine. Heaven is large, and affords space for all modes of
love and fortitude. Why should we be busy-bodies, and superserviceable?
Action and inaction are alike to the true.... Besides, why should we
be cowed by the name of action? 'Tis a trick of the senses,--no more.
We know that the ancestor of every action is a thought. The rich mind
lies in the sun and sleeps, and is Nature. To think is to act."
Or if one were to put down the name of Sir Thomas Brown as the author
of such a sentence as the following, are there many who would detect
the cheat? "I like the silent church, before the service begins,
better than any preaching. How far off, how cool, how chaste the
persons look, begirt each one with a precinct or sanctuary; so let us
always sit. Why should we assume the faults of our friend, or wife, or
father, or child, because they sit around our hearth, or are said to
have the same blood?"
But Emerson is too original a mind to be either a Montaigne or a Sir
Thomas Brown. He lives, too, in quite another age, and moves in a
higher region of philosophy than either of them. The utmost that can
be said is, that he is of the same class of independent, original
thinkers, somewhat wayward and fitful, who present no system, or none
that is distinctly and logically set forth, but cast before us many
isolated truths expressed in vivid, spontaneous eloquence.
This class of writers may be described as one whose members, though
not deficient in the love of _truth_, are still more conspicuous for
their love of _thought_. They crave intellectual excitement; they have
a genuine, inexhaustible ardour of reflection. They are not writers of
systems, for patience would fail them to traverse the more arid parts
of their subject, or those where they have nothing new, nothing of
their _own_, to put forth. The task of sifting and arranging materials
that have passed a thousand times through the hands of others, does
not accord with their temperament. Neither are they fond of retracing
their own steps, and renewing, from the same starting-place, the same
inquiry. They are off to fresh pastures. They care not to be ruffling
the leaves of the old manuscript, revising, qualifying, expunging.
They would rather brave all sorts of contradictions and _go on_,
satisfied that to an ingenuous reader their thoughts will ultimately
wear a true and faithful aspect. They will not be hampered by their
own utterances more than by other men's--"If you would be a man," says
Emerson, "speak what you think to-day in words as hard as
cannon-balls, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words
again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day." These
headstrong sages, full of noble caprice, of lofty humours, often pour
forth in their wild profusion a strange mixture of great truths and
petty conceits--noble principles and paradoxes no better than
conundrums. As we have said, they are lovers pre-eminently of thought.
Full of the chase, they will sometimes run down the most paltry game
with unmitigated ardour. Such writers are not so wise as their best
wisdom, nor so foolish as their folly. When certain of the ancient
sages who were in the habit of guessing boldly at the open riddle of
nature, made, amidst twenty absurd conjectures, one that has proved to
be correct, we do not therefore give them the credit of a scientific
discovery. One of these wise men of antiquity said that the sea was a
great fish; he asserted also that the moon was an opaque body, and
considerably larger than she appears to be. He was right about the
moon; he was wrong about the fish; but as he speculated on both
subjects in the same hap-hazard style, we give him very little more
credit in the one case than the other. Perhaps his theory which
transformed the sea into a fish, was that on which he prided himself
most. Something of the same kind, though very different in degree,
takes place in our judgment upon certain moral speculators. When a man
of exuberant thought utters in the fervour or the fever of his mind
what _comes first_, his fragments of wisdom seem as little to belong
to him as his fragments of folly. The reader picks up, and carries
off, what best pleases him, as if there were no owner there, as if it
were treasure-trove, and he was entitled to it as first finder. He
foregoes the accustomed habit of connecting his writer with the
assemblage of thoughts presented to him, as their sole proprietor for
the time being: "he cries halves," as Charles Lamb has said on some
similar occasion, in whatever he pounces on.
The task of the critic on a writer of this class, becomes more than
usually ungracious and irksome. He meets with a work abounding with
traits of genius, and conspicuous also for its faults and
imperfections. As a reader only, he gives himself up to the pleasure
which the former of these inspire. Why should he disturb that pleasure
by counting up the blemishes and errors? He sees, but passes rapidly
over them; on the nobler passages he dwells, and to them alone he
returns. But, as critic, he cannot resign himself entirely to this
mood; or rather, after having resigned himself to it, after having
enjoyed that only true perusal of a book in which we forget all but
the truth we can extract from it, he must rouse himself to another and
very different act of attention; he must note defects and blemishes,
and caution against errors, and qualify his admiration by a recurrence
to those very portions of the work which he before purposely hurried
over.
We take up such a book as these Essays of Emerson. We are charmed with
many delightful passages of racy eloquence, of original thought, of
profound or of _naive_ reflection. What if there are barren pages?
What if sometimes there is a thick entangled underwood through which
there is no penetrating? We are patient. We can endure the one, and
for the other obstacle, in military phrase, we can _turn_ it. The page
is moveable. We are not bound, like the boa-constrictor, to swallow
all or none. Meanwhile, in all conscience, there is sufficient for one
feast. There is excellence enough to occupy one's utmost attention;
there is beauty to be carried away, and truth to be appropriated. What
more, from a single book, can any one reasonably desire? But if the
task of criticism be imposed upon us, we must, nevertheless, sacrifice
this easy and complacent mood,--this merely receptive disposition; we
must re-examine; we must cavil and object; we must question of
obscurity why it should stand there darkening the road; we must refuse
admittance to mere paradox; we must expose the trifling conceit or
fanciful analogy that would erect itself into high places, and assume
the air of novel and profound truth.
Some portion of this less agreeable duty we will at once perform, that
we may afterwards the more freely and heartily devote ourselves to the
more pleasant task of calling attention to the works of a man of
genius,--for we suspect that Emerson is not known in this country as
he deserves to be. With some who have heard his name coupled with that
of Carlyle, he passes for a sort of echo or double of the English
writer. A more independent and original thinker can nowhere in this
age be found. This praise must, at all events, be awarded him. And
even in America--which has not the reputation of generally
overlooking, or underrating, the merits of her own children--we
understand that the reputation of Emerson is by no means what it ought
to be; and many critics there who are dissatisfied with merely
imitative talent, and demand a man of genius _of their own_, are not
aware that he stands there amongst them.
When we accuse Mr Emerson of obscurity, it is not obscurity of style
that we mean. His style often rises--as our readers have had already
opportunities of judging--into a vivid, terse, and graphic eloquence,
agreeably tinged at times with a poetic colouring; and although he
occasionally adopts certain inversions which are not customary in
modern prose, he never lays himself open to the charge of being
difficult or unintelligible. But there is an obscurity of thought--in
the very matter of his writings--produced first by a vein of mysticism
which runs throughout his works, and, secondly, by a manner he
sometimes has of sweeping together into one paragraph a number of
unsorted ideas, but scantily related to each other--bringing up his
drag-net with all manner of fish in it, and depositing it then and
there before us.
Mysticism is a word often so vaguely and rashly applied, that we feel
bound to explain the sense in which we use it. It is not because Mr
Emerson is an idealist in his philosophy--what we are in the habit in
the present day of describing as the German school of metaphysics,
though he does not appear to have drawn his tenets from the Germans,
and more frequently quotes the name of Plato than that of Kant or
Hegel--it is not for this we pronounce him to be a mystic. Berkeley
was no mystic. In support of this philosophy reasons may be adduced
which appeal to the faculties, and are open to the examination of all
men. We do not pronounce idealism to be mystical, but we pronounce him
to be a mystic who upholds this, or any other philosophy, upon grounds
of conviction not open to all rational men; whose convictions, in
short, rest upon some profound intuition, some deep and peculiar
source of knowledge, to which the great multitude of mankind are utter
strangers. A man shall be an idealist, and welcome; we can discuss the
matter with him, we can follow his reasonings, and if we cannot
sustain ourselves in that nicely-balanced aerial position he has
assumed, poised above the earth on a needle's point of faith, we can
at least apprehend how the more subtle metaphysician has contrived to
accomplish the feat. But the moment a man proclaims himself in the
possession of any truth whatever, by an intuition of which we, and
other men, find no traces in our own mind, then it is that we must, of
force, abandon him to the sole enjoyment of an illumination we do not
share, and which he cannot impart. We call him mystical, and he calls
us blind, or sense-beclouded. We assume that he pretends to see where
there is no vision, and no visual organ; he retorts that it is we, and
the gross vulgar who have lost, or never attained, the high faculty of
vision which he possesses. Whether it is Plato or Swedenborg, Pagan or
Christian, who lays claim to this occult and oracular wisdom, we must
proclaim it a delusion. It is in vain to tell us that these men may be
the _élite_ of humanity, that they are thus signally favoured because
they have more successfully cultivated their minds, both
intellectually and morally, and purified them for the reception of a
closer communion with the divine and all-sustaining and
interpenetrating Intelligence, than is vouchsafed to the rest of
mankind. We, who have nothing but our eyesight and our reason, we of
the multitude who are not thus favoured, can, at all events, learn
nothing _from them_. Whether above or beside human reason, they are
equally remote from intellectual communion. We do not recognise their
reason as reason, nor their truth as truth; and we call them mystics
to express this unapproachable nature of their minds, this hopeless
severance from intercommunion of thought, from even so much of contact
as is requisite for the hostilities of controversy. These wisest of
mankind are in the same predicament as the maddest of mankind; both
believe that they are the only perfectly sane, and that all the rest
of the world have lost their reason. The rest of the world hold the
opposite opinion, and we are not aware that in either case there is
any appeal but to the authority of numbers, to which, of course,
neither the lunatic nor the mystic will submit.
We have frequent intimations in Mr Emerson's writings of this high
intuitive source of truth. Take the following passage in the Essay on
Self-reliance:--
"And now at last the highest truth on this subject remains
unsaid, probably, cannot be said; for all that we say is the
far off remembering of the intuition. The thought by what I
can now nearest approach to say it, is this. When good is
near you, when you have life in yourself, it is not by any
known or appointed way; you shall not discern the
foot-prints of any other; you shall not see the face of man;
you shall not hear any name; the way, the thought, the good,
shall be wholly strange and new; it shall exclude all other
being. You take the way from man not to man. All persons
that ever existed are its fugitive ministers. There shall be
no fear in it. Fear and hope are alike beneath it. It asks
nothing. There is somewhat low even in hope. _We are then in
vision_. There is nothing that can be called gratitude,
nor, properly, joy. The soul is raised over passion. _It
seeth identity and eternal causation. It is a perceiving
that Truth and Right are._ Hence it becomes a tranquillity
out of the knowing that all things go well. Vast spaces of
nature--the Atlantic Ocean--the South Sea--vast intervals of
time--years--centuries--are of no account. This, which I
think and feel, underlay that former state of life and
circumstances as it does underlie my present, and will
always all circumstance, and what is called life, and what
is called death."
Whenever a man begins by telling us that he cannot find language to
express his meaning, we may be pretty sure that he has no intelligible
meaning to express; and Mr Emerson, in the above passage, fully bears
out this general observation. "I cannot," he says in another place, "I
cannot, nor can any man, speak precisely of things so sublime, but it
seems to me, the wit of man, his strength, his grace, his tendency,
his art, is the grace and the presence of God. It is beyond
explanation. When all is said and done, the rapt saint is found the
only logician. Not exhortation, not argument, becomes our lips, but
pæans of joy and praise. But not of adulation: _we are too nearly
related in the deep of the mind to that we honour. It is God in us
which checks the language of petition by a grander thought. In the
bottom of the heart it is said 'I am, and by me, O child! this fair
body and world of thine stands and grows. I am: all things are mine:
and all mine are thine._'"
If we can gather any thing from this language, it must imply that the
individual mind is _conscious_ of being a part, an emanation of the
Divine mind--is conscious of this union or identity--the pretension to
which species of consciousness is, in our apprehension, pure
mysticism.
But we shall not weary our readers by seeking further proofs of this
charge of mysticism; for what can be more wearisome than to have a
number of unintelligible passages brought together from different and
remote parts of an author's works. We pass to that other cause of
obscurity we have hinted at,--the agglomerations of a multitude of
unrelated, or half-related, ideas. Sometimes a whole paragraph, and a
long one too, is made up of separate fragments of thought or fancy,
good or amusing, it may be, in themselves, but connected by the
slightest and most flimsy thread imaginable. Glittering insects and
flies of all sorts, caught and held together in a spider's web,
present as much appearance of unity as some of these paragraphs we
allude to.
For an example, we will turn to the first essay in the series, that on
History. It is, perhaps, the most striking of the whole, and one which
has a more distinct aim and purport than most of them, and yet the
reader is fairly bewildered at times by the incongruous assemblage of
thoughts presented to him. It is the drift of the essay to show, that
the varied and voluminous record of history is still but the
development and expansion of the individual being man, as he existed
yesterday, as he exists to-day. "A man," he says, "is the whole
encyclopædia of facts. The creation of a thousand forests is in one
acorn, and Egypt, Greece, Rome, Gaul, Britain, America, lie folded
already in the first man. Epoch after epoch, camp, kingdom, empire,
republic, democracy, are merely the application of his manifold spirit
to the manifold world." This idea is explained, illustrated,
amplified, and very often in a novel and ingenious manner. To
exemplify the necessity we feel to recognise _ourselves_ in the past,
he says,--"All inquiry into antiquity, all curiosity respecting the
pyramids, the excavated cities, Stonehenge, the Ohio circles, Mexico,
Memphis, is the desire to do away this wild, savage, and preposterous
There or Then, and introduce in its place the Here and the Now. It is
to banish the _Not me_, and supply the _Me_. It is to abolish
difference and restore unity. Belzoni digs and measures in the
mummy-pits and pyramids of Thebes, until he can see the end of the
difference between the monstrous work and himself. When he has
satisfied himself, in general and in detail, that it was made by such
a person as himself, so armed and so motived, and to ends to which he
himself, in given circumstances, should also have worked, the problem
is then solved, his thought lives along the whole line of temples and
sphinxes and catacombs, passes through them all like a creative soul,
with satisfaction, and they live again to the mind, or are _now_."
This is good, but by and by he begins to intercalate all sorts of
vagrant fantasies, as thus:--
"Civil history, _natural history_, the history of art, and the history
of literature,--all must be explained from individual history, or must
remain words. There is nothing but is related to us, nothing that does
not interest us,--kingdom, college, _tree_, _horse_, or iron shoe, the
roots of all things are in man. It is in the soul that architecture
exists. Santa Croce and the dome of St Peter's are lame copies after a
divine model. Strasburg cathedral is a material counterpart of the
soul of Erwin of Steinbach. The true poem is the poet's mind, the true
ship is the ship-builder," and so forth. It would be waste of time and
words to ask how "tree and horse," in the same sense as kingdom and
college, can be said to have "their roots in man;" or whether, when it
is said that "Strasburg cathedral is the material counterpart of the
soul of Erwin of Steinbach," this can possibly mean anything else than
the undoubted fact, that the architect thought and designed before he
built.
This subject of architecture comes sadly in the way of the author, and
of the reader too, whom it succeeds in thoroughly mystifying. "The
Gothic cathedral is a blossoming in stone, subdued by the insatiable
demand of harmony in man. The mountain of granite blooms into an
eternal flower with the lightness and delicate finish, as well as the
aerial proportions and perspective of vegetable beauty. _In like
manner_, all public facts are to be individualised, all private facts
are to be generalised. Then at once history becomes fluid and true,
and biography deep and sublime."
The fables of Pagan mythology next cross his path, and these lead to
another medley of thoughts. "These beautiful fables of the Greeks," he
says, "being proper creations of the imagination, and not of the
fancy, are universal verities." And well they may be, whether of the
fancy or the imagination (and the great distinction here marked out
between the two, we do not profess to comprehend), if each mind, in
every age, is at liberty to interpret them as it pleases, and with the
same unrestrained license that our author takes. But how can he find
here an instance of the _present man_ being written out in history,
when the old history or fable is perpetually to receive new
interpretations, as it is handed down from generation to
generation--interpretations which assuredly were never dreamt of by
the original inventor?
"Apollo kept the flocks of Admetus, said the poets. Every man is a
divinity in disguise, a god playing the fool. It seems as if heaven
had sent its insane angels into our world as to an asylum, and here
they will break out into their native music, and utter at intervals
the words they have heard in heaven; then the mad fit returns, and
they mope and wallow like dogs." Whether witty or wise, such
interpretations have manifestly nothing to do with the fable as it
exists in history, as part of the history of the human mind.
"The transmigration of souls: that too is no fable; I would it were.
But men and women are only half human. Every animal of the barn-yard,
the field and the forest, of the earth and of the waters that are
under the earth, has contrived to get a footing, and to leave the
print of its features and form in some one or other of these upright,
heaven-facing speakers." Very good; only, if poets and wits are to set
themselves to the task, we should like to know what fable there is in
the world, whether the product of imagination or fancy, which might
not be shown to abound in eternal verities.
Travelling on a little farther, we meet with the following paragraph,
some parts of which are to be made intelligible by putting ourselves
in the point of view of the idealistic philosopher; but the whole
together, by reason of the incongruity of its parts, produces no other
effect than that of mere and painful bewilderment,--
"A man is a bundle of relations, a knot of roots, whose
flower and fruitage is the world. All his faculties refer to
natures out of him. All his faculties predict the world he
is to inhabit, as the fins of the fish foreshow that water
exists, or the wings of an eagle in the egg presuppose a
medium like air. Insulate and you destroy him. He cannot
live without a world. Put Napoleon in an island prison, let
his faculties find no men to act on, no Alps to climb, no
stake to play for, and he would beat the air and appear
stupid. Transport him to large countries, dense population,
complex interests and antagonist power, and you shall see
that the man Napoleon, bounded, that is, by such a profile
and outline, is not the virtual Napoleon. This is but
Talbot's shadow;
"His substance is not here:
For what you see is but the smallest part,
And least proportion of humanity;
But were the whole frame here,
It is of such a spacious lofty pitch,
Your roof were not sufficient to contain it.
Columbus needs a planet to shape his course upon. Newton and
Laplace need myriads of ages and thick-strewn celestial
areas. One may say, a gravitating solar system is already
prophesied in the nature of Newton's mind. Not less does the
brain of Davy and Gay-Lussac, from childhood exploring
always the affinities and repulsions of particles,
anticipate the laws of organisation. Does not the eye of the
human embryo predict the light? the ear of Handel predict
the witchcraft of harmonic sound? Do not the constructive
fingers of Watt, Fulton, Whittemore, and Arkwright, predict
the fusible, hard, and temperable texture of metals, the
properties of stone, water, and wood? the lovely attributes
of the maiden child predict the refinements and decorations
of civil society? Here, also, we are reminded of the action
of man on man. A mind might ponder its thoughts for ages,
and not gain so much self-knowledge as the passion of love
shall teach it in a day. Who knows himself before he has
been thrilled with indignation at an outrage, or has heard
an eloquent tongue, or has shared the throb of thousands in
a national exultation and alarm? No man can antedate his
experience, or guess what faculty or feeling a new object
shall unlock, any more than he can draw to-day the face of a
person whom he shall see to-morrow for the first time."
And the essay concludes by presenting its leading idea in this
distorted and exaggerated shape:--
"Thus, in all ways does the soul concentrate and reproduce
its treasures for each pupil, each new-born man. He, too,
shall pass through the whole cycle of experience. He shall
collect into a focus the rays of nature. History no longer
shall be a dull book. It shall walk incarnate in every just
and wise man. You shall not tell me by languages and titles
a catalogue of the volumes you have read. You shall make me
feel what periods you have lived. A man shall be the Temple
of Fame. He shall walk as the poets have described that
goddess, in a robe painted all over with wonderful events
and experiences;--his own form and features by that exalted
intelligence shall be that variegated vest. I shall find in
him the Foreworld; in his childhood the age of gold; the
apples of knowledge; the Argonautic expedition; the calling
of Abraham; the building of the temple; the advent of
Christ; dark ages; the revival of letters; the Reformation;
the discovery of new lands, the opening of new sciences, and
new regions in man. He shall be the priest of Pan, and bring
with him into humble cottages the blessing of the morning
stars, and all the recorded benefits of heaven and earth."
We regret to say that instances of this painful obscurity, of this
outrageous and fantastical style of writing, it would not be difficult
to multiply, were it either necessary or desirable. We have quoted
sufficient to justify even harsher terms of censure than we have
chosen to deal in; sufficient to warn our readers who may be induced,
from the favourable quotations we have made, and shall continue to
make, to turn to the works of this author, that it is not all gold
they will find there, that the sun does not always shine upon his
page, that a great proportion of his writings may be little suited to
their taste.
That which forms the great and inextinguishable charm of those
writings is the fine moral temper they display, the noble ardour, the
high ethical tone they every where manifest and sustain, and
especially that lofty independence of his intellect, that freedom of
his reason which the man who aspires after true cultivation should
watch over and preserve with the utmost jealousy. Addressing the
Divinity students of Cambridge, U. S., he says,--
"Let me admonish you, first of all, to go alone; to refuse
the good models, even those most sacred in the imagination
of men, and dare to love God without mediator or veil.
Friends enough you will find, who will hold up to your
emulation Wesleys and Oberlins, saints and prophets. Thank
God for these good men, but say, 'I also am a man.'
Imitation cannot go above its model. The imitator dooms
himself to hopeless mediocrity. The inventor did it because
it was natural to him; and so in him it has a charm. In the
imitator, something else is natural, and he bereaves himself
of his own beauty, to come short of another man's....
"Let us not aim at common degrees of merit. Can we not leave
to such as love it the virtue that glitters for the
commendation of society, and ourselves pierce the deep
solitudes of absolute ability and worth? We easily come up
to the standard of goodness in society. Society's praise can
be cheaply secured, and almost all men are content with
those easy merits; but the instant effect of conversing with
God, will be to put them away. There are sublime merits;
persons who are not actors, not, speakers, but influences;
persons too great for fame, for display; who disdain
eloquence; to whom all we call art and artist seems too
nearly allied to show and by-ends, to the exaggeration of
the finite and selfish, and loss of the universal. The
orators, the poets, the commanders, encroach on us only, as
fair women do, by our allowance and homage. Slight them by
preoccupation of mind,--slight them, as you can well afford
to do, by high and universal aims, and they instantly feel
that you have right, and that it is in lower places that
they must shine. They also feel your right; for they, with
you, are open to the influx of the all-knowing spirit, which
annihilates before its broad noon the little shades and
gradations of intelligence in the compositions we call wiser
and wisest.
"In such high communion, let us study the grand strokes of
rectitude: a bold benevolence, an independence of friends,
so that not the unjust wishes of those who love us shall
impair our freedom; but we shall resist, for truth's sake,
the freest flow of kindness, and appeal to sympathies far in
advance. And, what is the highest form in which we know this
beautiful element?--a certain solidity of merit that has
nothing to do with opinion, and which is so essentially and
manifestly virtue, that it is taken for granted that the
right, the brave, the generous step will be taken by it, and
nobody thinks of commending it. You would compliment a
coxcomb doing a good act, but you would not praise an angel.
The silence that accepts merit as the most natural thing in
the world, is the highest applause."
Nothing but the necessity to husband our space prevents us from
quoting other passages of the same noble strain.
There is an Essay _on Love_ which has highly pleased us, and from
which we wish to make some extracts. To a man of genius the old
subjects are always new. The romance and enthusiasm of the passion is
here quite freshly and vividly portrayed, while the great moral end of
that charming exaggeration which every lover makes of the beauty and
excellence of his mistress, is finely pointed out. There is both
poetry and philosophy in the essay--as our readers shall judge for
themselves from the following extracts. We do not always mark the
omissions we make for the sake of economy of space, nor always cite
the passages in the order they appear in the essay.
"What fastens attention, in the intercourse of life, like
any passage betraying affection between two parties? Perhaps
we never saw them before, and never shall meet them again.
But we see them exchange a glance, or betray a deep emotion,
and we are no longer strangers. We understand them, and take
the warmest interest in the development of the romance. _All
mankind love a lover_. The earliest demonstrations of
complacency and kindness are nature's most winning pictures.
It is the dawn of civility and grace in the coarse and
rustic. The rude village boy teases the girls about the
school-house door;--but to-day he comes running into the
entry, and meets one fair child arranging her satchel: he
holds her books to help her, and instantly it seems to him
as if she removed herself from him infinitely, and was a
sacred precinct. Among the throng of girls he runs rudely
enough, but one alone distances him; and these two little
neighbours that were so close just now, have learned to
respect each other's personality."
As is ever the case when men describe what is, or might be an
exquisite happiness, there steals a melancholy over the description;
and our author makes it a primary condition,
"That we must leave a too close and lingering adherence to
the actual, to facts, and study the sentiment as it appeared
in _hope_, and not in _history_. Let any man go back to
those delicious relations which make the beauty of his life,
which have given him sincerest instruction and nourishment,
he will shrink, and shrink. Alas! I know not why, but
infinite compunctions imbitter in mature life all the
remembrances of budding sentiment, and cover every beloved
name. Every thing is beautiful seen from the point of the
intellect, or as truth. But all is sour, as seen from
experience. It is strange how painful is the actual
world,--the painful kingdom of time and space. There dwell
care, canker, and fear. With thought, with the ideal, is
immortal hilarity, the rose of joy. Round it all the muses
sing. But with names and persons and the partial interests
of to-day and yesterday, is grief.
"But be our experience in particulars what it may, no man
ever forgot the visitations of that power to his heart and
brain which created all things new; which was the dawn in
him of music, poetry, and art; which made the face of nature
radiant with purple light, the morning and the night varied
enchantments; when a single tone of one voice could make the
heart beat, and the most trivial circumstance associated
with one form, is put in the amber of memory; _when we
became all eye when one was present, and all memory when one
was gone;_ when the youth becomes a watcher of windows, and
studious of a glove, a veil, a ribbon, or the wheels of a
carriage; when no place is too solitary, and none too silent
for him who has richer company and sweeter conversation in
his new thoughts, than any old friends, though best and
purest, can give him; when all business seemed an
impertinence, and all the men and women running to and fro
in the streets, mere pictures.
"For, though the celestial rapture falling out of heaven,
seizes only upon those of tender age, and although a beauty,
overpowering all analysis or comparison, and putting us
quite beside ourselves, we can seldom see after thirty
years, yet the remembrance of these visions outlasts all
other remembrances, and is a wreath of flowers on the oldest
brows."
And on this matter of beauty how ingenious and full of feeling are the
following reflections!--
"Wonderful is its charm. It seems sufficient to itself. The
lover cannot paint his maiden to his fancy poor and
solitary. Like a tree in flower, so much soft, budding,
informing loveliness, is society for itself, _and she
teaches his eye why Beauty was ever painted with Loves and
Graces attending her steps_. Her existence makes the world
rich. Though she extrudes all other persons from his
attention as cheap and unworthy, yet she indemnifies him by
carrying out her own being into somewhat impersonal; so that
the maiden stands to him for a representation of all select
things and virtues. _For that reason the lover sees never
personal resemblances in his mistress to her kindred or to
others._ His friends find in her a likeness to her mother,
or her sisters, or to persons not of her blood. _The lover
sees no resemblance except to summer evenings and diamond
mornings, to rainbows and the song of birds._
"Beauty is ever that divine thing the ancients esteemed it.
It is, they said, the flowering of virtue. Who can analyse
the nameless charm which glances from one and another face
and form? We are touched with emotions of tenderness and
complacency, but we cannot find whereat this dainty emotion,
this wandering gleam, points. It is destroyed for the
imagination by any attempt to refer it to organisation. Nor
does it point to any relations of friendship or love that
society knows or has, but, as it seems to me, to a quite
other and unattainable sphere, to relations of transcendent
delicacy and sweetness, a true faerie land; to what roses
and violets hint and foreshow. We cannot get at beauty. Its
nature is like opaline doves'-neck lustres, hovering and
evanescent. Herein it resembles the most excellent things,
which all have this rainbow character, defying all attempts
at appropriation and use. What else did Jean Paul Richter
signify, when he said to music, 'Away! away! thou speakest
to me of things which in all my endless life I have found
not, and shall not find.' The same fact may be observed in
every work of the plastic arts. The statue is then
beautiful, when it begins to be incomprehensible, when it is
passing out of criticism, and can no longer be defined by
compass and measuring wand, but demands an active
imagination to go with it, and to say what it is in the act
of doing. The god or hero of the sculptor is always
represented in a transition _from_ that which is
representable to the senses, _to_ that which is not. Then
first it ceases to be a stone.
"So must it be with personal beauty which love worships.
Then first is it charming and itself when it dissatisfies us
with any end; when it becomes a story without an end; when
it suggests gleams and visions, and not earthly
satisfactions; when it seems
'Too bright and good
For human nature's daily food;'
when it makes the beholder feel his unworthiness; when he
cannot feel his right to it, though he were Cæsar; he cannot
feel more right to it, than to the firmament and the
splendours of a sunset."
But this dream of love is but one scene in the play; and our author
concludes his essay by pointing out what is, or should be, the
denouement of the drama.
"Meantime, as life wears on, it proves a game of permutation
and combination of all possible positions of the parties to
extort all the resources of each, and acquaint each with the
whole strength and weakness of the other. For, it is the
nature and end of this relation, that they should represent
the human race to each other.
"At last they discover that all which at first drew them
together,--those once sacred features, that magical play of
charms, was deciduous, had a prospective end, like the
scaffolding by which the house was built; and the
purification of the intellect and the heart, from year to
year, is the real marriage foreseen and prepared from the
first, and wholly above their consciousness. Looking at
these aims with which two persons, a man and a woman, so
variously and correlatively gifted, are shut up in one house
to spend in the nuptial society forty or fifty years, I do
not wonder at the emphasis with which the heart prophesies
this crisis from early infancy,--at the profuse beauty with
which the instincts deck the nuptial bower, and nature and
intellect and art emulate each other in the gifts and the
melody they bring to the epithalamium. Thus are we put in
training for a love which knows not sex, nor person, nor
partiality, but which seeketh virtue and wisdom every where,
to the end of increasing virtue and wisdom."
If there is some of the _ideal_ in this account given of love and
matrimony, there is, nevertheless, a noble truth in it. And surely in
proportion as the sentiment of love is refitted and spiritualised, so
also ought the moral culture, to which it is subservient, to be pure
and elevated.
The longest essay in the collection, and that which approaches nearest
to the more formidable character of a treatise, is that entitled
"Nature." This exhibits, so to speak, the practical point of view of
an idealist. The idealist has denied the substantial, independent
existence of the material world, but he does not deny the existence of
a phenomenal world. The Divine Nature reveals itself in the twofold
form of finite mind and this phenomenal world. Thus, we believe, we
may express the general creed of these philosophers, though it is a
very delicate matter to act as interpreter to this class of thinkers:
they are rarely satisfied with any expressions of their own, and are
not likely to be contented with those of any other person. This
phenomenal world has for its final cause the development and education
of the finite mind. It follows, therefore, that all which a realist
could say of the utility of nature can be advanced also by the
idealist. He has his practical point of view, and can discourse, as Mr
Emerson does here, on the various "uses" of nature which, he says,
"admit of being thrown into the following classes:--commodity, beauty,
language, and discipline."
We have not the least intention of proceeding further with an analysis
of this essay; as we have already intimated, the value of Mr Emerson's
writings appears to us to consist in the beauty and truthfulness of
individual passages, not at all in his system, or any prolonged train
of reasoning he may adopt. It is impossible to read this production
without being delighted and arrested by a number of these individual
passages sparkling with thought or fancy; it would be equally
impossible to gather from it, as a whole, any thing satisfactory or
complete.
On the beauty of nature he is always eloquent; he is evidently one who
intensely feels it. "Every day, the sun; and, after sunset, night and
the stars. Ever the winds blow; ever the grass grows." The shows of
heaven and earth are with him a portion of daily life. "In the woods
is perpetual youth." "We talk," he says in another place, "with
accomplished persons who appear to be strangers in nature. The cloud,
the tree, the turf, the bird are not theirs, have nothing of them; the
world is only their lodging and table." No such stranger is our
poet-philosopher. "Crossing a bare common, in twilight, under a
clouded sky, without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special
good fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. Almost I fear to
think how glad I am."
The only quotation we shall make from the Essay on "Nature," shall be
one where he treats of this subject--
"A nobler want of man is served by nature,--namely, the love
of beauty. Such is the constitution of all things, or such
the plastic power of the human eye, that the primary form,
as the sky, the mountain, the tree, the animal, give us a
delight _in and for themselves_; a pleasure arising from
outline, colour, motion, and grouping. And as the eye is the
best composer, so light is the first of painters. _There is
no object so foul, that intense light will not make
beautiful._ And the stimulus it affords to the sense, and a
sort of infinitude which it hath, like space and time, will
make all matter gay. But besides this general grace diffused
over nature, almost all the individual forms are agreeable
to the eye, as is proved by our endless imitations of some
of them; as the acorn, the grape, the pine-cone, the
wheat-ear, the egg, the wings and forms of most birds, the
lion's claw, the serpent, the butterfly, sea-shells, flames,
clouds, buds, leaves, and the forms of many trees, as the
palm.
"The influence of the forms and actions in nature is so
needful to man that, in its lowest functions, it seems to
lie on the confines of Commodity and Beauty. To the body and
mind which have been cramped by noxious work or company,
nature is medicinal and restores their tone. The tradesman,
the attorney, comes out of the din and craft of the street,
and sees the sky and the woods, and is a man again. In their
eternal calm he finds himself. The health of the eye seems
to demand a horizon. We are never tired so long as we can
see far enough.
"But in other hours nature satisfies the soul purely by its
loveliness, and without any mixture of corporeal benefit. I
have seen the spectacle of morning from the hill-top over
against my house, from daybreak to sunrise, with emotions
which an angel might share. The long slender bars of cloud
float like fishes in the sea of crimson light. From the
earth, as a shore, I look out into that silent sea. I seem
to partake its rapid transformations; the active enchantment
reaches my dust, and I dilate and conspire with the morning
wind. How does nature deify us with a few and cheap
elements! _Give me health and a day, and I will make the
pomp of emperors ridiculous._ The dawn is my Assyria, the
sunset and moonrise my Paphos, and unimaginable realms of
faerie."
Mr Emerson has published a volume of poems, and it has been generally
admitted that he has not succeeded in verse. But there are touches of
charming poetry in his prose. This discrepancy, which is not
unfrequently met with, must result, we presume, from an inaptitude to
employ the forms of verse, so that the style, instead of being
invigorated, and polished, and concentrated by the necessary attention
to line and metre, becomes denaturalised, constrained, crude, and
unequal. We have looked through this volume of poems, but we should
certainly not be adding to the reputation of the author by drawing
attention to it. If we wished to find instances of the poetry of
Emerson, we should still seek for them in his prose essays. Thus he
says:--
"In this pleasing contrite wood-life which God allows me, let me
record, day by day, my honest thought, without prospect or retrospect,
and I cannot doubt it will be found symmetrical, though I mean it not
and see it not. _The swallow over my window should interweave that
thread or straw he carries in his bill into my web also._"
"Our moods," he says, "do not believe in each other. To-day I am full
of thoughts; but yesterday I saw a dreary vacuity in this direction in
which now I see so much; and a month hence, I doubt not, I shall
wonder who he was that wrote so many continuous pages. Alas for this
infirm faith, this will not strenuous, this vast ebb of a vast flow!
_I am God in nature--I am a weed by the wall!_"
"A lady," he writes on another occasion, "with whom I was riding in
the forest, said to me that the woods always seemed to her _to wait_,
as if the genii who inhabit them suspended their deeds until the
wayfarer has passed onward. This is precisely the thought which poetry
has celebrated in the dance of the fairies which breaks off on the
approach of human feet." The lady had a true poetic feeling. And the
following thought is illustrated by a very happy image.
"In man, we still trace the rudiments or hints of all that we esteem
badges of servitude in the lower races, yet in him they enhance his
nobleness and grace; as Io in Æschylus, transformed to a cow, offends
the imagination, but how changed when as Isis in Egypt she meets Jove,
a beautiful woman, with nothing of the metamorphosis left but the
lunar horns, as the splendid ornament of her brows!"
In his philosophy, we have seen that Mr Emerson is an idealist,
something, too, of a pantheist. In theology, we have heard him
described as a Unitarian; but although the Unitarians of America
differ move widely from each other, and from the standard of
orthodoxy, than the same denomination of men in this country, we
presume there is no body of Unitarians with whom our philosopher would
fraternise, or who would receive him amongst their ranks. His
Christianity appears rather to be of that description which certain of
the Germans, one section of the Hegelians for instance, have found
reconcilable with their Pantheistic philosophy. It is well for him
that he writes in a tolerant age, that he did not make his appearance
a generation too soon; the pilgrim fathers would certainly have burnt
him at the stake; he would have died the death of Giordano Bruno. And
we believe--if the spirit of his writings be any test of the spirit of
the man--that he would have suffered as a martyr, rather than have
foregone the freedom and the truthfulness of his thought. His essays
are replete with passages such as this:--"God offers to every mind its
choice between truth and repose. Take which you please--you can never
have both. Between these, as a pendulum, man oscillates ever. He in
whom the love of repose predominates, will accept the first creed, the
first philosophy, the first political party he meets,--most likely his
father's. He gets rest, commodity, and reputation; but he shuts the
door of truth. He in whom the love of truth predominates, will keep
himself aloof from all moorings and afloat. He will abstain from
dogmatism, and recognise all the opposite negations, between which, as
walls, his being is swung. He submits to the inconvenience of suspense
and imperfect opinion, but he is a candidate for truth, as the other
is not, and he respects the highest law of his being."
We gather from what little has reached us of his biography, that he
has in fact sacrificed somewhat of the commodity of this life, to this
"higher law of his being." In a work which has just fallen into our
hands, entitled "_The Prose Writers of America, with a Survey of the
Intellectual History, Condition, and Prospects of the Country, by
Rufus Wilmot Griswold_," we find the following scanty account of
Emerson. "He is the son of a Unitarian clergyman of Boston, and in
1821, when about seventeen years of age, was graduated at Harvard
University. Having turned his attention to theology, he was ordained
minister of one of the congregations of his native city, but,
embracing soon after some peculiar views in regard to the forms of
worship, he abandoned his profession, and retiring to the quiet
village of Concord, after the manner of an Arabian prophet, gave
himself up to 'thinking,' preparatory to his appearance as a
revelator." Which meagre narrative, not very happily told, leads us to
infer that the recluse of Concord has lived up to the high spirit of
his own teaching.
It is remarkable that Mr Griswold, in the prefatory essay which he
entitles _The Intellectual History, Condition, and Prospects of the
Country_, although he has introduced a host of writers of all grades,
some of whom will be heard of in England for the first time, never
once mentions the name of Emerson! Yet, up to this moment, America has
not given to the world any thing which, in point of original genius,
is comparable to his writings. That she has a thousand minds better
built up, whose more equal culture, and whose more sober opinions, one
might prefer to have,--this is not the question,--but in that highest
department of reflective genius, where the power is given to impart
new insights into truth, or make old truths look new, he stands
hitherto unrivalled in his country; he has no equal and no second.
Very popular he perhaps never may become; but we figure to ourselves
that, a century hence, he will be recognised as one of those old
favourite writers whom the more thoughtful spirits read, not so much
as teachers, but as noble-minded companions and friends, whose
aberrations have been long ago conceded and forgiven. Men will read
him then, not for his philosophy,--they will not care two straws for
his idealism or his pantheism: they will know that they are there, and
there they will leave them,--but they will read him for those genuine
confessions of one spirit to another, that are often breathed in his
writings; for those lofty sentiments to which all hearts respond; for
those truths which make their way through all systems, and in all
ages.