We may now bring this study of human personality to a close, incomplete
as it is. We have not by any means exhausted all the factors of
personality, but, guided by practical consideration, we have at least
examined the chief of its fundamentals, more particularly those which
are concerned in the disturbances which general psychopathology makes
the object of study. Such a study should be undertaken preparatory to
that of special pathology or particular complexes of disturbances of
function (the functional psychoneuroses). The aim of psychology should
be to become capable of being an applied science. So far as a science is
only of academic interest it fails to be of real value to the world.
Physics, chemistry, astronomy, mineralogy, geology, physiology,
bacteriology, botany, and many departments of zoology, etc., can be
applied, and other sciences at least tend to form our notions of the
universe in which we live, and thus to mould our religious,
philosophical and other conceptions. Until very recent years it was an
opprobium of psychology, as studied and taught, that it had not become
divorced from philosophy[304] and stood amongst the few sciences that
could not be applied to practical life and was for the most part of
academic interest only. Now, however, in the field of medicine
psychology is fast looming to the front as of great practical
interest—not the older psychology, but the new psychology of functions
and mechanisms. In the field of human efficiency in the mechanical arts
it is also fast becoming capable of practical application. With the
above aim in view we have dealt in these lectures more particularly with
those psychological activities a knowledge of which can be applied in
the theory and practice of medicine. But as the laws governing the
organism are general, not special, what has been found is as applicable
to normal as to pathological life.
We have not attempted to enter the field of special pathology to study
the psycho-pathology of special diseases. So far as this has been done
it has been mainly for the purpose of seeking data. Our aim has been
rather to obtain that knowledge of functions which will serve as an
introduction to such medical studies. Even in this limited field there
are any number of specific problems which have been scarcely more than
touched upon and any one of which, by itself, would be a rich field of
investigation.
It is well now, in conclusion, to make a general survey of the fields
which we have tilled, and gather together into a whole, so far as
possible, the results of our gleaning.
We have seen on the basis of the phenomena of memory that the “mind”
includes more than conscious processes; that it includes a vast
storehouse of acquired “dispositions” deposited by the experiences of
life, and that these dispositions (by which mental experiences are
conserved) may be regarded as chemical or physical in their nature, as
sort of residua deposited (if we are asked to confine ourselves to terms
of the same order) by the neural processes correlated with the conscious
experiences of life. This storehouse of acquired dispositions provides
the material for conscious and subconscious processes; and thus provides
the wherewithal which enables the personality to be guided in its
behavior by the experiences of the past. It provides the elements of
memory which we know must be supplied by the mind in every perception of
the environment—even the simplest—and which are required for every
process of thought. Indeed throughout our review of processes and
manifestations of mind, which we need not recapitulate, we have
continually come upon evidences of these dispositions playing as I
foretold in our first lecture an underlying and responsible part.
The fact that brain dispositions are of one order of events (physical)
while psychological processes are of another (psychical) is in no way an
objection to such an interpretation, as in this antithesis we have only
the old mind-matter problem—dualism, or monism, or parallelism.
We have also seen that in neural dispositions, whether acquired or
innate, we have a conception of the unconscious that is definite,
precise.
We have also reviewed the evidence going to show that though the main
teleological function of the unconscious, so far as it represents
acquired dispositions, is to provide the material for conscious memory
and _conscious_ processes, in order that the organism may be consciously
guided in its reactions by experience, yet under certain conditions
neurographic residua can function as a _subconscious_ process which may
be _unconscious_, i.e., without being accompanied by conscious
equivalents. The latter were classed as a sub-order of subconscious
processes. We saw reason for believing that any neurogram deposited by
life’s experience can, given certain other factors, thus function
subconsciously, either autonomously or as a factor in a large mechanism
embracing both conscious and unconscious elements; and that this was
peculiarly the case when the neurogram was organized with an emotional
disposition or instinct. The impulsive force of the latter gives energy
to the former and enables it to be an active factor in determining
behavior. The organism may then be subconsciously governed in its
reactions to the environment.
After a consideration of actions so habitually performed that they
become automatic and free from conscious direction (so-called
habit-reactions), of actions performed by decerebrate animals, of
cerebro-spinal reflexes, and many motor activities of lower forms of
animal life, we came to the conclusion that they also were performed by
unconscious neural dispositions and processes, analogous to, or
identical with (as the case might be) the acquired dispositions and
processes correlated with conscious processes. Many of them may likewise
be acquired and in a pragmatic sense intelligent. We thus were able to
broaden our conception of the unconscious and its functioning, and at
the same time see the further necessity of distinguishing the
unconscious as a subdivision of the subconscious.
Proceeding further we found that besides subconscious processes that are
distinctly unconscious, there are others which are distinctly conscious
(or at least unconscious processes with conscious accompaniments) but
which do not enter the focus or fringe of awareness—in other words, true
subconscious ideas. These were termed _coconscious_ as a second
subdivision of the subconscious. They may include true perceptions,
memories, thoughts, volition, imagination, etc. As with unconscious
processes, any conserved experience of life, _under certain conditions
and given certain other factors_, may thus function coconsciously,
particularly if organized with and activated by an innate emotional
disposition. So we may have subconscious processes both without and with
conscious equivalents. We have also seen that coconscious processes may
exhibit intelligence of a high order, and the same thing is possibly
true in a less degree of unconscious processes. We found evidence
showing that a conserved idea may undergo subconscious incubation and
elaboration, and that subconscious processes may acquire a marked degree
of autonomy, may determine or inhibit conscious processes of thought,
solve problems, enter into conflicts, and in various modes produce all
sorts of psychological phenomena (hallucinations, impulsive phenomena,
aboulia, amnesia, dissociation of personality, etc.).
We have seen how, by the use of the experimental method of “_tapping_,”
and by hypnotic and other procedures, that this same autonomy can be
demonstrated, manifesting itself by impulsive phenomena (writing,
speech, gestures, and all sorts of motor automatisms) on the one hand,
and sensory automatisms (hallucinations) on the other. And we have seen
that by similar procedures, in specially adapted individuals,
remembrances of coconscious processes that have induced identical
phenomena can be recalled. With this precise knowledge of the processes
at work these automatisms were correlated with the spontaneous
occurrence of the same kinds of phenomena in the psychoses and in normal
conditions. Their occurrence in all sorts of pathological conditions
thus becomes intelligible.
Evidence has been adduced to show that life’s experiences, and therefore
acquired dispositions, tend to become organized into groups. The latter,
termed for descriptive purposes neurograms, thereby acquire a functional
unity; and they may become compounded into larger functioning groups, or
complexes, and still larger systems of neurograms. Whether their origin
is remembered or not they become a part of the personality. Such
complexes and systems play an important part by determining mental and
bodily behavior. Amongst other things they tend to determine the points
of view, the attitudes of mind, the individual and social conscience,
judgment, etc., and, as large systems, may become “sides to one’s
character.” When such complexes have strong emotional tones they may set
up conflicts leading to the inhibition of antagonistic sentiments, and
sometimes to the contraction and even disruption of the personality. All
these phenomena can be induced by the artificial creation and
organization of complexes and this principle becomes an important one in
therapeutics.
When studying ideas we found that, besides sensory images, they have
meaning derived from antecedent associated experiences that form the
setting or context. Further evidence was adduced to show that this
setting and the idea formed a psychic whole; but that often the former
remained subconscious while the idea only, or the affect only, or both,
emerged into the content of consciousness. The significance of this
mechanism lay in the fact that it enabled us to understand the
insistency of emotional ideas or obsessions. Indeed reasons have been
given for holding that subconscious processes perform a part in most
processes of thought.
Besides acquired dispositions, organized and, so to speak, deposited by
life’s experiences, personality includes many that are innate, and
therefore conditioned by inherited pre-formed anatomical and
physiological arrangements of the nervous system. These function after
the manner of a physiological reflex; and the theory was adopted that
the emotions are the central elements in certain of such dispositions.
These may therefore be called emotional dispositions or instincts. By
the excitation of such emotional reflexes the organism reacts in an
emotional manner to the environment.
In the organization of life’s experiences the emotional dispositions
tend to become synthesized with ideas to form sentiments and therefore
synthesized with the neurographic residua by which ideas are conserved.
Thus, on the one hand, neurograms and systems of neurograms become
organized with innate emotional dispositions, and, on the other, ideas
become energized by the emotional impulsive force that carries the ideas
to fruition.
As to general psycho-pathological and certain physiological phenomena, a
large variety such as anxiety states, hallucinations, and automatic
motor phenomena, are clearly the manifestations of automatic
subconscious processes; some are the resultants of conflicts between the
impulsive forces of distinctly conscious sentiments, others between
those of conscious and subconscious sentiments; others are the
physiological manifestation of emotional processes, conscious or
subconscious. Some, indicative of losses from personality (such as
amnesia, anesthesia, paralysis, altered personality, etc.), are the
resultants of inhibitions or dissociations of acquired or innate
dispositions, effected by the conflicting force of antagonistic factors.
These resultants may or may not be associated with the excitation and
dominance of complexes, or large systems of acquired dispositions. If
so, moods, trance states, fugues, somnambulistic states, secondary
personalities, and other hysterical states come into being. In all cases
these various pathological conditions are functional derangements of the
fundamental factors of a given human personality—expressions of the same
mechanisms which the organism normally makes use of to adapt itself
harmoniously to its own past or present experiences and to its
environment.
Finally, out of the innate and acquired dispositions organized by
experience to a very large extent into unitary dynamic systems human
personality is constructed by the integration of these systems (and
other dispositions) into a composite functioning whole. And according as
certain systems acquire dominance and determine fixed and predictable
reactions to the environment character traits are developed. But as
personality is thus a composite, that is an integrated system of lesser
systems these latter are capable of being reassembled or integrated in
varying combinations into many and different composites and thus
multiple personality may be formed. The forces which bring about the
disintegration of the normal composite and the resynthesizing of the
unitary systems into new personalities are to be found in the dynamic
dispositions of conscious and unconscious mechanisms. And we have also
seen that as the empirical ego is a unitary system organized by
experience each personality may contain its own differentiated ego.
Viewing as a whole the phenomena we have studied, we see why it is that
personality is a complex affair in that in its make-up there enter many
factors, some acquired and some innate. Each of these is capable of more
or less autonomy and upon their harmonious coöperation depends the
successful adaptation of the personality to its environment. It is, we
may say with almost literal truth, when these factors work to cross
purposes that a personality ceases to be a harmonious whole; just as the
individuals composing a group of persons, a football team, for example,
when they fail to work together and each strives to fulfill his own
purposes, cease to be a single team. Consciousness is not a unity in any
sense that the term has any significant meaning beyond that which is a
most banal platitude. The “unity of consciousness” seems to be a
cant-expression uttered by some unsophisticated ancient philosopher and
repeated like an article of faith by each successive generation without
stopping to think of its meaning or to test it by reference to facts.
Neither a reference to the evidence of consciousness or to its
manifestations gives support to the notion of unity. The mind is rather
an aggregation of potential or functioning activities some of which may
combine into associative functioning processes at one time and some at
another; while again these different activities may become disaggregated
with resulting contraction of personality, on the one hand, and
conflicting multiple activities on the other.
The unconscious, representing as it does all the past experiences of
life that have been conserved, is not limited to any particular type of
experiences; nor are the subconscious and conscious processes to which
it gives rise more likely to be determined by any particular
antecedents, such as those of childhood, as some would have us believe.
Nor are these motivated by any particular class of emotional instincts
or strivings of human personality. The instincts and other innate
dispositions which are fundamental factors are, as we have seen,
multiform, and any one of them may provide the motivating force which
activates subconscious as well as conscious processes. Impelled by any
one or combination of these instincts unconscious complexes may undergo
subconscious incubation and in the striving to find expression may work
for harmony or, by conflict with other complexes, for discord.
Having grasped the foregoing general principles governing the
functioning mechanisms of the mind, we are prepared to undertake the
study of the more particular problems of everyday life and of special
pathology.
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Footnote 304:
In most universities to-day Psychology is classed as a department of
Philosophy! How long is this attitude to be continued?