THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC

{1} Very different reflections suggest themselves to my mind, I men of

Athens, when I turn my eyes to our real situation, and when I think of

the speeches that I hear. For I observe that the speeches are all

concerned with the taking of vengeance upon Philip; whereas in reality

matters have gone so far, that we have to take care that we are not

ourselves the first to suffer: so that those who speak of vengeance are

actually, as it seems to me, suggesting to you a false conception of

the situation which you are discussing. {2} That there was a time when

the city could both keep her own possessions in safety, and punish

Philip, I am very well aware. For it was not long ago, but within my

own lifetime, that both these things were so. But I am convinced that

it is now quite enough for us as a first step to make sure of the

preservation of our allies. If this is safely secured, we shall then be

able to consider upon whom vengeance is to fall, and in what way. But

until the first step is properly conceived, I consider it idle to say

anything whatever about the last.

{3} If ever the most anxious deliberation was required, it is required

in the present crisis; and my greatest difficulty is not to know what

is the proper advice to give you in regard to the situation: I am at a

loss rather to know, men of Athens, in what manner I should address you

in giving it. For I am convinced by what I have heard with my own ears

in this place that, for the most part, the objects of our policy have

slipped from our grasp, not because we do not understand what our duty

is, but because we will not do it; and I ask you to suffer me, if I

speak without reserve, and to consider only whether I speak truly, and

with this object in view--that the future may be better than the past.

For you see that it is because certain speakers make your gratification

the aim of their addresses, that things have gone on getting worse,

till at last the extremity has been reached.

{4} I think it necessary, first, to remind you of a few of the events

which have taken place. You remember, men of Athens, that two or three

years ago[n] the news came that Philip was in Thrace, besieging Heraeon

Teichos. That was in the month of November. Amidst all the discussion

and commotion which took place in this Assembly, you passed a

resolution that forty warships should be launched, that men under

forty-five years of age should embark in person, and that we should pay

a war-tax of 60 talents. {5} That year came to an end, and there

followed July, August, September. In the latter month, after the

Mysteries,[n] and with reluctance, you dispatched Charidemus[n] with

ten ships, carrying no soldiers, and 5 talents of silver. For so soon

as news had come that Philip was sick or dead--both reports were

brought--you dismissed the armament, men of Athens, thinking that there

was no longer any occasion for the expedition. But it was the very

occasion; for had we then gone to the scene of action with the same

enthusiasm which marked our resolution to do so, Philip would not have

been preserved to trouble us to-day. {6} What was done then cannot be

altered. But now a critical moment in another campaign has arrived; and

it is in view of this, and to prevent you from falling into the same

error, that I have recalled these facts. How then shall we use this

opportunity, men of Athens? For unless you will go to the rescue 'with

might and main to the utmost of your power',[n] mark how in every

respect you will have served Philip's interest by your conduct of the

war. {7} At the outset the Olynthians possessed considerable strength,

and such was the position of affairs, that neither did Philip feel safe

against them, nor they against Philip. We made peace with them, and

they with us. It was as it were a stumbling-block in Philip's path, and

an annoyance to him, that a great city which had made a compact with us

should sit watching for any opportunity he might offer. We thought that

we ought to excite them to war with him by every means; and now this

much-talked-of event has come to pass--by what means, I need not

relate. {8} What course then is open to us, men of Athens, but to go to

their aid resolutely and eagerly? I can see none. Apart from the shame

in which we should be involved, if we let anything be lost through our

negligence, I can see, men of Athens, that the subsequent prospect

would be alarming in no small degree, when the attitude of the Thebans

towards us is what it is, when the funds of the Phocians are

exhausted,[n] and when there is no one to prevent Philip, so soon as he

has made himself master of all that at present occupies him, from

bringing his energies to bear upon the situation further south. {9} But

if any of you is putting off until then his determination to do his

duty, he must be desirous of seeing the terrors of war close at hand,

when he need only hear of them at a distance, and of seeking helpers

for himself, when now he can give help to others. For that this is what

it must come to, if we sacrifice the present opportunity, we must all,

I think, be fairly well aware.

{10} 'But,' some one may say, 'we have all made up our minds that we

must go to their aid, and we will go. Only tell us how we are to do

it.' Now do not be surprised, men of Athens, if I give an answer which

will be astonishing to most of you. You must appoint a Legislative

Commission.[n] But when the commissioners meet, you must not enact a

single law--you have laws enough--you must cancel the laws which, in

view of present circumstances, are injurious to you. {11} I mean the

laws which deal with the Festival Fund--to put it quite plainly--and

some of those which deal with military service: for the former

distribute your funds as festival-money to those who remain at home;

while the latter give immunity to malingerers,[n] and thereby also take

the heart out of those who want to do their duty. When you have

cancelled these laws, and made the path safe for one who would give the

best advice, then you can look for some one to propose what you all

know to be expedient. {12} But until you have done this, you must not

expect to find a man who will be glad to advise you for the best, and

be ruined by you for his pains; for you will find no one, particularly

when the only result will be that some unjust punishment will be

inflicted on the proposer or mover of such measures, and that instead

of helping matters at all, he will only have made it even more

dangerous in future than it is at present to give you the best advice.

Aye, and you should require the repeal of these laws, men of Athens,

from the very persons who proposed them.[n] {13} It is not fair that

those who originally proposed them should enjoy the popularity which

was fraught with such mischief to the whole State, and that the

unpopularity, which would lead to an improvement in the condition of us

all, should be visited to his cost upon one who now advises you for the

best. Until you have thus prepared the way, men of Athens, you must

entertain no expectation whatever that any one will be influential

enough here to transgress these laws with impunity, or senseless enough

to fling himself to certain ruin.

{14} At the same time, men of Athens, you must not fail to realize this

further point. No resolution is worth anything, without the willingness

to perform at least what you have resolved, and that heartily. For if

decrees by themselves could either compel you to do what you ought, or

could realize their several objects unaided, you would not be decreeing

many things and performing few--nay, none--of the things that you

decree, nor would Philip have insulted you so long. {15} If decrees

could have done it, he would have paid the penalty long ago. But it is

not so. Actions come later than speeches and voting in order of

procedure, but in effectiveness they are before either and stronger

than either. It is action that is still needed; all else you already

have. For you have those among you, men of Athens, who can tell you

what your duty is; and no one is quicker than you are to understand the

speaker's bidding. Aye, and you will be able to carry it out even now,

if you act aright. {16} What time, what opportunity, do you look for,

better than the present? When, if not now, will you do your duty? Has

not the man seized every position from us already? If he becomes master

of this country too, will not our fate be the most shameful in the

world? And the men whom we promised to be ready to save, if they went

to war--are they not now at war? {17} Is he not our enemy? Are not our

possessions in his hands? Is he not a barbarian? Is he not anything

that you choose to call him? In God's name, when we have let everything

go, when we have all but put everything into his hands, shall we then

inquire at large who is responsible for it all? That we shall never

admit our own responsibility, I am perfectly sure. Just so amid the

perils of war, none of those who have run away accuses himself; he

accuses his general, his neighbour--any one but himself; and yet, I

suppose, all who have run away have helped to cause the defeat. He who

now blames the rest might have stood fast; and if every one had done

so, the victory would have been theirs. {18} And so now, if a

particular speaker's advice is not the best, let another rise and make

a proposal, instead of blaming him; and if some other has better advice

to give, carry it out, and good fortune be with you. What? Is the

advice disagreeable? That is no longer the speaker's fault--unless, of

course, he leaves out the prayer that you expect of him. There is no

difficulty in the prayer, men of Athens; a man need only compress all

his desires into a short sentence. But to make his choice, when the

question for discussion is one of practical policy, is by no means

equally easy. _Then_ a man is bound to choose what is best, instead of

what is pleasant, if both are not possible at once. {19} But suppose

that some one is able, without touching the Festival Fund, to suggest

other sources of supply for military purposes--is not he the better

adviser? Certainly, men of Athens--if such a thing _is_ possible. But I

should be surprised if it ever has happened or ever should happen to

any one to find, after spending what he has upon wrong objects, that

what he has _not_ is wealth enough to enable him to effect right ones.

Such arguments as these find, I think, their great support in each

man's personal desire, and, for that reason, nothing is easier than to

deceive oneself; what a man desires, he actually fancies to be true.

{20} But the reality often follows no such principle. Consider the

matter, therefore, men of Athens, after this fashion; consider in what

way our objects can be realized under the circumstances, and in what

way you will be able to make the expedition and to receive your pay.

Surely it is not like sober or high-minded men to submit

light-heartedly to the reproach which must follow upon any shortcomings

in the operations of the war through want of funds--to seize your

weapons and march against Corinthians and Megareans,[n] and then to

allow Philip to enslave Hellenic cities, because you cannot find

rations for your troops.

{21} These words do not spring from a wanton determination to court the

ill-will of any party among you. I am neither so foolish nor so

unfortunate as to desire unpopularity when I do not believe that I am

doing any good. But a loyal citizen ought, in my judgement, to care

more for the safety of his country's fortunes than for the popularity

of his utterances. Such, I have heard, and perhaps you have heard it

also, was the principle which the orators of our forefather's time

habitually followed in public life--those orators who are praised by

all who rise to address you, though they are far from imitating

them--the great Aristides, and Nicias, and my own namesake, and

Pericles. {22} But ever since these speakers have appeared who are

always asking you, 'what would you like?' 'what may I propose for you?'

'what can I do to please you?' the interests of the city have been

wantonly given away for the sake of the pleasure and gratification of

the moment; and we see the consequences--the fortunes of the speakers

prosper, while your own are in a shameful plight. {23} And yet

consider, men of Athens, the main characteristics of the achievements

of your forefathers' time, and those of your own. The description will

be brief and familiar to you; for you need not have recourse to the

history of others, when your own will furnish examples, by following

which you may achieve prosperity. {24} Our forefathers, who were not

courted and caressed by their politicians as you are by these persons

to-day, were leaders of the Hellenes, with their goodwill, for

forty-five years;[n] they brought up into the Acropolis more than

10,000 talents; the king[n] who then ruled Macedonia obeyed them as a

foreigner ought to obey a Hellenic people; serving in person, they set

up many glorious trophies for victories by land and sea; and alone of

all mankind they left behind them, as the crown of their exploits, a

fame that is beyond the reach of envy. {25} Such was the part they

played in the Hellenic world: and now contemplate the manner of men

they were in the city, both in public and in private life. As public

men, they gave us buildings and objects of such beauty and grandeur, in

the temples which they built and the offerings which they dedicated in

them, that no room has been left for any of those that come after to

surpass them: while in private life they were so modest, {26} so

intensely loyal to the spirit of the constitution, that if any one

actually knows what the house of Aristides, or Miltiades, or any other

of the glorious men of that day, is like, he can see that it is no more

imposing than those of their neighbours. For it was not to win a

fortune that they undertook affairs of State; but each thought it his

duty to add to the common weal. And thus, acting in a spirit of good

faith towards the Hellenes, of piety towards the gods, and of equality

towards one another, they naturally attained great prosperity. {27}

Such was the national life of those times, when those whom I have

mentioned were the foremost men in the State. How do matters stand

to-day, thanks to these worthy persons? Is there any likeness, any

resemblance, to old times? Thanks to them (and though I might say much,

I pass over all but this), when we had the field, as you see,

completely open to us--when the Spartans had been ruined,[n] and the

Thebans had their hands full,[n] and no other power could seriously

dispute the supremacy with us on the field of battle--when we could

have retained our own possessions in safety, and have stood as umpires

of the rights of others--we have been deprived of our own territory;

{28} we have spent more than 1,500 talents to no good purpose; the

allies whom we had gained in the war,[n] these persons have lost in

time of peace; and we have trained Philip to be the powerful enemy to

us that he is. Let any one rise and tell me how Philip has grown so

strong, if we ourselves are not the source of his strength. {29} 'But,

my good Sir,' you say, 'if we are badly off in these respects, we are

at any rate better off at home.' And where is the proof of this? Is it

in the whitewashing of the battlements, the mending of the roads, the

fountains, and all such trumperies? Look then at the men whose policy

gives you these things. Some of them who were poor have become rich;

others, who were unknown to fame, have risen to honour; some of them

have provided themselves with private houses more imposing than our

public buildings; and the lower the fortunes of the city have fallen,

the higher theirs have risen.

{30} What is the cause of all these things? Why is it that all was well

then, and all is amiss to-day? It is because then the people itself

dared to act and to serve in the army; and so the people was master of

its politicians; all patronage was in its own hands; any separate

individual was content to receive from the people his share of honour

or office or other emolument. The reverse is now the case. {31} All

patronage is in the hands of the politicians, while you, the people,

emasculated, stripped of money and allies, have been reduced to the

position of servile supernumeraries, content if they give you

distributions of festival-money, or organize a procession at the

Boedromia;[n] and to crown all this bravery, you are expected also to

thank them for giving you what is your own. They pen you up closely in

the city; they entice you to these delights; they tame you till you

come to their hand. {32} But a high and generous spirit can never, I

believe, be acquired by men whose actions are mean and poor; for such

as a man's practice is, such must his spirit be. And in all solemnity I

should not be surprised if I suffered greater harm at your hands for

telling you the things that I have told you, than the men who have

brought them to pass. Even freedom of speech is not possible on all

subjects in this place, and I wonder that it has been granted me to-day.

{33} If, even now, you will rid yourselves of these habits, if you will

resolve to join the forces and to act worthily of yourselves,

converting the superfluities which you enjoy at home into resources to

secure our advantage abroad, then it may be, men of Athens, it may be,

that you will gain some great and final good, and will be rid of these

your perquisites, which are like the diet that a physician gives a sick

man--diet which neither puts strength into him nor lets him die. For

these sums which you now share among yourselves are neither large

enough to give you any adequate assistance, nor small enough to let you

renounce them and go about your business; but these it is that[2]

increase the indolence of every individual among you. {34} 'Is it,

then, paid service that you suggest?'[n] some one will ask. I do, men

of Athens; and a system for immediate enforcement which will embrace

all alike; so that each, while receiving his share of the public funds

may supply whatever service the State requires of him.[3] If we can

remain at peace, then he will do better to stay at home, free from the

necessity of doing anything discreditable through poverty. But if a

situation like the present occurs, then supported by these same sums,

he will serve loyally in person, in defence of his country. If a man is

outside the military age, then let him take, in his place among the

rest, that which he now receives irregularly and without doing any

service, and let him act as an overseer and manager of business that

must be done. {35} In short, without adding or subtracting anything,[n]

beyond a small sum, and only removing the want of system, my plan

reduces the State to order, making your receipt of payment, your

service in the army or the courts, and your performance of any duty

which the age of each of you allows, and the occasion requires, all

part of one and the same system. But it has been no part of my proposal

that we should assign the due of those who act to those who do nothing;

that we should be idle ourselves and enjoy our leisure helplessly,

listening to tales of victories won by somebody's mercenaries;[n] for

this is what happens now. {36} Not that I blame one who is doing some

part of your duty for you; but I require you to do for yourselves the

things for which you honour others, and not to abandon the position

which your fathers won through many a glorious peril, and bequeathed to

you.

I think I have told you all that, in my belief, your interest demands.

May you choose the course which will be for the good of the city and of

you all!

The Public Orations of Demosthenes, volume 1 · 第 17 / 27 题