[Footnote 1: A lecture lately delivered at the Aldershot Military
Society's library.]
By Col. R. S. LIDDELL.
I feel that some apology is due from me for coming down to Aldershot
and giving my opinions before so many officers whose daily experience
renders them much more capable than I am of bringing this subject
forward, and it was with some hesitation that I yielded to the
flattering invitation of the Military Society of Aldershot to read a
paper here to-day on cavalry. At the same time, if it is thought that
anything I can say can increase the success that this society has
already met with, I can only add that I render my services most
willingly. It seems to me one of the many advantages that these
meetings possess is the bringing together of the different branches of
the service, and the mutual information they afford of each other's
arm. When we look back only a few years, we have much to be thankful
for in the disappearance of a vast amount of prejudice that used to
exist between the different branches. Each arm thought that theirs,
and theirs only, was worth studying. Infantry officers sometimes said,
as long as their arm was sufficiently numerous and well equipped,
that, with the exception of a few scouts and orderlies, cavalry might
be dispensed with. Artillery might think that unless guns were largely
used, no infantry could ever make an attack at all; while cavalry
officers, who were perhaps the most conservative of all, would point
to the past, and show how every battle that had ever been fought was
won by cavalry, and ever would be.
Confidence in one's own arm is most desirable, and should be fostered,
if at the same time we can learn how to work with others, remembering
that while cavalry gives the information to and hides the movements of
the army, while artillery shakes and disperses the enemy's formation,
and prepares the way for attack, it is the infantry alone who can
assault and hold the position, and it is for their advance and to
bring them up to the point that determines the battle in the condition
most favorable to insure success that all the efforts of the other two
arms must be devoted. I have made these preliminary remarks, as from
my paper being entirely given to the actions of cavalry, it might
appear that I am claiming more for that arm in the battle field than
is reasonable; but I wish it clearly understood that whatever I may
say is only in an auxiliary sense to the action of infantry, and I
trust that I shall not be thought underestimating other arms, while
showing unbounded confidence in my own.
The necessary rest required by Europe after the exhaustion of the wars
of Napoleon resulted in the long peace which succeeded the campaign of
1815. This, and the improvement that took place in fire arms in the
next forty years, gave room for speculation as to whether cavalry
would play as important a part in the future as it had done in the
past, under Marlborough, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and
Wellington. The Crimean war helped to confirm the opinion that the
days of cavalry had gone by. No account was made of the enormous
distance by sea that the cavalry had to be transported, the
unfavorable nature of the seat of war for that arm, the little scope
given in a campaign that resolved itself into a siege, the smallness
of the cavalry force employed, and the difficulty in keeping up a
fresh supply of horses. After this war came the introduction and
improvement in the breech loader, and with it opinions were
strengthened that cavalry duties would be still further limited, and
its traditions for a time appear to have been lost.
The awakening from this transient period of theory came from a nation
not trained to arms, and it is to the American civil war that we owe
the revival that took place in the use of the cavalry arm. The raids
made by the Confederates under Morgan, Stuart, Forrest, and by the
Federals under Sheridan, drew attention to advanced cavalry work, such
as scouting, reconnaissance, outpost and dismounted work. As
particular examples we may select Morgan's boldest and greatest raid
in 1862, when he passed through Kentucky and Indiana, capturing large
stores from the enemy. By his rapid and skillful marches the Federal
officers were completely bewildered. He was absent from his army 24
days, in which time he traveled 1,000 miles, capturing 17 towns and
destroying all the government supplies and arms. In a second raid he
forced the Federal army to fall back by taking possession of the
railway in its rear which brought it supplies. In October, 1862,
Stuart made his greatest raid through Pennsylvania, around the
Northern army. He set out with 1,800 cavalry and four pieces of horse
artillery, and crossed the Potomac. The telegraph wires were cut in
all directions, railways obstructed, and a large number of horses
captured, and all the public stores and buildings were destroyed. His
position at this time was very critical, 90 miles from his own army.
He considered it less dangerous to return by the opposite way to which
he came.
Forrest used his cavalry in every possible manner, dismounting in the
battle field and employing it as infantry. In October, 1864, during a
raid, he impeded the navigation of the Tennessee River, which was
filled with Federal gunboats. Choosing a strong position on the bank,
he masked his guns and awaited the approach of the enemy's vessels. He
captured a gunboat and a transport, and manned them with his own men;
but his naval expedition did not last long. Pursued by several
gunboats, he had to run his ships on shore, when the troopers gladly
mounted their horses again. His object was, however, gained--inspiring
alarm throughout the country and occupying a considerable number of
the enemy. Later on the Federals copied this system, when the raids of
Sheridan, with his 10,000 horsemen, armed with the magazine rifle and
revolver, with sword attached to the saddle, brought about the final
overthrow of the Southern army.
The next campaign that took place was in 1866, known as the "Seven
Weeks' War," when large bodies of cavalry were used by the Austrians
and Prussians. This campaign was of such short duration that there was
not sufficient time for the experience gained in the use of cavalry to
be utilized while the war lasted; but when the war was over, both
sides, having bought their experience, set out to reorganize their
systems, and the course pursued by the Prussians after this campaign
in largely increasing their cavalry was fully justified by the
advantages reaped in the war in France in 1870. At the close of the
Franco-German war the attention of the whole of Europe was called to
the successful use of German cavalry during the campaign, more
especially the advanced duties, when at times 60 miles in breadth and
50 in advance of the army was covered by the cavalry.
In England, after the termination of this war, many German military
works of great value were translated and published; the battle fields
in France were visited and described; every movement of both armies,
strategical and tactical, was studied. All this tended to draw our
attention to the extended use of the cavalry arm in future campaigns,
and the shortcomings of our own system were carefully scrutinized. The
movements of our drill book were simplified, the careful training of
our men in shooting was more fully recognized, and the teaching of
advanced cavalry duties, reconnaissance, outpost and dismounted work,
were gone into most thoroughly--in such a manner that I may
confidently appeal to those officers who have the best opportunities
of forming an opinion, whether our cavalry does not bear comparison
now with what is being done in other armies, and in these matters is
advancing in a satisfactory manner. While all this good work has been
going on (and I would be the last to say one word that might seem to
depreciate its value) we may perhaps have permitted the action of
cavalry on the field of battle to escape from sufficient notice.
It is for this reason I will ask your permission to bring before you
this subject, believing that the opinions of all branches of the
service being brought to bear upon it, considerable advantage maybe
obtained. It will be my endeavor to show, not by my own arguments, but
by quotations from others, that cavalry still has an important part to
take on the battle field, and far from its duties ending when armies
come in contact, that it is still reserved to them, as has been the
case before, to decide, perhaps by only one charge, the issue of a
whole campaign. Prince Kraft in his letters on cavalry says: "The
battle of Mars-la-Tour, won by the bold employment of cavalry, made
possible the blockade of Metz, and afterward the surrender of the
whole of Bazaine's army. So it may be said, without exaggeration, that
the charge of Bredow's six squadrons on that day was the turning point
of the Franco-German campaign."
Colonel Home, in his "Précis of Modern Tactics," says: "The action of
cavalry on the actual battle field is by no means a thing of the past.
The use of cavalry with skill at the right moment and in the right
numbers has always been considered one of the most difficult problems
in war. Modern arms have increased this difficulty manifold, but to
say the day of cavalry on the field of battle is past is merely
another way of saying that the knowledge of how it should be used is
wanting." Cavalry is apportioned to an army in two capacities: (1)
Divisional cavalry, that is (if possible) a regiment, or as many
squadrons as can be spared, attached to each infantry division, acting
under the orders of the general of the division. (2) The cavalry
division, that is, a large body of cavalry composed of several
brigades, an independent body having its own commander. On the march
the divisional cavalry covers the head and flanks of its own division:
on the field of battle it will be as near as possible to its division,
in the most sheltered spot that can be found; in the early part of the
battle it would be kept as much in reserve as possible, écheloned in
rear of one flank of its own infantry. It would remain there until the
artillery and musketry had effected their work, and the enemy's flanks
had become thinned and shaken. Then, when his infantry become tired
and exhausted, under cover of the smoke, the cavalry may be further
advanced.
Prince Kraft says: "At Sedan the divisional cavalry were employed
during the battle, charging by single squadrons, patrolling and
reconnoitering to obtain information of the enemy and the ground.
Every infantry body is accompanied by patrols, however small." An
instance of the too early employment of cavalry in a battle occurred
at Waterloo, when Napoleon at the commencement launched his cavalry
into the fight. The result was that although it far outnumbered the
English at first, it became so reduced, depressed, and worn out, that
it was unable afterward to offer full resistance to the British
squadrons, who were comparatively fresh. Wellington, on the contrary,
after his first successes, kept his cavalry, as much as possible, in
reserve. The field of battle itself shows the proper situation of
cavalry, but the divisional cavalry on the defensive side must always
be at hand to fall upon the flanks of the enemy's infantry when in
extended order, while that of the attacking side must be equally at
hand to prevent the flanks of its own infantry being so attacked.
In discussing the action of divisional cavalry, the most advantageous
time for its assisting in the combat must be considered. At what
moment, if any, can infantry be attacked by cavalry? When opposed to a
force acting on the defensive, divisional cavalry has its operations
limited, and probably in the earlier part of an engagement, confined
to watching, and, if possible, guarding the flanks of its own
attacking infantry from surprise. It is the cavalry on the defenders'
side that has the greatest opportunities. In both cases, however, a
rule must be made not to attack infantry when it has taken up a
favorable position, or before its ranks have been shaken by artillery
or musketry. Prince Kraft, in speaking of Mars-la-Tour, says: "This
same day took place a series of cavalry charges of greater or less
importance, which all showed practically to the cavalry the limits of
their effective action against infantry. The advancing infantry were
brought to a stand, infantry who gave way were ridden down, but where
the cavalry attacked infantry intact, the cavalry were unable to
prevail."
The precision of modern fire arms has necessitated great changes in
infantry tactics. To advance against the murderous fire of the present
rifle, infantry is compelled to adopt scattered formations in small
lines, and to move forward with sudden rushes. All this lends itself
to the attacks of an active cavalry. When these infantry attacks take
place, it may be presumed that they have already been under arms some
hours, have marched some distance, and been exposed to considerable
loss from artillery and musketry fire. Their advance in extended
formation will have commenced at about 1,000 yards, or earlier. By
this time the squadrons opposing them will have been brought to a more
advanced position, to the nearest point to their flank where cover is
afforded, and to carry this out successfully requires skillful
handling. Files must be extended, and short rushes made with small
bodies, say half a troop if over exposed ground, into sheltered
places. It is true that cavalry cannot hide themselves over exposed
ground as infantry can, but they have one advantage that nothing can
deprive them of--rapidity of motion; and the distance that would take
them say 10 seconds to traverse, viz., 150 yards, would take infantry
a minute.
Prince Kraft writes: "No battle field is a _tabula rasa_, for in the
most exposed country there are depressions. If strong skirmishing
lines of infantry can advance directly over a country devoid of cover,
cavalry can undoubtedly do the like, if by making use of the lie of
the ground they can gain the enemy's flank. A skilled cavalry leader
will thus undoubtedly find an opportunity to get close to the enemy."
Having arrived at this more advanced position, say from 500 to 1,000
yards, according to the formation of the ground, the nearer the
better, the most favorable moment to assail the flanks of the
attacking infantry would probably be immediately before the last belt
of the fighting line, and before the main body had re-enforced them,
as they are preparing for their last united rush, and as their
supports are doubling up to join them.
At this moment the men would be to some extent out of breath, their
attention would be fixed on the point about to be attacked, and their
flanks would be neglected. Cavalry should then descend upon them at
the utmost speed that can be extracted from the horses, with a good
interval from knee to knee. If there is only one squadron, one troop
should take the flank or fighting line, while the other throws itself
upon the support. As the distance to be covered in the open will
probably be not more than from 200 to 400 yards, they will be exposed
to fire, supposing none of the ground is undulating, for fifteen to
thirty seconds when at full speed. As they close on the infantry
neither the supports nor those in rear of them or their artillery will
dare to fire, on account of their own men. If the infantry run to get
into small squares, as is most likely, the cavalry must endeavor to
catch them before they assemble. If they get together it may be too
late for the cavalry to stop. They must then throw themselves upon
them and trust to the supporting squadron to complete the attack.
Although it is rare that a battle field is on such ground that there
are no undulations to afford shelter for cavalry in an advanced
position, this may be the case, and if so the enemy's infantry attack
must be allowed to take place, but even then, by cavalry showing
itself on the flanks for a moment, infantry would get together and
afford a better mark for fire, and the progress of the attack would be
delayed. The very appearance of cavalry frequently frightens infantry
into masses. If the ground was too much exposed for the charge, men
might be dismounted, with their carbines, at a safe distance to assist
the infantry. If mounted infantry were at hand, they would be utilized
in the same way, and the machine guns of the cavalry would also pour
in their volleys. If the enemy's attack is successful, cavalry must
then advance on their flanks and take its chance, and if necessary
sacrifice itself to give its own infantry time to rally. If it is
unsuccessful, the cavalry must be ready to take every favorable
opportunity of molesting its broken ranks.
Speaking of Mars-la-Tour, Prince Kraft says: "During the battle a
German infantry brigade was forced to retire with heavy loss, and ran
some danger of being annihilated by the pursuing enemy. But the First
Dragoons of the Guards threw themselves on the pursuers. The enemy's
infantry massed round the eagles and ceased to press on, while the
thin ranks of our infantry were able to rally, and our guns were saved
and brought into position. The losses were heavy; half a regiment of
cavalry (250 horses) were sacrificed in order to save the brigade." At
Waterloo a French division of infantry fled before three regiments of
dragoons (the Union Brigade). The Royal Dragoons and the Inniskillings
in first line, the Scots Greys on their left rear, the whole under Sir
William Ponsonby, acting in support of the Highland Infantry Brigade,
were awaiting the attack of the whole of the 1st French Division under
Gen. Alix. The three Scotch regiments threw into them a concentrated
fire, and as they were staggered by the shock Ponsonby gave the order
to advance. Passing through the Highlanders, the Greys having come up
into line, the three regiments charged the leading portion of the
French column, which yielded, and those in rear were hurled back. The
dragoons having the advantage of the descent of the hill appeared to
mow down the mass, the Greys on the left pressed on through the
supporting brigade of the French, while the Royals drove back the
right, giving no time for fire. Many threw down their arms, while
hundreds of prisoners were hurried off to the rear of the line. At the
same time the Inniskillings forced their way through the center, when
the remainder of the French division broke and fled.
It may be said that this took place before the introduction of the
rifle, and is therefore no example, but it took place within the range
of the weapon then in use, and at that distance it was equally
effective. The celebrated charge of Bredow's brigade at Vieuville
(Mars-la-Tour) also shows what an energetic attack may do. It had
become necessary to demand a sacrifice from the cavalry for the good
of the army, to enable Prince Frederick Charles, with only 24,000
infantry, to hold in check Bazaine's army of 180,000 until his own
main body came up. Bredow's cavalry brigade consisted of six squadrons
of the 7th Cuirassiers and the 16th Uhlans. They were ordered to make
a breach in the front of the 16th French Army Corps.
The six squadrons advanced in column, the cuirassiers leading, when
they received the word to change direction to the right, then to form
line, which was done under heavy fire. The cuirassiers getting into
line first, charged at once, the 16th following in echelon. In a
moment the batteries, vomiting flames, were reached with a loud
hurrah, and the gunners cut down at their guns, when the whole
brigade, which had now got into one line, charged the long lines of
infantry in rear, who received them with a heavy fire from their
chassepots. These lines, too, were broken through, and the main object
of the charge was attained, but, carried away by the ardor of the
combat, they charged and took the mitrailleuses, when the French
cuirassiers, with a dragoon brigade in support, come down upon them,
and compelled them to fall back. This they did, having to force their
way back through the enemy's masses of infantry with enormous loss.
The object, however, was gained, and the attack of the French corps
checked and never resumed. The cavalry division covers the advance of
the whole army, and is a day or two in front of it. It conceals and
guards the army, while finding out the movements of the enemy. It
collects information, and is also used with horse artillery on great
enterprises on the enemy's communications. Having finished the
reconnaissance and covering the army on the day of battle, it falls
back as the two opposing sides come in contact, and awaits further
orders. On the battle field it should be placed so as to suffer as
little loss as possible--as a rule, in rear of the flanks. How far
must depend on the formation of the ground; if shelter is to be
obtained nearer the front, the better. If not, then some 2,000 yards
in rear of one flank would seem advisable. Its duties are to guard the
exposed flank or flanks and rear of the army, while it watches the
cavalry of the enemy. If within range of artillery, it should be kept
on the move from front to rear. Its strength should not be wasted or
frittered away on doubtful enterprises, as it maybe required for some
decisive blow, in pursuit, or in covering the retreat.
Prince Kraft, speaking of the battle of St. Privat, says: "On the 18th
of August the gigantic fight of St. Privat took place. The cavalry
divisions were held back in reserve, but the divisional cavalry took
an active part. During the battle a squadron of hussars advanced and
sent information of the enemy making a flank movement." He also says:
"At Sedan the cavalry division was kept in reserve." The massing of
artillery at the commencement of a battle must expose a long line with
some weak spot to attack. If protected by cavalry, then probably a
cavalry combat will ensue. Prince Kraft says: "The action of the
masses of German cavalry at Mars-la-Tour excited wonder and
admiration; they surprised the enemy's cavalry when in bivouac, they
met and surrounded the hostile infantry in a threatening manner, and
thus 8,000 cavalry occupied 65,000 infantry, until the Prussian
infantry came up. The cavalry made no charges which could not have
been successful, but carried out their task of occupying the enemy
almost without loss.
"In the old days these squadrons would have charged and ridden down
the infantry. The change is the result of the improvement in fire
arms." During the early stages of a battle, advanced parties, under
officers selected for the purpose, must be kept out from the cavalry
division to watch the enemy's movements, and the information they
should be able to afford should be invaluable to the general-in-chief.
An engagement with the enemy's cavalry should not be sought unless
they are much weaker; but should the necessity arise, the ground
should be reconnoitered, and every advantage of position taken to
insure success. The attack being determined on, the preparations for
it should be carried out rapidly. Echelon movements have many
advantages. They favor the formation of oblique lines, they also
insure in a charge direct to the front the bringing up of squadron
after squadron in support. The attack of Vivian's Hussar Brigade upon
the French reserves at Waterloo gives a brilliant illustration of
this, and has been termed by Siborne the "crisis of Waterloo." This
celebrated charge, intended to be in line, became virtually a charge
in echelon of squadrons in consequence of the rapid pace of the head
of the column.
"The movement of cavalry must be rapid and unexpected, and bear the
character of determined confidence; an effort should be made by
maneuvering to come suddenly on the enemy's flank. A gentle declivity
for the final charge must be sought. The rapid, vigorous, and
determined charge in line on to cavalry, riding knee to knee, is what
is required." The charge to be made effectual, the horses must be
brought up in wind, the gallop must not be begun too early; when begun
it must gradually be increased to a fast gallop, the final charge for
the last sixty yards made with every horse extended. "Nothing, then,
must be left undone to excite the spirit of enthusiasm, even to
ferocity; then, and only then, the 'cheer' to be raised." At Waterloo
the charge of the heavy brigade, the 1st and 2d Life Guards and King's
Dragoon Guards, with the Blues in support, is a good example of a
successful attack on cavalry. The French line of cavalry as it
advanced presented an imposing appearance.
They had ascended the brow of the ridge, when a vigorous fire from
Ross' Horse Artillery was opened on to them. In the next moment their
trumpets sounded the charge and they rushed to the attack, and as
cuirassiers approached the British squares, the Heavy Brigade dashed
into them. The shock was terrific. The right of the Life Guards being
thrown forward, came first into collision. The right of the French was
suddenly thrown out by coming unexpectedly on to a hollow way, and as
they passed it the 2d Life Guards came full speed upon them. The
French cuirassiers were driven back and pursued until the English
brigade came under infantry fire.
The charge of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade at Balaklava, under Gen.
Scarlett, is another good example, when the Russian cavalry, receiving
the British charge at a halt, were entirely overthrown. One of the
greatest difficulties after the charge is to know when and how to
stop, and it is then that the squadron and troop leaders, well in
front of their men, must use all their efforts to carry out the ends
of their commander. I think this is the time when a strong whistle
carried by the commanding officer and the squadron leaders can be used
with good effect. Being an unusual sound, it would attract attention.
The battle being over, some of the most serious duties of cavalry
commence. If the enemy is victorious, the pursuit has immediately to
follow. History points out the difficulty of carrying this out.
Uncertainty of the victory, or how far it can be counted on, often
delays its commencement. Battles are often ended by nightfall,
valuable time is lost, and the golden opportunities are past. An
active cavalry leader will, however, without further orders at least,
follow with his advanced parties and not lose touch of the enemy. He
will soon learn the condition of the enemy, act accordingly, harass
his flanks and rear and play upon him with his artillery.
An example of another manner in which cavalry may be employed after a
victory can be taken from the Egyptian campaign of 1882, when, after
the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, by a rapid advance of the cavalry some
fifty miles ahead of the infantry, the capital of the country was
captured by the English cavalry division.
If the battle is lost, still greater are the responsibilities of the
cavalry. Detached squadrons with scouts must be sent round the flanks
to ascertain the strength of the enemy sent in pursuit. Every
available position must be taken up by the horse artillery, and every
advantage seized for counter attack. Above all, accurate information
must be obtained for the general-in-chief of the nature of the
pursuit, in order that he may not harass his main body by falling back
further than necessary. This subject, however, is beyond the scope of
this lecture, and is one of study of past campaigns.
Of the action of cavalry in savage warfare, the recent campaigns in
Africa have given some experience. In the presence of an enemy met
with in such enormous numbers as in the desert, cut off from all help,
knowing that unless you win you die, it seems to be decided that our
infantry must adopt the square as the most suitable formation. In the
Zulu war, the cavalry at the battle of Ulundi was placed inside the
square. The experience met with there was exceptional, and from the
swarms of savages surrounding the square in all directions it was
considered desirable to keep the 17th Lancers in the center of it, in
order that they should not interfere with the infantry fire, and that
when the enemy was repulsed, they should be launched out upon them,
and this was done with perfect success. It is, however, contrary to
the instincts and traditions of cavalry to be shut up in a square,
and, where practicable, I should think cavalry outside a square, even
at some distance out of the way of the infantry fire, acting with
horse artillery, would very much disturb the attacking bodies of the
enemy, and perhaps attract away a portion of them, and they could be
brought up, when called upon to do so, to carry out the pursuit.
In the first campaign on the east coast of the Soudan, on the advance
to El Teb and afterward to Tokar, squadrons were sent in front and on
the flanks of the square with scouts thrown out to feel the way and
obtain information, while the main body of the cavalry was echeloned
on the rear and flank opposite an angle of the square in the most
suitable manner to avoid any interference with its fire. During the
action it remained in this position until after the first attack on
the square, when it moved away past the square on the outward flank
and acted on the enemy's rear and engaged their reserves until the
action was over. During the desert march in the Nile expedition, the
19th Hussars, by its scouting, protected the square and gave it timely
notice of the approach of the enemy.
In a country where a great deal of bush abounds the effective charge
of cavalry on to groups of savages is very much curtailed. The Arabs
throw themselves on to the ground behind the prickly bushes, the ranks
are opened out as the horses avoid the thorns, and the men get no
chance of using their swords; but although much execution is not
achieved under these circumstances, the natives have great fear of
cavalry, and they are prevented from attacking elsewhere. When their
attention is thus occupied, horse artillery and machine guns might
make great havoc among them. At the action of Tamai, where the ground,
from the rocks and ravines of the neighboring mountains, was
unsuitable for cavalry charges, when one of the infantry squares was
broken, the cavalry advanced, and one squadron of the 10th Hussars,
dismounting, helped to create a favorable diversion by pouring fire
into the flanks of the attacking Arabs.
My remarks would, I think, be considered incomplete if I did not touch
on the question of cavalry charging squares, as this point is always
made very prominent in all discussions on the action of cavalry. I
therefore must not pass it by. I will say at once that I think it most
undesirable, even under favorable circumstances, that cavalry should
charge a formed square and men armed with the breech loader. At best
the gain can be but local and partial, while the loss to the
cavalry--an arm so difficult to keep up in numbers--must be
disastrous, and it seems to me that if cavalry by its appearance can
force infantry to form square, it has done enough, and that the
artillery, infantry, and machine guns should do the rest. The
necessity might, however, arise, and by looking at the past we see its
possibility. At Langensalza two Prussian squares were broken by the
Hanoverian cavalry, and the major part taken prisoners.
We have only to turn to the recent campaigns in Egypt to see the
effect of determined rushes of men, intending to succeed, charging on
to squares carefully formed on ground affording shelter, with an
enormous amount of fire being poured upon them. It will be said that
these men were fanatics, but our cavalry, too, have been, and will be,
fanatics in a charge; and I still think, if the necessity recurs, that
an attack, properly conducted on favorable ground, one troop charging
on the corner of a square, followed by another at double distance,
others in echelon on both flanks immediately following, the whole
charging with the greatest impetuosity, intended to win, will break
down any square that Englishmen are likely to meet with. If we look
back again on the past, we will find many instances of British cavalry
not being called upon in vain to make a sacrifice. At Talavera, the
23d Light Dragoons, supported by the 1st Hussars of the German Legion,
advanced against the French squares. In their impetuous rush they came
upon a hollow cleft covered with long grass, eight feet deep, and
eighteen feet broad. Too late to pull up, the foremost rode headlong
into it, some tumbled in, others over it, some rode boldly at it and
gained the other side. Still they went on, swept past the infantry
columns, and fell upon a brigade of French chasseurs.
At Balaklava 670 British horsemen were launched against an entire wing
of the Russian army. The brigade, at first in two lines, the 11th
Hussars, 17th Lancers, and 13th Light Dragoons, followed by the 4th
Light Dragoons and 8th Hussars, advanced down a gradual descent of
three-quarters of a mile; the Russian guns vomiting shell and shot
upon them, one battery bearing on their right, another on their left,
and all the intermediate ground covered with riflemen. The guns were
charged and forced through, the forces drawn up in rear were
overpowered. They then had to turn, and, retiring up hill, ran through
the same gauntlet. In the Sikh war, at the battle of Ferozeshah, the
3d Light Dragoons charged the enemy's entrenchments at a point
defended by some of their heaviest batteries. When within 250 yards
the regiment moved at speed under a destructive fire of grape and
musketry, and pressing forward at the charge entered the enemy's camp
and captured the whole of the batteries.
Cavalry attacks have been made with success after dark, and the
advantage, of course, is gained of obviating opposing fire. Prince
Kraft mentions that after the battle of Mars-la-Tour, the cavalry
division, re-enforced by the divisional cavalry, rode forward to
complete the advantages gained. It was almost night, and fault has
been found with making the attack in the dark. If the ground is well
known a night attack may be advisable. While criticising it, we have
to think of the feelings of a half-defeated army about to bivouac
being attacked by unknown forces in the dark. In this case, at
Vionville, the enemy did not wait for a second, but withdrew, and
abandoned the whole field of battle. Prince Kraft quotes the attack of
Blücher at Gross-Gorchen and a cavalry attack at Loon. During the
first Egyptian campaign the Life Guards made an attack by moonlight at
Kassassin.
I have now, I think, touched lightly on some important cavalry duties
on a campaign. In some points perhaps these remarks may appear
contradictory. How to combine keeping cavalry in reserve for any great
action it may be called upon to perform, while using it unsparingly to
assist on the battle field, if the necessity arises. It may, however,
be noticed that, much as they may be criticised, few cavalry
commanders have been severely blamed when they have thought it best to
take the bolder course. To insure to cavalry the power of carrying out
its duties successfully in war, organization and practice in peace is
most essential. Infantry may suddenly be increased without much
deranging its action in the field, but cavalry cannot be hurried into
an increased augmentation. In tactics simplicity in every evolution
and rapidity in execution are the most important principles. This
simplicity of drill, I think, might be assisted if our squadrons were
divided into four divisions, zuges, or pelotons. When squadrons have
48 files in the front rank there might be four of these, while weak
regiments with 36 files could drill equally as well with three
divisions. This system, introduced by the late Gen. Valentine Baker
into the English service for a time, and now used by all European
countries, was found to work well.
I think the whistle could be carried with advantage by all cavalry
officers. For advanced work attention can be drawn by it without being
heard at a distance like a bugle. In movements the commanding officers
would find it useful to call the attention of leaders to himself,
especially in extended or échelon formation. I have omitted to make
much mention of the action of horse artillery combined with cavalry,
as it seems beyond the limits of this paper; but it is one to which
the cavalry officer's attention requires to be brought most strongly
to bear. I would also have wished to have made some remarks on the
many advantages to be obtained by having mounted infantry attached to
cavalry. I understand that this force would be under the orders of the
cavalry general, and if so, I think a cavalry division well found in
horse artillery, with mounted infantry, whether conveyed on horses,
or, where the cavalry admitted of it, on cars, and accompanied by
machine guns on wheels, could act in such an independent manner as to
enable it to penetrate far ahead into an enemy's country, or threaten
his communications, and be absent from its main body for many days or
weeks.
As regards the English cavalry, I think it may be said, without
boasting, that the material is excellent. The men are of the best
physique, recruited from a good class, and plenty of them to be had.
The non-commissioned officers are intelligent and always ready for
instruction; the riding compares favorably with cavalry of other
nations, certainly far better than any I have ever seen abroad, either
German, Russian, or French, and among all foreign countries we have
the reputation of being the best horsemen in the world, which at all
events has a good moral effect. Our horses are undoubtedly first-rate,
having more quality and greater speed than foreigners. We have in our
officers the exact stuff we want. Their very sports and amusements
start them with all the makings of cavalry soldiers. But the quickness
of eye, the self-confidence and readiness that these sports and games
may give, require nowadays more than ever something beyond this to
produce the trained cavalry leader. Cavalry is an arm of opportunity,
and above all others depends greatly on its leaders, but with the
chances now available of reading, in every detail, the campaigns of
the past, if taken advantage of, as is now daily becoming more common,
we should produce in the future the best and most accomplished cavalry
officers that this country or any other has ever seen.
As there appeared to be a unanimity of opinion on the lecture, there
was no discussion, and the proceedings closed with a vote of thanks to
the lecturer.--_Broad Arrow._
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