THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (_continued_)
IT was said in the last chapter that moral disapproval is a
sub-species of resentment, and that resentment is, in its essence, an
aggressive attitude of mind towards an assumed cause of pain. It was
shown that, in the course of mental evolution, the true direction of
the hostile reaction involved in moral disapproval has become more
apparent. We shall now see that, at the same time, its aggressive
character has become more disguised.
This is evidenced by the changed opinion about anger and revenge which
we meet at the higher stages of moral development. Retaliation is
condemned, and forgiveness of injuries is laid down as a
duty.
The rule that a person should be forbearing and kind to his enemy has
no place in early ethics.
"Let those that speak evil of us perish. Let the enemy be clubbed,
swept away, utterly destroyed, piled in heaps. Let their teeth be
broken. May they fall headlong into a pit. Let us live, and let our
enemies perish." Such were the requests which generally concluded the
prayers of the Fijians.[1] A savage would find nothing objectionable
in them. On the contrary, he regards revenge as a duty,[2] and
forgiveness of enemies as a sign of weakness, or cowardice, or want of
honour.[3] Nor {74} is this opinion restricted to the savage world. In
the Old Testament the spirit of vindictiveness pervades both the men
and their god. The last thing with which David on his death-bed
charged Solomon was to destroy an enemy whom he himself had spared.[4]
Sirach counts among the nine causes of a man's happiness to see the
fall of his enemy.[5] The enemies of Yahveh can expect no mercy from
him, but utter destruction is their lot.[6] To do good to a friend and
to do harm to an enemy was a maxim of the ancient Scandinavians.[7] It
was taken for a matter of course by popular opinion in Greece[8] and
Rome. According to Aristotle, "it belongs to the courageous man never
to be worsted"; to take revenge on a foe rather than to be reconciled
is just, and therefore honourable.[9] Cicero defines a good man as a
person "who serves whom he can, and injures none except when provoked
by injury."[10] Except in domestic life and in the case of friends,
Professor Seeley observes, "people not only did not forgive their
enemies, but did not wish to do so, nor think better of themselves for
having done so. That man considered himself fortunate who on his
deathbed could say, in reviewing his past life, that no one had done
more good to his friends or more mischief to his enemies. This was the
celebrated felicity of Sulla; this the crown of Xenophon's panegyric
on Cyrus the Younger."[11]
[Footnote 1: Fison, quoted by Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 147, n. 1.]
[Footnote 2: See _infra_, on Blood-revenge.]
[Footnote 3: _Cf._ Domenech, _Great Deserts of North America_, ii. 97,
338, 438 (Dacotahs); Boas, _first General Report on the Indians of
British Columbia_, p. 38; Baker, _Albert N'yanza_ i. 240 _sq._
(Latukas).]
[Footnote 4: _1 Kings_, ii. 8 _sq._]
[Footnote 5: _Ecclesiasticus_, xxv. 7.]
[Footnote 6: _Cf._ Montefiore, Hibbert Lectures, p. 40.]
[Footnote 7: Maurer, _Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes_, ii. 154 _sq._]
[Footnote 8: Maury, _Histoire des religions de la Grèce antique_, i.
383. Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 309 _sqq._]
[Footnote 9: Aristotle, _Rhetorica_, i. 9. 24. _Cf._ Aeschylus,
_Choeophori_, 309 _sqq._; Plato, _Meno_, p. 71; Xenophon,
_Memorabilia_, ii. 6. 35.]
[Footnote 10: Cicero, _De officiis_, iii. 19. iii. 19. _Cf._ _ibid._
ii. 14; but _cf._ also _ibid._ i. 25, where it is said that nothing is
more worthy of a great and a good man than placability and moderation.]
[Footnote 11: Seeley, _Ecce Homo_, p. 273.]
But side by side with the doctrine of resentment, we meet, among
peoples of culture, the doctrine of forgiveness.
"Recompense injury with kindness," says Lao-Tsze.[12] According to
Mencius, "a benevolent man does not lay up anger, nor cherish
resentment against his brother, but only regards him with affection
and love."[13] In the laws of Manu the following rule is laid down for
the twice-born man:--"Against an angry man let him not in return show
anger, let him bless {75} when he is cursed."[14] It is said in the
Buddhistic Dhammapada: "Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time;
hatred ceases by love, this is an old rule . . . . Among men who hate
us we dwell free from hatred. . . . Let a man overcome anger by love,
let him overcome evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by
liberality, the liar by truth."[15] According to one of the Pahlavi
texts, we ought not to indulge in wrathfulness; wrath is one of the
fiends besetting man, and "goodness is little in the mind of a man of
wrath."[16]
[Footnote 12: _Tâo Teh King_, ii. 63. 1. According to _Thâi-Shang_, 4,
a bad man "broods over resentment without ceasing."]
[Footnote 13: Mencius, v. 1. 3. 2.]
[Footnote 14: _Laws of Manu_, vi. 48. _Cf._ _ibid._ viii. 313;
Monier-Williams, _Indian Wisdom_, pp. 444, 446; Muir, _Additional
Moral and Religious Passages, rendered from the Sanskrit_, p. 30.]
[Footnote 15: _Dhammapada_, i. 5; xv. 197; xvii. 223. _Cf._ _J[=a]taka
Tales_, i. 22; Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 298.]
[Footnote 16: _Dînâ-î-Maînôg-î Khirad_, ii. 16; xli. 11; xxxix. 26.]
In Leviticus hatred is condemned:--"Thou shalt not hate thy brother
in thine heart. . . . Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge
against the children of thy people."[17] Sirach, whom I have already
quoted, says in another passage, "Forgive thy neighbour the hurt that
he has done unto thee, so shall thy sins also be forgiven when thou
prayest."[18] According to the Talmud, "whosoever does not persecute
them that persecute him, whosoever takes an offence in silence, he who
does good because of love, he who is cheerful under his sufferings
they are the friends of God, and of them the Scripture says, And they
shall shine forth as does the sun at noon-day."[19] The Koran, whilst
repeating the old rule, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth,"[20] at the same time teaches that Paradise is "for those who
repress their rage, and those who pardon men; God loves the kind."[21]
Muhammedan tradition puts the following words in the mouth of the
Prophet:--"Say not, if people do good to us, we will do good to them,
and if people oppress us, we will oppress them: but resolve that if
people do good to you, you will do good to them, and if they oppress
you, oppress them not again."[22] Professor Goldziher emphasises
Muhammed's opposition to the traditional rule of the Arabs that an
enemy is a proper object of hatred;[23] and Syed Ameer Ali has
collected various passages from the writings of Muhammedan scholars,
which prove that, {76} in spite of what has often been said to the
contrary, forgiveness of injuries is by no means foreign to the spirit
of Islam.[24] Thus the author of the Kashshâf prescribes, "Seek again
him who drives you away; give to him who takes away from you; pardon
him who injures you: for God loveth that you should cast into the
depth of your souls the roots of His perfections."[25] That "the
sandal-tree perfumes the axe that fells it," is a saying in everyday
use among the Muhammedans of India.[26] And Lane often heard Egyptians
forgivingly say, on receiving a blow from an equal, "God bless thee,"
"God requite thee good," "Beat me again."[27]
[Footnote 17: _Leviticus_, xix. 17 _sq._ _Cf._ _Exodus_, xxiii. 4.]
[Footnote 18: _Ecclesiasticus_, xxviii. 2. _Cf._ _ibid._ x, 6;
_Proverbs_, xxv. 21.]
[Footnote 19: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 58. _Cf._ Katz, _Der
wahre Talmudjude_, p. 11, _sq._]
[Footnote 20: _Koran_, ii. 190: "Whoso transgresses against you,
transgress against him like as he transgressed against you."]
[Footnote 21: _Ibid._ iii. 125. _Cf._ _ibid._ xxiii. 98; xxiv. 22;
xli. 34.]
[Footnote 22: Lane-Poole, _Speeches and Table-Talk of Mohammad_, p. 147.]
[Footnote 23: Goldziher, _Mohammedanische Studien_, i. 15 _sq._]
[Footnote 24: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Islam_, p. 26 _sqq._]
[Footnote 25: _Ibid._ p. 7. _Idem_, _Life and Teachings of Mohammed_,
p. 280.]
[Footnote 26: Poole, _Studies in Mohammedanism_, p. 226.]
[Footnote 27: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 314 _sq._]
The principles of forgiveness had also advocates in Greece and
Rome. In one of the Platonic dialogues, Socrates says, "We ought not
to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may
have suffered from him"; though he wisely adds that "this opinion has
never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of
persons."[28] The Stoics strongly condemned anger as unnatural and
unreasonable. "Mankind is born for mutual assistance, anger for mutual
ruin."[29] "Anger is a crime of the mind; . . . it often is even more
criminal than the faults with which it is angry."[30] He is the best
and purest "who pardons others as if he sinned himself daily, but
avoids sinning as if he never pardoned."[31] "If any one is angry with
you, meet his anger by returning benefits for it."[32] "The cynic
loves those who beat him."[33]
[Footnote 28: Plato, _Crito_, p. 49.]
[Footnote 29: Seneca, _De ira_, i. 5.]
[Footnote 30: _Ibid._ i. 16; ii. 6.]
[Footnote 31: Pliny, _Epistolæ_, ix. 22 (viii. 22).]
[Footnote 32: Seneca, _op. cit._ ii. 34.]
[Footnote 33: Epictetus, _Dissertationes_, iii. 22, 54.]
Forgiveness of enemies is thus by no means an exclusively Christian
tenet, although it has never before or after been inculcated with the
same emphasis as it was by Jesus. "Love your enemies; bless them that
curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which
despitefully use you, and persecute you."[34] When St. Peter asked,
"Lord, how oft shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him?
till seven times?" Jesus replied, "I say not unto thee, Until seven
times: but, Until seventy times seven,"[35]--that is, as often as he
repeats the offence. It would seem that Jesus by these sentences
expressly forbade men to avenge themselves, or even {77} to feel
resentment on their own behalf; and so also he was understood by St.
Paul.[36]
[Footnote 34: _St. Matthew_, v. 44. _Cf._ _ibid._ v. 39 _sq._; vi. 14
_sq._; _St. Luke_, vi. 27 _sqq._; xvii. 3 _sq._; _St. Mark_,
xi. 25 _sq._]
[Footnote 35: _St. Matthew_, xviii. 21 _sq._]
[Footnote 36: _Romans_, xii. 19 _sqq._; _1 Thessalonians_, v. 14
_sq._; _Colossians_, iii. 12 _sq._]
The rule of retaliation and the rule of forgiveness, however, are not
so radically opposed to each other as they appear to be. What the
latter condemns is, in reality, not every kind of resentment, but
non-moral resentment; not impartial indignation, but personal hatred.
It prohibits revenge, but not punishment. According to the Laws of
Manu, crime was so indispensably to be followed by punishment, that if
the king pardoned a thief or a perpetrator of violence, instead of
slaying or striking him, the guilt fell on the king;[37] and if
Lao-tsze was an enemy to the infliction of any kind of suffering, it
was because he held that in a well-governed State the necessity for
punishment could not arise, as crime would cease to exist.[38] The
Chinese book, _Merits and Errors Scrutinised_, which regards it as a
merit to refrain from avenging an injury, adds that, "if a man should
omit to avenge the injuries of his parents, it would become an
error."[39] Jesus was certainly not free from righteous indignation.
It does not appear that he ever forgave the legalists who sinned
against the kingdom of God, and he told his disciples that, if a
brother who had trespassed against his brother neglected to hear the
church, he should be looked upon as a heathen and a publican.[40]
Christian writers have laid much stress upon the circumstance that
Jesus enjoined men to forgive their own enemies, but not to abstain
from resenting injuries done to others. According to Thomas Aquinas,
"the good bear with the wicked to this extent, that, so far as it is
proper to do so, they patiently endure at their hands the injuries
done to themselves; but they do not bear with them to the extent of
enduring the injuries done to God and their neighbours. For Chrysostom
says, 'For it {78} is praiseworthy to be patient under one's own
wrongs, but the height of impiety to dissemble injuries done to
God.'"[41] Practically, at least, Christianity has not altered the
validity of the Aristotelian rule that anger admits not only of an
excess, but of a defect, and that we ought to feel angry at certain
things.[42] As Plutarch says, we even think those worthy of hatred who
are not vexed at hateful individuals; and we can sympathise with the
man who, hearing somebody praise Charillus, king of Sparta, for his
gentleness, replied, "How can Charillus be good, who is not harsh even
to the bad?"[43] Moreover, the belief in a transcendental retributive
justice, in an ultimate punishment of badness, which we meet with in
Taouism,[44] Brahmanism, Buddhism,[45] Christianity,[46] side by side
with the doctrine of forgiveness, is based upon the demand that wrong
should be resented.
[Footnote 37: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 316, 346 _sq._ _Cf._ _Gautama_,
xii. 45; _Âpastamba_, i. 9. 25. 5.]
[Footnote 38: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 204.]
[Footnote 39: 'Merits and Errors scrutinised,' in _Indo-Chinese
Gleaner_, iii. 153.]
[Footnote 40: _St. Matthew_, xviii. 15 _sqq._]
[Footnote 41: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologia_, ii.-ii. 108. 1. 2.
_Cf._ Lactantius, _De ira Dei_, 17.]
[Footnote 42: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, ii. 7. 10; iii. 1. 24;
iv. 5. 3 _sqq._]
[Footnote 43: Plutarch, _De invidia et odio_, 5.]
[Footnote 44: Douglas, _op. cit._ p. 257.]
[Footnote 45: _Dhammapada_, i. 15, 17; x. 137 _sqq._]
[Footnote 46: _Cf._ _Romans_, xii. 19: "Vengeance is mine; I will
repay, saith the Lord."]
It is easy to see why enlightened and sympathetic minds disapprove of
resentment and retaliation springing from personal motives. Such
resentment is apt to be partial. It is too often directed against
persons whom impartial reflection finds to be no proper objects of
indignation, and still more frequently it is unduly excessive. As
Butler ays, "we are in such a peculiar situation, with respect to
injuries done to ourselves, that we can scarce any more see them as
they really are, than our eye can see itself."[47] "As bodies seem
greater in a mist, so do little matters in a rage"; hence the old rule
that we ought not to punish whilst angry.[48] The more the moral
consciousness is influenced by sympathy, the more severely it condemns
any retributive infliction of pain which it regards as undeserved; and
it seems to be in the first place with a {79} view to preventing such
injustice that teachers of morality have enjoined upon men to love
their enemies. It would, indeed, be absurd to blame a person for
expressing moral indignation at an act simply because he himself
happens to be the offended party; practically we allow him to be even
more indignant than the impartial spectator would be, whereas
excessive placability often meets with censure. Like Aristotle, we
maintain that "to submit to insult, or to overlook an insult offered
to our friends, shows a slavish spirit"[49]; and we agree with the
Confucian maxims, that injuries should be recompensed, not with
kindness, but with justice, and that nobody but he who deserves it
should be an object of hatred.[50]
[Footnote 47: Butler, 'Sermon IX.--Upon Forgiveness of Injuries,' in
_Analogy of Religion, &c._, p. 469.]
[Footnote 48: Plutarch, _De cohibenda ira_, 11. Montaigne, _Essais_,
ii. 31 (_Oeuvres_, p. 396).]
[Footnote 49: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, 5. 6.]
[Footnote 50: _Lun Yü_ xiv. 36. 3; xvii. 9. 1, 5; xvii. 24. 1.
Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 9. _Cf._ _Chung Yung_, x. 3;
xxxi. 1; xxxiii. 4.]
At the same time, the injunctions of moralists that unjust resentment
should be suppressed, are far from introducing any absolutely new
element into the estimation of conduct. They only represent a higher
stage of a process of moral development the early phases of which are
found already in primitive societies. Even the savage who enjoins
revenge as a duty, regards revenge under certain circumstances as
wrong.[51] The restraining rule of like for like, as we shall see, is
an instance of this.
[Footnote 51: Concerning the Dacotahs, Prescott observes, "There are
cases where the Indians say retaliation is wrong, and they try to
prevent it" (Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes_, ii. 197).]
The aggressive character of moral disapproval has become more
disguised, not only by the more scrutinising attitude towards the
resentment and retaliation which distinguishes the moral consciousness
of a higher type, but by the different way in which the aggressiveness
displays itself. The infliction of suffering merely for the sake of
retribution is condemned, and the rule is laid down that we should
hate, not the sinner, but only the sin.
Punishment, which expresses more or less faithfully the moral
indignation of the society which inflicts it, is externally similar to
an act of revenge; it causes, or is intended {80} to cause, pain in
return for inflicted pain. For ages it was looked upon as a matter of
course that if a person had committed an offence he should have to
suffer for it. This is still the notion of the multitude, as also of a
host of theorisers, who, by calling punishment an expiation, or a
reparation, or a restoration of the disturbed equilibrium of justice,
only endeavour to give a philosophical sanction to a very simple fact,
the true nature of which they too often have failed to grasp. The
infliction of pain, however, is not an act which the moral
consciousness regards with indifference, even in the case of a
criminal; and to many enlightened minds with keen sympathy for human
suffering, it has appeared both unreasonable and cruel that the State
should wilfully torment him to no purpose. But whilst retributive
punishment has been condemned, punishment itself has been defended; it
is only looked upon in a different light, not as an end by itself, but
as a means of attaining an end. It is to be inflicted, not because
wrong has been done, but in order that wrong be not done. Its object
is held to be, either to deter from crime, or to reform the criminal,
or by means of elimination or seclusion, to make it physically
impossible for him to commit fresh crimes.
These views were expressed already in Greek and Roman
antiquity.[52] According to Plato, a reasonable man punishes for the
sake of deterring from wickedness, or with a view to correcting the
offender.[53] Aristotle looks upon punishment as a moral medicine.[54]
Seneca maintains that the law, in punishing wrong, aims at three ends:
"either that it may correct him whom it punishes, or that his
punishment may render other men better, or that, by bad men being put
out of the way, the rest may live without fear."[55] In modern times
all these theories have had, and still have, their numerous adherents.
According to Hugo Grotius, "men are so bound together by their common
{81} nature, that they ought not to do each other harm, except for the
sake of some good to be attained"; hence "man is not rightly punished
by man merely for the sake of punishing"; advantage alone makes
punishment right--"either the advantage of the offender, or of him who
suffers by the offence, or of persons in general."[56] For a long time
the view taken by Hobbes, that "the aym of Punishment is not a
revenge, but terrour,"[57] remained the leading doctrine on the
subject, among philosophers, as well as legislators. It was shared by
Montesquieu,[58] Beccaria,[59] and filangieri,[60] by Anselm von
Feuerbach[61] and Schopenhauer,[62] and, in the main, by Bentham.[63]
During the nineteenth century the principle of determent was largely
superseded by the principle of reformation; whilst certain
contemporary criminologists--like some previous ones[64]--are of
opinion that punishment should aim to repress crime by an "absolute"
or "relative elimination" of the criminal, that is, in extreme cases
by killing him, but generally by incarcerating him in a criminal
lunatic asylum, or by banishing him for ever or for a certain period,
or by interdicting him from a particular neighbourhood.[65]
[Footnote 52: _Cf._ Laistner, _Das Recht in der Strafe_, p. 9 _sqq._;
Thonissen, _Le droit pénal de la république Athénienne_, p. 418 _sqq._]
[Footnote 53: Plato, _Protagoras_, p. 324. _Idem_, _Politicus_, p.
293. _Idem_, _Gorgias_, p. 479. _Idem_, _Leges_, ix. 854; xi. 934;
xii. 944.]
[Footnote 54: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, ii. 3. 4.]
[Footnote 55: Seneca, _De clementia_, i. 22. _Cf._ _Idem_, _De ira_,
i. 19.]
[Footnote 56: Grotius, _De iure belli et pacis_, ii. 20. 4 _sqq._]
[Footnote 57: Hobbes, _Leviathan_, ii. 28, p. 243.]
[Footnote 58: Montesquieu, _Lettres Persanes_, 81.]
[Footnote 59: Beccaria, _Dei delitti e delle pene_, _passim_.]
[Footnote 60: filangieri, _La scienza della legislazione_, iii. 2. 27,
vol. iv. 13 _sq._]
[Footnote 61: von Feuerbach-Mittermaier, _Lehrbuch des gemeinen in
Deutschland gültigen Peinlichen Rechts_, p. 38 _sqq._]
[Footnote 62: Schopenhauer, _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_,
ii. 683 _sqq._]
[Footnote 63: Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, p. 170
_sq._ n. 1: ". . . Example is the most important end of all." _Idem_,
_Rationale of Punishment_, p. 19 _sqq._]
[Footnote 64: See von Feuerbach-Mittermaier, _op. cit._ p. 40.]
[Footnote 65: Garofalo, _Criminologie_, p. 251 _sqq._ Ferri,
_Criminal Sociology_, p. 204 _sqq._]
The advocates of these various theories are unanimous in condemning
retributive punishment as wrong. Without the grounds of social
defence, says M. Guyau, "the punishment would be as blameworthy as the
crime, and . . . the lawgivers and the judges, by deliberately
condemning the guilty to punishment, would become their fellows."[66]
For my own part I believe, on the contrary, that those who would
venture to carry out all the consequences to which the theories of
social defence or of reformation might lead, would be regarded even as
more criminal than those they punished, not only by the {82}
opponents, but probably by the very supporters of the theories in
question. A brief statement of some of those consequences will, I
hope, suffice to prove that punishment can hardly be guided
exclusively by utilitarian considerations, but requires the sanction
of the retributive emotion of moral disapproval.
[Footnote 66: Guyau, _Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni
sanction_, p. 148.]
The principle of repressing crime by eliminating the criminal may at
once be put aside, because it has no reference to the _punishment_ of
criminals, although it contains a suggestion--and a most excellent one
indeed--as to the proper mode of treating them. Their exclusion from
the company of their fellow-men--not to speak of their elimination by
death--certainly entails suffering, but, according to the principle
with which we are dealing, this suffering is not _intended_. On the
other hand, punishment, in the ordinary sense of the word, always
involves an express intention to inflict pain, whatever be the object
for which pain is inflicted. We do not punish an ill-natured dog when
we tie him up so as to prevent him from doing harm, nor do we punish a
lunatic by confining him in a madhouse.
According to the principle of determent, the infliction of suffering
in consequence of an offence is justified as a means of increasing
public safety. The offender is sacrificed for the common weal. But why
the offender only? It is quite probable that a more effective way of
deterring from crime would be to punish his children as well; and if
the notion of justice derived all its import from the result achieved
by the punishment, there would be nothing unjust in doing so. The only
objection which, from this point of view, might ever be raised against
the practice of visiting the wrongs of the fathers upon the children,
is that it is needlessly severe; the innocence of the children could
count for nothing. Nor do I see why the law should not allow our own
judges now and then to follow the example of their Egyptian colleague
who in an intricate lawsuit caused a person avowedly innocent to be
bastinadoed with the hope that whoever was the real {83} culprit might
be induced to confess out of compassion.[67] Moreover, if the object
of punishment is merely preventive, the heaviest punishment should be
threatened where the strongest motive is needed to restrain.
Consequently, an injury committed under great temptation, or in a
passion, should be punished with particular severity; whereas a crime
like parricide might be treated with more indulgence than other kinds
of homicide, owing to the restraining influence of filial affection.
Could the moral consciousness approve of this?
[Footnote 67: Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 103 _sq._]
Again, if punishment were to be regulated by the principle of
reforming the criminal, the result would in some cases be very
astonishing. There is no more incorrigible set of offenders than
habitual vagrants and drunkards, whereas experience has shown that the
most easily reformed of all offenders is often some person who has
committed a serious crime. According to the reformation theory, the
latter should soon be set free, whilst the petty offender might have
to be shut up for all his life. Nay more, if the criminal proves
absolutely incorrigible, and not the slightest hope of his reformation
is left, there would no longer be any reason for punishing him at
all.[68] The reformationist may also be asked why he does not try some
more humane method of improving people's characters than by the
infliction of suffering.
[Footnote 68: _Cf._ Morrison, _Crime and its Causes_, p. 203;
Durkheim, _Division du travail social_, p. 94.]
It may seem strange that theories which are open to such objections
should have been able to attract so many intelligent partisans. These
theories must at least possess a certain plausibility. If punishment
on the one hand springs from moral indignation, and on the other hand
is frequently interpreted as a means either of deterring from crime or
of reforming the criminal, there must obviously be some connection
between these ends and the retributive aim of moral resentment. There
must be certain facts which, to some extent, fill up the gap between
the theory of retribution and the other theories of punishment.
{84} The doctrine of determent regards punishment as a means of
preventing crime. A crime always involves the infliction of pain; and
the one thing which men try to prevent for its own sake is pain. The
one thing which arouses resentment is likewise pain. There must
consequently be a general coincidence between the acts which people
resent and the acts which the law would punish if it were framed on
the principle of determent. But the resemblance between the desire to
deter and resentment is greater still. Resentment is not only aroused
by pain, but is a hostile attitude towards its cause, and its
intrinsic object is to remove this cause, that is, to prevent pain. An
act of moral resentment is therefore apt to resemble a punishment
inflicted with a view to deterring from crime, provided that the
punishment is directed against the cause of crime--the criminal
himself--and is not unduly severe.
The doctrine of reformation aims at the removal of a criminal
disposition of mind by improving the offender. Moral resentment
likewise aims at the removal of a volitional cause of pain, by
bringing about repentance in the offender. That repentance ought to be
followed by forgiveness, partial or total, is a widely recognised
moral claim.
According to the Chinese Penal Code, whoever, having committed an
injury which can be repaired by restitution or compensation,
surrenders himself voluntarily, and acknowledges his guilt to a
magistrate, before it is otherwise discovered, shall be freely
pardoned, though all claims upon his property shall be duly
liquidated.[69] In Madagascar, according to a law made in 1828, "all
the fines shall be reduced one-half, according to the nature of the
fines, if the persons guilty accuse themselves."[70] According to
Zoroastrianism, one element of atonement consists in repentance, as
manifested by avowal of the guilt and by the recital of a formula, the
_Patet_.[71] It is said in the Laws of Manu:--"In proportion as a man
who has done wrong, himself {85} confesses it, even so far he is freed
from guilt, as a snake from its slough. . . . He who has committed a
sin and has repented, is freed from that sin, but he is purified only
by the resolution of ceasing to sin and thinking 'I will do so no
more.'"[72] According to the Rig-Veda, Varuna inflicts terrible
punishments on the hardened criminal, but is merciful to him who
repents; to Varuna the cry of anguish from remorse ascends, and before
him the sinner comes to discharge himself of the burden of his guilt
by confession.[73] So, also, Zeus pardons the repentant.[74] The main
doctrine of Judaism on the subject of atonement is comprised in the
single word Repentance. No teachers, says Mr. Montefiore, "exalted the
place and power of repentance more than the Rabbis. There was no sin
for which in their eyes a true repentance could not obtain forgiveness
from God."[75] According to the Talmud, a space of only two fingers'
breadth lies between Hell and Heaven: the sinner has only to repent
sincerely, and the gates to everlasting bliss will spring open.[76]
Jesus commanded his disciples to forgive injuries if followed by
repentance:--"If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him; and if
he repent, forgive him. And if he trespass against thee seven times in
a day, and seven times in a day turn again to thee, saying, I repent;
thou shalt forgive him."[77]
[Footnote 69: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. xxv. p. 27 _sq._]
[Footnote 70: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 386.]
[Footnote 71: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_,
iv. p. lxxxvi.]
[Footnote 72: _Laws of Manu_, xi. 229, 231. _Cf._ _ibid._ xi. 228, 230.]
[Footnote 73: _Rig-Veda_, i. 25. 1 _sq._; ii. 28. 5 _sqq._; v. 85. 7
_sq._; vii. 87. 7, 88. 6 _sq._, 89. 1 _sqq._ Barth, _Religions of
India_, p. 17.]
[Footnote 74: _Ilias_, ix. 502 _sqq._]
[Footnote 75: Montefiore, _op. cit._ pp. 524, 335 n.]
[Footnote 76: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 53. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 56;
Katz, _Der wahre Talmudjude_, p. 87 _sq._; Kohler, 'Atonement,' in
_Jewish Encyclopedia_, ii. 279; Moore, 'Sacrifice' in Cheyne and
Black, _Encyclopædia Biblica_, iv. 4224 _sq._]
[Footnote 77: _St. Luke_, xvii. 3 _sq._]
But repentance not only blunts the edge of moral indignation and
recommends the offender to the mercy of men and gods: it is the sole
ground on which pardon can be given by a scrupulous judge. When
sufficiently guided by deliberation and left to itself, without being
unduly checked by other emotions, the feeling of moral resentment is
apt to last as long as its cause remains unaltered, that is until the
will of the offender has ceased to be offensive; and it ceases to be
offensive only when he acknowledges his guilt and repents. It is true
that the mere performance of certain ceremonies is frequently supposed
to relieve the performer of his sins,[78] and that the {86} same end
is thought to be attained by pleasing God in some way or other, by
sacrifice, or alms-giving, or the like. Men even lay claim to divine
forgiveness as a right belonging to them in virtue of some meritorious
deeds of theirs, according to the doctrine of _opera supererogativa_--a
doctrine which, in substance, is not restricted to Roman Catholicism,
but is found, in a more or less developed form, in Judaism,[79]
Muhammedanism,[80] Brahmanism,[81] and degenerated Buddhism.[82] But
all such ideas are objectionable to the moral consciousness of a
higher type. They are based on the crude notion that sin is a material
substance which may be removed by material means; or on the belief
that an offender may compound with the deity for sinning against him,
in the same way as he pacifies his injured neighbour, by bribery or
flattery; or on the assumptions that by a good or meritorious deed a
man has done more than his duty, that a good deed stands in the same
relation to a bad deed as a claim to a debt, that the claim is made on
the same person to whom the debt is due, namely, God--even though it
beinclihedinclihed only by his mercy--and that the debt consequently
may be compensated by the claim in the same way as the payment of a
certain sum may compensate for a loss inflicted. This doctrine
attaches badness and goodness to external acts rather than to mental
facts. Reparation implies compensation for a loss. The loss may be
compensated by the bestowal of a corresponding advantage; but no
reparation can be given for badness. Badness can only be forgiven, and
moral forgiveness can be granted only on condition that the agent's
mind has undergone a radical alteration for the better, that the
badness of the will has given way to repentance.[83] Hence the
Reformation {87} proscribed offerings for the redemption of sins,
together with the trade in indulgences; and we meet with an analogous
movement in other comparatively advanced forms of religion. In
reformed Brahmanism, repentance is declared to be the only means of
redeeming trespasses.[84] The idea expressed in the Psalms, that God
delights not in burnt offerings, but that the sacrifices of God are a
broken and a contrite heart,[85] became the prevailing opinion among
the Rabbis, most of whom regarded repentance as the _conditio sine quâ
non_ of expiation and the forgiveness of sins.[86] Let us also
remember that he who commanded his followers to forgive a brother for
his sin, at the same time pronounced the qualification: "if he
repent."[87]
[Footnote 78: _Supra_, p. 53 _sqq._ Heriot, _Travels through the
Canadas_, p. 378 (ancient Mexicans). Adair, _History of the American
Indians_, p. 150. Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamchatka_, p. 178.
Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 24.]
[Footnote 79: Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 525 _sqq._]
[Footnote 80: _Koran_, xi. 116. Sell, _Faith of Islám_, p. 220 _sq._
According to Muhammadanism, however, it is only "little sins" that are
forgiven if some good actions are done, whereas "great sins" can only
be forgiven after due repentance (_ibid._ p. 214).]
[Footnote 81: Wheeler, _History of India_, ii. 475.]
[Footnote 82: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 150, 161, 164. Davis,
_China_, ii. 48.]
[Footnote 83: This point was certainly not overlooked by the Catholic
moralists, but even the most ardent apology cannot explain away the
idea of reparation in the Catholic doctrine of the justification of
man (_cf._ Manzoni, _Osservazioni sulla Morale Cattolica_, p. 100).
Penance consists of contrition, confession, and satisfaction, and
contrition itself is chiefly "a willingness to compensate" (_Catechism
of the Council of Trent_, ii. 5. 22).]
[Footnote 84: Goblet d'Alviella, _Hibbert Lectures on the Origin and
Growth of the Conception of God_, p. 263.]
[Footnote 85: _Psalms_, li. 16 _sq._]
[Footnote 86: Moore, _loc. cit._ col. 4225.]
[Footnote 87: _Cf._ Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, ii. 203.]
That moral indignation is appeased by repentance, and that repentance
is the only proper ground for forgiveness, is thus due, not to the
specifically moral character of such indignation, but to its being a
form of resentment. This is confirmed by the fact that an angry and
revengeful man is apt to be in a similar way influenced by the sincere
apologies of the offender. As Aristotle said, men are placable in
regard to those who acknowledge and repent their guilt: "there is
proof of this in the case of chastising servants; for we chastise more
violently those who contradict us, and deny their guilt; but towards
such as acknowledge themselves to be justly punished, we cease from
our wrath."[88] To take an instance from the savage world. The
Caroline Islander, according to Mr. Christian, "is inclined to be
revengeful, and will bide his time patiently until his opportunity
comes. Yet he is not implacable, and counts reconciliation a noble and
a princely thing. There is a form of etiquette to be observed on {88}
these occasions--a present (_katom_) is made, an apology offered--a
piece of sugar-cane accepted by the aggrieved party--honour is
satisfied and the matter ends."[89] In the case of revenge, external
satisfaction or material compensation is often allowed to take the
place of genuine repentance, and the humiliation of the adversary may
be sufficient to quiet the angry passion. But the revenge felt by a
reflecting mind is not so readily satisfied. It wants to remove the
cause which aroused it. The object which resentment is chiefly intent
upon, Adam Smith observes, "is not so much to make our enemy feel pain
in his turn, as to make him conscious that he feels it upon account of
his past conduct, to make him repent of that conduct, and to make him
sensible, that the person whom he injured did not deserve to be
treated in that manner."[90] The delight of revenge, says Bacon,
"seemeth to be not so much in doing the hurt, as in making the party
repent."[91]
[Footnote 88: Aristotle, _Rhetorica_, ii. 3. 5.]
[Footnote 89: Christian, _Caroline Islands_, p. 72.]
[Footnote 90: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 138 _sq._]
[Footnote 91: Bacon, 'Essay IV. Of Revenge,' in _Essays_, p. 45. _Cf._
Montaigne, _Essais_, ii. 27 (_Oeuvres_, p. 384).]
We can now see the origin of the idea that the true end of punishment
is the reformation of the criminal. This idea merely emphasises the
most humane element in resentment, the demand that the offender's will
shall cease to be offensive. The principle of reformation has thus
itself a retributive origin. This explains the fact, otherwise
inexplicable, that the amendment which it has in view is to be
effected by the infliction of pain. It also accounts for the
inconsistent attitude of the reformationist towards incorrigible
offenders, already commented upon. Resentment gives way to forgiveness
only in the case of repentance, not in the case of incorrigibility.
Hence, not even the reformationist regards incorrigibility as a
legitimate ground for exempting a person from punishment, although
this flatly contradicts his theory about the true aim of all
punishment.
Thus the theories both of determent and of reformation are ultimately
offspring of the same emotion that first {89} induced men to inflict
punishment on their fellow-creatures. It escaped the advocates of
these theories that they themselves were under the influence of the
very principle they fought against, because they failed to grasp its
true import. Rightly understood, resentment is preventive in its
nature, and, when sufficiently deliberate, regards the infliction of
suffering as a means rather than as an end. It not only gives rise to
punishment, but readily suggests, as a proper end of punishment,
either determent or amendment or both. But, first of all, moral
resentment wants to raise a protest against wrong. And the immediate
aim of punishment has always been to give expression to the righteous
indignation of the society which inflicts it.
Now it may be thought that men have no right to give vent to their
moral resentment in a way which hurts their neighbours unless some
benefit may be expected from it. In the case of many other emotions,
we hold that the conative element in the emotion ought not to be
allowed to develop into a distinct volition or act; and it would seem
that a similar view might be taken with reference to the
aggressiveness inherent in moral disapproval. It is a notion of this
kind that lies at the bottom of the utilitarian theories of
punishment. They are protests against purposeless infliction of pain,
against crude ideas of retributive justice, against theories hardly in
advance of the low feelings of the popular mind. Therefore, they mark
a stage of higher refinement in the evolution of the moral
consciousness; and if the principles of determent and reformation are
open to objections which will be shared by almost everyone, that is
due to other circumstances than their demand that punishment should
serve a useful end. As we have seen, they ignore the fact that a
punishment, in order to be recognised as just, must not transgress the
limits set down by moral disapproval, that it must not be inflicted on
innocent persons, that it must be proportioned to the guilt, that
offenders who are amenable to discipline must not be treated more
severely {90} than incorrigible criminals. These theories also seem to
exaggerate the deterring or reforming influence which punishments
exercise upon criminals,[92] whilst, in another respect, they take too
narrow a view of its social usefulness. Whether its voice inspire fear
or not, whether it wake up a sleeping conscience or not, punishment,
at all events, tells people in plain terms what, in the opinion of the
society, they ought not to do. It gives the multitude a severe lesson
in public morality; and it is difficult to see how quite the same
effect could be attained by any other method. Retaliation is such a
spontaneous expression of indignation, that people would hardly
realise the offensiveness of an act which evokes no signs of
resentment. Of course, punishment, in the legal sense of the term, is
only one form--the most concrete form--of public retaliation; it is,
indeed, probable that public opinion exercises a greater influence on
men than punishment would do without its aid.[93] But punishment, in
combination with public opinion, has no doubt to some extent an
educating, and not merely a deterring, influence upon the members of a
society. As Sir James Stephen observes, "the sentence of the law is to
the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a
seal is to hot wax. It converts into a permanent final judgment what
might otherwise be a transient sentiment."[94] finally, it must not be
overlooked that the infliction of punishment upon the perpetrator of a
grave offence gratifies a strong general desire, and, even though the
pain which always accompanies an unsatisfied desire would by itself
afford no sufficient justification for subjecting the offence to such
intense {91} suffering, other more serious consequences might easily
result from leaving him unpunished. The public indignation might find
a vent in some less regular and less discriminating mode of
retaliation, like lynching; or, on the other hand, by remaining
unsatisfied, the desire might dwindle away from want of nourishment,
and the moral standard suffer a corresponding loss.
[Footnote 92: On the limited efficiency of punishment as a deterrent,
see Ferri, _op. cit._ p. 82 _sq._ On the moral insensibility of the
instinctive and habitual criminal, and absence of remorse, see
Havelock Ellis, _The Criminal_, p. 124 _sqq._]
[Footnote 93: _Cf._ Locke, _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, ii.
28. 12 (_Philosophical Works_, p. 283); Shaftesbury, 'Inquiry
concerning Virtue and Merit,' i. 3. 3, in _Characteristicks_, ii. 64.]
[Footnote 94: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, ii.
81. _Cf._ Shaftesbury, _op. cit._ ii. 64: "As to punishments and
rewards, their efficacy is not so much from the fear or expectation
which they raise, as from a natural esteem of virtue, and detestation
of villainy, which is awaken'd and excited by these publick
expressions of the approbation and hatred of mankind in each case."]
However, it is not to be believed that, in practice, the infliction of
punishment is, or ever will be, regulated merely by considerations of
social utility, even within the limits of what is recognised as
legitimate by the moral sentiment. The retributive desire is so
strong, and appears so natural, that we can neither help obeying it,
nor seriously disapprove of its being obeyed. The theory that we have
a right to punish an offender only in so far as, by doing so, we
promote the general happiness, really serves in the main as a
justification for gratifying such a desire, rather than as a
foundation for penal practice. Moreover, this theory refers, and
pretends to refer, only to outward behaviour--to punishment, not to
the emotion from which punishment springs. It condemns the retributive
act, not the retributive desire.
But at the same time the aggressive element in the emotion itself has
undergone a change, which tends to conceal its true nature by partly
leading it into a new channel, or, rather, by narrowing the channel in
which it discharges itself. Resentment is directed against the cause
of the offence by which it was aroused--broadly speaking, the
offender. But when duly reflecting upon the matter, we cannot fail to
admit that the real cause was not the offender as a whole, but his
will. Deliberate and discriminating resentment is therefore apt to
turn against the will rather than against the willer; as we have seen,
it is desirous to inflict pain on the offender chiefly as a means of
removing the cause of pain suffered, _i.e._, the existence of the bad
will. If this is the case with deliberate resentment in general, it
must particularly be the case with moral indignation, which is more
likely to be {92} influenced by sympathy, and hence more discriminate,
than non-moral resentment. This fact gives rise to the moral
commandment that we should hate, not the sinner, but the sin. The
hostile reaction should be focussed on the will of the offender, and
his sensibility should be regarded merely as an instrument through
which the will is worked upon. But there is little hope that such a
demand can ever be strictly enforced. Professor Sidgwick justly
remarks that, though moralists try to distinguish between anger
directed "against the act" and anger directed "against the agent," it
may be fairly doubted whether it is within the capacity of ordinary
human nature to maintain this distinction in practice.[95] The will
which offends, and the sensibility which suffers, cannot seriously be
looked upon as two different entities the one of which should not be
punished for the fault of the other. The person himself is held
responsible for the offence. The hostile reaction turns against his
will because only by acting upon the will can the cause of pain be
removed. But since the remotest ages the aggressive attitude towards
this cause has been connected with an instinctive desire to produce
counter-pain; and, though we may recognise that such a desire, or
rather the volition into which it tends to develop, may be morally
justifiable only if it is intended to remove the cause of pain, we can
hardly help being indulgent to the gratification of a human instinct
which seems to be well nigh ineradicable. It is the instinctive desire
to inflict counter-pain that gives to moral indignation its most
important characteristic. Without it, moral condemnation and the ideas
of right and wrong would never have come into existence. Without it,
we should no more condemn a bad man than a poisonous plant. The reason
why moral judgments are passed on volitional beings, or their acts, is
not merely that they are volitional, but that they are sensitive as
well; and however much we try to concentrate our indignation on the
act, it derives its peculiar flavour from being directed {93} against
a sensitive agent. I have heard persons of a highly sympathetic cast
of mind assert that a wrong act awakens in them only sorrow, not
indignation; but though sorrow be the predominant element in their
state of mind, I believe that, on a close inspection, they would find
there another emotion as well, one in which there is immanent an
element of hostility, however slight. It is true that the intensity of
moral indignation cannot always be measured by the actual desire to
cause pain to the offender; but its intensity seems nevertheless to be
connected with the amount of suffering which the indignant man is
willing to let the offender undergo in consequence of the offence.
Which of us could ever, quite apart from any utilitarian
considerations, feel the same sympathy with a person who suffers on
account of his badness as with one who suffers innocently? It is one
of the most interesting facts related to the moral consciousness of a
higher type, that it in vain condemns the gratification of the very
desire from which it sprang. It is like a man of low extraction, who,
in spite of all acquired refinement, bears his origin stamped on his face.
[Footnote 95: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 364.]
* * * * *
Whilst resentment is a hostile attitude of mind towards a cause of
pain, retributive kindly emotion is a friendly attitude of mind
towards a cause of pleasure. Just as in the lower forms of anger there
is hardly any definite desire to produce suffering, only a vehement
desire to remove the cause of pain, so in the lower form of
retributive kindly emotion there is hardly any definite desire to
produce pleasure, only a friendly endeavour to retain the cause of the
pleasure experienced. When the emotion contains a definite desire to
give pleasure in return for pleasure received, and at the same time is
felt by the favoured party in his capacity of being himself the object
of the benefit, it is called gratitude. We often find intermingled
with gratitude a feeling of indebtedness; he upon whom a benefit has
been conferred feels himself as a debtor, and regards the benefactor
as his creditor. This feeling has {94} even been represented as
essential to, or as a condition of, gratitude;[96] but it is not
implied in what I here understand by gratitude. It is one thing to be
grateful, and another thing to feel that it is one's duty to be
grateful. A depression of the "self-feeling," a feeling of
humiliation, also frequently accompanies gratitude as a motive for
requiting the benefit; but it is certainly not an element in gratitude
itself.
[Footnote 96: Horwicz, _Psychologische Analysen_, ii. 333: "Ohne
dieses Gefühl des Verbundenseins . . . . kann keine Dankbarkeit
auskommen." _Cf._ Milton, _Paradise Lost_, iv. 52 _sqq._]
Retributive kindly emotion is a much less frequent phenomenon in the
animal kingdom than is the emotion of resentment. In many animal
species not even the germ of it is found, and where it occurs it is
generally restricted within narrow limits. Anybody may provoke an
animal's anger, but only towards certain individuals it is apt to feel
retributive kindliness. The limits for this emotion are marked off by
the conditions under which altruistic sentiments in general tend to
arise--a subject which will be discussed in another connection.
Indeed, social affection is itself essentially retributive. Gregarious
animals take pleasure in each other's company, and with this pleasure
is intimately associated kindly feeling towards its cause, the
companion himself. Social affection presupposes reciprocity; it is not
only a friendly sentiment towards another individual, but towards an
individual who is conceived of as a friend.
The intrinsic object of retributive kindliness being to retain a cause
of pleasure, we may assume that the definite desire to produce
pleasure in return for pleasure received is due to the fact that such
a desire materially promotes the object in question--exactly in the
same way as the definite desire to inflict pain in return for pain
inflicted has become an element in resentment because such a desire
promotes the intrinsic object of resentment, the removal of the cause
of pain. And as natural selection accounts for the origin of
resentment, so it also accounts for the {95} origin of retributive
kindly emotion. Both of these emotions are useful states of mind; by
resentment evils are averted, by retributive kindliness benefits are
secured. That there is such a wide difference in their prevalence is
explicable from the simple facts that gregariousness--which is the
root of social affection, and, largely at least, a condition of the
rise of retributive kindly emotions--is an advantage only to some
species, not to all, and that even gregarious animals have many
enemies, but few friends.
In some cases the friendly reaction in retributive kindliness is
directed towards individuals who have in no way been the cause of the
pleasure which gave rise to the emotion. So intimate is the connection
between the stimulus and the reaction, that he who is made happy often
feels a general desire to make others happy.[97] But such an
indiscriminate reaction is only an offset of the emotion with which we
are here concerned. Moreover, retributive kindly emotion often confers
benefits upon somebody nearly related to the benefactor, if he himself
be out of reach, or in addition to benefits conferred on him. But in
such cases the gratitude towards the benefactor is the real
motive.
[Footnote 97: That a happy man wants to see glad faces around him, is
also due to another cause, which has been pointed out by Dr. Hirn
(_Origins of Art_, p. 83): from their expression he wants to derive
further nourishment and increase for his own feeling.]
That moral approval--by which I understand that emotion of which moral
praise or reward is the outward manifestation--is a kind of
retributive kindly emotion and as such allied to gratitude, will
probably be admitted without much hesitation.[98] Its friendly
character is not, like the hostile character of moral disapproval,
disguised by any apparently contradictory facts. To confer a benefit
upon a person is not generally regarded as wrong, unless, indeed, it
involves an encroachment on somebody's rights or is contrary to the
feeling of justice. And that moral approval sometimes bestows its
favours upon undeserving {96} individuals for the merits of others,
can no more invalidate the fact that it is essentially directed
towards the cause of pleasure, than the occasional infliction of
punishments upon innocent individuals invalidates the fact that moral
disapproval is essentially directed against the cause of pain.
Unmerited rewards are explicable on grounds analogous to those to
which we have traced unmerited punishments.
[Footnote 98: The relationship between gratitude and moral approval
has been recognised by Hartley (_Observations on Man_, i. 520) and
Adam Smith (_Theory of Moral Sentiments_, _passim_).]
The doctrine of family solidarity leads, not only to common
responsibility for crimes, but to common enjoyment of merits.
In Madagascar, exemption from punishment was claimed by the
descendants of persons who had rendered any particular service to the
sovereign or the State, as also by other branches of the family, on
the same plea.[99] According to Chinese ideas, the virtuous conduct of
any individual will result, not only in prosperity to himself, but in
a certain quantity of happiness to his posterity, unless indeed the
personal wickedness of some of the descendants neutralise the benefits
which would otherwise accrue from the virtue of the ancestor;[100]
and, conversely, the Chinese Government confers titles of nobility
upon the dead parents of a distinguished son.[101] The idea that the
dead share in _punya_ or _pâpa_, that is, the merit or demerit of the
living, and that the happiness of a man in the next life depends on
the good works of his descendants, was early familiar to the civilised
natives of India; almost all legal deeds of gift contain the formula
that the gift is made "for the increase of the _punya_ of the donor
and that of his father and mother."[102]
[Footnote 99: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, 376.]
[Footnote 100: Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_, i. 426,
n. 3; ii. 384, n. 63. Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 398.]
[Footnote 101: Giles, _op. cit._ i. 305, n. 6. Wells Williams, _Middle
Kingdom_, i. 422.]
[Footnote 102: Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 52, n. 4.]
But the vicarious efficacy of good deeds is not necessarily restricted
to the members of the same family.
In a hymn of the Rig-Veda we find the idea that the merits or the
pious may benefit their neighbours.[103] According to one of the
Pahlavi texts, persons who are wholly unable to perform good works are
supposed to be entitled to a share of any supererogatory good works
performed by others.[104] The Chinese believe that {97} whole kingdoms
are blessed by benevolent spirits for the virtuous conduct of their
rulers.[105] Yahveh promised not to destroy Sodom for the sake of ten
righteous, provided that so many righteous could be found in the
town.[106] The doctrine of vicarious reward or satisfaction through
good works is, in fact, more prevalent than the doctrine of vicarious
punishment. Jewish theology has a great deal more to say about the
acceptance of the merits of the righteous on behalf of the wicked,
than about atonement through sacrifice.[107] The Muhammedans, who know
nothing of vicarious suffering as a means of expiation, confer merits
upon their dead by reciting chapters of the Koran and almsgiving, and
some of them allow the pilgrimage to Mecca to be done by proxy.[108]
Christian theology itself maintains that salvation depends on the
merit of the passion of Christ; and from early times the merits of
martyrs and saints were believed to benefit other members of the
Church.[109]
[Footnote 103: _Rig-Veda_, vii. 35. 4.]
[Footnote 104: _Dînâ-î-Maînôg-î Khirad_ xv. 3.]
[Footnote 105: de Groot, _Religious System of China_ (vol. iv. book)
ii. 435.]
[Footnote 106: _Genesis_, xviii. 32.]
[Footnote 107: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 424, n. 1.]
[Footnote 108: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, pp. 247, 248, 532. Sell, _op.
cit._ pp. 242, 278, 287, 288, 298. _Cf._ Wallin, _Fórsta Resa från
Cairo till Arabiska öknen_, p. 103.]
[Footnote 109: Harnack, _History of Dogma_, ii. 133, n. 3.]
For the explanation of these and similar facts various circumstances
have to be considered. Good deeds may be so pleasing to a god as to
induce him to forgive the sins of the wicked in accordance with the
rule that anger yields to joy. There is solidarity not only between
members of the same family, but between members of the same social
unit; hence the virtues of individuals may benefit the whole community
to which they belong. The Catholic theologian argues that, since we
are all regenerated unto Christ by being washed in the same baptism,
made partakers of the same sacraments, and, especially, of the same
meat and drink, the body and blood of Christ, we are all members of
the same body. "As, then, the foot does not perform its functions
solely for itself, but also for the benefit of the eyes; and as the
eyes exercise their sight, not for their own, but for the common
benefit of all the members; so should works of satisfaction be deemed
common to all the members of the {98} Church."[110] Moreover, virtues,
like sins, are believed to be in a material way transferable. In Upper
Bavaria, when a dead person is laid out, a cake of flour is placed on
his breast in order to absorb the virtues of the deceased, whereupon
the cake is eaten by the nearest relatives.[111] And we are told that,
in a certain district in the north of England, if a child is brought
to the font at the same time as a body is committed to the ground,
whatever was "good" in the deceased person is supposed to be
transferred to the little child, since God does not allow any
"goodness" to be buried and lost to the world, and such "goodness" is
most likely to enter a little child coming to the sacrament of
Baptism.[112] A blessing, also, no less than a curse, is looked upon
in the light of material energy; goodness is not required for the
acquisition of it, mere contact will do. Blessings are hereditary:--"The
just man walketh in his integrity: his children are blessed after
him."[113]
[Footnote 110: _Catechism of the Council of Trent_, ii. 5. 72.]
[Footnote 111: _Am Urquell_, ii. 101.]
[Footnote 112: Peacock, 'Executed Criminals and Folk-Medicine,' in
_Folk-Lore_, vii. 280.]
[Footnote 113: _Proverbs_, xx. 7.]
It is no doubt more becoming for a god to pardon the sinner on account
of the merits of the virtuous, than to punish the innocent for the
sins of the wicked. It shows that his compassion overcomes his wrath;
and the mercy of the deity is, among all divine attributes, that on
which the higher monotheistic religions lay most stress. Allah said,
"Whoso doth one good act, for him are ten rewards, and I also give
more to whomsoever I will; and whoso doth ill, its retaliation is
equal to it, or else I forgive him."[114] Nevertheless, the moral
consciousness of a higher type can hardly approve that the wicked
should be pardoned for the sake of the virtuous, or that the reward
for an act should be bestowed upon anybody else than the agent. The
doctrine of vicarious merit or recompense is not just; it involves
that badness is unduly ignored; it is based on crude ideas of goodness
and merit. The theory of _opera supererogativa_, as we have seen,
attaches badness {99} and goodness to external acts rather than to
mental facts, and assumes that reparation can be given for badness,
whereas the scrutinising moral judge only forgives badness in case it
is superseded by repentance. If thus a bad act cannot be compensated
by a good one, even though both be performed by one and the same
person, it can still less be compensated by the good act of another
man. From various quarters we hear protests against the notion of
vicarious merit--protests which emphasise the true direction of moral
reward. Ezekiel, who reproved the old idea that the children's teeth
are set on edge because the fathers have eaten sour grapes, also
taught that a wicked son is to reap no benefit from the blessings
bestowed upon a righteous father.[115] "Fear the day," says the Koran,
"wherein no soul shall pay any recompense for another soul."[116] The
Buddhistic Dhammapada contains the following passage, which sums up
our whole argument:--"By oneself the evil is done, by oneself one
suffers; by oneself evil is left undone, by oneself one is purified.
The pure and the impure stand and fall by themselves, no one can
purify another."[117]
[Footnote 114: Lane-Poole, _Speeches and Table-Talk of Mohammad_,
p. 147.]
[Footnote 115: _Ezekiel_, xviii. 5 _sqq._]
[Footnote 116: _Koran_, ii. 44.]
[Footnote 117: _Dhammapada_, xii. 165.]