[_Introduction_. After the fall of Olynthus in 348, the Athenians, on
the proposal of Eubulus, sent embassies to the Greek States in the
Peloponnese and elsewhere, to invite them to join in a coalition
against Philip. Aeschines went for this purpose to Megalopolis, and did
his best to counteract Philip's influence in Arcadia. When the
embassies proved unsuccessful, it became clear that peace must be made
on such terms as were possible. Philip himself was anxious for peace,
since he wished to cross the Pass of Thermopylae without such
opposition from Athens as he had encountered in 352, and to be free
from the attacks of hostile ships upon his ports. Even before the fall
of Olynthus, informal communications passed between himself and Athens
(see Speech on Embassy, §§ 12, 94, 315); and in consequence of these,
Philocrates proposed and the Assembly passed a decree, under which ten
ambassadors were appointed to go to Philip and invite him to send
plenipotentiaries to Athens to conclude a peace. Demosthenes (who had
strongly supported Philocrates) was among the ten, as well as Aeschines
and Philocrates himself. Delighted with Philip's reception of them, and
greatly attracted by his personality, the ambassadors returned with a
letter from him, promising in general terms to confer great benefits
upon Athens, if he were granted alliance as well as peace: in the
meantime he undertook not to interfere with the towns allied to Athens
in the Chersonese. Demosthenes proposed (in the Council, of which he
was a member in the year 347-346) the usual complimentary resolution in
honour of the ambassadors, and on his motion it was resolved to hold
two meetings of the Assembly, on the 18th and 19th of the month
Elaphebolion (i.e. probably just after the middle of April 346), when
Philip's envoys would have arrived, to discuss the terms of peace. The
envoys--Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus--reached Athens shortly
after this; and before the first of the two meetings was held, the
Synod of the allies of Athens, now assembled in the city, agreed to
peace on such terms as the Athenian people should decide, but added a
proposal that it should be permitted to any Greek State to become a
party to the Peace within three months. They said nothing of alliance.
Of the two meetings of the Assembly, in view of the conflicting
statements of Demosthenes and Aeschines, only a probable account can be
given. At the first, Philocrates proposed that alliance as well as
peace should be made by Athens and her allies with Philip and his
allies, on the understanding that both parties should keep what they
_de facto_ possessed--a provision entailing the renunciation by Athens
of Amphipolis and Poteidaea; but that the Phocians and the people of
Halus should be excluded. Aeschines opposed this strongly; and both he
and Demosthenes claim to have supported the resolution of the allies,
which would have given the excluded peoples a chance of sharing the
advantage of the Peace. The feeling of the Assembly was with them,
although the Phocians had recently insulted the Athenians by declining
to give up to Proxenus (the Athenian admiral) the towns guarding the
approaches to Thermopylae, which they had themselves offered to place
in the hands of Athens. But Philocrates obtained the postponement of
the decision till the next day. On the next day, if not before, it
became plain that Philip's envoys would not consent to forgo the
exclusion of the Phocians and Halus; but in order that the Assembly
might be induced to pass the resolution, the clause expressly excluding
them was dropped, and peace and alliance were made between Athens and
Philip, each with their allies.[n] Even this was not secured before
Aeschines and his friends had deprecated rash attempts to imitate the
exploits of antiquity by continuing the war, and had explained that
Philip could not openly accept the Phocians as allies, but that when
the Peace was concluded, he would satisfy all the wishes of the
Athenians in every way; while Eubulus threatened the people with
immediate war, involving personal service and heavy taxation, unless
they accepted Philocrates' decree. A few days afterwards the Athenians
and the representatives of the allies took the oath to observe the
Peace: nothing was said about the Phocians and Halus: Cersobleptes'
representative was probably not permitted to swear with the rest. The
same ten ambassadors as before were instructed to receive Philip's
oath, and the oaths of his allies, to arrange for the ransom of
prisoners, and generally to treat with Philip in the interests of
Athens. Demosthenes urged his colleagues (and obtained an instruction
from the Council to this effect) to sail at once, in order that Philip,
who was now in Thrace, might not make conquests at the expense of
Athens before ratifying the Peace; but they delayed at Oreus, went by
land, instead of under the escort of Proxenus by sea, and only reached
Pella (the Macedonian capital) twenty-three days after leaving Athens.
Philip did not arrive for twenty-seven days more. By this time he had
taken Cersobleptes prisoner, and captured Serrhium, Doriscus, and other
Thracian towns, which were held by Athenian troops sent to assist
Cersobleptes. Demosthenes was now openly at variance with his
colleagues. He had no doubt realized the necessity of peace, but
probably regarded the exclusion of the Phocians as unwarrantable, and
thought that the policy of his colleagues must end in Philip's conquest
of all Greece. At Pella he occupied himself in negotiations for the
ransom of prisoners. After taking the oath, Philip kept the ambassadors
with him until he had made all preparations for his march southward,
and during this time he played with them and with the envoys from the
other Greek States who were present at the same time. His intention of
marching to Thermopylae was clear; but he seems to have led all alike
to suppose that he would fulfil their particular wishes when he had
crossed the Pass. The ambassadors accompanied him to Pherae, where the
oath was taken by the representatives of Philip's allies; the Phocians,
Halus, and Cersobleptes were excluded from the Peace. (Halus was taken
by Philip's army shortly afterwards.) The ambassadors of Athens then
returned homewards, bearing a letter from Philip, but did not arrive at
Athens before Philip had reached Thermopylae. On their return
Demosthenes denounced them before the Council, which refused them the
customary compliments, and (on Demosthenes' motion) determined to
propose to the people that Proxenus with his squadron should be ordered
to go to the aid of the Phocians and to prevent Philip from crossing
the Pass. When the Assembly met on the 16th of Scirophorion (shortly
before the middle of July), Aeschines rose first, and announced in
glowing terms the intention of Philip to turn round upon Thebes and to
re-establish Thespiae and Plataeae; and hinted at the restoration to
Athens of Euboea and Oropus. Then Philip's letter was read, containing
no promises, but excusing the delay of the ambassadors as due to his
own request. The Assembly was elated at the promises announced by
Aeschines; Demosthenes' attempt to contradict the announcement failed;
and on Philocrates' motion, it was resolved to extend the Peace and
alliance with Philip to posterity, and to declare that if the Phocians
refused to surrender the Temple of Delphi to the Amphictyons, Athens
would take steps against those responsible for the refusal. Demosthenes
refused to serve on the Embassy appointed to convey this resolution to
Philip: Aeschines was appointed, but was too ill to start. The
ambassadors set out, but within a few days returned with the news that
the Phocian army had surrendered to Philip (its leader, Phalaecus, and
his troops being allowed to depart to the Peloponnese). The surrender
had perhaps been accelerated by the news of the Athenian resolution.
The Assembly, in alarm lest Philip should march southwards, now
resolved to take measures of precaution and defence, and to send the
same ambassadors to Philip, to do what they could. They went, Aeschines
among them, and arrived in the midst of the festivities with which
Philip was celebrating the success of his plans. The invitation which
Philip sent to Athens--to send a force to join his own, and to assist
in settling the affairs of Phocis--was (on Demosthenes' advice)
declined by the Assembly; and soon afterwards another letter from
Philip expressed surprise at the unfriendly attitude taken up by the
Athenians towards him. Philip next summoned the Amphictyonic Council
(the legitimate guardians of the Delphian Temple, on whose behalf the
Thebans and Thessalians, aided by Philip, were now at war with the
Phocians): and the Council, in the absence of many of its members,
resolved to transfer the votes of the Phocians in the Council-meeting
to Philip, to break up the Phocian towns into villages, disarming their
inhabitants and taking away their horses, to require them to repay the
stolen treasure to the temple by instalments, and to pronounce a curse
upon those actually guilty of sacrilege, which would render them liable
to arrest anywhere. The destructive part of the sentence was rigorously
executed by the Thebans. In order to punish the former supporters of
the Phocians, the right to precedence in consulting the oracle was
transferred from Athens to Philip, by order of the Council, and the
Spartans were excluded from the temple: Orchomenus and Coroneia were
destroyed and their inhabitants enslaved; and Thebes became absolute
mistress of all Boeotia. The Pythian games (at Delphi) in September 346
were celebrated under Philip's presidency; but both Sparta and Athens
refused to send the customary deputation to them, and Philip
accordingly sent envoys to Athens, along with representatives of the
Amphictyons, to demand recognition for himself as an Amphictyonic
power. Aeschines supported the demand, his argument being apparently to
the effect that Philip had been forced to act as he had done by the
Thebans and Thessalians; but the Assembly was very angry at the results
(as they seemed to be) of Aeschines' diplomacy and the calamities of
the Phocians; and it was only when Demosthenes, in the Speech on the
Peace, advised compliance, that they were persuaded to give way. To
have refused would have brought the united forces of the Amphictyonic
States against Athens: and these she could not have resisted. It was
therefore prudent to keep the Peace, though Demosthenes evidently
regarded it only as an armistice.]
{1} I see, men of Athens, that our present situation is one of great
perplexity and confusion, for not only have many of our interests been
sacrificed, so that it is of no use to make eloquent speeches about
them; but even as regards what still remains to us, there is no general
agreement in any single point as to what is expedient: some hold one
view, and some another. {2} Perplexing, moreover, and difficult as
deliberation naturally is, men of Athens, you have made it far more
difficult. For while all the rest of mankind are in the habit of
resorting to deliberation before the event, you do not do so until
afterwards: and consequently, during the whole time that falls within
my memory, however high a reputation for eloquence one who upbraids you
for all your errors may enjoy, the desired results and the objects of
your deliberation pass out of your grasp. {3} And yet I believe--and it
is because I have convinced myself of this that I have risen--that if
you resolve to abandon all clamour and contention, as becomes men who
are deliberating on behalf of their country upon so great an issue, I
shall be able to describe and recommend measures to you, by which the
situation may be improved, and what we have sacrificed, recovered.
{4} Now although I know perfectly well, men of Athens, that to speak to
you about one's own earlier speeches, and about oneself, is a practice
which is always extremely repaying, I feel the vulgarity and
offensiveness of it so strongly, that I shrink from it even when I see
that it is necessary. I think, however, that you will form a better
judgement on the subject on which I am about to speak, if I remind you
of some few of the things which I have said on certain previous
occasions. {5} In the first place, men of Athens, when at the time of
the disturbances in Euboea[n] you were being urged to assist
Plutarchus, and to undertake an inglorious and costly campaign, I came
forward first and unsupported to oppose this action, and was almost
torn in pieces by those who for the sake of their own petty profits had
induced you to commit many grave errors: and when only a short time had
elapsed, along with the shame which you incurred and the treatment
which you received--treatment such as no people in the world ever
before experienced at the hands of those whom they went to
assist--there came the recognition by all of you of the baseness of
those who had urged you to this course, and of the excellence of my own
advice. {6} Again, men of Athens, I observed that Neoptolemus[n] the
actor, who was allowed freedom of movement everywhere on the ground of
his profession, and was doing the city the greatest mischief, was
managing and directing your communications with Philip in Philip's own
interest: and I came forward and informed you; and that, not to gratify
any private dislike or desire to misrepresent him, as subsequent events
have made plain. {7} And in this case I shall not, as before, throw the
blame on any speakers or defenders of Neoptolemus--indeed, he had no
defenders; it is yourselves that I blame. For had you been watching
rival tragedies in the theatre, instead of discussing the vital
interests of a whole State, you could not have listened with more
partiality towards him, or more prejudice against me. {8} And yet, I
believe, you have all now realized that though, according to his own
assertion, this visit to the enemy's country was paid in order that he
might get in the debts owing to him there, and return with funds to
perform his public service[n] here; though he was always repeating the
statement that it was monstrous to accuse those who were transferring
their means from Macedonia to Athens; yet, when the Peace had removed
all danger, he converted his real estate here into money, and took
himself off with it to Philip. {9} These then are two events which I
have foretold--events which, because their real character was exactly
and faithfully disclosed by me, are a testimony to the speeches which I
have delivered. A third, men of Athens, was the following; and when I
have given you this one instance, I will immediately proceed to the
subject on which I have come forward to speak. When we returned from
the Embassy, after receiving from Philip his oath to maintain the
Peace, {10} there were some[n] who promised that Thespiae and
Plataeae[n] would be repeopled, and said that if Philip became master
of the situation, he would save the Phocians, and would break up the
city of Thebes into villages; that Oropus would be yours, and that
Euboea would be restored to you in place of Amphipolis--with other
hopes and deceptions of the same kind, by which you were seduced into
sacrificing the Phocians in a manner that was contrary to your interest
and perhaps to your honour also. But as for me, you will find that
neither had I any share in this deception, nor yet did I hold my peace.
On the contrary, I warned you plainly, as, I know you remember, that
_I_ had no knowledge and no expectations of this kind, and that I
regarded such statements as nonsense.
{11} All these plain instances of superior foresight on my part, men of
Athens, I shall not ascribe to any cleverness, any boasted merits, of
my own. I will not pretend that my foreknowledge and discernment are
due to any causes but such as I will name; and they are two. The first,
men of Athens, is that good fortune, which, I observe, is more powerful
than all the cleverness and wisdom on earth. {12} The second is the
fact that my judgement and reasoning are disinterested. No one can
point to any personal gain in connexion with my public acts and words:
and therefore I see what is to our interest undistorted, in the light
in which the actual facts reveal it. But when you throw money into one
scale of the balance, its weight carries everything with it; your
judgement is instantly dragged down with it, and one who has acted so
can no longer think soundly or healthily about anything.
{13} Now there is one primary condition which must be observed by any
one who would furnish the city with allies or contributions or anything
else--he must do it without breaking the existing Peace: not because
the Peace is at all admirable or creditable to you, but because,
whatever its character, it would have been better, in the actual
circumstances, that it should never have been made, than that having
been made, it should now be broken through our action. For we have
sacrificed many advantages which we possessed when we made it, and
which would have rendered the war safer and easier for us then than it
is now. {14} The second condition, men of Athens, is that we shall not
draw on these self-styled Amphictyons,[n] who are now assembled, until
they have an irresistible or a plausible reason for making a united war
against us. My own belief is that if war broke out again between
ourselves and Philip about Amphipolis or any such claim of our own, in
which the Thessalians and Argives and Thebans had no interest, none of
these peoples would go to war against us, least of all--{15} and let no
one raise a clamour before he hears what I have to say--least of all
the Thebans; not because they are in any pleasant mood towards us; not
because they would not be glad to gratify Philip; but because they know
perfectly well, however stupid one may think them,[n] that if war
springs up between themselves and you, _they_ will get all the
hardships of war for their share, while another will sit by, waiting to
secure all the advantages; and they are not likely to sacrifice
themselves for such a prospect, unless the origin and the cause of the
war are such as concern all alike. {16} Nor again should we, in my
opinion, suffer at all, if we went to war with Thebes on account of
Oropus[n] or any other purely Athenian interest. For I believe that
while those who would assist ourselves or the Thebans would give their
aid if their ally's own country were invaded, they would not join
either in an offensive campaign. For this is the manner of
alliances--such, at least, as are worth considering; and the
relationship is naturally of this kind. {17} The goodwill of each
ally--whether it be towards ourselves or towards the Thebans--does not
imply the same interest in our conquest of others as in our existence.
Our continued existence they would all desire for their own sakes; but
none of them would wish that through conquest either of us should
become their own masters. What is it then that I regard with
apprehension? What is it that we must guard against? I fear lest a
common pretext should be supplied for the coming war, a common charge
against us, which will appeal to all alike. {18} For if the Argives[n]
and Messenians and Megalopolitans, and some of the other Peloponnesians
who are in sympathy with them, adopt a hostile attitude towards us
owing to our negotiations for peace with Sparta, and the belief that to
some extent we are giving our approval to the policy which the Spartans
have pursued: if the Thebans already (as we are told) detest us, and
are sure to become even more hostile, because we are harbouring those
whom they have exiled,[n] and losing no opportunity of displaying our
ill-will towards them; {19} and the Thessalians, because we are
offering a refuge to the Phocian fugitives;[n] and Philip, because we
are preventing his admission to Amphictyonic rank; my fear is that,
when each power has thus its separate reasons for resentment, they may
unite in the war against us, with the decrees of the Amphictyons for
their pretext: and so each may be drawn on farther than their several
interests would carry them, just as they were in dealing with the
Phocians. {20} For you doubtless realize that it was not through any
unity in their respective ambitions, that the Thebans and Philip and
the Thessalians all acted together just now. The Thebans, for instance,
could not prevent Philip from marching through and occupying the
passes, nor even from stepping in at the last moment to reap the credit
of all that they themselves had toiled for.[n] {21} For, as it is,
though the Thebans have gained something so far as the recovery of
their territory is concerned, their honour and reputation have suffered
shamefully, since it now appears as though they would have gained
nothing, unless Philip had crossed the Pass. This was not what they
intended. They only submitted to all this in their anxiety to obtain
Orchomenus and Coroneia, and their inability to do so otherwise. {22}
And as to Philip, some persons,[n] as you know, are bold enough to say
that it was not from any wish to do so that he handed over Orchomenus
and Coroneia to Thebes, but from compulsion; and although I must part
company with them there, I am sure that at least he did not want to do
this _more_ than he desired to occupy the passes, and to get the credit
of appearing to have determined the issue of the war, and to manage the
Pythian games by his own authority. These, I am sure, were the objects
which he coveted most greedily. {23} The Thessalians, again, did not
desire to see either the Thebans or Philip growing powerful; for in any
such contingency they thought that they themselves were menaced. But
they did desire to secure two privileges--admission to the Amphictyonic
meeting, and the recovery of rights at Delphi;[n] and in their
eagerness for these privileges, they joined Philip in the actions in
question. Thus you will find that each was led on, for the sake of
private ends, to take action which they in no way desired to take. But
this is the very thing against which we have now to be on our guard.
{24} 'Are we then, for fear of this, to submit to Philip? and do _you_
require this of us?' you ask me. Far from it. Our action must be such
as will be in no way unworthy of us, and at the same time will not lead
to war, but will prove to all our good sense and the justice of our
position: and, in answer to those who are bold enough to think that we
should refuse to submit to anything whatever,[n] [2] and who cannot
foresee the war that must follow, I wish to urge this consideration. We
are allowing the Thebans to hold Oropus; and if any one asked us to
state the reason honestly, we should say that it was to avoid war. {25}
Again, we have just ceded Amphipolis to Philip by the Treaty of
Peace;[n] we permit the Cardians[n] to occupy a position apart from the
other colonists in the Chersonese; we allow the Prince of Caria[n] to
seize the islands of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, and the Byzantines to
drive our vessels to shore[n]--obviously because we believe that the
tranquillity afforded by peace brings more blessings than any collision
or contention over these grievances would bring: so that it would be a
foolish and an utterly perverse policy, when we have behaved in this
manner towards each of our adversaries individually, where our own most
essential interests were concerned, to go now to war with all of them
together, on account of this shadow at Delphi.[n]