[_Introduction_. The speech was delivered in 354 B.C. News had been
brought to Athens that the Persian King Artaxerxes Ochus was making
great military and naval preparations, and though these were, in fact,
directed against his own rebellious subjects in Egypt, Phoenicia, and
Cyprus, the Athenians had some ground for alarm: for, two years before
this, Chares, in command of an Athenian fleet, had given assistance to
Artabazus, Satrap of Ionia, who was in revolt against the king. The
king had made a protest, and (late in 355) Athens had ordered Chares to
withdraw his aid from Artabazus. A party in Athens now wished to
declare war on Persia, and appealed strongly to Athenian traditions in
favour of the proposal. Demosthenes opposes them, on the ground that it
was not certain that the king was aiming at Athens at all, and that the
disunion of the Hellenic peoples would render any such action unsafe:
Athens had more dangerous enemies nearer home, and her finances were
not in a condition for such a campaign. But he takes advantage of the
interest aroused, to propose a reform of the trierarchic system,
designed to secure a more efficient navy, and to remedy certain abuses
in the existing method of equipping vessels for service.
In earlier times, the duty of equipping and commanding each trireme was
laid upon single citizens of means, the hull and certain fittings being
found by the state. When, early in the fourth century, the number of
wealthy men had diminished, each ship might be shared by two citizens,
who commanded in turn. In 357 a law was passed, on the proposal of
Periander, transferring the responsibility from individuals to
'Symmories' or Boards. (The system had been instituted in a slightly
different form for the collection of the war-tax in the archonship of
Nausinicus, 378-7 B.C.) The collection of the sums required became the
work of twenty Boards, formed by the subdivision of the 1,200 richest
citizens: each contributor, whatever his property, paid the same share.
The richer men thus got off with the loss of a very small proportion of
their income, as compared with the poorer members of the Boards,[1] and
in managing the business of the Boards they sometimes contrived to
exact the whole sum from their colleagues, and to escape payment
themselves. At the same time the duties of the several Boards and their
members were not allocated with sufficient precision to enable the
responsibility to be brought home in case of default; and the nominal
Twelve Hundred had fallen to a much smaller number, on whom the burden
accordingly fell with undue weight. Demosthenes' proposal provided for
the distribution of the responsibility of equipping the vessels and
providing the funds, in the most detailed manner, with a view to
preventing all evasion; but it was not carried. In fact, it was not
until 340 that he succeeded in reforming the trierarchy, and he then
made the burden vary strictly with property. The proposal, however, to
declare war upon Persia went no further.
While, in this speech, Demosthenes is in accord with the policy of
Eubulus, so far as concerns the avoidance of war with Persia, his
proposals of financial reform would not be viewed with favour by the
wealthy men who were Eubulus' firm supporters. Some of the themes which
recur continually in later speeches are prominent in this--the futility
of rhetorical appeals to past glories, without readiness for personal
service, and the need of a thorough organization of the forces. While
the speech shows rather too strongly the marks of careful preparation,
and seldom rises to eloquence--the style, indeed, is often rather
cramped and stiff, and the sentiments, especially at the beginning,
artificially phrased--it is moderate and practical in tone, and shows a
characteristic mastery of minute detail.]
{1} Those who praise your forefathers,[n] men of Athens, desire, no
doubt, to gratify you by their speeches; and yet I do not think that
they are acting in the interests of those whom they praise. For the
subject on which they attempt to speak is one to which no words can do
justice; and so, although they thus win for themselves the reputation
of capable speakers, the impression which they convey to their hearers
of the merit of our forefathers is not adequate to our conception of
it. For my part I believe that their highest praise is constituted by
Time: for the time that has passed has been long, and still no
generation has arisen, whose achievements could be compared with
advantage to theirs. {2} As for myself, I shall attempt to point out
the way in which, in my opinion, you can best make your preparations.
For the truth is, that if all of us who propose to address you were to
succeed in proving to you our rhetorical skill, there would not be the
slightest improvement in your condition--I am sure of it; but if a
single speaker were to come forward, whoever he might be, who could
instruct and convince you as to the nature of the preparations which
would meet the city's need, as to their extent, and the resources upon
which we can draw for them, your present fears would instantly be
dissolved. This I will attempt to do--if indeed it is in my power. But
first I must briefly express my views as to our relations with the king.
{3} I hold the king to be the common enemy of all the Hellenes; and yet
I should not on that account urge you, alone and unsupported, to raise
war against him. For I observe that there is no common or mutual
friendship even among the Hellenes themselves: some have more faith in
the king than in some other Hellenes. When such are the conditions,
your interest requires you, I believe, to see to it that you only begin
war from a fair and just cause, and to make all proper preparations:
this should be the basis of your policy. {4} For I believe, men of
Athens, that if it were made plain to the eyes and understandings of
the Hellenes, that the king was making an attempt upon them, they would
both fight in alliance with those who undertook the defence for them
and with them, and would feel very grateful to them. But if we quarrel
with him prematurely, while his intentions are still uncertain, I am
afraid, men of Athens, that we may be forced to fight not only against
the king, but also against those for whose benefit we are exercising
such forethought. {5} For he will pause in the execution of his
project, if indeed he has really resolved to attack the Hellenes, and
will bribe some of them with money and offers of friendship; while
they, desirous of bringing their private wars to a successful end, and
animated only by such a spirit, will disregard the common safety of
all. I urge you then, not to hurl the city needlessly into the midst of
any such chaos of selfish passions. {6} Moreover, I see that the
question of the policy to be adopted towards the king does not even
stand on the same footing for the other Hellenes as for you. It is
open, I think, to many of them to manage certain of their own interests
as they please, and to disregard the rest of the Hellenes. But for you
it is not honourable, even if you are the injured party, and are
dealing with those who have injured you, to punish them so severely as
to leave some of them to fall under the domination of the foreigner:
{7} and this being so, we must take care, first, that we do not find
ourselves involved in an unequal war, and secondly, that he, whom we
believe to be plotting against the Hellenes, does not gain credit from
the supposition that he is their friend. How then can this be achieved?
It will be achieved if it is manifest to all that the forces of Athens
have been overhauled and put in readiness, and if her intentions in
regard to their use are plainly righteous. {8} But to those who take a
bold line, and urge you, without any hesitation whatever, to go to war,
my reply is this--that it is not difficult to win a reputation for
bravery, when the occasion calls for deliberation; nor to prove
yourself an accomplished orator, when danger is at the door: but to
display your courage in the hour of danger, and, in debate, to have
wiser advice to offer than others--that is the hard thing, and that is
what is required of you. {9} For my part, men of Athens, I consider
that the proposed war with the king would be a difficult undertaking
for the city; while the decisive conflict in which the war would result
would be an easier matter, and for this reason. Every war, I suppose,
necessarily requires ships and money and the command of positions. All
such advantages the king, I find, possesses more abundantly than we.
But a conflict of forces requires nothing so much as brave men; and of
these, I believe, the larger number is with us, and with those who
share our danger. {10} For this reason I exhort you not to be the
first, in any way whatever, to take up the war; but for the decisive
struggle I think you ought to be ready and your preparations made. And
further, if the forces[n] with which foreigners and Hellenes could
respectively be repelled were really different in kind, the fact that
we were arraying our forces against the king would naturally, it may
be, admit of no concealment. {11} But since all military preparations
are of the same character, and the main points of a force must always
be the same--the means to repel enemies, to help allies, and to retain
existing advantages--why, when we have our acknowledged foes,[n] do we
seek to procure others? Let us rather prepare ourselves to meet the
enemies whom we have, and we shall then repel the king also, if he
takes the aggressive against us. {12} Suppose that you yourselves
summon the Hellenes to your side now. If, when the attitude of some of
them towards you is so disagreeable, you do not fulfil their demands,
how can you expect that any one will listen to you? 'Why,' you say, 'we
shall tell them that the king is plotting against them.' Good Heavens!
Do you imagine that they do not foresee this themselves? Of course they
do. But their fear of this does not yet outweigh the quarrels which
some of them have against you and against each other. And so the tour
of your envoys will end in nothing but their own rhapsodies.[n] {13}
But if you wait, then, if the design which we now suspect is really on
foot, there is not one of the Hellenes who stands so much upon his
dignity that he will not come and beg for your aid, when he sees that
you have a thousand cavalry, and infantry as many as any one can
desire, and three hundred ships: for he will know that in these lies
his surest hope of deliverance. Appeal to them now, and we shall be
suppliants, and, if unsuccessful, rejected suppliants. Make your own
preparations and wait, and then they will be the suppliants and we
their deliverers; and we may rest assured that they will all come to us
for help.
{14} In thinking out these points and others like them, men of Athens,
my object was not to devise a bold speech,[n] prolonged to no purpose:
but I took the greatest pains to discover the means by which our
preparations could be most effectively and quickly made; and therefore,
if my proposal meets with your approval, when you have heard it, you
ought, I think, to pass it. Now the first element in our preparation,
men of Athens (and it is the most important), must be this: your minds
must be so disposed, that every one of you will perform willingly and
heartily any service that is required of him. {15} For you see, men of
Athens, that whenever you have unanimously desired any object, and the
desire has been followed by a feeling on the part of every individual,
that the practical steps towards it were for himself to take, the
object has never yet slipped from your grasp: but whenever the wish has
had no further result than that each man has looked to his neighbour,
expecting his neighbour to act while he himself does nothing, the
object has never yet been attained. {16} But supposing you to be filled
with the keenness that I have described, I am of opinion that we should
make up the Twelve Hundred to their full number, and increase it to
2,000, by the addition of 800. For if you can display this total, then,
when you have allowed for the unmarried heiresses and orphans,[n] for
property outside Attica,[n] or held in partnership, and for any persons
who may be unable to contribute,[n] you will, I believe, actually have
the full 1,200 persons available. {17} These you must divide into
twenty boards, as at present, with sixty persons to each board; and
each of these boards you must divide into five sections of twelve
persons each, taking care in every case to associate with the richest
man the poorest men,[n] to maintain the balance. Such is the
arrangement of persons which I recommend, and my reason you will know
when you have heard the nature of the entire system. {18} I pass to the
distribution of the ships. You must provide a total complement of 300
ships, forming twenty divisions of fifteen ships apiece, and including
in each division five of the first hundred vessels,[n] five of the
second hundred, and five of the third hundred. Next, you must assign by
lot[n] to each board of persons its fifteen ships, and each board must
assign three ships to each of its sections. {19} This done, in order
that you may have the payments also systematically arranged, you must
divide the 6,000 talents (for that is the taxable capital[n] of the
country) into 100 parts of sixty talents each. Five of each of these
parts you must allot to each of the larger boards--the twenty--and each
board must assign one of these sums of sixty talents to each of its
sections; {20} in order that, if you need 100 ships,[n] there may be
sixty talents to be taxed for the expense of each ship, and twelve
persons responsible for it; if 200, thirty talents will be taxed to
make up the cost, and six persons will be responsible; if 300, then
twenty talents must be taxed to defray the expense, and four persons
will be responsible. {21} In the same way, men of Athens, I bid you
make a valuation according to the register of all those fittings of the
ships which are in arrear,[n] divide them into twenty parts, and allot
to each of the large boards one-twentieth of the debtors: these must
then be assigned by each board in equal numbers to each of its
sections, and the twelve persons composing each section must call up
their share of the arrears, and provide, ready-equipped, the ships
which fall to them. {22} Such is the plan by which, in my opinion, the
expense, the ships, the trierarchs, and the recovery of the fittings
could best be provided for and put into working order. I proceed to
describe a simple and easy scheme for the manning of the vessels. I
recommend that the generals should divide the whole space of the
dockyards into ten, taking care to have in each space thirty slips for
single vessels close together. This done they should apportion to each
space two of the boards and thirty ships; and should then assign a
tribe to each space by lot. {23} Each captain should divide into three
parts the space which falls to his tribe, with the corresponding ships,
and should allot these among the three wards[n] of each tribe, in such
a way that if each tribe has one division of the entire docks, each
ward will have a third of one of these divisions; and you will know, in
case of need, first the position assigned to the tribe; next, that of
the ward; and then the names of the trierarchs and their ships; each
tribe will be answerable for thirty, and each ward for ten ships. If
this system is put in train, circumstances as they arise will provide
for anything that I may have overlooked to-day (for perhaps it is
difficult to think of everything), and there will be a single
organization for the whole fleet and every part of it.
{24} But what of funds? What resources have we immediately at our
command? The statement which I am about to make on this subject will no
doubt be astonishing; but I will make it nevertheless; for I am
convinced that upon a correct view of the facts, this statement alone
will be proved true, and will be justified by the event. I say then,
that this is not the time to discuss the financial question. We have
large resources upon which, in case of necessity, we may honourably and
rightly draw: but if we inquire for them now, we shall not believe that
we can rely upon them even against the hour of need; so far shall we be
from supplying them now. 'What then,' you will ask me, 'are these
resources, which are non-existent now, but will be ours then? This is
really like a riddle.' I will tell you. {25} Men of Athens, you see all
this great city.[n] In this city there is wealth which will compare, I
had almost said, with the united wealth of all other cities. But such
is the disposition of those who own it, that if all your orators were
to raise the alarm that the king was coming--that he was at the
doors--that there was no possible escape; and if with the orators an
equal number of prophets foretold the same thing; even then, far from
contributing funds, they would show no sign[2] [and make no
acknowledgement] of their possession of them. {26} If, however, they
were to see in course of actual realization all the terrors with which
at present we are only threatened in speeches, not one of them is so
blind that he would not both offer his contribution, and be among the
first to pay the tax. For who will prefer to lose his life and
property, rather than contribute a part of his substance to save
himself and the remainder of it? Funds, then, we can command, I am
certain, if there is a genuine need of them, and not before; and
accordingly I urge you not even to look for them now. For all that you
would provide now, if you decided upon a levy, would be more ludicrous
than nothing at all. {27} Suppose that we are told to pay 1 per cent.
now; that gives you sixty talents. Two per cent. then--double the
amount; that makes 120 talents. And what is that to the 1,200 camels
which (as these gentlemen tell us) are bringing the king's money for
him? Or would you have me assume a payment of one-twelfth, 500 talents?
Why, you would never submit to this; and if you paid the money down, it
would not be adequate to the war. {28} You must, therefore, make all
your other preparations, but allow your funds to remain for the present
in the hands of their owners--they could nowhere be more safely kept
for the use of the State; and then, if ever the threatened crisis
arises, you will receive them as the voluntary gift of their
possessors. This, men of Athens, is not only a possible course of
action, but a dignified and a politic one. It is a course of action
which is worthy to be reported to the ears of the king, and which would
inspire him with no slight apprehension. {29} For he well knows that by
two hundred ships, of which one hundred were Athenian,[n] his ancestors
were deprived of one thousand; and he will hear that Athens alone has
now equipped three hundred; so that, however great his infatuation, he
could certainly not imagine it a light thing to make this country his
foe. But if it is his wealth that suggests proud thoughts to his mind,
he will find that in this respect too his resources are weaker than
ours. {30} It is true that he is said to be bringing a great quantity
of gold with him. But if he distributes this, he must look for more:
for just so it is the way of springs and wells to give out, if large
quantities are drawn from them all at once; whereas we possess, as he
will hear, in the taxable capital of the country, resources which we
defend against attack in a way of which those ancestors of his who
sleep at Marathon can best tell him: and so long as we are masters of
the country there is no risk of our resources being exhausted.
{31} Nor again can I see any grounds for the fear, which some feel,
lest his wealth should enable him to collect a large mercenary force.
It may be that many of the Hellenes would be glad to serve under him
against Egypt,[n] against Orontas,[n] or against certain other foreign
powers--not from a wish that the king should conquer any such enemies,
but because each desires individually to obtain some private means to
relieve his present poverty. But I cannot believe that any Hellene
would march against Hellas. Whither will he turn afterwards? Will he go
to Phrygia and be a slave? {32} For the war with the foreigner is a war
for no other stake than our country, our life, our habits, our freedom,
and all that we value. Where is the wretch who would sacrifice self,
parents, sepulchres, fatherland, for the sake of some short-lived gain?
I do not believe that he exists. And indeed it is not even to the
king's own interest to conquer the Hellenes with a mercenary force; for
an army which has conquered us is, even more certainly,[n] stronger
than he; and his intention is not to destroy us only that he may fall
into the power of others: he wishes to rule, if it may be, over all the
world; but if not, at least over those who are already his slaves.
{33} It may be supposed that the Thebans will be on the king's side.
Now this subject is one upon which it is hard to address you. For such
is your hatred of them, that you cannot hear a good word about them,
however true, without displeasure. And yet those who have grave
questions to consider must not on any pretext pass over any profitable
line of argument. {34} I believe, then, that so far are the Thebans
from being likely ever to march with him against the Hellenes, that
they would give a great deal, if they had it to give, for an
opportunity of cancelling their former sins against Hellas.[n] But if
any one does believe that the Thebans are so unhappily constituted, at
least you are all aware, I presume, that if the Thebans take the part
of the king, their enemies must necessarily take the part of the
Hellenes.
{35} My own belief is that our cause, the cause of justice, and its
supporters, will prove stronger in every emergency than the traitor and
the foreigner. And therefore I say that we need feel no excessive
apprehension, and that we must not be led on into taking the first step
towards war. Indeed, I cannot even see that any of the other Hellenes
has reason to dread this war. {36} Are they not all aware, that so long
as they thought of the king as their common foe, and were at unity with
one another, they were secure in their prosperity; but that ever since
they imagined that they could count upon the king as their friend, and
fell to quarrelling over their private interests, they have suffered
such evils as no malediction could have devised for them? Must we then
dread a man whose friendship, thanks to Fortune and Heaven, has proved
so unprofitable, and his enmity so advantageous? By no means! Let us
not, however, commit any aggression, in view of our own interests, and
of the disturbed and mistrustful spirit which prevails among the rest
of the Hellenes. {37} Were it possible, indeed, to join forces with
them all, and with one accord to attack the king in his isolation, I
should have counted it no wrong even were we to take the aggressive.
But since this is impossible, we must be careful to give the king no
pretext for trying to enforce the claims of the other Hellenes against
us. If you keep the peace, any such step on his part would arouse
suspicion; but if you are the first to begin war, his hostility to you
would make his desire to befriend your rivals appear natural enough.
{38} Do not then lay bare the evil condition of Hellas, by calling the
powers together when they will not obey, or undertaking a war which you
will be unable to carry on. Keep the peace; take courage, and make your
preparations. Resolve that the news which the king hears of you shall
certainly not be that all Hellas, and Athens with it, in distress or
panic or confusion. Far from it! {39} Let him rather know that if
falsehood and perjury were not as disgraceful in Hellenic eyes as they
are honourable in his, you would long ago have been on the march
against him: and that though, as it is, your regard for yourselves
forbids you to act thus, you are praying to all the gods that the same
madness may seize him as once seized his ancestors. And if it occurs to
him to reflect upon this, he will find that your deliberations are not
conducted in any careless spirit. {40} He at least shares the knowledge
that it was your wars with his own ancestors that raised Athens to the
summit of prosperity and greatness; while the peaceful policy which she
previously pursued never gave her such a superiority as she now enjoys
over any single state in Hellas. Aye, and he sees that the Hellenes are
in need of one who, whether intentionally or not, will reconcile them
one to another; and he knows that if he were to stir up war, he himself
would assume that character in relation to them; so that the news which
he will hear of you will be intelligible and credible to him.
{41} But I do not wish to trouble you, men of Athens, by unduly
prolonging my speech. I will therefore recapitulate my advice and
retire. I bid you prepare your forces with a view to the enemies whom
you have. If the king or any other power attempts to do you injury, you
must defend yourselves with these same forces. But you must not take
the aggressive by word or deed; and you must take care that it is your
deeds, and not your platform speeches, that are worthy of your
forefathers. If you act thus, you will be consulting both your own
interests and those of the speakers who are opposing me; since you will
have no cause to be angry with them afterwards, because you have
decided wrongly to-day.