DR. KUYPER'S FINAL METAPHOR.[24]
1.--_Where are the Peace Lovers?_
I have finished my criticism of Dr. Kuyper's article.
Should he not find it clear, perhaps he will be kind enough to mark the
points which he desires to have explained. I will gladly insert his
reply, on condition that he allows me to publish it, with his article,
in pamphlet form, so that readers may have both sides of the question
before them. I do not follow him in detail in his apologetic, religious,
metaphysical, and oratorical digressions where common-places stand for
facts and arguments.
"Has civilisation the right to propagate itself by means of war?" he
cries. As far as I am concerned, I think war a very bad vehicle of
civilisation, albeit it has often served the purpose; but as long as it
remains the last resource of international relations, it is impossible
to suppress it.
I return the question. "Has an inferior civilisation the right to impose
itself upon a superior civilisation, and to propagate itself by means of
war?"
Pro-Boers delight to exhibit in the shop windows a picture representing
three Transvaal soldiers; a youth of sixteen, an old man of sixty-five,
and a man in the prime of life. What does it prove? That every Boer is
a soldier. They have no other calling; to drive ox-teams; ride; shoot;
keep a sharp eye on the Kaffirs in charge of their cattle; use the
sjambok freely "in Boer fashion," to make them work; these are their
occupations. Their civilisation is one of the most characteristic types
of a military civilisation.
It is a curious thing, that so many Europeans among the lovers of peace,
should actually be the fiercest enemies of England, a country which
represents industrial civilisation in so high a degree, that she stands
alone, in all Europe, in refusing to adopt compulsory military service.
Such lovers of peace range themselves on the side of professional
fighters against peaceable citizens. They are for the Boer spoliator
against the despoiled Uitlanders. They take their stand against the
English who in 1881 and 1884 voluntarily restored autonomy to the
Transvaal, and in favor of the Boer, who in the Petition of Rights,
1881, took for programme, as in the pamphlet recently published by Dr.
Reitz, "Africa for the Afrikanders from the Zambesi to Simon's Bay."
The British Government, far from desiring fresh conquests, is drawn on
by its colonists. France colonises by sending an army, to be followed by
officials; then the government, the press, and committees of all sorts,
beg and pray refractory home lovers to go forth and settle in the
conquered territory. Englishmen go out to Australia, Borneo,
Johannesburg; and the British Government has to follow them. It is not
English trade which follows the flag, it is the flag which follows the
trade. The present crisis was not brought about by the zeal of British
statesmen, but by their weakness in 1881 and 1884; and by the habit
which they have allowed the Government of Pretoria of violating
conventions with impunity. To such a degree were these violations
carried on with regard to the Uitlanders (chiefly English) who, relying
on the guarantee of the Transvaal Government, had settled and invested
millions of capital in the country, that, dreading for their lives after
the murder of Edgar, they presented the petition of March 28th, 1899, to
the British Government. No government in the world, approached in such a
manner, could have refused to move; and where European governments have
gone wrong is that, instead of supporting the action of Great Britain,
they let President Krüger believe that they would intervene against her,
to the prejudice even of their own countrymen.
It may be mentioned that British Uitlanders only appealed to their own
government, after having, conjointly with Uitlanders of other
nationalities, addressed various petitions, since 1894, to the Pretoria
Government which petitions were received with contempt, President Krüger
replying: "Protest! protest as much as you like! I have arms, and you
have none!"
[Footnote 24: _Le Siècle_, April 14th, 1900.]
2.--_The Moral Worth of the Boers._
Dr. Kuyper affirms that "with regard to moral worth the Boers do not
fall short of any European nation." I have not wished to digress from my
argument by entering upon known cases of corruption concerning the
Volksraad in general, and Mr. Krüger in particular, but we have seen
their methods of legislation, of administering justice, and of keeping
their pledged word; let that suffice.
Dr. Kuyper collects all the calumnies against British soldiers, but he
dare not aver that the Boers have not been guilty of the abuse of the
white flag, and of the Red Cross. At the beginning of April, Lieutenant
Williams, trusting in the good faith of a party of Boers, who hoisted
the white flag, was shot dead by them.
Dr. Kuyper says "all the despatches have been garbled, defeats turned
into victories." It is not of Dr. Leyds he is speaking, but of the
English. He declares (February 1st) that "the best English regiments are
already disintegrated," that "the immensity of the cost will frighten
the English shopkeepers," that "the ministerial majority will likely
soon be dissipated." In giving these proofs of perspicacity, Dr. Kuyper
charitably adds, concerning England, "her reverses may be her
salvation." And in order to ensure her this salvation, he looks forward
to "those projected alliances, whose tendency it is unquestionably to
draw together against that insular power," of which Dr. Kuyper would
fain "be the son, were he not a Dutchman," and yet whose destruction he
so ardently desires. This far seeing politician forgets that were his
wishes realised, Holland would be the first victim.
3.--_A Lioness out of Place._
Dr. Kuyper delivers a lengthy dissertation upon "the inadequacy of the
Christian movement"; and shows himself worthy to be a collaborator of
M. Brunetière by excommunicating Schleiermacher, "the typical
representative," says the Rev. J.F. Smith, of modern effort to reconcile
science, theology and the "world of to-day with Christianity."
He inveighs against individualism, Darwinism, and the law of evolution;
he speaks of "the broad paths of human sin," and accuses the English
clergy of "betraying the God of Justice"; he places before them the God
of the Boers, declaring that "an invisible Power protects their
commandos."
Dr. Kuyper who is much better acquainted with the North Sea herrings
than with African lions, concludes his articles with this daring
metaphor:--
"So long as the roar of the Transvaal lioness, surrounded by her
cubs, shall be heard from the heights of the Drakensberg, so long
shall the Boers remain unconquered."
Now, the Boers have surmounted the armorial bearings of the South
African Republic with an eagle, bird of prey beloved of conquerers. It
is true that in the left quarter of their coat of arms is a small lion
lying down with bristling mane. It is probably the lady-friend of this
ferocious quadruped which Dr. Kuyper has chosen to symbolise the people
of the Transvaal.
I would merely remark to him that the highest summit of the Drakensberg
rises to an elevation of something like 10,000 feet. It is situated away
from the frontier of the Transvaal, between Natal, Basutoland, and the
Orange Free State. I imagine it is there that Dr. Kuyper's Transvaal
lioness is to take her stand, in order to carry out Krüger's programme
"Africa for the Afrikanders, from the Zambesi to Simon's Bay." But the
poor animal would not be long on that height, before she would die of
cold and hunger. This concluding imagery well reflects the spirit of Dr.
Kuyper's essay; it demonstrates to perfection the rapacious and
megalomaniac ideal of the Boers; and in his grandiloquence the author
contrives to express exactly the reverse of what he means.
4.--_Moral Unity by Means of Unity of Method._
Here again Dr. Kuyper puts metaphor in the place of reasoning; a truly
Eastern mode of discussion.
Ever since I entered upon public life, I have always endeavoured, in the
study of social and political phenomena, to eliminate subjective
affirmations, the dogmatic and comminatory _a priori_, the antiquated
methods which consist of taking words for things, _nomina_ for _numina_,
metaphors for realities.
Physical and biological science owe to the objective method the progress
that, from the times of Bacon and Galileo, has transformed the face of
the world; social science must henceforth replace rhetoric,
scholasticism and all balderdash of that kind; affirmations, _a priori_,
and excommunications, by the rigorous scrutiny of facts: Unity of Method
will lead to Moral Unity.[25]
[Footnote 25: Yves Guyot. _Les Principes de 1789 et le Socialisme_.]
APPENDIX A.
I cannot do better than reproduce at the end of this pamphlet the
analysis made by me in _Le Siècle_, March 14th, of a remarkable article
written by M. Tallichet, Editor of the _Bibliothèque Universelle de
Lausanne_.
ENGLAND, HOLLAND AND GERMANY.[26]
I have good reason for believing that President Krüger was kept by Dr.
Leyds under the illusion that he could count on intervention in his
favour. However, "Who should intervene?" is the question asked by M.
Tallichet in his article, _La Guerre du Transvaal et l'Europe_,
published by _La Bibliothèque Universelle de Lausanne_.
"President MacKinley, as was asked of him in a petition organised
by the Peace League? He has no such intention. Of the European
Powers, three only could have tried to do so: Russia, Germany and
France. Russia, however, who might have induced France to act with
her, will not trouble herself about it. Nicholas II., her
sovereign, has but lately taken part at the Hague in a conference
promoted by himself for the purpose of considering the means of
insuring peace. Having taken the initiative he may be believed to
have been actuated by philanthropic motives. But it also happens
that peace is, for Russia, of the greatest importance, grown, as
she is, out of all proportion, continuing to extend her tentacles
wherever there is a chance of seizing something. To this cause of
weakness must be added others: the need of money for her gigantic
enterprises; the famine, now become endemic, by which her European
provinces are ravaged, depopulated and reduced to the greatest
misery. She is profiting now by her experiences after the Crimean
War. As long as she remains inactive, the influence she exercises
on general politics by her mere extent, and the mysterious power
which seems to be the corollary of it, far exceeds her actual
strength. On her descending into the arena, however, this optical
illusion is dissipated, as was apparent in the recent Turkish War;
her prestige was lessened. No steps will therefore be taken by her
to increase England's difficulties by which she gains much without
striking a single blow.
"With regard to France, her only interest in the question is her
rivalry with England and the possibility, afforded by the latter's
difficulties, of re-opening the Egyptian Question. Public opinion
was sounded on this subject by a few newspapers, government organs
among them, but without obtaining the desired result. Although not
daring to counsel a formal alliance with Germany, they would have
liked to see her intervene. The present French Government, and
especially M. Delcassé may be credited with too much good sense and
good feeling to resort to the foolish, pin-pricking policy of M.
Hanotaux to which the Fashoda incident is really due. Such blunders
are not made a second time."
Only Germany remains to be considered. That there have been intimate
relations between the Governments at Pretoria and Berlin, is certain. At
one time the Emperor's aspiration was to unite his possessions in East
Africa to those in the West, and he counted on the Transvaal to assist
him. Mr. Stead's opinion on this subject, at the time of the Jameson
Raid, has already been quoted by us (_Le Siècle_, December 28th, 1899).
But this policy has since been renounced by him; the German Government
took fright at the influence exercised by Dr. Leyds on certain of the
Berlin newspapers; guns and Mauser rifles have been furnished by Krupp,
but that is a private firm; German officers have entered the Boer army,
to what extent have they been disavowed? The Emperor William is
certainly interested in the Transvaal War.
"He gets others to experiment on the value of German armaments,
rifles, guns, and all the tactical and strategetical problems
incident to the perfection of modern arms, and which have not yet
been solved. Experience, that is to say war, is worth everything in
such a matter as this, and the Boers with their German officers are
literally working for 'the King of Prussia.'"
That the Emperor should wish the Boers to succeed is logical enough, and
to all Frenchmen capable of thought, to Belgians, Swiss and Dutch too we
commend the way in which this desire is proved by M. Tallichet:
"Should the Boers be successful, England's power would be lessened.
She could no longer maintain the balance of power in Europe, which
is a service of inestimable benefit to our continent, especially to
the smaller countries, and to none more than to Holland. The
conquest of the Netherlands is a great temptation to Germany, who
would thereby gain exactly what she wishes: an excellent sea-board;
a great number of sailors; colonies, at the very moment when she is
aspiring to a first-class fleet. In a recent number of the
semi-official _Norddeutsche Zeitung_, an article was published by
Dr. Ed. von Hartmann, suggesting that Holland should be persuaded,
or if necessary forced by commercial competition to become part of
the German Empire, which would thus gain all it could possibly
desire. Is it likely that this glorious little country will
consent? Its charming young Queen, said to be a great sympathiser
with the Boers, will she descend from her present position to take
rank with the German Princes under the Emperor whose equal she is
to-day? Assuredly not.
"But if, on the other hand, England were to be paralysed, no
defence of Holland would be possible; France could not undertake it
alone, much as it would be to her interest; and what other Powers
would be capable of resisting?
"Of course, it may be urged, the German Emperor would never do such
a thing. Perhaps not, he is not immortal however, and there is no
knowing what may be done by his successors. Besides, by his
friendship with Abdul-Hamid, he has shown himself capable of
sacrificing everything to the greatness of his Empire. It would in
all probability be unnecessary to resort to force; there are less
brutal ways just as efficacious. In the event of Germany possessing
undisputed preponderance, with no counter-weight, she will bring an
irresistible pressure to bear upon Holland, as did Russia to poor
Finland, and induce her to join the Germanic Confederation. When,
therefore, Holland upholds the Transvaal, and seeks to annihilate
England, she, like the Boers, though in a different manner, is
working for "the King of Prussia"."
I earnestly recommend this passage in M. Ed. Tallichet's article to the
attention of my fellow-countrymen; the folly which dominates our foreign
policy, alarms me as much as that which caused the innocence of Dreyfus
to be denied for years, by Ministers, _the état-major_, and many
millions of Frenchmen. Justice was sacrificed by them to paltry
considerations, and to-day those of us who are infatuated with sympathy
for the pillaging policy of the Boers seem to have set up as their ideal
the completion of the disaster of 1870!
M. Ed. Tallichet's article should be read and carefully considered by
all who take an interest in the future of Europe. The question is
presented by him fully and clearly; there is no trace of sympathy for or
antipathy to Boers or British; the fate of France, Holland, Belgium,
Switzerland, is equally discussed. Their position is linked with
England's power; any injury to her power would weaken any of the smaller
countries above-mentioned, and be a source of danger to France.
[Footnote 26: _Le Siècle_, March 14th, 1900.]
APPENDIX B.
DR. KUYPER'S ADMISSION.
I. Offer to Dr. Kuyper to reproduce his article.--II. Dilatory reply of
Dr. Kuyper.--III. Withdrawal of Dr. Kuyper.--IV. M. Brunetière's
refusal.--V. The Queen of Holland and Dr. Kuyper's article.
OFFER TO DR. KUYPER.
On March 25th I addressed the following registered letter to Dr. Kuyper:
_March 25th, 1900._
SIR,
I have the honour to send you the numbers of _Le Siècle_ containing
a criticism of your article, "La Crise Sud-Africaine," which
appeared in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_.
In order to present the _pros_ and _cons_ to the reader at one and
the same time, I ask you to agree to the following proposition: _I
offer to publish in one pamphlet your article and my reply._ I
undertake to pay the cost and if there should be any profits to
divide them with you.
By accepting this proposal you will show that you are as convinced
of the solidity of your arguments as I am of the solidity of mine.
YVES GUYOT.
II. REPLY OF DR. KUYPER.
I received the following letter, March 29th:
AMSTERDAM,
_March 28th, 1900._
TO M. YVES GUYOT.
SIR,
Only having received one number of your paper (23,381) I do not
know whether your criticism is finished. As soon as I have it all
before me--with references to the documents cited, if you please,
otherwise it is difficult to follow--I will see whether it calls
for a detailed reply on my part, in which case I might, according
to American precedent, republish my article, inserting, with your
permission, your reply. This was done by the New York _Outlook_,
when it published in the same number, "the Case of the Boers," and
"the Case of the British."
At the same time the copyright of my article belongs to the Editor
of the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, without whose permission I can do
nothing. As I shall be in Paris before long I will ask him for it,
should your polemic attack seem to me to require a reply.
With regard to your proposal to leave the risks of a fresh
publication to you, while sharing the profits, although I
appreciate the delicacy of such a suggestion, I could not accept
it.
KUYPER.
The following remarks on his letter were published by me in _Le Siècle_,
March 30th.
"With regard to the first point, I regret that, at the time of
writing, Dr. Kuyper should only have received one number of _Le
Siècle_; each of my replies having been sent to him under
registered cover on the day of publication. It is unfortunate for
me that Dr. Kuyper's Article should have appeared in the _Revue des
Deux Mondes_, for that brings me again into contact with M.
Brunetière, and it is well-known that M. Brunetière who, last year
for fifteen days burdened _Le Siècle_ with his prose, does not wish
this discussion to be presented to the reader in its entirety. I am
greatly afraid of his desiring the same isolation for Dr. Kuyper's
article.
"As far as I am concerned, having began my reply to Dr. Kuyper I
shall continue it. If it is not M. Brunetière's wish that our
articles should be published together he will thereby acknowledge
anew the force of my replies. Were they not documented and
convincing, he would not fear their proximity."
III. ANOTHER LETTER.
On April 6th I sent the following letter to Dr. Kuyper (registered).
_April 6th, 1900._
SIR,
In a few days I shall have finished my replies to your article;
they will then be published in pamphlet form. I have the honour to
ask you definitely whether you accept my proposal to precede them
with your article in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_.
YVES GUYOT.
In answer to this I received the following letter from Dr. Kuyper
written from the Grand Hotel, Paris:
GRAND HOTEL,
12, BOULEVARD DES CAPUCINES,
_April 12th, 1900._
SIR,
My last letter informed you to what extent I could meet your
wishes.
Now that, without regard to my reply, you simply ask for the
authorisation to print my article in a pamphlet which you propose
to publish, I can only refer you to the person who has the power to
dispose of the copyright.
KUYPER.
I was under the impression that I had acted in accordance with the reply
of Dr. Kuyper, who in his letter, March 28th, wrote: "The copyright of
my article belongs to the Editor of the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, without
whose permission I can do nothing. As I shall be in Paris before long I
will ask him for it should your polemics seem to me to require a reply."
But since Mr. Kuyper withdrew from the correspondence I wrote the
following letter to Mr. Brunetière, Editor of the _Revue des Deux
Mondes_:
_April 13th, 1900._
TO THE EDITOR, SIR,
In the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, February 1st, an article was
published by Dr. Kuyper under the title of "La Crise
Sud-Africaine."
I have published a criticism upon it in _Le Siècle;_ and in order
that both sides of the question may be presented to the reader, I
have asked Dr. Kuyper's authorisation to reproduce his article in a
pamphlet in which I purpose to collect my own.
On March 28th, Dr. Kuyper wrote me: "The copyright of my article
belongs to the editor of the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, without whose
permission I can do nothing. As I shall be in Paris before long I
will ask him for it, should your polemic attack seem to me to
require a reply."
To-day Dr. Kuyper writes to me from the Grand Hotel, Paris: "I can
only refer you to the person who has the power to dispose of the
copyright." Since I am asked by Dr. Kuyper to make the request
which he had undertaken to make himself, I will do so. I have the
honour to ask you for the authorisation to publish Dr. Kuyper's
article which appeared in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_ under the
title of "La Crise Sud-Africaine," and to inform me of your
conditions for the reproduction.
YVES GUYOT.
IV. M. BRUNETIÈRE'S REFUSAL.
The next day I received the following from M. Brunetière:
PARIS,
_April 14th, 1900._
SIR,
You ask me for the authorisation to publish in a pamphlet Dr.
Kuyper's article which appeared in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_,
under the title of "La Crise Sud-Africaine." I hasten to refuse you
the authorisation.
I am, Sir, etc.,
F. BRUNETIÈRE.
In this reply I trace M. Brunetière's habitual courtesy. If I do not
thank him for his refusal, I yet thank him for the promptness with which
it was signified by him.
It had been my desire to enable the reading public to judge for
themselves the value of the arguments put forward by Dr. Kuyper and
myself; but it was evidently M. Brunetière's wish that Dr. Kuyper's
article should be known only to the readers of the _Revue des Deux
Mondes_, and that they should remain ignorant of my reply. This is in
itself a confession; for undoubtedly had Dr. Kuyper been convinced that
it was impossible for me to refute his arguments he would have requested
M. Brunetière to give me the authorisation to reproduce his article.
V.
On April 26th a telegram from the Havas Agency announced that the Queen
of Holland had received the journalists of Amsterdam, of whom Dr. Kuyper
is President.
I therefore wrote the following letter to Mr. W.H. de Beaufort, the
Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs:
PARIS,
_April 27th, 1900._
TO H.E. THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
SIR,
The Havas Agency, in a telegram, April 26, gives the following
information:
"Replying to a speech made by Dr. Kuyper, President of the
Society of Journalists, the Queen said she had read with
interest his article on the South African crisis, published in
a Paris review. The Queen expressed the hope that the article
would be circulated abroad, adding that she considered it
important that it should be widely distributed in America."
That the Queen of a constitutional government, such as that of
Holland, should have spoken in this way, proves that the Cabinet is
of the same mind. I trust, therefore, that I am not too bold in
asking your assistance to carry out Her Majesty's intentions.
I had asked Dr. Kuyper's authorisation to reproduce his article at
the beginning of a pamphlet; he referred me to M. Brunetière, who
with the courtesy of which he has given me so many proofs, replied:
"I hasten to refuse your request."
M. Brunetière's views are evidently opposed to those of the Queen
of the Netherlands.
It is true that the article would have been followed by my
criticism, but if the arguments therein contained are irrefutable,
why fear the proximity of my refutation? I beg you, therefore, to
be kind enough to ask M. Brunetière to give me permission to second
the views of Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands by assisting
to circulate Dr. Kuyper's article.
YVES GUYOT.
I have published my pamphlet while awaiting M. Brunetière's reply to the
Dutch Government which can hardly do otherwise than make the request,
agreeing, as it does, with the views of Her Majesty. Should M.
Brunetière by any chance cease to fear the proximity to Dr. Kuyper's
assertions of the facts and documents published by me, I will issue a
new Edition.
APPENDIX C.
THE LAST PRO-BOER MANIFESTATION.
Since the foregoing articles were written Dr. Leyds and Mr. Boer have
not been idle. M. Pierre Foncin, a General Inspector of the University,
has compiled on behalf of a Society called "Le Sou des Boers," a
manifesto ending thus: "Well then, since this lust of gold has resulted
in war, let the gold of France be poured out in floods, in aid of the
innocent victims!"
In spite of considerable influence brought to bear upon this member of
the University, the Committee, after some weeks' work, only managed to
scrape together something like four hundred pounds. Since then, no more
has been heard of it, and its place has been taken by "The Committee for
the Independence of the Boers," with M. Pauliat, a Nationalist Senator,
at its head. Its object was, in the first place, to organise a reception
for the Boer delegates on their return from America.
It was confidently expected by the promoters of the enterprise that it
would afford a good opportunity for a demonstration in opposition to the
Government on the fourteenth of July. The delegates were received at the
Hôtel-de-Ville by the Nationalist Municipal Council, whose President, M.
Grébauval, addressed them in virulent speeches, while the great square
in front remained empty. The Irish Banquet which took place this year on
the twelfth of July under the Presidency of Mr. Archdeacon, and which
had been much talked of in 1899 at the time of the Auteuil
manifestation, when President Loubet was hit with a stick by Baron
Christiani, passed off amidst complete indifference. No disturbance of
any kind occurred on the fourteenth of July.
The Congress of the Interparliamentary Union in favour of Peace and
Arbitration was to be held on the 31st of July. It was stated that the
Boer delegates were going to present a memorial, whilst M. Pauliat
intended to raise the Transvaal question. My answer was that I intended
to be there too, and considered it of interest to treat that question.
Dr. Leyds knew that the majority of the English Members of Parliament
who belonged to the Congress had declared themselves against the South
African war, and he anticipated that owing to their former declarations
they would find it difficult not to side with the pro-Boer sympathisers.
It was rather a clever idea. But on the 30th of July there was a meeting
of the executive Committee composed of two members of each of the
various nationalities, at which the English members declared that, if
contrary to its regulations, the Transvaal question was to be discussed
they were resolved to withdraw. The Committee decided to admit Mr.
Wessels, formerly Speaker of the Orange Free State Parliament, simply as
a member of the Congress; to oppose any discussion of the Transvaal
question and to rule that the communication made by the Boer delegates
was merely to be circulated among the members as individuals.
My pamphlet, _La Politique Boer_, and my answer in _Le Siècle_ of the
1st of August, were also distributed. Here are a few extracts:
"The manifesto of Messrs. Fisher, Wessels and Wolmarans, delegates
for the South African Republics, has been a disappointment to me. I
expected that these gentlemen would produce some arguments; they
have contented themselves with giving us a summary of Dr. Reitz's
pamphlet--"A Century of Wrongs." It ends with the same incitement
to annexation, which was already to be found in the cry for help
sent on the 17th of February, 1881, by the Transvaal to the Orange
Free State--"Africa for the Afrikander, from the Zambesi to Simon's
Bay!" The delegates recognise that the time for claiming new
territories has passed; they describe themselves as a nation of
mild and peace-loving men, the victims of perpetual English
persecution. I do not wish to discuss their way of dealing with
historical facts, about which they are not so candid as was Mr.
Krüger in his 1881 manifesto, because what we are now interested
in, is not that which happened in times long ago, but what has
happened since the annexation of the Transvaal by England, on the
12th of April, 1877. They do not say a word of the state of anarchy
then prevailing in the Transvaal, nor of its military reserves, nor
of the threatening attitude of Sekukuni and Cetewayo. Whereas in
the manifesto of 1881, with these facts still fresh in the memory
of its author, it is said: "At the outset our military operations
were not very successful. In the opinion of our opponents we were
too weak to resist successfully an attack from the natives," Sir
Theophilus Shepstone, unable to restore order, had finally to annex
the Transvaal. This he did at the head of twenty-five policemen
only. Had the Transvaal been left to itself Sekukuni's and
Cetewayo's impis would have overrun the country and turned out the
Boers, who, after they had been delivered from their enemies by the
English, proclaimed "a war of independence" in December, 1880. The
Majuba disaster, 27th of February, 1881, in which the English had
92 killed, 134 wounded, and 59 prisoners, is of course mentioned by
the delegates. An English army twelve thousand strong was
advancing; but though the Queen's speech referred to the fact of
the annexation, Mr. Gladstone, who in his Midlothian campaign, had
protested against it, agreed to the 1881 Convention in which the
independence of the Transvaal under England's suzerainty was
recognised.
"The Boer nation," the Boer delegates say in their Memorandum,
"could not bring themselves to accept the Convention; from all
parts of the country protests arose against the Suzerainty clause."
I admit willingly that the Boers did not abide by the Convention.
In 1884, speaking in the House of Lords,--Lord Derby said: "The
attitude of the Boers might constitute a _casus belli_ but as the
Government were not in the mood for war, and the position of the
English resident in Pretoria was anomalous," he assented to the
Convention of 27th February, 1884, "by which," say the Boer
delegates, "the suzerainty over the Transvaal was abolished, and
the South African Republic's complete independence acknowledged."
This is their contention, now for the facts."
I then adverted to the events of which the XVth. and XVIth. chapters of
_La Politique Boer_ give a summary. The Jameson raid is, of course, the
mainstay of the delegates' argument. After showing what this is really
worth, and also discussing the arbitration question, I concluded as
follows:
"The Memorandum shirks all the questions; documents are not
referred to; there is nothing in it but assertions, which are to be
accepted without discussion. It ends by mixing up what relates to
the organisation and adminstration of the two Republics. But the
adminstration of the Orange Free State and the adminstration of the
South African Republic were quite different things. By following
Krüger's policy Mr. Steyn has been guilty of a crime as well as a
great political blunder. Had he remained neutral the English army
would have been compelled to establish the basis of its operations
much farther North, and would have been deprived of the use of the
railway line to Bloemfontein. Moreover, when peace was restored, he
would have remained independent. The Memorandum alludes to the
prosperity of the Transvaal, but forgets to mention that the only
share taken in it by the Boers has been an ever-increasing
appropriation of the wealth created by the Uitlanders' industry,
capital and labour.
"The Memorandum mentions also the laws passed annually, but is
careful to omit law No. 1 of 1897, by which Mr. Krüger was
empowered to exact from the judges a declaration that decisions of
the Volksraad would be enforced by them as legal enactments,
whether they were in agreement with the constitutions or not, and
to dismiss at a moment's notice any one of them whose response
might seem to him unsatisfactory.
"We have already spoken of the concluding sentences in the
Memorandum. Messrs. A. Fischer, C.H. Wessels, A.D.W. Wolmarans
"appeal to the _Conférence de l'Union Interparlementaire_ to take
in hand their cause." The Executive Committee has, as has already
been said, ruled the question out of order. This decision is not to
be regretted considering the tendencies of the delegates'
Memorandum; it does not help their cause any more than does Dr.
Kuyper's article."
M. Pauliat complained bitterly of the decision. A progressive member of
the Belgian deputation, Mr. Lorand, tried to revive the question on the
2nd of August by means of the following resolution:
"The tenth Conference of the Interparliamentary Union for
International Arbitration now meeting in Paris being cognisant of
acknowledging the resolutions of the Conference at the Hague, and
being desirous to express its gratitude to all who have contributed
towards its results; trusts, that in future the Powers will avail
themselves of the means put at their disposal for the amicable
settlement of international disputes and regret that "they have not
done so" in the actual conflict between England and the South
African Republics."
Upon this, M. Beernaert, with all authority conferred upon him by his
position as the delegate of the Belgian Government at the Hague
Conference, observed that the Transvaal was not in a position to avail
itself of the resolution arrived at by the Conference--because that
Conference was no longer in existence, and because the Boers had not
been a party to it. On his motion the words "could not do so" were
inserted instead of the words "had not done so."
Now why were the Boers not represented at the Hague Conference?
The Queen of Holland, in whose name the invitations were issued, had
undoubtedly been appealed to by them, to admit the Transvaal to the
Congress in conformity with Dr. Reitz's contention that "the Transvaal
had inherent rights to be an international state,"--but their request
had been refused, as would have been a similar demand coming from
Finland or the Bey of Tunis.
The case was on all fours with that of the Vatican. When the Italian
Government declared that they would not sit in the Conference if an
invitation were sent to the Holy See, the Vatican was omitted.
Such is the simple fact; and it is just this fact which M. Lorand and M.
Beernaert brought into relief by the resolution of 2nd August. I am
quite sure that that was not their intention; the fact remains,
notwithstanding.
APPENDIX D.
SOUTH AFRICAN CRITICS.
The letters written by Messrs. Labouchere, Ellis and Clark, Members of
Parliament, found in Pretoria, are not of much importance to my mind.
The authors were not branded as traitors by Mr. Chamberlain, he only
wanted to place the letters before the public and their electors, who
most likely will find these three gentlemen guilty of another offence
than that of supporting Mr. Chamberlain's policy with President Krüger
while they made him believe that, as they were fighting against that
policy in England, there was no necessity for him to heed their advice.
Their attitude in Europe was bound to nullify the effect of the warnings
they were sending to Africa. It is astounding to see sedate men
contradict themselves in that way. I cannot help wondering at Dr. Clark
boasting on the 27th of September that owing to his endeavours Mr.
Stead's pamphlet was widely circulated, though, according to his words,
"Mr. Stead had to the last moment been our enemy." The fact is that Mr.
Stead had met Dr. Leyds (he went on meeting him during the war), and had
been persuaded to drop Cecil Rhodes and Jameson in spite of his former
praise of them. The publicity given to these letters does evidently not
give weight to the opinion of the writers or Mr. Stead either; the
interest of the Blue Book on "Correspondence relating to the recent
Political Situation in South Africa" does not lie that way, but it lies
in the opinion and advice of an Afrikander--to be found in Sir H. de
Villiers' letters--he being the Speaker of the House in Cape Colony,
Chief Justice, and one of the leaders of the Afrikander party. Sir
Henry de Villiers has been often taken to task for being a partisan of
the Boers, he cannot, therefore, be suspected of biassed ideas in favour
of Great Britain. Some extracts of the letters he wrote to President
Steyn on the 21st of May to Mr. Fischer and to his brother Mr. Melius de
Villiers on the 31st of July, then on the 28th September, twelve days
before the ultimatum was sent by Mr. Krüger, show to what extent he
appreciated the latter's policy. His opinion carries all the more weight
as he was one of the delegates to negotiate the 1881 Convention.
On the 21st of May, he says:
"I am quite certain that if in 1881 it had been known to my fellow
Commissioners that the President would adopt his retrogressive
policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever have induced them
to consent to sign the Convention. They would have advised the
Secretary of State to let matters revert to the condition in which
they were before peace was concluded; in other words, to recommence
the war."
Here are his views on the actual situation:
"On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President as I
considered it hopeless to think of making any impression on him,
but I saw Reitz, Smuts and Schalk Burger, who, I thought, would be
amenable to argument, but I fear that either my advice had no
effect on them, or else their opinion had no weight with the
President.
"I urged upon them to advise the President to open the Volksraad
with promises of a liberal franchise and drastic reforms.
"It would have been so much better if these had come voluntarily
from the Government instead of being gradually forced from them. In
the former case they would rally the greater number of the
malcontents around them, in the latter case no gratitude will be
felt to the Republic for any concessions made by it. Besides, there
can be no doubt that as the alien population increases, as it
undoubtedly will, their demands will increase with their
discontent, and ultimately a great deal more will have to be
conceded than will now satisfy them. The franchise proposals made
by the President seems to be simply ridiculous.
"I have always been a well-wisher to the Republic, and if I had any
influence with the President I would advise him no longer to sit on
the boiler to prevent it from bursting. Some safety-valves are
required for the activities of the new population. In their
irritation they abuse the Government, often unjustly, in the press,
and send petitions to the Queen, but that was only to be expected.
Let the Transvaal Legislature give them a liberal franchise and
allow them local self-government for their towns and some portion
of the discontent will be allayed."
This, I beg to observe, is exactly what I said at the time when people
in Europe who called themselves friends of the Boers yet are only Dr.
Leyds' friends or rather dupes urged upon Mr. Krüger the expediency of
going on with his mistaken and retrograde policy, and continental
diplomatists assured him that he might with impunity disregard the
claims of the Uitlanders and England's warnings.
Those who have never condescended to read the Blue Book or the short
chapter in this pamphlet, in which an analysis of this Blue Book is
given are never tired of referring to concessions and franchise schemes
proffered by Mr. Krüger.
What does Sir Henry de Villiers say about it!
"The franchise proposal made by the President seems to be simply
ridiculous."
To Mr. Krüger he sent the English Enactment of 1870 on Naturalisation,
and urged him to have it adopted. Is not this an answer to those who
contended that England "would not be satisfied with what she offered the
Transvaal?"
At the same time his lack of confidence in the Volksraad's promises is
shown here:
"I fear there would always still be a danger of the Volksraad
revoking the gift before it has come into operation."
His second letter is dated 31st of July, more than six weeks after the
Bloemfontein Conference. He writes to Mr. Fischer who acted as
go-between the Cape Afrikanders and President Krüger. Mr. Chamberlain
had requested that a mixed Commission be appointed to enquire into the
merits of the franchise law, passed in accordance with Mr. Krüger's
proposals. Here is Sir Henry de Villiers' judgment upon Mr. Krüger's and
Mr. Chamberlain's proceedings.
"I am convinced Mr. Krüger's friends must now regret they did not
recommend to President Krüger three months ago, as I strongly
urged, to offer voluntarily a liberal franchise bill with such
safeguards as would prevent the old burghers from being swamped.
"Mr. Chamberlain's speech was more moderate than I expected it
would be, and as he holds out an olive branch in the form of a
joint enquiry into the franchise proposals, would it not be well to
meet him in this matter? I know that it might be regarded as a
_partial_ surrender."
The last sentence runs as follows:
"I don't think that President Krüger and his friends realise the
gravity of the situation. Even now the State Secretary is doing
things which would be almost farcical if the times were not so
serious."
According to Sir Henry telegrams were suppressed by Dr. Reitz on the
plea that "the Government should not disseminate lies by its own wires."
Mr. de Villiers added:
"The Transvaal will soon not have a single friend left among the
cultivated classes."
Events have proved he had a better opinion of them than they deserved.
He goes on with the following:
"The time really has come when the friends of the Transvaal must
induce President Krüger to become perfectly frank and take the new
comers into his confidence."
And ends with saying again:
"As one who signed the Convention in 1881 I can assure you that my
fellow Commissioners would not have signed it if they had not been
led to believe that President Krüger's policy towards the
Uitlanders would have been very different from what it has been."
In a letter written the same day to his brother Melius, one can see in
what fool's paradise Dr. Reitz and his colleagues were living:
"When I was in the Transvaal three months ago, I found that Reitz
and others had the most extraordinary notions of the powers and
duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war. They are Ministers of the
Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible
assistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions a
responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of
internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all
the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown;
at least, if they did not do so, they would be liable to
dismissal."
Here is his opinion on the proceedings in the House of Commons:
"The debate which took place in the House of Commons since I last
wrote to you satisfies me that the British nation is now determined
to settle the Transvaal business in a manner satisfactory to
themselves.
"I accordingly begged of Krüger's friends to put the matter to him
in this way: On the one side there is war with England--on the
other side there are concessions which will avoid war or occupation
of the country. Now decide at once how far you will ultimately go;
adopt the English five years' franchise--offer it voluntarily to
the Uitlanders--make them your friends, be a far-sighted statesman,
and you will have a majority of the Uitlanders with you when they
become Burghers. The answer I got was: 'We have done too much
already and cannot do more.'"
One is aware of the fact that Mr. Krüger contended that the
_non_-English Uitlanders would side with him. Sir Henry Villiers writes:
"I have never been able to understand why Krüger never attempted to
take the Uitlanders into his confidence. He has always kept them at
arm's length with the result that he has entirely alienated them.
It is said that there are 21,000 Uitlanders in Johannesburg who
support him, and yet no meeting has been held at Johannesburg to
compare with the meetings held by his opponents.
"Why should he not appoint as one of his nominees an Uitlander of
position, whose integrity and judgment he has confidence in? If
none such exists, it would only be a proof of his want of tact and
statesmanship in not rallying such people to his side."
Mr. Melius de Villiers who was in Bloemfontein, while paying due
attention to his brother's warnings, wanted only to persuade Krüger to
yield for the time being. Forwarding his brother's letter he wrote to
Mr. Fischer:
"Please impress upon Oom Paul what I think is an important fact,
namely, that the present Ministry in England will not always last.
"By giving way now, we do not do so in perpetuity; but I feel
assured a Liberal Ministry will be willing to reconsider the
relations of the South African Republic to England, and even to
revoke the Convention of London."
"Africa for the Afrikander, from the Zambezi to Simon's Bay" remained
the motto, only Mr. de Villiers looked to the future for its
realization. Yet Mr. Krüger sticks to his policy of deceit taking back
what had been already granted.
Mr. de Villiers is down upon the summary and arrogant way with which
reasonable offers have been rejected, and alluded to the despatch of the
21st of August in which proposals made in the despatch of the 19th are
declared to be subordinate to the abandonment of suzeranity rights and
acceptance of the principle of arbitration for pending questions.
On the 28th of September Mr. de Villiers appeals to Mr. Fischer for the
last time:--
"Supposing a war does take place, is there any chance of the
Transvaal obtaining better terms when the war is over? The war will
not cease until the Transvaal is entirely subjugated. What will the
position of the Republics then be?
"The very best friends of the Transvaal feel that the Bill
providing for the seven years' franchise is not a fair or workable
measure.
"I am assuming, of course, that the proposals are such as can be
accepted without dishonour.
"I confess I look with horror on a war to be fought by Afrikanders
to bolster up President Krüger's régime. I could understand a war
in defence of the South African Republic after it has made
reasonable concessions to the demands of the new-comers, and after
it has displayed the same desire to secure good government as is
seen in the Orange Free State; but of such a desire I have not seen
the faintest trace."
He alludes again to the doings of Dr. Reitz and Smuts:--
"I have carefully read the latest correspondence, and I am by no
means satisfied that the British Resident was guilty of a breach of
faith. The utmost I would say is that there was a misunderstanding.
The dispatch of the 21st August seems to me to have been wholly
unnecessary, unless something happened between the 19th and 21st
which led the Transvaal Government to think they had yielded too
much. I have heard it said that between those dates a cablegram
from Dr. Leyds gave hopes of European intervention...."
Does this telegram exist? It is indeed likely. At any rate the
responsibility of the war rests upon those who--be they diplomatists or
journalists--have deluded Dr. Leyds to that extent. And the blood which
is now shed is on the head of those who still try and persuade the Boers
that Russia, Germany, or France is going to interfere.
In _Le Siècle_ of the 3rd September, extracts from the "Blue Book" have
been printed. We also find there letters from the 11th of March, 1898,
up to the 8th of May, 1899, written by Mr. J.X. Merriman, the Cape
Treasurer during the Schreiner Ministry. As he is one of the leaders of
the irreconcilable Afrikander group he cannot be suspected of undue
sympathy towards England. In his first letter to Mr. Steyn a year before
the Uitlanders had petitioned for a redress, fourteen months before the
Bloemfontein Conference, eighteen months before the declaration of war,
the following passage is to be found:--
"Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the
future lies in the attitude of President Krüger and his vain hope
of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow unenlightened
minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using the
materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true Republic
on a broad liberal basis. The report of recent discussions in the
Volksraad on his finances and their mismanagement fill one with
apprehension. Such a state of affairs cannot last, it must break
down from inherent rottenness, and it will be well if the fall does
not sweep away the freedom of all of us.
"I write in no hostility to the Republics: my own feelings are all
in the opposite direction; but the foes of that form of government
are too often those of their own household. I am quite sure that
you have done what you can in modifying the attitude at Pretoria;
but I entreat you, for the welfare of South Africa, to persevere,
however unsatisfactory it may be to see your advice flouted and
your motives so cruelly misrepresented by a section of colonists.
"Humanly speaking, the advice and good will of the Free State is
the only thing that stands between the South African Republic and a
catastrophe."
Alluding to the Kotzé incident, the upshot of which was that Krüger and
the Volksraad claimed the right to overrun judicial decisions, he
writes:
"The radical fault is the utter incapacity of the body that affects
to issue its mandates to the Courts. In England it is a Parliament,
but then it represents the intelligence of the country, and in
Switzerland the same; in the Transvaal it is a narrow oligarchy."
In a letter dated 1st January, 1899, President Krüger is depicted as
follows:
"I had the opportunity the other day of a long talk, or rather
several talks, with Lippert about the Transvaal. He takes a very
sane view of matters there, and is very hopeless. He represents
Krüger--as others describe him--as more dogged and bigoted than
ever, and surrounded by a crew of self-seekers who prevent him from
seeing straight. He has no one to whom he turns for advice, and he
is so inflated as to have the crazy belief that he (Krüger) is born
to bring about peace between Germany and France!"
Mr. Merriman is confident that the Orange Free State will interfere (Mr.
Steyn was alas, so blind as to fall in with Mr. Krüger's temper instead
of smoothing it down), and says:
"Is there no opportunity of bringing about a _rapprochement_
between us, in which the Free State might play the part of honest
broker?"
"_Us_" here means Cape Colony and Orange Free State.
Having spoken of matters of general interest for South Africa, of
uniform custom duties, etc., he ends by saying:
"The deplorable confusion and maladministration of his financial
arrangements still continue, and are a standing menace to the peace
of South Africa. Yet, judging from the utterances of the leading
men from the Rand who come down here, a very moderate reform would
satisfy all except those who do not want to be satisfied, and, I
believe, there is very little sympathy for the mischievous
agitation that, rightly or wrongly, is attributed to the designs of
Rhodes and Beit."
On the 26th of May, 1899, on the eve of the Bloemfontein Conference, he
writes to Mr. Fischer, prompter and organiser of the Conference,
foreseeing the results of the policy advocated by Dr. Leyds:
" ... but there is, of course, an even worse prospect, namely, that
misrepresentation may goad Great Britain into a position where,
_with the concurrence and invitation of the other powers_, she
might feel obliged, even at the risk of enormous military outlay,
to cut the Gordian knot. You will probably say, as I certainly say,
'where is the _casus belli_,' and refuse to believe it possible to
imagine such a contingency. Unfortunately, you and I, who keep our
heads, must not ignore the fact that an immense number of people
seem to have lost theirs and are ready, without reflection or
examination, to accept the highly-coloured statements of a partisan
press."
He mentions the maladministration in the Transvaal several months before
he had written to Mr. Smuts, asking for detailed account of the money
granted by the Boer Government to Johannesburg but without getting an
answer.
"Of course I know from previous correspondence that you and the
President are not disposed to minimize the blots on the
administration of the South African Republic, the weak points in
the Constitution, and the ignorance and laxity that prevails in
financial matters. To do so would be to fatally complicate the
situation.
"I am sure that you will, and I most strongly urge you to use your
utmost influence to bear on President Krüger to concede some
colourable measure of reform, not so much in the interests of
outsiders as in those of his own State.
"Granted that he does nothing. What is the future? His Boers, the
backbone of the country, are perishing off the land; hundreds have
become impoverished loafers, landless hangers-on of the town
population. In his own interests he should recruit his Republic
with new blood--and the sands are running out. I say this
irrespective of agitation about Uitlanders. The fabric will go to
pieces of its own accord unless something is done."
Such is the opinion of Mr. Merriman, a friend of the Transvaal, yet
every day in Europe one is told that its misfortunes are due to the
Uitlanders.
Mr. Merriman thought on the contrary that it was necessary to ask them
to come forward and help the State out of its ruinous course.
"Surely it would be better to come forward now and earn the
gratitude of South Africa by a comprehensive and liberal measure
than to have the State torn and distracted by constant irritation
and bad blood. A moderate franchise reform and municipal privileges
would go far to satisfy any reasonable people, while a maintenance
of the oath ought to be a sufficient safeguard against the swamping
of the old population.
"President Krüger should reflect that nine out of ten people that
receive the franchise will be supporters of the Republic in which
they will have an interest, and that he will, by granting liberal
reforms, disarm all opposition provoked.
"Try and persuade President Krüger to confer a benefit on the whole
of South Africa by granting a broad measure of reform, and you will
have done the best day's work any statesman ever did in South
Africa."
Two months after the declaration of war, while the Boers' military
operations were somehow successful he wrote to Mr. Piet de Wet also a
member of the Cape Parliament--"it is hopeless...."
"If the Republics had not made the fatal mistake of sending the
ultimatum when they did, things would have gone differently; but it
is of no use going back on what might have been."
His letter had no effect upon Mr. de Wet, who now is under trial for
high treason along with three other Members of the House.
There are other letters, among them one written by Mr. Te Water, who
left the Schreiner Ministry. In a speech delivered at Graaff-Reinet some
time ago he has declared that the Cape Government ought not to have
allowed the railway lines to be used by English troops. Yet in a letter
to President Steyn on the 8th of May, 1899, he asked him to put pressure
upon "our friends in Pretoria" to adopt conciliatory measures. Alluding
to the impending Conference he writes:--
"In your position you as go-between can do endless good towards
arriving at an understanding at such Conference. I know well that
there is a party who will do everything possible to prevent this."
Nevertheless he also is in favour of the policy advocated by Mr. Melius
de Villiers:--
"We must now play to win time. Governments are not perpetual. It is
honestly now the time to yield a little, however one may later
again tighten the rope."
This shows how this former Minister at the Cape meant to abide by
Conventions. How Mr. Krüger did abide by the Conventions of 1881 and
1884 is a well-known fact. No wonder if England was suspicious of the
"ridiculous proposals," to use Mr. de Villiers' phrase, offered by
President Krüger. The letters written by Mr. Te Water and Mr. Melius de
Villiers show that there was good reason for suspicion. These letters
show also what responsibility has been assumed by the members of the
Liberal party who sided so eagerly with Mr. Krüger and by those who,
like Mr. Stead, backed at first Mr. Rhodes' policy with all their might
(so Mr. Clark wrote to General Joubert, Mr. Krüger, and President
Steyn) and were blind enough to imagine that their party was strong
enough to elbow out the Government and revert to Mr. Gladstone's policy
after Majuba. Had they been more far-sighted they would have recognised
that the Transvaal had since 1881 condemned itself, and that no
Ministry, be it Liberal or Conservative, could follow again in the steps
of Mr. Gladstone.
* * * * *
Since President Krüger has left the Transvaal, and Botha is negotiating
for a surrender, the pacification of the Transvaal needs no more war
operation, it has become a mere question of police arrangements.
Nevertheless Dr. Leyds is still as active as ever. He reminds us of the
Spanish Ministers who when they got the news that the Spanish fleet had
been annihilated by Dewey, manufactured forthwith a report to the effect
that Americans had suffered a defeat at the hands of the Spaniards. _Le
Petit Bleu_ does the same. The announcement--English troops
retreating--appeared in a marginal note the very day that Lydenburg was
taken. On Tuesday, 11th September, _L'Eclair_ made the following
announcement: "London, 10th September, Prince Henry sails back to
Germany. From well-informed quarters I learn that the main object of the
German Emperor's brother's visit was to discuss the ways and means of
preserving Transvaal independence."
Eight days previous to this Dr. Leyds had tried to make the world
believe that he had come to an understanding with the Czar. In both
cases the object aimed at was obvious. Yet though the Dreyfus affair
has taught me the all-powerful and far-reaching influence of a lie, I
confess that Dr. Leyds is a puzzle to me.
But his work is at an end now. He may have succeeded cleverly in
deceiving Krüger and Steyn what the European Powers really meant to do,
or in giving those same Powers garbled accounts of the state of affairs
in the Transvaal, and the true bearings of the Bloemfontein negotiation,
yet the fact remains that it is mainly through him that the South
African Republics have lost their independence. He could not like Mr.
Krüger, excuse himself upon being led astray by blind and ignorant
patriotism. He knew well enough how far the very help he depicted as
forthcoming could be depended upon, he knew that England was bound to
win in the long run, but there was only one thing which he cared for; to
make people in Europe believe that he had an important part to play in
the political arena. The war came as a welcome diversion to an endurable
position. And now that his country's interests have been entirely
sacrificed to his own, he may look upon his work with satisfaction.
APPENDIX E.
THE TRANSVAAL AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE HELD IN PARIS FROM SEPTEMBER
30TH TO OCTOBER 5TH, 1900.
SITTING OF OCTOBER 1ST.
In the English section of the Peace Conference the most prominent
members of which were Dr. Clarke, Mr. Moscheles and Mr. Alexander, the
following resolutions had been unanimously adopted to be proposed at the
Peace Conference:
"That according to the report sent by the Berne International
Bureau it has come to the knowledge of the International Peace
Congress, that:
(_a_) "The British Government steadily opposed various attempts
made with the object to submit the South African difficulties to
arbitration.
(_b_) "Arbitration was eagerly accepted by the South African
Republics, who had repeatedly asked for it, therefore, the
International Peace Congress feels compelled to arrive at the
following conclusions:
1st. "Of the two opponents the one who declined arbitration,
_i.e._, the British Government is responsible for the war in South
Africa.
2nd. "As long as arbitration can possibly be resorted to the appeal
to arms is tantamount to being guilty of a crime against
civilisation and humanity; therefore,
3rd. "The application of brutal force by Great Britain so as to end
their quarrel with the South African Republics deserves an
everlasting blame for what must be considered as an outrage
against human conscience, and a betrayal of the cause of progress
and humanity."
Then a lengthy discussion arose, in the course of which M. Yves Guyot
quoted facts in contradiction to the assertions which the proposed
resolution contained.
That resolution was passed in principle by the Congress Commission of
Actuality, with the proviso that some words should be left out as being
too offensive.
For instance the words: _an outrage_ or a _reprehensible attempt_
against the right of nations should be substituted for _a crime_ against
civilisation. The former version was adopted and submitted to the
Congress by the Commission, whilst soliciting its opinion on the text of
the proposition and of its bearings. After the English delegates had
exposed their views, M. Yves Guyot rose and said that he considered it
his duty, as a member of the Congress Committee of Patronage, not only
to find fault with the proposals of the Commission in their details,
_but to object also to the spirit as well as to the letter of the
resolution_.
"Looking at actual facts", said Mr. Yves Guyot, "it was not true
that arbitration had been accepted by the Governments of the South
African Republics. The acceptance, if any, had been hedged in by
all sorts of restrictions, for instance, in making it conditional
that England should drop the suzerainty, a condition which Her
British Majesty's Government could not accept. True, arbitration
was mentioned. But arbitration of what kind? about what? Could
England recognise the right which the Boers had given themselves,
to violate over and over again the Conventions of 1881 and 1884?
"Really it was astounding to see such an amount of sympathy wasted
on people who had constantly set at naught Art. 14 of the 1884
Convention with respect to the Uitlanders, who had come and
brought them civilisation, energy and wealth.
"A retrospect history of the Boers would quickly show that their
hatred of the English was in the first place due to the protection
which the latter had given to the natives. It is clearly apparent
from documents dealing with the Bloemfontein Conference, that when
Mr. Krüger brought forward the arbitration question he merely meant
to throw dust into the public's eyes. Now he (M. Yves Guyot)
considered it to the interest of the Congress to point out that its
members, generous-minded as they were, were irresponsible people.
What authority did they attribute to resolutions, blame and
reproach, addressed to governments who are themselves responsible
for the destinies of their countries?
"Their resolution might be couched in words as strong as they
liked, but what effective sanction could they give it? Was it not
to be feared rather that by its very violence their language might
fan the flames, or rake the embers of new conflicts instead of
making its peaceful influence felt?"
M. Guyot's speech was listened to with silent and earnest attention,
though now and then objections were heard.
Then after Dr. Clark, Mr. Frederic Passy, Mr. Moscheles and Mr. Arnaud
had made their observations the final decision was put off till the next
day.
On the 2nd of October the Russian delegate, Mr. Nevicow, read the text
of the resolution as it had been amended by the commission:
_Motion of the Commission._
"The Ninth International Peace Congress after hearing the report on the
events of the year sent by the Berne Bureau, though without pretending
to assume the right to pass judgment on the policy of a friendly nation
unless it should be to affirm publicly the everlasting principles of
international justice, declares that:
1st. "The responsibility of the war which is now devastating South
Africa lies with the Government which refused several times to
countenance arbitration, that is with the British Government.
2nd. "The English Government by ignoring the principles of right
and justice, which have been the glory of the great British nation,
_i.e._, by refusing to arbitrate and indulging in threats which
were bound fatally to lead to war, whereas the difficulties might
have been solved by judicial means, has committed an outrage
against the rights of nations, of such a nature as to check the
pacific evolutions of humanity.
3rd. "The Congress equally regrets that, the majority of the
Governments represented at the Hague Conference, had not taken any
steps to assure the respect of resolutions which were to them an
undertaking of honour.
4th. "The Congress considers that it is advisable to appeal to
public opinion as regards the Transvaal.
5th. "The Congress expresses its profound sympathy and admiration
to the English members of the Congress for the manliness of their
declarations, and it hopes that under similar circumstances their
example will be followed by other nations."
Mr. Jaffe, of London, alluding to public opinion in England, said that
arbitration could only be resorted to by sovereign powers, that the
Transvaal was not a sovereign power, and also that any judgment arrived
at by arbitration on the various points in dispute between England and
the Transvaal, would have been difficult to execute. Mr. Jaffe referred
to the approval, almost unanimous, with which the war was looked upon
in England and her Colonies; it had provoked great enthusiasm, and it
would be a mistake to hurt the feelings of a whole nation.
The wording of the resolution as proposed by the Commission was adopted
by all the members but one.
Mr. Lafontaine, Belgium, proposed to add another resolution which ran as
follows:
"The congress hopes that the crime or to use the corrected phrase,
the error of depriving the South African Republics of their
existence and independence will not be committed definitely; it
makes an earnest appeal to civilised governments to intervene as
mediators in favour of the two Republics."
After various observations had been made by Mr. Giretti (Italy), Hodgson
Pratt, Frederic Passy and Moscheles (the English delegates) the
proposition was rejected by 170 votes against 60.
LONDON:
BOYLE, SON & WATCHURST,
PRINTERS,
WARWICK SQUARE, E.C.