[Footnote 193: _Isaiah_, lviii. 6 _sqq._]

[Footnote 194: _Cf._ Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 122 _sq._]

[Footnote 195: Halévy, _Mélanges de critique et d'histoire

relatifs aux peuples sémitiques_, p. 371.]

The opposition against ritualism which was started by the

Prophets reached its height in Christ. Men are defiled not by

external uncleanness, but by evil thoughts and evil deeds.[196]

"It is lawful to do well on the sabbath days."[197] Those whose

righteousness does not exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees

shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.[198] The first and

great commandment is that which {719} enjoins love to God, but

the second, according to which a man shall love his neighbour as

himself, "is like unto it."[199] At the same time there are in

the New Testament passages in which God's judgment of men seems

to be represented as determined by theological dogma.[200] The

only sin which can never be forgiven either in this world or in

the world to come, is blasphemy against the Holy Ghost;[201] and

the belief in Jesus is laid down as indispensable for

salvation.[202] According to St. Paul, a man is justified by

faith alone, without the deeds of the law.[203] This doctrine,

which makes man's salvation dependent upon his acceptance of the

Messiahship of Jesus, has had a lasting influence upon Christian

theology, and has, together with certain other dogmas, led to

that singular discrepancy between the notions of divine and human

justice which has up to the present day characterised the chief

branches of the Christian Church.

[Footnote 196: _St. Matthew_, xv. 19 _sq._ _St. Mark_, vii. 6 _sqq._]

[Footnote 197: _St. Matthew_, xii. 12.]

[Footnote 198: _Ibid._ v. 20.]

[Footnote 199: _St. Matthew_, xxii. 37 _sqq._]

[Footnote 200: Toy, _Judaism and Christianity_, p. 82 _sq._]

[Footnote 201: _St. Matthew_, xii. 31 _sq._ _St. Mark_, iii. 28 _sq._]

[Footnote 202: _St. Mark_, xvi. 16. _St. John_, iii. 18, 36;

viii. 24.]

[Footnote 203: _Romans_, iii. 28.]

Some of the early Fathers maintained that the interference and

suffering of Christ, in itself, unconditionally saved all souls

and emptied hell for ever;[204] but this theory never became

popular. According to St. Augustine and, subsequently, Calvinian

theology, the benefits of the atonement are limited to those whom

God, of his sovereign pleasure, has from eternity arbitrarily

elected, the effect of faith and conversion being not to save the

soul, but simply to convince the soul that it is saved. A third

theory--that of Pelagius, Armenius, and Luther--attributes to the

sufferings of Christ a conditional efficacy, depending upon

personal faith in his vicarious atonement, whereas those who for

some reason or other do not possess such faith are excluded from

salvation. A fourth doctrine, which early began to be constructed

by the Fathers and was adopted by the Roman Catholic and the

consistent portion of the Episcopalian Church, declares that by

Christ's vicarious {720} suffering power is given to the Church,

a priestly hierarchy, to save those who confess her authority and

observe her rites, whilst all others are lost. Certain

sectarians, like the Unitarians, or those "liberal Christians"

who do not feel themselves tied by the dogmas of any special

creed, are the only ones among whom we meet with the opinion that

a free soul, who by the immutable laws which the Creator has

established may choose between good and evil, is saved or lost

just so far and so long as it partakes of either the former or

the latter.[205]

[Footnote 204: Alger, _History of the Doctrine of a Future Life_,

pp. 550-552, 563. Farrar, _Mercy and Judgment_, p. 58 _sq._]

[Footnote 205: Alger, _op. cit._ p. 553 _sqq._]

According to the leading doctrines of Christianity, then, the

fates of men beyond the grave are determined by quite other

circumstances than what the moral consciousness by itself

recognises as virtue or vice. They are all doomed to death and

hell in consequence of Adam's sin, and their salvation, if not

absolutely predestined, can only be effected by sincere faith in

the atonement of Christ or by valid reception of sacramental

grace at the hands of a priest. Persons who on intellectual or

moral grounds are unable to accept the dogma of atonement or to

acknowledge the authority of an exacting hierarchy, are subject

to the most awful penalties for a sin committed by their earliest

ancestor, and so are the countless millions of heathen who never

even had an opportunity to embrace the Christian religion. Luther

was considered to have shown an exceptional boldness when he

expressed the hope that "our dear God would be merciful to

Cicero, and to others like him."[206] In the Westminster

Confession of Faith the Divines declared the opinion that men not

professing Christianity may be saved to be "very pernicious, and

to be detested";[207] and in their Larger Catechism they

expressly said that "they who, having never heard the gospel,

know not Jesus Christ, and believe not in him, cannot be saved,

be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the

light of nature, or the laws of that religion which they

profess."[208] This doctrine has had many {721} adherents up to

the present time,[209] although a more liberal view in favour of

virtuous heathen has obviously been gaining ground.[210] Even in

the case of Christians errors in belief on such subjects as

church government, the Trinity, transubstantiation, original sin,

and predestination, have been declared to expose the guilty to

eternal damnation.[211] In the seventeenth century it was a

common theme of certain Roman Catholic writers that "Protestancy

unrepented destroys salvation,"[212] while the Protestants on

their part taxed Du Moulin with culpable laxity for admitting

that some Roman Catholics might escape the torments of hell.[213]

Nathanael Emmons, the sage of Franklin, tells us that "it is

absolutely necessary to approve of the doctrine of reprobation in

order to be saved."[214]

[Footnote 206: Farrar, _op. cit._ p. 146.]

[Footnote 207: _Confession of Faith_, x. 4.]

[Footnote 208: _Larger Catechism_, Answer to Question 60.]

[Footnote 209: Farrar, _op. cit._ p. 146 _sq._]

[Footnote 210: Prentiss, 'Infant Salvation,' in _Presbyterian

Review_, iv. 576. For earlier instances of this opinion see

Abbot, 'Literature of the Doctrine of a Future Life,' forming an

Appendix to Alger's _History of the Doctrine of a Future Life_,

pp. 859, 863, 865.]

[Footnote 211: Abbot, _loc. cit._ p. 863.]

[Footnote 212: Wilson, _Charity Mistaken, with the Want whereof

Catholickes are unjustly charged, for affirming . . . that

Protestancy unrepented destroys Salvation_.]

[Footnote 213: Abbot, _loc. cit._ p. 860.]

[Footnote 214: Emmons, _Works_, iv. 336.]

Besides the heathen there is another large class of people whom

Christian theology has condemned to hell for no fault of theirs,

namely, infants who have died unbaptised. From a very early age

the water of baptism was believed by the Christians to possess a

magic power to wipe away sin,[215] and since the days of St.

Augustine it was deemed so indispensable for salvation that any

child dying without "the bath of regeneration" was regarded as

lost for ever.[216] St. Augustine admitted that the punishment of

such children was of the mildest sort,[217] but other writers

were more severe; St. Fulgentius condemned to "everlasting

punishment in eternal fire" even infants who died in their

mother's womb.[218] However, {722} the notion that unbaptised

children will be tormented, gradually gave way to a more humane

opinion. In the middle of the twelfth century Peter Lombard

determined that the proper punishment of original sin, when no

actual sin is added to it, is "the punishment of loss," that is,

loss of heaven and the sight of God, but not "the punishment of

sense," that is, positive torment. This doctrine was confirmed by

Innocentius III. and shared by the large majority of the

schoolmen, who assumed the existence of a place called _limbus_,

or _infernus puerorum_, where unbaptised infants will dwell

without being subject to torture.[219] But the older view was

again set up by the Protestants, who generally maintained that

the due punishment of original sin is, in strictness, damnation

in hell, although many of them were inclined to think that if a

child dies by misfortune before it is baptised the parents'

sincere intention of baptising it, together with their prayers,

will be accepted with God for the deed.[220] In the Confession of

Augsburg the Anabaptistic doctrine is emphatically

condemned;[221] and although Zwingli rejected the dogma that

infants dying without baptism are lost, and Calvin, in harmony

with his theory of election, refused to tie the salvation of

infants to an outward rite, the necessity of baptism as the

ordinary channel of receiving grace appears to have been a

general belief in the Reformed churches throughout the sixteenth

and seventeenth centuries.[222] The damnation of infants was in

fact an acknowledged doctrine of Calvinism,[223] though an

exception was made for the children of pious parents.[224] But in

the latter part of the eighteenth century Toplady, who was a

vehement Calvinist, avowed {723} his belief in the universal

salvation of all departed infants, whether baptised or

unbaptised.[225] And a hundred years later Dr. Hodge thought he

was justified in stating that the common opinion of evangelical

Protestants was that "all who die in infancy are saved."[226] The

accuracy of this statement, however, seems somewhat doubtful. In

1883 Mr. Prentiss wrote of the doctrine of infant salvation

independently of baptism:--"My own impression is that, had it

been taught as unequivocally in the Presbyterian Church even a

third of a century ago, by a theologian less eminent than Dr.

Hodge for orthodoxy, piety, and weight of character, it would

have called forth an immediate protest from some of the more

conservative, old-fashioned Calvinists."[227]

[Footnote 215: Tertullian, _De baptismo_, 1 _sqq._ (Migne,

_Patrologiæ cursus_, i. 1197 _sqq._). Harnack, _History of

Dogma_, i. 206 _sq._; ii. 227. Stanley, _Christian Institutions_,

p. 16. Lewis, _Paganism surviving in Christianity_, pp. 72, 73,

129, 144 _sq._]

[Footnote 216: Bingham, _Works_, iii. 488 _sqq._ Prentiss, _loc.

cit._ p. 549.]

[Footnote 217: St. Augustine, _De peccatorum meritis et

remissione_, i. 16 (Migne, _op. cit._ xliv. 16).]

[Footnote 218: St. Fulgentius, _De fide_, 27 (Migne, _op. cit._

lxv. 701).]

[Footnote 219: Wall, _History of Infant-Baptism_, i. 460 _sq._]

[Footnote 220: _Ibid._ i. 462, 468. Luther and his followers,

however, speak more doubtfully about the efficacy of the parents'

unrealised intention, and lay much stress on actual baptism

(_ibid._ i. 469).]

[Footnote 221: _Augsburg Confession_, i. 9.]

[Footnote 222: Prentiss, _loc. cit._ p. 550.]

[Footnote 223: Calvin, _Institutio Christiana religionis_, iv.

15. 10, vol. ii. 371. Norton, _Tracts concerning Christianity_,

p. 179 _sqq._]

[Footnote 224: Calvin, _op. cit._ iv. 16. 9, vol. ii. 383 _sq._

Wall, _op. cit._ i. 469. Anderson, 'Introductory Essay,' to

Logan's _Words of Comfort for Parents bereaved of Little

Children_, p. xxi.]

[Footnote 225: Toplady, _Works_, p. 645 _sq._]

[Footnote 226: Hodge, _Systematic Theology_, i. 26 _sq._]

[Footnote 227: Prentiss, _loc. cit._ p. 559. See also Anderson,

_loc. cit._ p. xxiii.]

In order fully to realise the true import of the dogma of

damnation it is necessary to consider the punishment in store for

the condemned. The immense bulk of the Christians have always

regarded hell and its agonies as material facts.[228] Origen, who

was a Platonist and an heretic on many points, was severely

censured for saying that the fire of hell was inward and of the

conscience rather than outward and of the body;[229] and in the

later Middle Ages Scotus Erigena showed unusual audacity in

questioning the locality of hell and the material tortures of the

condemned.[230] The punishment is burning--a penalty which even

in the most barbaric codes is reserved for the very gravest

crimes; and some great divines, like Jeremy Taylor and Jonathan

Edwards, have been anxious to point out that the fire of hell is

infinitely more painful than any fire on earth, being "fierce

enough to melt the very rocks and elements."[231] This awful

punishment also exceeds in dreadfulness anything which even the

most vivid imagination can conceive, because it will last not for

a passing moment, {724} nor for a year or a hundred, thousand,

million, or milliard years, but for ever and ever. In case any

doubt should arise as regards the physical capacity of the damned

to withstand the heat, we are assured by some modern theologians

that their bodies will be annealed like glass or asbestos-like or

of the nature of salamanders.[232] This, then, is the future

state of the large majority of men, quite independently of any

fault of their own, or of the degree of their "guilt."[233] It

would seem that even the felicity of the few who are saved must

be seriously impaired by their contemplation of this endless and

undescribable misery, but we are told that the case is just the

reverse. They become as merciless as their god. Thomas Aquinas

says that a perfect sight of the punishment of the damned is

granted to them that they "may enjoy their beatitude and the

grace of God more richly."[234] And the Puritans, especially,

have revelled in the idea that "the sight of hell torments will

exalt the happiness of the saints for ever," as a sense of the

opposite misery always increases the relish of any pleasure.[235]

[Footnote 228: Alger, _op. cit._ p. 516.]

[Footnote 229: _Ibid._ p. 516.]

[Footnote 230: Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, ix. 88,

n. k.]

[Footnote 231: Alger, _op. cit._ p. 516 _sq._]

[Footnote 232: Alger, _op. cit._ pp. 518, 520. _Cf._ St.

Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, xxi. 2 _sqq._]

[Footnote 233: For the numbers of souls supposed to be lost see

Alger, _op. cit._ p. 530 _sqq._ St. Chrysostom (_In Acta

Apostolorum Homil. XXIV._ 4 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, lx.

189]) doubted whether out of the many thousands of souls

constituting the Christian population of Antioch in his day one

hundred would be saved. And at the end of the seventeenth century

a History Professor at Oxford published a book to prove "that not

one in a hundred thousand (nay probably not one in a million)

from Adam down to our times, shall be saved" (Du-Moulin, _Moral

Reflections upon the Number of the Elect_, title page).]

[Footnote 234: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, iii.

Supplementum, qu. xciv. 1. 2 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Secunda,

iv. 1393).]

[Footnote 235: Jonathan Edwards, _Works_, vii. 480. Alger,

_op. cit._ p. 541.]

In the present times there is a distinct tendency among Christian

theologians to humanise somewhat the doctrines of the future

life.[236] But if Christianity is to be judged from the dogmas

which almost from its beginning until quite recent times have

been recognised by the immense majority of its adherents, it must

be admitted that its {725} conception of a heavenly Father and

Judge has been utterly inconsistent with all ordinary notions of

goodness and justice. Calvin himself avowed that the decree

according to which the fall of Adam involved, without remedy, in

eternal death so many nations together with their infant

children, was a "horrible" one. "But," he adds, "no one can deny

that God foreknew the future final fate of man before he created

him, and that he did foreknow it because it was appointed by his

own decree."[237]

[Footnote 236: Thus the doctrine of endless torments is opposed

by a considerable number of theologians (Alger, _op. cit._ p.

546), and, "if held, is not practically taught by the vast

majority of the English clergy" (Stanley, _op. cit._ p. 94).]

[Footnote 237: Calvin, _op. cit._ iii. 23. 7, vol. ii. 151.]

Like Christianity, Muhammedanism adorns its godhead with the

highest moral attributes and at the same time ascribes to him

decrees and actions which flatly contradict even the most

elementary notions of human justice. The god of Islam is

addressed as the compassionate and merciful; but his love is

restricted to "those who fear,"[238] and his mercy can only be

gained by that submissiveness or self-surrender which is

indicated by the very name of Islam. He demands a righteous life,

he punishes the wrongdoer and rewards the charitable.[239]

Through his Prophet he has revealed to mankind both the rules of

morality and the elements of a social system containing minute

regulations for a man's conduct in various circumstances of life,

with due rewards or penalties according to his fulfilment of

these regulations.[240] The whole constitution of the State has

on it a divine stamp; as an Arab proverb says, "country and

religion are twins."[241] But foremost among duties is to believe

in God and his Prophet. "God," it is said, "does not pardon

polytheism and infidelity, but He can, if He willeth, pardon

other crimes."[242] And the "pillars of religion" are the five

duties of reciting the Kalimah or creed, of performing the five

stated daily prayers, of fasting--especially in the month of

Rama[d.]ân,--of giving the legal alms, and of making the

pilgrimage to Mecca.[243] These duties are based on clear {726}

sentences of the Koran, but the traditions have raised the most

trivial ceremonial observances into duties of the greatest

importance. It is true that hypocrisy and formalism without

devotion were strongly condemned by Muhammed. "Righteousness," he

said, "is not that ye turn your faces towards the East or the

West, but righteousness is, one who believes in God, and the last

day, and the angels, and the Book, and the prophets, and who

gives wealth for His love to kindred, and orphans, and the poor,

and the son of the road, and beggars, and those in captivity; and

who is steadfast in prayer, and gives alms; and those who are

sure of their covenant when they make a covenant; and the patient

in poverty, and distress, and in time of violence; these are they

who are true, and these are those who fear."[244] Yet in

Muhammedanism, as in other ritualistic religions, the chief

importance is practically attached to the punctual performance of

outward ceremonies, and the virtue of prayer is made dependent

upon an ablution.[245] In the future life the felicity or

suffering of each person will be proportionate to his merits or

demerits,[246] but the admittance into paradise depends in the

first place on faith. "Those who believe, and act righteously,

and are steadfast in prayer, and give alms, theirs is their hire

with their Lord."[247] Those who have acknowledged the faith of

Islam and yet acted wickedly will be punished in hell for a

certain period, but will finally enter paradise.[248] As regards

the future state of certain infidels the Koran contains

contradictory statements. In one place it is said, "Verily,

whether it be of those who believe, or those who are Jews or

Christians or Sabaeans, whosoever believe in God and {727} the

last day and act aright, they have their reward at their Lord's

hand, and there is no fear for them, nor shall they grieve."[249]

But this passage is considered to have been abrogated by another

where it is stated that whoso desires any other religion than

Islam shall in the next world be among the lost.[250] The

punishments inflicted upon unbelievers are no less horrible than

the torments of the Christian hell. Yet in one point the

Muhammedan doctrine of the future life is more merciful than the

dogmas of Christianity. The children of believers will all go to

paradise, and the children of unbelievers are generally supposed

to escape hell. Some think they will be in A[(]ráf, a place

situated between heaven and hell; whilst others maintain that

they will be servants to the true believers in paradise.[251]

[Footnote 238: _Koran_, iii. 70.]

[Footnote 239: _Supra_, i. 553.]

[Footnote 240: _Cf._ Muir, _Life of Mahomet_, iii. 295 _sq._;

Lane-Poole, _Studies in a Mosque_, p. 101.]

[Footnote 241: Sell, _Faith of Islám_, pp. 19, 39.]

[Footnote 242: _Ibid._ p. 241.]

[Footnote 243: _Ibid._ p. 251.]

[Footnote 244: _Koran_, ii. 172.]

[Footnote 245: _Cf._ Polak, _Persien_, i. 9; Wallin,

_Reseanteckningar från Orienten_, iv. 284 _sq._; Sell, _op. cit._

p. 256.]

[Footnote 246: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern

Egyptians_, i. 95 _sq._ Sell, _op. cit._ p. 231. Lane-Poole,

_Studies in a Mosque_, p. 319.]

[Footnote 247: _Koran_, ii. 277.]

[Footnote 248: Lane, _op. cit._ i. 95. Sell, _op. cit._ p. 228.

The Mu[(]tazilas, however, teach that the Muslim who enters hell

will remain there for ever. They maintain that the person who,

having committed great sins, dies unrepentant, though not an

infidel, ceases to be a believer, and hence suffers as the

infidels do, though the punishment is lighter than that which an

infidel receives (Sell, _op. cit._ pp. 229, 241).]

[Footnote 249: _Koran_, ii. 59.]

[Footnote 250: _Ibid._ iii. 79. Sell, _op. cit._ p. 359

_sq._]

[Footnote 251: Sell, _op. cit._ p. 204 _sq._]

The formalism of Muhammedan orthodoxy has from time to time

called forth protests from minds with deeper aspirations. The

earlier Muhammedan mystics sought to impart life to the rigid

ritual;[252] and in the nineteenth century Bábíism revolted

against orthodox Islam, opposing bigotry and enjoining friendly

intercourse with persons of all religions.[253] At present there

are some liberal Muhammedans who set aside the scholastic

tradition, maintain the right of private interpretation of the

Koran, and warmly uphold the adaptability of Islam to the most

advanced ideas of civilisation.[254] To them Muhammed's mission

was chiefly that of a moral reformer. "In Islam," says Syed Ameer

Ali, "the service of man and the good of humanity constitute

pre-eminently the service and worship of God."[255]

[Footnote 252: _Ibid._ p. 110.]

[Footnote 253: _Ibid._ p. 136 _sqq._]

[Footnote 254: Ameer Ali, _Life and Teachings of Mohammed_,

_passim_. _Idem_, _Ethics of Islâm_, _passim_. _Cf._ Lane-Poole,

_Studies in a Mosque_, p. 324; Sell, _op. cit._ p. 198

_sq._]

[Footnote 255: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Islâm_, p. 3 _sq._ _Idem_,

_Life and Teachings of Mohammed_, p. 274.]

In the next chapter I shall try to explain the chief facts now

set forth relating to gods as guardians of **worldly morality.

CHAPTER LII

GODS AS GUARDIANS OF MORALITY (_concluded_)

WE have seen that the gods of uncivilised races are to a very

large extent of a malevolent character, that they as a rule take

little interest in any kind of human conduct which does not

affect their own welfare, and that, if they show any signs of

moral feelings, they may be guardians either of tribal customs in

general or only of some special branch of morality. Among peoples

of a higher culture, again, the gods are on the whole benevolent

to mankind, when duly propitiated. They by preference resent

offences committed against themselves personally; but they also

avenge social wrongs of various kinds, they are superintendents

of human justice, and are even represented as the originators and

sustainers of the whole moral order of the world. The gods have

thus experienced a gradual change for the better; until at last

they are described as ideals of moral perfection, even though,

when more closely scrutinised, their goodness and notions of

justice are found to differ materially from what is deemed good

and just in the case of men.

The malevolence of savage gods is in accordance with the theory

that religion is born of fear. The assumed originators of

misfortunes were naturally regarded as enemies to be propitiated,

whilst fortunate events, if attracting sufficient attention and

appearing sufficiently marvellous to suggest a supernatural

cause, were commonly ascribed to beings who were too good to

require {729} worship. But growing reflection has a tendency to

attribute more amiable qualities to the gods. The religious

consciousness of men becomes less exclusively occupied with the

hurts they suffer, and comes more and more to reflect upon the

benefits they enjoy. The activity of a god which displays itself

in a certain phenomenon, or group of phenomena, appears to them

on some occasions as a source of evil, but on other occasions as

a source of good; hence the god is regarded as partly malevolent,

partly benevolent, and in all circumstances as a being who must

not be neglected. Moreover, a god who is by nature harmless or

good may by proper worship be induced to assist man in his

struggle against evil spirits.[1] This protective function of

gods becomes particularly important when the god is more or less

disassociated from the natural phenomenon in which he originally

manifested himself. Nothing, indeed, seems to have contributed

more towards the improvement of nature gods than the expansion of

their sphere of activity. When supernatural beings can exert

their power in the various departments of life, men naturally

choose for their gods those among them who with great power

combine the greatest benevolence. Men have selected their gods

according to their usefulness. Among the Maoris "a mere trifle,

or natural casualty, will induce a native (or a whole tribe) to

change his Atua."[2] The negro, when disappointed in some of his

speculations, or overtaken by some sad calamity, throws away his

fetish, and selects a new one.[3] When hard-pressed, the

Samoyede, after invoking his own deities in vain, addresses

himself to the Russian god, promising to become his worshipper if

he relieves him from his distress; and in most cases he is said

to be faithful to his promise, though he may still try to keep on

good terms with his former gods by occasionally {730} offering

them a sacrifice in secret.[4] North American Indians attribute

all their good or bad luck to their Manitou, and "if the Manitou

has not been favourable to them, they quit him without any

ceremony, and take another."[5] Among many of the ancient Indians

of Central America there was a regular and systematical selection

of gods. Father Blas Valera says that their gods had annual

rotations and were changed each year in accordance with the

superstitions of the people. "The old gods were forsaken as

infamous, or because they had been of no use, and other gods and

demons were elected. . . . Sons when they inherited, either

accepted or repudiated the gods of their fathers, for they were

not allowed to hold their pre-eminence against the will of the

heir. Old men worshipped other greater deities, but they likewise

dethroned them, and set up others in their places when the year

was over, or the age of the world, as the Indians had it. Such

were the gods which all the nations of Mexico, Chiapa, and

Guatemala worshipped, as well as those of Vera Paz, and many

other Indians. They thought that the gods selected by themselves

were the greatest and most powerful of all the gods."[6] These

are crude instances of a process which in some form or other must

have been an important motive force in religious evolution by

making the gods better suited to meet the wants of their believers.

[Footnote 1: von Rosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 162

(Niase). Howard, _Life with Trans-Siberian Savages_, p. 192

(Ainu). Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 273 _sq._ (shamanistic peoples of

Siberia). Buch, 'Die Wotjaken,' in _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennicæ_,

xii. 633. _Supra_, ii. 701, 702, 704 _sq._]

[Footnote 2: Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders_,

i. 233.]

[Footnote 3: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 212.]

[Footnote 4: Ahlqvist, 'Unter Wogulen und Ostjaken,' in _Acta

Soc. Scient. Fennicæ_, xiv. 240.]

[Footnote 5: Bossu, _Travels through Louisiana_, p. 103. Frazer,

_Totemism_, p. 55.]

[Footnote 6: Blas Valera, quoted by Garcilasso de la Vega, _First

Part of the Royal Commentaries of the Yncas_, i. 124 _sq._]

But men not only select as their gods such supernatural beings as

may be most useful to them in their struggle for life, they also

magnify their good qualities in worshipping them. Praise and

exaggerating eulogy are common in the mouth of a devout

worshipper. In ancient Egypt the god of each petty state was

within it held to be the ruler of the gods, the creator of the

world, and the giver of all good things.[7] So also in Chaldea

the god of {731} a town was addressed by its inhabitants with the

most exalted epithets, as the master or king of all the gods.[8]

The Vedic poets were engrossed in the praise of the particular

deity they happened to be invoking, exaggerating his attributes

to the point of inconsistency.[9] "Every virtue, every

excellence," says Hume, "must be ascribed to the divinity, and no

exaggeration will be deemed sufficient to reach those perfections

with which he is endowed."[10] The tendency of the worshipper to

extol his god beyond all measure is largely due to the idea that

the god is fond of praise,[11] but it may also be rooted in a

sincere will to believe or in genuine admiration. That nations of

a higher culture have especially a strong faith in the power and

benevolence of their gods is easy to understand when we consider

that these are exactly the peoples who have been most successful

in their national endeavours.[12] As the Greeks attributed their

victory over the Persians to the assistance of Zeus,[13] so the

Romans maintained that the grandeur of their city was the work of

the gods whom they had propitiated by sacrifices.[14]

[Footnote 7: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 11.]

[Footnote 8: Mürdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens und

Assyriens_, p. 24.]

[Footnote 9: Macdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 16 _sq._ Barth,

_Religions of India_, p. 26. Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 139.]

[Footnote 10: Hume, _Philosophical Works_, iv. 353.]

[Footnote 11: See _supra_, ii. 653 _sq._]

[Footnote 12: _Cf._ Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, p. 281;

Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 18.]

[Footnote 13: _Supra_, ii. 713.]

[Footnote 14: Cicero, _De natura deorum_, iii. 2.]

The benevolence of a god, however, does not imply that he acts as

a moral judge. A friendly god is not generally supposed to bestow

his favours gratuitously; it is hardly probable, then, that he

should meddle with matters of social morality out of sheer

kindliness and of his own accord. But by an invocation he may be

induced to reward virtue and punish vice. We have often noticed

how closely the retributive activity of gods is connected with

the blessings and curses of men. In order to give efficacy to

their good or evil wishes men appeal to some god, or simply bring

in his name when they pronounce a blessing or a curse; and if

this is regularly done in connection with some particular kind of

conduct, the idea may grow up that the god rewards or punishes it

even independently of {732} any human invocation. Moreover,

powerful curses, as those uttered by parents or strangers, may be

personified as supernatural beings, like the Greek Erinyes; or

the magic energy inherent in a blessing or a curse may become an

attribute of the chief god, owing to the tendency of such a god

to attract supernatural forces which are in harmony with his

general nature.[15] So also, the notion of a persecuting ghost

may be changed into the notion of an avenging god.[16] Various

departments of social morality have thus come to be placed under

the supervision of gods: the rights of life[17] and property,[18]

charity[19] and hospitality,[20] the submissiveness of

children,[21] truthspeaking and fidelity to a given promise.[22]

That gods are so frequently looked upon as guardians of truth and

good faith is, as we have seen, mainly a result of the common

practice of confirming a statement or promise by an oath; and

where the oath is an essential element in the judicial

proceedings, as was the case in the archaic State,[23] the

consequence is that the guardianship of gods is extended to the

whole sphere of justice. Truth and justice are repeatedly

mentioned hand in hand as matters of divine concern. We have seen

how frequently the same gods as are appealed to in oaths or

ordeals are described as judges of human conduct.[24] "En

Égypte," says M. Amélineau, "la vérité et la justice n'avaient

qu'un seul et même nom, _Mât_, qui veut aussi bien dire vérité

que justice, et justice que vérité."[25] Zeus presided over

assemblies and trials;[26] according to a law of Solon, the

judges of Athens had to swear by him.[27] And the Erinyes, the

personifications of oaths and curses, are sometimes represented

by poets and philosophers as guardians of right in general.[28]

[Footnote 15: See _supra_, ii. 68.]

[Footnote 16: _Supra_, i. 378 _sq._]

[Footnote 17: _Supra_, i. 379 _sqq._]

[Footnote 18: _Supra_, ii. 59 _sqq._]

[Footnote 19: _Supra_, i. 561 _sqq._]

[Footnote 20: _Supra_, i. 578 _sqq._]

[Footnote 21: _Supra_, i. 621 _sqq._]

[Footnote 22: _Supra_, ii. 114 _sqq._]

[Footnote 23: Leist, _Græco-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 228.]

[Footnote 24: _Supra_, ii. 115, 116, 121, 122, 686, 687, 699.]

[Footnote 25: Amélineau, _L'évolution des idées morales dans

l'Égypte ancienne_, p. 187. See also _supra_, ii. 115, 699.]

[Footnote 26: Farnell, _Cults of the Greek States_, i. 58.]

[Footnote 27: Pollux, _Onomasticum_, viii. 12. 142.]

[Footnote 28: Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 246.]

{733} It has been said that when men ascribe to their gods a

mental constitution similar to their own they also _eo ipso_

consider them to approve of virtue and disapprove of vice.[29]

But this conclusion is certainly not true in general. Malevolent

gods cannot be supposed to feel emotions which essentially

presuppose altruistic sentiments; and, as we have just noticed,

an invocation is frequently required to induce benevolent gods to

interfere with the worldly affairs of men. Moreover, where the

system of private retaliation prevails, not even the extension of

human analogies to the world of supernatural beings would lead to

the idea of a god who of his own accord punishes social wrongs.

But it is quite probable that such analogies have in some cases

made gods guardians of morality at large, especially ancestor

gods who may readily be supposed not only to preserve their old

feelings with regard to virtue and vice but also to take a more

active interest in the morals of the living, and who are

notoriously opposed to any deviation from ancient custom.[30] I

also admit that the conception of a great or supreme god may

perhaps, independently of his origin, involve retributive justice

as a natural consequence of his power and benevolence towards his

people. Yet it is obvious that even a god like Zeus was more

influenced by the invocation of a suppliant than by his sense of

justice. Dr. Farnell points out that the epithets which designate

him as the god to whom those stricken with guilt can appeal are

far more in vogue in actual Greek cult than those which attribute

to him the function of vengeance and retribution.[31] Hermes was

addressed by thieves as their patron.[32] According to the Talmud

"the thief invokes God while he breaks into the house."[33] And

the Italian bandit begs the Virgin herself to bless his endeavours.

[Footnote 29: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 232

_sq._ Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 95. Tiele, _Elements of the

Science of Religion_, i. 92 _sq._]

[Footnote 30: See _supra_, ii. 519 _sq._ _Cf._ Tylor,

_Anthropology_, p. 369; Macdonald, _Religion and Myth_, p. 229.]

[Footnote 31: Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 66 _sq._]

[Footnote 32: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, i.

136.]

[Footnote 33: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 57.]

At the same time we must again remember that men {734} ascribe to

their gods not only ordinary human qualities but excellences of

various kinds, and among these may also be a strong desire to

punish wickedness and to reward virtue. The gods of monotheistic

religions in particular have such a multitude of the most

elevated attributes that it would be highly astonishing if they

had remained unconcerned about the morals of mankind. If flattery

and admiration make the deity all-wise, all-powerful, all-good,

they also make him the supreme judge of human conduct. And there

is yet another reason for investing him with the moral government

of the world. The claims of justice are not fully satisfied on

this earth, where it only too often happens that virtue is left

unrewarded and vice escapes unpunished, that right succumbs and

wrong triumphs; hence persons with deep moral feelings and a

religious or philosophical bent of mind are apt to look for a

future adjustment through the intervention of the deity, who

alone can repair the evils and injustices of the present. This

demand of final retribution is sometimes so strongly developed

that it even leads to the belief in a deity when no other proof

of his existence is found convincing. Kant maintained that we

must postulate a future life in which everybody's happiness is

proportionate to his virtue, and that such a postulate involves

the belief in a God of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness who

governs the moral as well as the physical world. Not even

Voltaire could rid himself of the notion of a rewarding and

avenging deity, whom, if he did not exist, "it would be necessary

to invent."

The belief in a god who acts as a guardian of **worldly morality

undoubtedly gives emphasis to its rules. To the social and legal

sanctions a new one is added, which derives particular strength

from the supernatural power and knowledge of the deity. The

divine avenger can punish those who are beyond the reach of human

justice and those whose secret wrongs even escape the censure of

their fellow men. But on the other hand there are also certain

circumstances which considerably detract from the {735} influence

of the religious sanction when compared with other sanctions of

morality. The supposed punishments and rewards of the future life

have the disadvantage of being conceived as very remote; and fear

and hope decrease in inverse ratio to the distance of their

objects. Men commonly live in the happy illusion that death is

far off, even though it in reality is very near, hence also the

retribution after death appears distant and unreal and is

comparatively little thought of by the majority of people who

believe in it. Moreover, there seems always to be time left for

penance and repentance. Manzoni himself admitted, in his defence

of Roman Catholicism, that many people think it an easy matter to

procure that feeling of contrition by which, according to the

doctrine of the Church, sins may be cancelled, and therefore

encourage themselves in the commission of crime through the

facility of pardon. The frequent assumption that the moral law

would hardly command obedience without the belief in retribution

beyond the grave is contradicted by an overwhelming array of

facts. We hear from trustworthy witnesses that unadulterated

savages follow their own rules of morality no less strictly, or

perhaps more strictly, than civilised people follow theirs. Nay,

it is a common experience that contact with a higher civilisation

exercises a deteriorating influence upon the conduct of

uncultured races, although we may be sure that Christian

missionaries do not fail to impart the doctrine of hell to their

savage converts.

It has also been noticed that a high degree of religious devotion

is frequently accompanied by great laxity of morals. Of the

Bedouins Mr. Blunt writes that, with one or two exceptions, "the

practice of religion may be taken as the sure index of low

morality in a tribe."[34] Wallin, who had an intimate and

extensive knowledge of Muhammedan peoples, often found that those

Muslims who attended to their prayers most regularly were the

greatest scoundrels.[35] "One of the most remarkable traits {736}

in the character of the Copts," says Lane, "is their bigotry";

and at the same time they are represented as "deceitful,

faithless, and abandoned to the pursuit of worldly gain, and to

indulgence in sensual pleasure."[36] Among two hundred Italian

murderers Ferri did not find one who was irreligious; and Naples,

which has the worst record of any European city for crimes

against the person, is also the most religious city in

Europe.[37] On the other hand, according to Dr. Havelock Ellis,

"it seems extremely rare to find intelligently irreligious men in

prison";[38] and Laing, who himself was anything but sceptical,

observed that there was no country in Europe where there was so

much morality and so little religion as Switzerland.[39] Most

religions contain an element which constitutes a real peril to

the morality of their votaries. They have introduced a new kind

of duties--duties towards gods;--and, as we have noticed above,

even where religion has entered into close union with worldly

morality, much greater importance has been attached to ceremonies

or worship or the niceties of belief than to good behaviour

towards fellow men. People think that they may make up for lack

of the latter by orthodoxy or pious performances. A Christian

bishop of the seventh century, who was canonised by the Church of

Rome, described a good Christian as a man "who comes frequently

to church; who presents the oblation which is offered to God upon

the altar; who doth not taste of the fruits of his own industry

until he has consecrated a part of them to God; who, when the

holy festivals approach, lives chastely even with his own wife

during several days, that with a safe conscience he may draw near

the altar of God; and who, in the last place, can repeat the

Creed and the Lord's Prayer."[40] A scrupulous observance of

external ceremonies--that is all which in this description is

required {737} of a good Christian. And since then popular ideas

on the subject have undergone but little change. Smollett

observes in his 'Travels into Italy' that it is held more

infamous to transgress the slightest ceremonial institution of

the Church of Rome than to transgress any moral duty; that a

murderer or adulterer will be easily absolved by the Church, and

even maintain his character in society; but that a man who eats a

pigeon on a Saturday is abhorred as a monster of reprobation.[41]

In the nineteenth century Simonde de Sismondi could write:--"Plus

chaque homme vicieux a été régulier à observer les commandemens

de l'Église, plus il se sent dans son c[oe]ur dispensé de

l'observation de cette morale céleste, à laquelle il faudroit

sacrifier ses penchans dépravés."[42] And how many a Protestant

does not imagine that by going to church on Sundays he can sin

more freely on the six days between.

[Footnote 34: Mr. Blunt, in Lady Anne Blunt's _Bedouin Tribes of

the Euphrates_, ii. 217.]

[Footnote 35: Wallin, _Reseanteckningar från Orienten_, iii. 166.]

[Footnote 36: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern

Egyptians_, p. 551.]

[Footnote 37: Havelock Ellis, _The Criminal_, p. 156.]

[Footnote 38: _Ibid._ p. 159.]

[Footnote 39: Laing, _Notes of a Traveller_, pp. 323, 324, 333.]

[Footnote 40: Robertson, _History of the Reign of the Emperor

Charles V._ i. 282 _sq._]

[Footnote 41: Smollett, quoted by Kames, _Sketches of the

History of Man_, iv. 380.]

[Footnote 42: Simonde de Sismondi, _Histoire des républiques

italiennes du moyen-âge_, xvi. 419.]

It should also be remembered that the religious sanction of moral

rules only too often leads to an external observance of these

rules from purely selfish motives. Christianity itself has,

essentially, been regarded as a means of gaining a blessed

hereafter. As for its influence upon the moral life of its

adherents I agree with Professor Hobhouse that its chief strength

lies not in its abstract doctrines but in the simple personal

following of Christ.[43] In moral education example plays a more

important part than precept. But even in this respect

Christianity has unfortunately little reason to boast of its

achievements.

[Footnote 43: Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, ii. 159.]

CHAPTER LIII

CONCLUSION

WE have completed our task. Only a few words will be added to

emphasise the leading features of our theory of the moral

consciousness and to point out some general conclusions which may

be drawn as regards its evolution.

Our study of the origin and development of the moral ideas was

divided into three main sections. As moral ideas are expressed in

moral judgments, we had to examine the general nature of both the

predicates and the subjects of such judgments, as well as the

moral valuation of the chief branches of conduct with which the

moral consciousness of mankind concerns itself. And in each case

our aim was not only to describe or analyse but also to explain

the phenomena which came under our observation.

The theory was laid down that the moral concepts, which form the

predicates of moral judgments, are ultimately based on moral

emotions, that they are essentially generalisations of tendencies

in certain phenomena to call forth either indignation or

approval. It was therefore necessary for us to investigate the

nature and origin of these emotions, and subsequently to consider

their relations to the various moral concepts.

We found that the moral emotions belong to a wider class of

emotions, which may be described as retributive; that moral

disapproval is a kind of resentment, akin to {739} anger and

revenge, and that moral approval is a kind of retributive kindly

emotion, akin to gratitude. At the same time they differ from

kindred non-moral emotions by their disinterestedness, apparent

impartiality, and flavour of generality. As for the origin of the

retributive emotions, we may assume that they have been acquired

by means of natural selection in the struggle for existence; both

resentment and retributive kindly emotion are states of mind

which have a tendency to promote the interests of the individuals

who feel them. This explanation also applies to the moral

emotions in so far as they are retributive: it accounts for the

hostile attitude of moral disapproval towards the cause of pain,

and for the friendly attitude of moral approval towards the cause

of pleasure. Our retributive emotions are always reactions

against pain or pleasure felt by ourselves; this holds true of

the moral emotions as well as of revenge and gratitude. But how

shall we explain those elements in the moral emotions by which

they are distinguished from other, non-moral retributive

emotions? First, why should we, quite disinterestedly, feel pain

evoking indignation because our neighbour is hurt, and pleasure

calling forth approval because he is benefited?

We noticed that sympathy aided by the altruistic sentiment--sympathy

in the common sense of the word--tends to produce disinterested

retributive emotions. In all animal species which possess the

altruistic sentiment in some form or other we may be sure to find

sympathetic resentment as its accompaniment. And this sentiment

may also give rise to disinterested retributive kindly emotion,

even though it is more readily moved by the sight of pain than by

the sight of pleasure and though sympathetic retributive

kindliness has a powerful rival in the feeling of envy. Moreover,

sympathetic retributive emotions may not only be reactions

against sympathetic pain or pleasure, but may also be directly

produced by the cognition of the signs of resentment or of the

signs of retributive kindliness. Punishments and {740} rewards

tend to reproduce the emotions from which they sprang, and

language communicates retributive emotions by terms of

condemnation and by terms of praise. Finally, there are cases of

disinterested retributive emotions into which sympathy does not

enter at all--sentimental antipathies and likings quite

disinterested in character.

There are thus various ways in which disinterested retributive

emotions may originate. But how shall we explain the fact that

disinterestedness together with apparent impartiality and the

flavour of generality have become characteristics by which the

so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive

emotions? To this question the following answer was

given:--Society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness. The

first moral judgments expressed not the private emotions of

isolated individuals but emotions which were felt by the

community at large. Public indignation is the prototype of moral

disapproval and public approval the prototype of moral

approbation. And these public emotions are characterised by

generality, individual disinterestedness, and apparent

impartiality.

The moral emotions give rise to a variety of moral concepts,

which are in different ways connected with the emotions from

which they were derived. Thus moral disapproval is at the bottom

of the concepts bad, vice, and wrong, ought and duty, right and

rights, justice and injustice; whilst moral approval has led to

the concepts good, virtue, and merit. It has, in particular, been

of fundamental importance for the whole of our investigation to

recognise the true contents of the notions of ought and duty. If

these concepts were unanalysable, as they have often been

represented to be, any attempt to explain the origin and

development of the moral ideas would, in my opinion, be a

hopeless failure.

From the predicates of moral judgments we proceeded to consider

their subjects. Generally speaking, such judgments are passed on

conduct or character, and {741} allowance is made for the various

elements of which conduct and character are composed in

proportion as the moral judgment is scrutinising and enlightened.

It is only owing to ignorance or lack of due reflection if, as is

often the case, moral estimates are influenced by external events

which are entirely independent of the agent's will; if

individuals who are incapable of recognising any act of theirs as

right or wrong are treated as responsible beings; if motives are

completely or partially disregarded; if little cognisance is

taken of forbearances in comparison with acts; if want of

foresight or want of self-restraint is overlooked when the effect

produced by it is sufficiently remote. We were also able to

explain _why_ moral judgments are passed on conduct and

character. This is due to the facts that moral judgments spring

from moral emotions; that the moral emotions are retributive

emotions; that a retributive emotion is a reactive attitude of

mind, either kindly or hostile, towards a living being (or

something looked upon in the light of a living being), regarded

as a cause of pleasure or as a cause of pain; and that a living

being is regarded as a true cause of pleasure or pain only in so

far as this feeling is assumed to be caused by its will. It is a

circumstance of the greatest importance that not only moral

emotions but non-moral retributive emotions are felt with

reference to phenomena exactly similar in their general nature to

those on which moral judgments are passed. How could we account

for this remarkable coincidence unless the moral judgments were

based on emotions and the moral emotions were retributive

emotions akin to gratitude and revenge?

Our theory as to the nature of the moral concepts and emotions is

further supported by another and very comprehensive set of facts.

In our discussion of the particular modes of conduct which are

subject to moral valuation and of the judgments passed on them by

different peoples and in different ages, this theory has

constantly been called in to explain the data before us. It is

noteworthy that the very acts, forbearances, and omissions {742}

which are condemned as wrong are also apt to call forth anger and

revenge, and that the acts and forbearances which are praised as

morally good are apt to call forth gratitude. This coincidence,

again, undoubtedly bears testimony both to the emotional basis of

the moral concepts and to the retributive character of the moral

emotions. Thus the conclusions arrived at in the first section of

the work, while helping to explain the facts mentioned in the two

other sections, are at the same time greatly strengthened by

these facts. Any attempt to discover the nature and origin of the

moral consciousness must necessarily take into account the moral

ideas of mankind at large. And though painfully conscious of the

incompleteness of the present treatise, I think I may confidently

ask, with reference to its fundamental thesis, whether any other

theory of the moral consciousness has ever been subjected to an

equally comprehensive test.

The general uniformity of human nature accounts for the great

similarities which characterise the moral ideas of mankind. But

at the same time these ideas also present radical differences. A

mode of conduct which among one people is condemned as wrong is

among another people viewed with indifference or regarded as

praiseworthy or enjoined as a duty. One reason for these

variations lies in different external conditions. Hardships of

life may lead to the killing of infants or abandoning of aged

parents or eating of human bodies; and necessity and the force of

habit may deprive these actions of the stigma which would

otherwise be attached to them. Economic conditions have

influenced moral ideas relating, for instance, to slavery,

labour, and cleanliness; whilst the form of marriage and the

opinions concerning it have been largely determined by such a

factor as the numerical proportion between the sexes. But the

most common differences of moral estimates have undoubtedly a

psychical origin.

When we examine the moral rules of uncivilised races we find that

they in a very large measure resemble those prevalent among

nations of culture. In every savage {743} community homicide is

prohibited by custom, and so is theft. Savages also regard

charity as a duty and praise generosity as a virtue--indeed,

their customs concerning mutual aid are often much more stringent

than our own; and many uncivilised peoples are conspicuous for

their aversion to telling lies. But at the same time there is a

considerable difference between the regard for life, property,

truth, and the general wellbeing of a neighbour, which displays

itself in primitive rules of morality and that which is found

among ourselves. Savages' prohibitions of murder, theft, and

deceit, as also their injunctions of charity and kind behaviour,

have, broadly speaking, reference only to members of the same

community or tribe. They carefully distinguish between an act of

homicide committed among their own people and one where the

victim is a stranger; whilst the former is in ordinary

circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in most cases allowed

and often considered worthy of praise. And the same thing holds

true of theft and lying and other injuries. Apart from the

privileges which are granted to guests, and which are always of

very short duration, a stranger is in early society devoid of all

rights. This is the case not only among savages but among nations

of archaic culture as well. When we from the lower races pass to

peoples more advanced in civilisation we find that the social

unit has grown larger, that the nation has taken the place of the

tribe, and that the circle of persons within which the infliction

of injuries is prohibited has extended accordingly. But the old

distinction between offences against compatriots and harm done to

foreigners remains. Nay, it survives to some extent even among

ourselves, as appears from the prevailing attitude towards war

and the readiness with which wars are waged. But although the

difference between a fellow countryman and a foreigner has not

ceased to affect the moral feelings of men even in the midst of

modern civilisation, its influence has certainly been decreasing.

The doctrine has been set forth, and has been gradually gaining

ground, that our duties towards our {744} fellow men are

universal duties, not restricted by the limits of country or

race. Those who recognise the emotional origin of the rules of

duty find no difficulty in explaining all these facts. The

expansion of the commandments relating to neighbours coincides

with the expansion of the altruistic sentiment. And the cause of

this coincidence at once becomes clear when we consider that such

commandments mainly spring from the emotion of sympathetic

resentment, and that sympathetic resentment is rooted in the

altruistic sentiment.

Besides the extension of duties towards neighbours so as to

embrace wider and wider circles of men, there is another point in

which the moral ideas of mankind have undergone an important

change on the upward path from savagery and barbarism to

civilisation. They have become more enlightened. Though moral

ideas are based upon emotions, though all moral concepts are

essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to

call forth moral approval or disapproval, the influence of

intellectual considerations upon moral judgments is naturally

very great. All higher emotions are determined by cognitions--sensations

or ideas; they therefore vary according as the cognitions vary,

and the nature of a cognition may very largely depend upon

reflection or insight. If a person tells us an untruth we are apt

to feel indignant; but if, on due reflection, we find that his

motive was benevolent, for instance a desire to save the life of

the person to whom the untruth was told, our indignation ceases,

and may even be succeeded by approval. The change of cognitions,

or ideas, has thus produced a change of emotions. Now, the

evolution of the moral consciousness partly consists in its

development from the unreflecting to the reflecting stage, from

the unenlightened to the enlightened. This appears from the

decreasing influence of external events upon moral judgments and

from the growing discrimination with reference to motives,

negligence, and other factors in conduct which are carefully

considered by a scrupulous judge. More penetrating reflection has

also reduced {745} the part played by disinterested likes and

dislikes in the formation of moral ideas. When we clearly realise

that a certain act is productive of no real harm but is condemned

simply because it causes aversion or disgust, we can hardly look

upon it as a proper object of moral censure--unless, indeed, its

commission is considered to imply a blamable disregard for other

persons' sensibilities. Deliberate resentment, whether moral or

non-moral, is too much concerned with the will of the agent to be

felt towards a person who obviously neither intends to offend

anybody nor is guilty of culpable oversight. Nay, even when the

agent knows that his behaviour is repulsive to others, he may be

considered justified in acting as he does. Some degree of

reflection easily leads to the notion that sentimental

antipathies are no sufficient ground for interfering with other

individuals' liberty of action either by punishing them or by

subjecting them to moral censure, provided of course that they do

not in an indelicate manner shock their neighbours' feelings.

Hence many persons have recourse to utilitarian pretexts to

support moral opinions or legal enactments which have originated

in mere aversions; thus making futile attempts to reconcile old

ideas with the requirements of a moral consciousness which is

duly influenced by reflection.

In innumerable cases the variations of moral estimates are due to

differences of beliefs. Almost every chapter of this work has

borne witness to the enormous influence which the belief in

supernatural forces or beings or in a future state has exercised

upon the moral ideas of mankind, and has at the same time shown

how exceedingly varied this influence has been. Religion, or

superstition (as the case may be), has on the one hand

stigmatised murder and suicide, on the other hand it has

commended human sacrifice and certain cases of voluntary

self-destruction. It has inculcated humanity and charity, but has

also led to cruel persecutions of persons embracing another

creed. It has emphasised the duty of truthspeaking, and has

itself been a cause of pious fraud. It has promoted {746} both

cleanly habits and filthiness. It has enjoined labour and

abstinence from labour, sobriety and drunkenness, marriage and

celibacy, chastity and temple prostitution. It has introduced a

great variety of new duties and virtues, quite different from

those which are recognised by the moral consciousness when left

to itself, but nevertheless in many cases considered more

important than any other duties or virtues. It seems that the

moral ideas of uncivilised men are more affected by magic than by

religion, and that the religious influence has reached its

greatest extension at certain stages of culture which, though

comparatively advanced, do not include the highest stage.

Increasing knowledge lessens the sphere of the supernatural, and

the ascription of a perfectly ethical character to the godhead

does away with moral estimates which have sprung from less

elevated religious conceptions.

I have here pointed out only the most general changes to which

the moral ideas have been subject in the course of progressive

civilisation; the details have been dealt with each in their

separate place. There can be no doubt that changes also will take

place in the future, and that similar causes will produce similar

effects. We have every reason to believe that the altruistic

sentiment will continue to expand, and that those moral

commandments which are based on it will undergo a corresponding

expansion; that the influence of reflection upon moral judgments

will steadily increase; that the influence of sentimental

antipathies and likings will diminish; and that in its relation

to morality religion will be increasingly restricted to

emphasising ordinary moral rules, and less preoccupied with

inculcating special duties to the deity.

ADDITIONAL NOTES TO VOL. II

P. 287, _n._ 6.--The connection between the Hebrew Sabbath and

the moon has been fully discussed by Professor Webster in his

recent book, _Rest Days_, ch. viii.

P. 377, _n._ 1.--In his book, _Totemism and Exogamy_, Sir J. G.

Frazer has definitely separated exogamy from totemism and

thereby, it is to be hoped, saved us from further speculations

about the totemic origin of the exogamous rules. Like myself,

Frazer thinks (iv. 105 _sqq._) that these rules have sprung from

an aversion to the marriages of near kin. But whilst my own

belief is that the aversion to such marriages through an

association of ideas led to the prohibitions of marriage between

members of the same clan on account of the notion of intimacy

connected with a common descent and a common name, Frazer is of

opinion that exogamy was deliberately instituted for the purpose

of preventing the sexual unions of near kin. To me it seems

almost inconceivable that the extensive, cumbersome, and

sometimes very complicated institution of exogamy should have

been invented simply as a precaution against unions between the

nearest relatives.

Granting the prevalence of an aversion to the marriages of near

kin, Frazer is confronted with the question how it has

originated. His answer is, "We do not know and it is difficult

even to guess." Yet he makes a cautious attempt to solve the

riddle. He observes (iv. 156 _sqq._) that the great severity with

which incest is generally punished by savages seems to show that

they believe it to be a crime which endangers the whole

community. It may have been thought to render the women of the

tribe sterile and to prevent animals and plants from multiplying;

such beliefs, Frazer remarks, appear in point of fact to have

been held by many races in different parts of the world. But he

admits himself that all the peoples who are known to hold them

seem to be agricultural, and that incest is in particular

supposed to have a sterilising effect on the crops. It is indeed

a poor argument to conjecture that a careful search among the

most primitive exogamous peoples now surviving, especially among

the Australian aborigines, might still reveal the existence of a

belief in the sterilising or injurious effects of incest "upon

women generally and particularly upon edible animals and plants."

It may also be asked if it really is reasonable to presume that

an aversion which had originated in the superstition mentioned

could have remained unimpaired among all the civilised nations of

the world. Moreover, if this superstition were the root of the

aversion to incest, we should still have to explain the origin of

the superstition itself, and this Frazer has not even attempted

to do. If, on the other hand, the abhorrence of incest has

originated in the way I have suggested, the superstition which he

is inclined to regard as the cause of that feeling is a very

natural result of it or of the prohibition to which it gave rise.

That this is the case is all the more probable because the same

injurious effects as are attributed to incest are supposed to

result from other sexual irregularities as well, such as adultery

and fornication (_cf._ _supra_, ii. 417).

Sir J. G. Frazer also subjects my theory to a detailed criticism

(iv. 96 _sqq._). He admits that there seems to be some ground for

believing in the existence of "a natural aversion to, or at least

a want of inclination for, sexual intercourse between persons who

have been brought up closely together {748} from early youth";

but he finds it difficult to understand how this could have been

changed into an aversion to sexual intercourse with persons near

of kin, and maintains that, till I explain this satisfactorily,

the chain of reasoning by which I support my theory breaks down

entirely at the crucial point. For my own part I think that the

transition which Frazer finds so difficult to understand is not

only possible and natural, but well-nigh proved by an exactly

analogous case of equally world-wide occurrence and of still

greater social importance, namely, the process which has led to

the association of all kinds of social rights and duties with

kinship. As I have pointed out above (ch. xxxiv.), the maternal

and paternal sentiments, which largely are at the bottom of

parental duties and rights, cannot in their simplest forms be

based on a knowledge of blood relationship, but respond to

stimuli derived from other circumstances, notably the proximity

of the helpless young, that is, the external relationship in

which the offspring from the beginning stand to the parents. Nor

is the so-called filial love in the first instance rooted in

considerations of kinship; it is essentially retributive, the

agreeable feeling produced by benefits received making the

individual look with pleasure and kindliness upon the giver. Here

again the affection is ultimately due to close living together,

and is further strengthened by it, as appears from the cooling

effect of long separation of children from their parents. So also

fraternal love and the duties and rights which have sprung from

it depend in the first place on other circumstances than the idea

of a common blood; and the same may be said of the tie which

binds together relatives more remotely allied. Its social force

is ultimately derived from near relatives' habit of living

together. "Men became gregarious by remaining in the circle where

they were born; if, instead of keeping together with their

kindred, they had preferred to isolate themselves or to unite

with strangers, there would certainly be no blood-bond at all.

The mutual attachment and the social rights and duties which

resulted from this gregarious condition were associated with the

relation in which members of the group stood to one another--the

relation of kinship as expressed by a common name--and these

associations might last even after the local tie was broken,"

being kept up by the common name (_supra_, ii. 203).

Here we have an immense group of facts which, though ultimately

depending upon close living together, have been interpreted in

terms of kinship. Why, then, could not the same have been the

case with the aversion to incest and the prohibitory rules

resulting from it? They really present a most striking analogy to

the instances just mentioned. They have been associated with

kinship because near relatives normally live together. They have

come to include relatives more remotely allied who do not live

together, owing to an association of ideas, especially through

the influence of a common name; clan exogamy has its counterpart,

for instance, in the blood feud as a duty incumbent on the whole

clan. But there are also cases in which marriages between

unrelated persons who have been brought up together in the same

family, or who belong to the same local group, are held blamable

or are actually prohibited; and so there are, even in early

society, social rights and duties which are associated not with a

common descent but with close living together. Frazer asks: "If

the root of the whole matter is a horror of marriage between

persons who have always lived with each other, how comes it that

at the present day that horror has been weakened into a mere

general preference for marriage with persons whose attractions

have not been blunted by long familiarity? . . . Why should the

marriage of a brother with a sister, or of a mother with a son,

excite the deepest detestation, . . . while the origin of it all,

the marriage between housemates, should excite at most a mild

surprise too slight probably to suggest even a subject for a

farce, and should be as legitimate in the eye of the law among

all civilised nations as any other marriage?" For my own part, I

believe that marriage between a man and his foster-daughter or

between a foster-brother {749} and a foster-sister, in case the

social relations between them have been exactly similar to those

of blood-relatives of corresponding degrees, would cause more

than a mild surprise, and appear unnatural and objectionable. As

I have said above (ii. 375), I do not deny that unions between

the nearest blood-relatives inspire a horror of their own, but it

seems quite natural that they should do so considering that from

earliest times the aversion to sexual intercourse between persons

living closely together has been expressed in prohibitions

against unions between kindred. Nor can it be a matter of

surprise that the prohibitory rules so commonly refer to

marriages of kindred alone. Law only takes into account general

and well-defined cases, and hence relationships of some kind or

other between persons who are nearly always kindred are defined

in terms of blood-relationship. This is true not only of the

prohibitions of incest, but of many duties and rights inside the

family circle.

Sir J. G. Frazer raises another objection to my theory. He argues

that, if exogamy resulted from a natural instinct, there would be

no need to reinforce that instinct by legal pains and penalties;

the law only forbids men to do what their instincts incline them

to do, and hence we may always safely assume that crimes

forbidden by law are crimes which many men have a natural

propensity to commit. I must confess that this argument greatly

surprises me. Of course, where there is no transgression there is

no law. But Frazer cannot be ignorant of the variability of

instincts and of the great variability of the sexual instinct;

nor should he forget that there are circumstances in which a

natural sentiment may be blunted and overcome. Would he maintain

that there can be no deep natural aversion to bestiality because

bestiality is forbidden by law, and that the exceptional severity

with which parricide is treated by many law books proves that a

large number of men have a natural propensity to kill their

parents? The law expresses the feelings of the majority and

punishes acts that shock them.

Sir J. G. Frazer accuses me of having extended Darwin's methods

to subjects which only partially admit of such treatment, because

my theory of the origin of exogamy attempts to explain the growth

of a human institution "too exclusively from physical and

biological causes without taking into account the factors of

intelligence, deliberation, and will." This, he adds, is "not

science, but a bastard imitation of it." What have I done to

incur so severe an accusation? I have suggested that the

instinctive aversion to sexual intercourse between persons who

have been living very closely together from early youth may be

the result of natural selection. I am inclined to think--and so

is Frazer--that consanguineous marriages are in some way or other

detrimental to the species. This fact would lead to the

development of a sentiment which would be powerful enough, as a

rule, to prevent injurious unions--a sentiment which would not,

of course, show itself as an innate aversion to sexual

connections with near relatives as such, but as an aversion on

the part of individuals to union with others with whom they lived

closely together from early childhood. These, as a matter of

fact, would be blood-relations, and the result would consequently

be the survival of the fittest. All that I have done, then, is to

appeal to natural selection to explain the origin of a primeval

instinctive sentiment; and I can never believe that this is to

transgress the legitimate boundaries of Darwinism.

Sir J. G. Frazer himself thinks that "we may safely conclude that

infertility is an inevitable consequence of inbreeding continued

through many generations in the same place and under the same

conditions," and in support of this view he quotes the valuable

opinions of Mr. Walter Heape and Mr. F. H. A. Marshall. He thus

finds that the principles of exogamy present "a curious

resemblance" to the principles of scientific breeding, but he

rightly assumes that this analogy cannot be due to any exact

knowledge or farseeing care on the part of its savage founders.

How then shall we explain this analogy? Frazer's answer is that

"it must be an accidental {750} result of a superstition, an

unconscious mimicry of science." In prohibiting incest the poor

savages "blindly obeyed the impulse of the great evolutionary

forces which in the physical world are constantly educing higher

out of lower forms of existence and in the moral world

civilisation out of savagery. If that is so, exogamy has been an

instrument in the hands of that unknown power, the masked wizard

of history, who by some mysterious process, some subtle alchemy,

so often transmutes in the crucible of suffering the dross of

folly and evil into the fine gold of wisdom and good." I hope it

will not be considered uncalled-for impertinence on my part to

ask if this reasoning is a specimen of what Frazer regards as

science proper in contradistinction to my own "bastard imitation

of it"?

In any attempt to explain the origin of exogamy there are, in my

opinion, three parallel groups of facts of general occurrence

which necessarily must be taken into consideration:--Firstly, the

prohibitions of incest and rules of exogamy themselves; secondly,

the aversion to sexual intercourse between persons living

together from early youth; thirdly, the injurious consequences of

inbreeding. As for the facts of the first group, Frazer and I

agree that they all have the same root, exogamy being in some way

or other derived from an aversion to the marriages of near kin.

As for the facts of the second group, Frazer at all events admits

that "there seems to be some ground" for believing in them. As

for the facts of the third group, there is complete agreement

between us. I ask: Is it reasonable to think that there is no

causal connection between these three groups of facts? Is it

right to ignore the second group altogether, as does Frazer, and

to look upon the coincidence of the first and the third as

accidental? I gratefully acknowledge that Frazer's chapter on the

Origin of Exogamy has only strengthened my belief in my own theory.

Other objections to my theory have recently been made by Messrs.

Hose and McDougall in their work on _The Pagan Tribes of Borneo_,

vol. ii., p. 197, note. They observe that intercourse between a

youth and his sister-by-adoption is not regarded as incest in

these tribes, and that they know at least one instance of

marriage between two young Kenyahs brought up together as adopted

brother and sister. "This occurrence of incest between couples

brought up in the same household," they say, "is, of course,

difficult to reconcile with Professor Westermarck's well-known

theory of the ground of the almost universal feeling against

incest, namely, that it depends upon sexual aversion or

indifference engendered by close proximity during childhood."

They moreover maintain that "the occurrence of incest between

brothers and sisters, and the strong feeling of the Sea Dyaks

against incest between nephew and aunt (who often are members of

distinct communities)," are facts which are fatal to this theory.

In my attempt to explain the rules against incest I certainly did

not overlook the fact that these rules very frequently have

reference to persons who are, or may be, members of different

communities, and I found no difficulty in accounting for it (see

_supra_, ii. 369; _History of Human Marriage_, p. 330 _sq._).

Curiously enough Messrs. Hose and McDougall's own attempt to

solve the problem is, if I understand them rightly, based on the

supposition that the prohibitions of intermarriage originally

referred to persons who belonged to the same community. They

write:--"If we accept some such view of the constitution of

primitive society as has been suggested by Messrs. Atkinson and

Lang (_Primal Law_), namely, that the social group consisted of a

single patriarch and a group of wives and daughters, over all of

whom he exercised unrestricted power or rights; we shall see that

the first step towards the constitution of a higher form of

society must have been the strict limitation of his rights over

certain of the women, in order that younger males might be

incorporated in the society and enjoy the undisputed possession

of them. The patriarch, having accepted this limitation of his

rights over his daughters for the sake of the greater security

and strength of the band given by the inclusion of a {751}

certain number of young males, would enforce all the more

strictly upon them his prohibition against any tampering with the

females of the senior generation. Thus very strict prohibitions

and severe penalties against the consorting of the patriarch with

the younger generation of females, _i.e._ his daughters, and

against intercourse between the young males admitted to

membership of the group and the wives of the patriarch, would be

the essential conditions of advance of social organisation. The

enforcement of these penalties would engender a traditional

sentiment against such unions, and these would be the unions

primitively regarded as incestuous. The persistency of the

tendency of the patriarch's jealousy to drive his sons out of the

family group as they attained puberty would render the extension

of this sentiment to brother-and-sister unions easy and almost

inevitable. For the young male admitted to the group would be one

who came with a price in his hand to offer in return for the

bride he sought. Such a price could only be exacted by the

patriarch on the condition that he maintained an absolute

prohibition on sexual relations between his offspring so long as

the young sons remained under his roof." I should like to know

how Messrs. Hose and McDougall, on the basis of this theory,

would explain "the strong feeling of the Sea Dyaks against incest

between nephew and aunt (who often are members of distinct

communities)," and, generally speaking, the rules prohibiting the

intermarriage of persons belonging to different local groups. For

the rest, I must confess that the assumptions on which their

whole theory rests seem to me extremely arbitrary. Brothers are

prohibited from marrying their sisters because the old patriarch

drove away his grown-up sons out of jealousy; but his jealousy

was not strong enough to prevent other young males from joining

the band. On the contrary, he allowed them to be incorporated in

it, because they added to its strength; nay, he gave them his own

daughters in marriage, and refrained henceforth himself from

intercourse with these young women so rigorously that ever since

a father has been prohibited from marrying his daughter. But the

young men had to pay a price for their wives. It may be asked:

Why did not the old patriarch accept a price from his own sons or

let them work for him, instead of mercilessly turning them out of

their old home, although they would have been just as good

protectors of it as anybody else? And why did he give the young

men his _daughters_? He might have kept the young women for

himself and let the young men have the old ones. This is what is

done by the old men in Australia, where the young girls are, as a

rule, allotted to old men, and the boys, whenever they are

allowed to marry, get old _lubras_ as wives (Malinowski, _The

Family among the Australian Aborigines_, p. 259 _sqq._). Yet, in

spite of this custom, there is no country where incest has been

more strictly prohibited than in Australia.

Messrs. Hose and McDougall maintain that the occurrence of incest

between brothers and sisters and the feeling of the Sea Dyaks

against incest between nephew and aunt are facts which seem "to

point strongly to the view that the sentiment has a purely

conventional or customary source." I ask: Is it reasonable to

suppose that, if this were the case, the feeling against sexual

intercourse between the nearest relatives could have so long

survived the conditions from which it sprang without showing any

signs of decay? As I have pointed out above, the prohibited

degrees are very differently defined in the customs or laws of

different peoples, generally being more numerous among peoples

unaffected by modern civilisation than they are in more advanced

communities; and it appears that the extent to which relatives

are prohibited from intermarrying is closely connected with the

intimacy of their social relations. Whilst among ourselves

cousins are allowed to intermarry, there is still a strong

sentiment against intercourse between parents and children and

between brothers and sisters, who in normal cases belong to the

same family circle. Why should the feeling against incest have

survived in this case but not in others, if it had a purely

conventional origin? And how could any law {752} based on

convention alone account for the normal absence of erotic

feelings in the relation between parents and children and

brothers and sisters? It is true that cases of intercourse

between the nearest relatives do occur, but they are certainly

quite exceptional. Messrs. Hose and McDougall say themselves (p.

198) that "incest of any form is very infrequent" among the

tribes of Borneo, and they seem to know of only one instance of

marriage between young Kenyahs brought up together as adopted

brother and sister, although such marriages are allowed. To

maintain that cases of this kind are fatal to my theory seems to

me as illogical as it would be to assume that the occurrence of a

_horror feminæ_ in many men disproves the general prevalence of a

feeling of love between the sexes.

P. 396, _n._ 1.--In his recent work, _The Family among the

Australian Aborigines_, Dr. Malinowski has come to the same

conclusion. He observes that the individual family plays a

foremost part in the social life of those aborigines; it has a

very firm basis in their customs and ideas, and "by no means

bears the features of anything like recent innovation, or a

subordinate form subservient to the idea of group marriage." The

Australian husband had generally a definite sexual "over-right"

over his wife, which secured to him the privilege of disposing of

her, or at least of exercising a certain control over her conduct

in sexual matters, even though this "over-right" did not, as a

rule, amount to an exclusive right. There were customs like

wife-lending, exchange of wives, ceremonial defloration of girls

by old men, the different forms of licence practised at large

tribal gatherings, and especially the _Pirrauru_ relationship

found in several of the southern central tribes. But all this

does not constitute group _marriage_, the complete content of

which does not consist in sexual relations alone. Dr. Malinowski

emphasises the fact that marriage cannot be detached from family

life; "it is defined in all its aspects by the problems of the

economic unity of the family, of the bonds created by common life

in one wurley, through the common rearing of, and affection

towards, the offspring." In nearly all these respects even the

_Pirrauru_ relationship essentially differs from marriage, and

cannot, therefore, seriously encroach upon the individual family.

Nor can we regard this relationship as a survival of previous

group marriage. Dr. Malinowski also points out (p. 89 _sq._) how

highly objectionable it is that "our best informants (especially

Howitt and Spencer and Gillen) describe the facts of sexual life

of to-day in terms of their hypothetical assumptions."

P. 419, _n._ 5.--For Moorish beliefs relating to contact between

sexual uncleanness and holiness see my essays, _The Moorish

Conception of Holiness (Baraka)_, p. 123 _sqq._, and _Ceremonies

and Beliefs connected with Agriculture, certain Dates of the

Solar Year, and the Weather in Morocco_, pp. 17, 22, 23, 28, 46,

47, 54.

P. 463, _n._ 8.--During the years that have passed since the

first edition of this book was issued, the study of homosexuality

has been carried on with remarkable activity. The following books

are exclusively devoted to this subject:--_Das gleichgeschlechtliche

Leben der Naturvölker_, by F. Karsch-Haack (1911), _Intermediate

Types among Primitive Folk_, by Edward Carpenter (1914), and _Die

Homosexualität des Mannes und des Weibes_, by Magnus Hirschfeld

(1914). Carpenter's book chiefly deals with the invert in early

religion and in warfare. Hirschfeld's work is a veritable

encyclopædia of homosexuality--according to Dr. Havelock Ellis,

"not only the largest but the most precise, detailed, and

comprehensive--even the most condensed--work which has yet

appeared on the subject." In 1915 Dr. Havelock Ellis issued a

third, revised and enlarged, edition of his _Sexual Inversion_.

P. 485, _n._ 1.--This passage and, generally, the suggestion that

there is a certain relationship between the social reaction

against homosexuality {753} and against infanticide, have been

excluded from the last edition of Dr. Havelock Ellis's book.

P. 584, _n._ 1.--There is hardly any subject which during the

last four or five years has been more eagerly discussed by

students of social anthropology than the relation between

religion and magic. It has been dealt with, _e.g._, by Sir J. G.

Frazer in _The Magic Art_, by Professor Durkheim in _Les formes

élémentaires de la vie religieuse_, by Dr. Marett in _The

Threshold of Religion_ and other writings, by Dr. Irving King in

_The Development of Religion_, by Professor Leuba in _A

Psychological Study of Religion_, by Mr. Sidney Hartland in

_Ritual and Belief_, and by the present Archbishop of Sweden,

Nathan Söderblom, in his book _Gudstrons uppkomst_. According to

the French school of sociologists, religion is social in its aims

and magic antisocial; and this distinction has lately been

accepted by Dr. Marett, who writes (_Anthropology_, p. 209

_sq._): "Magic I take to include all bad ways, and religion all

good ways, of dealing with the supernormal--bad and good, of

course, not as we may happen to judge them, but as the society

concerned judges them." But this use of the terms is neither in

agreement with traditional usage nor, in my opinion, suitable for

the purpose of scientific classification. Besides black magic, or

witchcraft, there is also white magic; even a medieval theologian

like Albertus Magnus asserts that "magical science is not evil,

since through knowledge of it evil can be avoided and good

attained." The French distinction between magic and religion

implies that a prayer to a god for the destruction of an enemy

must be classified as religion if it is offered in a cause which

is considered just by the community, but as magic if it is

disapproved of. If a man makes a girl drink a love-potion in

order to gain her favour, it is religion if their union is

desirable from the society's point of view, but if he gives the

same drink to another man's wife it is magic. The best part of

what has been hitherto called imitative or hom[oe]opathic magic

no longer remains magic at all; if water is poured out for the

purpose of producing rain it is hom[oe]opathic magic only in case

rain is not wanted by the community, but if it is done during a

drought it is religion. Thus the very same practices are

qualified as religious or magical according as they have social

or antisocial ends; and, as Mr. Hartland rightly asks (_Ritual

and Belief_, p. 76): "How shall we define these ends?"

It should be added, however, that the definition of religion

which I have given in the text has reference only to religion in

the abstract, not to the various religions. In the popular sense

of the word, a religion may include many practices which are what

I have called magical. As I have said above (p. 649), "both

Christianity in its earlier phases and Muhammedanism are full of

magical practices expressly sanctioned by their theology."

Although the magical and the strictly religious attitude differ

from each other, they are not irreconcilable, and may therefore

very well form parts of one and the same religion; there is no

such thing as a magic being opposed to a religion. By a religion

is generally understood a system of beliefs and rules of

behaviour which have reference to men's relations to one or

several supernatural beings whom they call their god or gods,

that is, supernatural beings who are the objects of a regular

cult and between whom and their worshippers there are established

and permanent relationships. If it be admitted that the word

religion may be thus legitimately used in two different senses, I

think there is little ground left for further controversy on the

subject. After all, sociologists may more profitably occupy their

time than by continuous quarrelling about the meaning of terms.

P. 608, _n._ 4.--In _The Dying God_, p. 204, _n._ 1, Sir J. G.

Frazer writes: "There is a good deal to be said in favour of Dr.

Westermarck's theory, which is supported in particular by the

sanctity attributed to the regalia. But on the whole I see no

sufficient reason to abandon the view adopted {754} in the text,

and I am confirmed in it by the Shilluk evidence, which was

unknown to Dr. Westermarck when he propounded his theory."

According to Professor C. G. Seligman to whom Frazer is indebted

for detailed information on the subject (_op. cit._ p. 17 _sqq._)

it is a fundamental article of the Shilluk creed that the spirit

of Nyakang, the divine or semi-divine hero who settled the

Shilluk in their present territory and founded the dynasty of

their kings, is incarnate in the reigning king, who is

accordingly himself invested to some extent with the character of

a divinity. But while the Shilluk hold their kings in high,

indeed religious, reverence and take every precaution against

their accidental death, nevertheless they cherish the conviction

that the king must not be allowed to become ill or senile, lest

with his diminishing vigour the cattle should sicken and fail to

bear their increase, the crops should rot in the fields, and man,

stricken with disease, should die in ever-increasing numbers. To

prevent these calamities it used to be the regular custom with

the Shilluk to put the king to death whenever he showed signs of

ill-health or failing strength. Nay, from Dr. Seligman's

enquiries it appears that even while the king was yet in the

prime of health and strength he might at any time be attacked by

a rival and have to defend his crown in a combat to the death.

According to the common Shilluk tradition any son of a king had

the right thus to fight the king in possession and, if he

succeeded in killing him, to reign in his stead. Now "an

important part of the solemnities attending the accession of a

Shilluk king appears to be intended to convey to the new monarch

the divine spirit of Nyakang, which has been transmitted from the

founder of the dynasty to all his successors on the throne. For

this purpose a sacred four-legged stool and a mysterious object

which bears the name of Nyakang himself are brought with much

solemnity from the shrine of Nyakang at Akurwa to the small

village of Kwom near Fashoda, where the king elect and the chiefs

await their arrival. The thing called Nyakang is said to be of

cylindrical shape, some two or three feet long by six inches

broad. The chief of Akurwa informed Dr. Seligman that the object

in question is a rude wooden figure of a man, which was fashioned

long ago at the command of Nyakang in person. We may suppose that

it represents the divine king himself and that it is, or was

formerly, supposed to house his spirit, though the chief of

Akurwa denied to Dr. Seligman that it does so now. . . . The

image of Nyakang is placed on the stool; the king elect holds one

leg of the stool and an important chief holds another. . . . A

bullock is killed and its flesh eaten by the men of certain

families called _ororo_, who are said to be descended from the

third of the Shilluk kings. Then the Akurwa men carry the image

of Nyakang into the shrine, and the _ororo_ men place the king

elect on the sacred stool, where he remains seated for some time,

apparently till sunset. When he rises, the Akurwa men carry the

stool back into the shrine, and the king is escorted to three new

huts, where he stays in seclusion for three days. On the fourth

night he is conducted quietly, almost stealthily, to his royal

residence at Fashoda, and next day he shows himself publicly to

his subjects."

As regards this so-called evidence it should, first, be noticed

that it is only Dr. Seligman's own conjecture that the mysterious

object called Nyakang is or has been supposed to contain the

spirit of the holy founder of the dynasty, and that this

conjecture is expressly said to be opposed to the present beliefs

of the natives. On the other hand it is obvious that the object

in question is regarded as a holy object, and that its holiness,

or a particle of it, is supposed to be transmitted to the new

king through material contact--an idea which well agrees with my

own theory. But even if the Shilluk had once believed that their

king was a reincarnation of the spirit of Nyakang, that belief

could hardly be regarded as a direct proof of the idea that the

soul of the slain man-god is transmitted to his royal successor.

The Shilluk believe that Nyakang, unlike his royal descendants of

more recent times, did not die but simply disappeared.

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