As one of our foremost psychologists has said, the subconscious is not
only the most important problem of psychology, it is _the_ problem. But
of course it involves many problems of practical and theoretical
interest. Among them are:
First of all the evidential justification of the postulation of
subconscious processes in general.
Second; the intrinsic nature of such processes. In other words and more
specifically, whether the neurograms of experiences after becoming
active subconscious _processes_ continue to be devoid of consciousness,
nothing but a brain process,—i.e., unconscious; or whether in becoming
activated they become conscious (monism), or acquire conscious
equivalents (parallelism), notwithstanding they are outside (dissociated
from) the content of the personal consciousness.
Third; the kind and complexity of functions a subconscious process can
perform. Can it perform the same functions as are ordinarily performed
by conscious _intelligence_ (as we commonly understand that term); that
is to say memory, perception, reasoning, imagination, volition,
affectivity, etc.? If so, to what extent?
Fourth; are the processes of the conscious mind only a part of a larger
mechanism of which a submerged part is a subconscious process?
Fifth; to what extent can and do subconscious processes determine the
processes of the conscious mind and bodily behavior in normal and
abnormal conditions?
These are some of the problems of the subconscious which for the most
part have been only incompletely investigated.
It is, of course, beyond the scope of these introductory lectures to
discuss with any completeness the evidence at hand bearing upon these
problems or to even touch upon many of the points involved. We may,
however, study more deeply than we have done some of the phenomena with
which we have become familiar with a view to seeing what light they
throw upon some of these problems, particularly the first three.
=1, 2, and 3; Actuality, Intrinsic Nature and Intelligence of
Subconscious Processes.=—As to the first question, whether subconscious
processes can be established in principle as a sound induction from
experimental and clinical facts and not merely as a hypothetical
concept, I have already pointed out that many manifestations of
conservation already cited in the exposition of the theory of memory are
of equal evidential value for the _actuality_ of such processes. Let us
now consider them in more detail from the point of view, more
particularly, of the second and third questions—the _intrinsic nature_
(whether coconscious or unconscious) and _intelligence_ of the
underlying processes at work. In any given case however the actuality of
the subconscious process must always be first demonstrated.
If we leave aside those conditions (hysteria, coconscious personalities)
wherein specific memory of a coconscious process can be recovered, or
such a process can be directly communicated with (automatic writing and
speech), the conditions required for the valid postulation of a
subconscious process underlying any given phenomenon are: first, that
the causal factor shall be positively _known_; second, that it shall be
an antecedent experience; and, third, that it shall not be in the
content of consciousness at the moment of the occurrence of the
phenomenon. If the causal factor and the phenomenon are both known, then
the only unknown factor to be determined is the process, if any,
_intervening between the two_. If this is not in consciousness, a
subconscious process must be postulated.
Obviously, if the known causal factor is _immediately_ related to the
caused phenomenon, the subconscious process must be the causal factor
itself. But if the known causal factor is _not immediately_ related to
the caused phenomenon, there must be an intervening process which must
be subconscious, perhaps consisting of a succession of processes
eventuating in the final phenomenon. For instance, if the causal factor
is a hypnotic suggestion (for which there is afterwards amnesia) that
the subject when awake shall automatically raise the right arm, a
subconscious process which is the memory of that suggestion immediately
provokes the automatic phenomenon. If, however, the suggestion is that
of a series of automatic actions involving complicated behavior, or if
it is a mathematical calculation, the intervening process which provokes
the end result must not only be subconscious but must be a more or less
complicated succession of processes.
When, on the other hand, the causal factor is not known but only
inferred with greater or less probability, the justification of the
postulation of a subconscious process may be invalidated by the
uncertainty of the inference. If for example a person raises his right
hand or has a number come into his head without obvious cause, any
_inferred_ antecedent experience as the causal factor must be open to
more or less doubt, and, therefore, a subconscious process cannot be
postulated with certainty. This uncertainty seriously affects the
validity of conclusions drawn from clinical phenomena where the
antecedent experience as well as a subconscious process must be inferred
and perhaps even a matter of guesswork.
Let us examine then, a few selected phenomena where the causal factor in
the process is a known antecedent conscious experience, one which can be
logically related to the succeeding phenomenon only by the postulation
of an intervening process of some kind. By an analysis of the antecedent
experience and the caused phenomenon into their constituent elements we
shall often be able to infer the functional characteristics of this
intervening process. Then, if the subject is a favorable one, by the use
of hypnotic and other methods we may be able to obtain an insight into
the intrinsic nature of the subconscious process and determine how far
it is conscious and how far unconscious. Necessarily the most available
phenomena are those experimentally induced. We can arrange beforehand
the causal experience and the phenomenon which it is to determine—an
hallucination, a motor automatism, a dream, a conscious process of
thought, or the product of an intellectual operation. The number of
observations we shall examine might be made much larger and the types
more varied. Those I have selected have such close analogies with
certain experiences of everyday and pathological life that what is found
to be true of them will afford valuable fundamentals in the elucidation
of these latter experiences.[80]
=Subconscious processes in which the causal factor was antecedently
known.=—I. The evidential value of _post-hypnotic phenomena_ ranks
perhaps in the first place for our purpose as the conditions under which
they occur are largely under control. Among these showing subconscious
processes of a high order of intelligence are:
(a) The well-known subconscious mathematical calculations which I cited
in a previous lecture (p. 96). There is no possible explanation of this
phenomenon except that the calculation was a subconscious process and
done either coconsciously or unconsciously. That it may be done, in some
cases, by coconscious processes of which the subject is unaware is
substantiated by the evidence.[81] In other cases this does not appear
to be wholly the case if we can rely upon hypnotic memories. We will
examine this process in connection with:
(b) A second class of post-hypnotic phenomena, namely, those of
suggested actions carried out by the subject more or less automatically,
in a sort of absent-minded way, without his being aware of what he is
doing. The subject is directed in hypnosis to perform such or such an
action after being awakened. Sometimes the suggested action is performed
consciously, the suggested ideas with their impulses arising in his
mind, but without his knowing why. In other instances, however, he
performs the action automatically without being consciously aware at the
moment that he is doing it, his attention being directed toward
something else. Such actions must be performed by some kind of
subconscious processes instigated by the ideas suggested in hypnosis.
Now hypnotic and other technically evoked memories sometimes reveal the
conscious content of the processes involved in both classes of
phenomena. For instance: two intelligent subjects, who have been the
object of extensive observations on this point, are able to recall in
hypnosis the previous occurrence of coconscious ideas of a peculiar
character. The description of these ideas has been very precise and has
carried a conviction, I believe, to all those who have had an
opportunity to be present at these observations that these recollections
were true memories and not fabrications.[82] The statements of these
subjects is that in their own cases, under certain conditions of
everyday life, coconscious ideas _of which the principal consciousness
is not aware_ emerge into the subconscious, persist for a longer or
shorter time, and then subside to be replaced by others. So long as the
conditions of their occurrence continue these coconscious ideas keep
coming and going, interchanging with one another. Sometimes these ideas
take the form of images, or what is described as visual “pictures.” When
the conditions are those of the subconscious solution of a mathematical
calculation then the same “pictures” occur and take the form of the
figures involved in the calculation; the figures come and go, apparently
add, subtract, and multiply themselves until the final result appears in
figures. An example will make this clear.
While the subject was in hypnosis the problem was given to add 458 and
367, the calculation to be done _subconsciously_ after she was awake.
The problem was successfully accomplished in the usual way. The mode in
which the calculation was effected was then investigated with the
following result: In what may be termed for convenience the secondary
consciousness, i.e., the subconsciousness, the numbers 458 and 367
appeared as distinct visualizations. These numbers were placed one over
the other, “with a line underneath them such as one makes in adding. The
visualization kept coming and going; sometimes the line was crooked and
sometimes it was straight. The secondary consciousness did not do the
sum at once, but by piecemeal. It took a long time before it was
completed.” The sum was not apparently done as soon as one would do it
when awake, by volitional calculation, “but rather the figures _added
themselves_, in a curious sort of way. The numbers were visualized and
the visualization kept coming and going and the columns at different
times added themselves, as it seemed, the result appearing at the
bottom.” In another problem (453 to be multiplied by 6) the process was
described as follows: The numbers were visualized in a line, thus, 453 ×
6. Then the 6 arranged itself under the 453. The numbers kept coming and
going the same as before. Sometimes, however, they added themselves, and
sometimes the 6 subtracted itself from the larger number. Finally,
however, the result was obtained. As in the first problem, the numbers
kept coming and going in the secondary consciousness until the problem
was solved and then they ceased to appear. It is to be understood, of
course, that the _principal or personal consciousness was not aware of
these coconscious figures, or even that any calculation was being or to
be performed_.
In suggested post-hypnotic actions, the pictures that come and go
correspond to and represent the details of the action as it is carried
out. Each detail is preceded or accompanied by its coconscious image or
picture. Likewise, when somatic phenomena have followed dreams, pictures
representing certain elements of the dream have appeared as secondary
conscious states. When the subject has been disturbed by some unsolved
moral or social problem (not suggested) the pictures have been symbolic
representations of the disturbing doubts and scruples.[83]
One of these two subjects, while in hypnosis and able to recollect what
goes on in the secondary consciousness, thus describes the coconscious
process during the _spontaneous_ subconscious solution of problems.
“When a problem on which my waking self is engaged remains unsettled, it
is still kept in mind by the secondary consciousness even though put
aside by my waking self. My secondary consciousness often helps me to
solve problems which my waking consciousness has found difficulty in
doing. But it is not my secondary consciousness that accomplishes the
final solution itself, but it helps in the following way: Suppose, for
instance, I am trying to translate a difficult passage in Virgil. I work
at it for some time and am puzzled. Finally, unable to do it, I put it
aside, leaving it unsolved. I decide that it is not worth bothering
about and so put it out of my mind. But it is a mistake to say you put
it _out_ of your mind. What you do is, you put it _into_ your mind; that
is to say, you don’t put it out of your mind if the problem remains
unsolved and unsettled. By putting it _into_ your mind I mean that,
although the waking consciousness may have put it aside, the problem
still remains in the secondary consciousness. In the example I used the
memory of the passage from Virgil would be retained persistently by my
secondary consciousness. Then from time to time a whole lot of
fragmentary memories and thoughts connected with the passage would arise
in this consciousness. Some of these thoughts, perhaps, would be
memories of the rules of grammar, or different meanings of words in the
passage, in fact, anything I had read, or thought, or experienced in
connection with the problem. These would not be logical, connected
thoughts, and they would not solve the problem. My secondary
consciousness does not actually do this, i.e., in the example taken,
translate the passage. The translation is not effected here. But later
when my waking consciousness thinks of the problem again, these
fragmentary thoughts of my secondary consciousness arise in my mind, and
with this information I complete the translation. The actual translation
is put together by my waking consciousness.[84] I am not conscious of
the fact that these fragments of knowledge existed previously in my
secondary consciousness. I do not remember a problem ever to have been
solved by the secondary consciousness.[85] It is always solved by the
waking self, although the material for solving it may come from the
secondary. When my waking consciousness solves it in this way, the
solution seems to come in a miraculous sort of way, sometimes as if it
came to me from somewhere else than my own mind. I have sometimes
thought, in consequence, that I had solved it in my sleep.”[86]
A series of observations conducted with a fourth subject (O. N.) gave
the following results, briefly summarized. (This subject, like the
others, is practiced in introspection and can differentiate her memories
with precision.) She distinguishes “two strata” in her mental processes
(an upper and lower). The “upper stratum” consists of the thoughts in
the focus of attention. The lower (also called the background of her
mind) consists of the perceptions and thoughts which are not in the
focus. This stratum, of course, corresponds with what is commonly
recognized as the fringe of consciousness, and, as is usual, when her
attention is directed elsewhere she is not aware of it. She can,
however, bring this fringe within the field of attention and then she
becomes aware of, or rather remembers, its content during the preceding
moment. To be able to do this is nothing out of the ordinary, but what
is unusual is this: by a trick of abstraction which she has long
practiced, she can bring the memory of the fringe or stratum into the
full light of awareness and then it is discovered that it has been
exceedingly rich in thoughts, far richer than ordinary attention would
show and a fringe is supposed to be. It is indeed a veritable
coconsciousness in which there goes on a secondary stream of thoughts
often of an entirely different character and with different affects from
those of the upper stratum. It is common for thoughts which she _has
resolutely put out of her mind as intolerable or unacceptable, or
problems which have not been solved, to continue functioning in the
lower stratum without entering awareness_.[87] She can, however, at any
time become aware of them by the trick of abstraction referred to, and
sometimes they emerge apparently spontaneously and suddenly[88] replace
the “upper stratum.” In hypnosis also the content of the lower stratum
can be distinctly recalled.
Now the point I have been coming to is, the subject has acquired the
habit of postponing the decision of many everyday problems and giving
them, as a matter of convenience, to this second stratum or fringe to
solve. She puts one aside, that is out of (or _into_) her mind and it
goes into this stratum. Then, later, when the time for action comes, she
voluntarily goes into abstraction, becomes aware of the subconscious
thoughts of the second stratum and, lo and behold! the problem is found
to be solved. If a plan of action, all the details are found arranged as
if planned “consciously.” If asked a moment before what plans had been
decided upon and decision reached she would have been obliged in her
conscious ignorance to reply, “I don’t know.”[89]
An analysis of these different observations shows, first, that the
post-hypnotic phenomena—calculations (a) and actions (b)—were performed
by a subconscious process. Of this there can be no manner of doubt, even
if the subsequent hypnotic memories of the process be rejected as
untrustworthy. The phenomenon—the answer to the mathematical problem in
the one case and the motor acts in the other—is so logically related to
the suggestion, and can be predicted with such certainty, that only a
causal relation can be admitted.
Second, in the calculation phenomena the process is clearly of an
intellectual character requiring _reasoning_ and the coöperation of
mathematical _memory_. (Reasoning is more conspicuous when the problem
is more complicated, as in the calculation of the number of seconds
intervening between, say, twenty-two minutes past eleven and seventeen
minutes past three o’clock.)[90] The phenomenon is the solution of a
problem.
The final phenomenon was not _immediately_ related to the suggested
idea. It was the final result of a quite long series of logical
processes of a more or less complex character occurring over a period of
time as in conscious calculation. _Conation_ (volition?) would seem also
to be essential to carry the suggested idea to fulfilment. _Subconscious
cognition_ would seem also to be required. There must have been an
intelligent appreciation of what the problem was and as soon as the
solution was accomplished the process stopped. Random figuring did not
continue.
In the post-hypnotic motor acts conation is obvious. Here too there is a
series of subconscious processes covering a period of time and carrying
out a purpose. The suggested causal idea did not include the acts
necessary for the fulfillment of the idea. Each step was adapted to an
end, ceased as soon as it accomplished that end, and was followed by
another in logical sequence, the whole taking place as if performed by
an intelligence. Reasoning may or may not be involved according to the
complexity of the actions.
Third; _the coconscious figures in the calculation experiments do not
constitute the whole of the process_. They would seem to be the product
of some deeper underlying process. The figures “kept coming and going”
and seemed to “add themselves.” There was no conscious process that
related the figures to one another and determined whether the problem
was one of addition or multiplication—as is the case when we do a
calculation consciously; that is to say, of course, if the hypnotic
personality remembered the whole of the conscious calculation. It was
more as if there was an underlying unconscious process which did the
calculation, certain final results of which appeared as dissociated
states of consciousness, i.e., figures which did not enter the personal
consciousness. The process reminds us of the printing of visible letters
by the concealed works of a typewriter; or of visible letters of an
electrically illuminated sign appearing and disappearing according as
the concealed mechanism is worked. This interpretation is in entire
accord with the spontaneous occurrence of the coconscious images during
the everyday life of these subjects. These images were pictorial
representations of antecedent thoughts and seemed to be the products or
elements of these thoughts apparently functioning as underlying
unconscious processes. Likewise, in post-hypnotic suggested actions, I
have not been able to obtain memories of coconscious thoughts directing
the actions, but only the images described. These behave as if they were
the product of another underlying process determining the action.
Inferences of this sort are as compulsory as the inference that the
illumination of a sensitive plate observed in the study of
radio-activity must be due to the bombardment of the plate by invisible
particles emitted by the radio-active substance. These particles and the
process which ejects them can only be inferred from the effects which
they produce. So, in the above observations, it would seem as if the
coconscious figures, and other images involved, must be ejected as
conscious phenomena by an underlying process. There is no explicit
evidence that this is conscious.
I said advisedly, a moment ago, “if the hypnotic personality remembered
the whole of the conscious calculation,” for, as a matter of fact, we
find, when we examine several different hypnotic states in the same
subject, that their memories for coconscious ideas are not coextensive,
one (or more) being fuller than another. Indeed in certain states there
may not be any such memories at all. It is necessary, therefore, to
obtain by hypnosis a degree of dissociation which will allow the
complete memories of this kind to be evoked. In the subjects I made use
of this procedure was followed. Theoretically it might be held that, no
matter how complete the memories evoked in the various states, some
other state might possibly be obtained in which still more complete
memory would be manifested. Theoretically this is true and all
conclusions are subject to this criticism. Practically, however, I
found, when making these investigations, that I seemed to have come to
the limit of such possibilities, for, obtain as I would new dissociated
arrangements of personality, after a certain point no additional
memories could be evoked. There is still another possibility that there
may be coconscious processes for which no memories can be evoked by any
method or in any state.
II. _Artificially induced visual hallucinations_ with which we have
already become familiar can, as we have seen, only be interpreted as the
product of subconscious processes. If only because of the important part
that hallucinations play in insanity and other pathological states and
of the frequency with which they occur in normal people (mystics and
others), the characteristics of the subconscious process are well worth
closer study. What is found to be true of the experimental type is
probably true of the spontaneous variety whether occurring in
pathological or normal conditions. Indeed, as we shall see, spontaneous
hallucinations have the same characteristics. We have considered them
thus far only from two points of view, viz. (1) as evidence of
conservation of forgotten experiences, and (2) as evidence for specific
residua of such experiences functioning as subconscious processes. Now,
artificial visual hallucinations, like the spontaneous ones, may be
limited—relatively speaking—to what is apparently little more than an
exact reproduction of an antecedent visual perception, e. g., a person
or object. But, generally speaking, it is more than this and when
analyzed will be found almost always to be the expression of a
complicated process. For instance, take the relatively simple crystal
vision, of the subject smoking a cigarette in a particular situation
during hypnosis, which I have previously cited. (Lecture III.) As a
matter of fact, the subject had no primary visual perceptions at the
time of the original episode at all. She was in hypnosis, her eyes were
closed, and she did not and could not see herself (particularly her own
face) or the cigarette or her surroundings. And yet the vision pictured
everything exactly as it had occurred in my presence, even to the
expression of her features. Looking into the crystal the subject saw
herself sitting in a particular place, enacting a series of movements,
talking and smoking a cigarette with a peculiar smile and expression of
enjoyment on her face.[91] For this experience there was complete
amnesia after waking from hypnosis and at the time of the vision.
Now consider further the facts and their implications. In the mechanism
of the process eventuating in the visual phenomenon we obviously have
two known factors: the antecedent causal factor—the hypnotic
episode—and, after a time interval, the end result—the vision. As there
was no conscious memory of the hypnotic episode the neurograms of the
latter must have functioned subconsciously to have produced the vision.
But what particular neurograms? As the subject’s eyes had been closed in
hypnosis, and, in any event, as she could not have seen her own face,
there were at the time no _visual_ perceptions of herself smoking a
cigarette, and therefore the vision could not have been simply a
reproduction of a visual experience. There were, however, tactual,
gustatory, and other perceptions and ideas of self and environment, and
these perceptions and ideas of course possessed _secondary visual
images_.[92] The simplest mechanism would be that the neurograms of this
complex of perception and ideas of self, etc., functioned subconsciously
and their _secondary_ visual images emerged into consciousness to be the
vision. I give this as the simplest mechanism by which we can conceive
of a visual representation of an antecedent experience emerging out of a
subconscious process.[93] There is a considerable body of data
supporting this interpretation.
But the original experiences of the episode included more than the mere
perceptions and movements of the subject. They included trains of
thought and enjoyment of the cigarette smoking experience. All formed a
complex of which the tactual and other perceptions of self were
subordinate elements. At one moment, of course, one element, and, at
another moment another element, had been in the focus of awareness, the
others becoming shifted into the fringe _where at all times were
secondary visual images of herself_. Did the subconscious process
underlying the vision include the whole of this complex? As to this, one
peculiarity of the vision has much significance. In behavior it acted
after the manner of a cinematographic or “moving picture,” and
delineated each successive movement of the episode, as if a rapid series
of photographs had been taken for reproduction. In this manner even the
emotional and changing play of the features of the vision-self,
expressive of the previous thoughts and enjoyment, were depicted. Such a
cinematographic series of visual images would seem to require a
concurrent subconscious process to produce the successive changes in the
hallucinatory images. As these changes apparently correspond from moment
to moment with the changes that had occurred in the content of
consciousness during the causal episode, it would also seem that the
subconscious process was a reproduction in subconscious terms of
substantially the whole original mental episode. This conclusion is
fortified by the following additional facts: In many experiments of this
kind, if the subject’s face be watched during the visualization, it will
be observed that _it shows the same play of features as is displayed by
the vision face_,[94] and the visualizer at the same moment _experiences
the same emotion as is expressed by the features of the vision
face_,[95] and sometimes knows “what her [my] vision self is thinking
about.” In other words, _in particular instances_, sometimes the
feelings alone and sometimes both the thoughts and feelings expressed in
pantomime in the hallucination arise at the same moment in
consciousness. This would seem to indicate that the same processes which
determined the mimetic play of features in the _hallucination_ were
determining at the same moment the same play in the features of the
visualizer, and that these processes were a subconscious memory of
substantially all the original perceptions and thoughts. That is to say,
this memory in such cases remains sometimes entirely subconscious and
sometimes emerges into consciousness. The hallucination is simply a
projected visualization induced by what is taking place subconsciously
in the subject’s mind at the moment. Whether this shall remain entirely
subconscious or shall emerge partially or wholly into consciousness
depends upon psychological conditions peculiar to the subject.
That even when the thoughts of the causal experience emerge in
consciousness along with the vision a portion of the functioning
complex—e. g., the perceptual elements—may still remain submerged is
shown by the following example: The vision, one of several of the same
kind, portrayed in pantomime an elaborate nocturnal somnambulistic act.
It represented the subject walking in her sleep with eyes closed; then
sitting before the fire in profound and depressing thought; then
joyously dancing; then writing letters, etc., and finally ascending the
stairs, _unconsciously dropping one of the letters from her hand on the
way_,[96] and returning to bed. During the visualization the thoughts
and feelings of the vision-self, even the contents of the letters, arose
in the mind of the visualizer whose features and tone of voice betrayed
the feelings.
The point to be noted in this observation is that the _vision reproduced
as a detail of the somnambulistic act the accidental dropping of a
letter from the hand of the somnambulist who was unaware of the fact_;
it reproduced what was not in conscious experience. How came it that an
act for which there had been no awareness could appear in the vision?
The only explanation is that originally in the somnambulistic state, as
is so commonly observed in hypnotic somnambulism, there was a
subconscious tactual perception (with secondary visual images?) of
dropping the letter and now the memory of this antecedent perception,
functioning subconsciously, induced this detail of the vision. The
general conclusion then would seem to be justified that this
hallucination was determined by a fairly large complex of antecedent
somnambulistic experiences of which a part emerged as the hallucination
and the thoughts of the somnambulist into consciousness, and a part—the
tactual and other perceptions—remained submerged as the subconscious
process. How much more may have been contained in this process the facts
do not enable us to determine.
An examination, then, of even the more simple artificial hallucinations
discloses that underlying them there is a residual process which is
quite an extensive subconscious memory of antecedent thoughts,
perceptions and affective experiences. Whether this memory is only an
unconscious functioning neurogram or whether it is also a coconscious
memory, or partly both, cannot be determined from the data.[97] The
bearing of these results upon the interpretation of _insane
hallucinations_ is obvious.
Our examination of subconscious processes in the two classes of
phenomena thus far studied—post-hypnotic phenomena and artificial
hallucinations—permits the following general conclusions: First, there
is positive evidence to show that in some instances, in their intrinsic
nature, they are coconscious. In other instances, in the absence of such
evidence, it is permissible to regard them as unconscious. Second, that
in the quality of the functions performed they frequently exhibit that
which is characteristic of Intelligence. This characteristic will be
seen to be still more pronounced in the phenomena which we shall next
study.
-----
Footnote 72:
I forbear to enter into the question of the nature of consciousness
and matter. In the last analysis, matter and mind probably are to be
identified as different manifestations of one and the same
principle—the doctrine of monism—call it psychical, spiritual, or
material, or energy, as you like, according to your fondness for
names. For our purpose it is not necessary to touch this philosophical
problem as we are dealing only with specific biological experiences.
Footnote 73:
Also quite commonly termed the Subconscious. Unfortunately the term
unconscious, as noun or adjective, is used in two senses, viz., (1)
pertaining to unawareness (for example, I am unconscious of such and
such a thing), and (2) in the sense of not having the psychological
attribute of consciousness, i.e., non-conscious.
In the first sense the adjective is used, as in the phrase
“unconscious process” to define a process of which we are unaware
without connotation as to whether it is a psychological process or a
brain process; also the noun (The Unconscious) is used to signify
something not in awareness regardless of whether that something is
psychological or not; on the other hand, as an adjective it is also
used, as in the phrase “unconscious ideas,” to specifically signify
real ideas of which we are unaware.
In the second sense, as noun or adjective, it is used to denote
specifically brain residua or processes, which, of course, are devoid
of consciousness. With this interchange of meaning the term is apt to
be confusing and is lacking in precision. _In the text unconscious
will be used always with the second meaning, unless inverted commas or
the context plainly indicate the first meaning._ (Cf. Lecture VIII,
pp. 248-254).
Footnote 74: