Language is totally inadequate to convey even a faint idea of the
fatigue and privations which a considerable portion of the allied
army suffered in this ill-fated retreat. From the 6th to the 19th
November, our brigade suffered much. The baggage being in the rear,
neither officers nor soldiers had any thing to shelter them from the
inclemency of the weather. Money we had none, being eight and nine
months in arrears of pay. The men's linen were reduced to less than
one shirt each, and their uniforms were literally composed of shreds
and patches. I know nothing to which I can so aptly compare their
jackets as parti-coloured bed-covers for there were not fifty in my own
regiment but what had been repaired with cloth of every colour under
the sun. The appearance of our poor fellows was, as may be conceived,
far from prepossessing when on parade. But hideous as was the spectacle
when viewed at a distance, it became ten times more so when close to
the eye. In the former case the _patches_ only were observable; in
the latter, hundreds of Burns' "crawling fairlies" were seen pacing
the exterior of the patches, in numerous bands, and although a war of
extermination was waged against them daily from sun-rise to sun-set,
yet they were not finally rooted out, till we had been in cantonments
two or three weeks. Placed in the fields without tents to shelter them
from the mid-night blast, without a change of linen, or money either to
purchase that luxury, or to add to their scanty stock of provisions,
was it possible for them to be so long exposed, night and day, to the
pelting of the pitiless storm, _without suffering severe privations_?
Let those who doubt the fact make a trial on the first opportunity, and
be convinced.
That staff-officers are not the proper persons, however, to judge
correctly of this, will be readily conceded by every person who may
read the following facts:--Soon after our arrival in Coria, the Marquis
of Wellington addressed a letter to the superior officers of the army,
in which he called upon them to pay attention to the discipline of
the troops under their command, which he, affirmed, had fallen off in
the previous campaign, to a greater degree than any army with which
he had ever served, _or of which he had ever read_. "Yet this army,"
continued the noble and gallant General, "has met with no disasters,
_it has suffered no privations_, which but a trifling attention on the
part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there
existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; _nor has it
suffered any hardships_ excepting those resulting from the necessity of
being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather, at a moment when they
were most severe. It must be obvious, however, to every officer, that
from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from Burgos on the
one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command
over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were
committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought
never to have occurred." All this was attributed by the Marquis of
Wellington, not to any want of ability of the superior officers;--not
to the want of tents, baggage money, or to a _partial failure of the
objects of the campaign_, but to the _habitual inattention of the
captains and subalterns of the army to their duty_, as prescribed by
the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of the army;
though he did not question their zeal, still less their gallantry and
spirit.
That discipline was permitted to relax to a criminal degree in some
regiments, I readily admit. But I cannot allow that the misconduct of
one two, three, or even a dozen of battalions could even form any thing
like a good apology for the commander of the forces in Spain, bestowing
upon the others a sweeping vote of censure for offences which they knew
they had never committed. It would be folly in me even to guess at the
probable object which the noble and gallant writer had in view, when he
seated himself to pen the unfortunate letter of the 28th of November;
but I am confident that if its promulgation had been deferred but a few
days longer, it would never have seen the light. Instead of huddling
the innocent and the guilty together, the Marquis would have brought
the guilty to punishment, and besprinkled with praise in place of
censure, those who had done their duty under every change of situation
and circumstances.
Since, however, this course was not followed, I conceive myself
called upon even at the eleventh hour, to affirm thus publicly and
unhesitatingly, that every officer in the regiment to which I belonged,
performed their several duties with credit to themselves, and advantage
to the service. And I as fearlessly assert, that _throughout the whole_
of the retreat, the _non-commissioned officers and privates obeyed the
orders of their officers_, with the same cheerfulness and alacrity
for which they have ever been distinguished. Their spirits were, no
doubt, frequently greatly depressed with hunger, cold, and fatigue;
yet into their manly bosoms the fell-fiend despair never found a
passage. Although covered with rags and vermin, yet they never ceased
to be animated with the same ardent patriotism--the same love of their
country, and the same thirst for glory, which they had exhibited on so
many previous occasions. Under all their hardships and discomforts,
their hearts remained truly British. They braved every danger with the
most heroic firmness, and submitted to their fate without allowing a
murmur to escape their lips.
Before taking leave of this subject, I beg to make a few remarks on
regimental instruction, to the almost total absence of which, at that
period, I conceive all the irregularities so grievously complained of
by our leader, may fairly be attributable.
From the earliest ages, military men have been of opinion, that it
is during a period of profound tranquillity only, that the military
establishments of an empire can be thoroughly examined, and so improved
in all its parts, that its army can take the field at a moment's
notice, _ready_ and _able_ to repel an invader, avenge an insult, or
afford protection to a friend, when threatened with the vengeance
of a more powerful adversary. Instead of improving, however, many
nations renowned for their knowledge in the art of war, have totally
neglected their military institutions in time of peace, and as a
very natural consequence, frequently drawn upon themselves invasion,
defeat, and ruin. The Romans, for example, were often guilty of this
flagrant error, and as often punished for this act of treason to
themselves. What but a culpable relaxation in regimental discipline and
instruction, during that period of comparative inactivity, in which the
Romans remained from the close of the first, to the commencement of the
second Punic War, led to all the misfortunes which befel their armies,
from the entrance of Hannibal into Italy, down to the battle of Cannæ?
As, therefore, what has once happened in this world of ours, may do
so again, may not dangers similar to those which threatened the Roman
empire with destruction, also pay us a visit, if we do not adopt the
necessary measures to counteract the baneful influence, which a period
of similar inactivity may ultimately exercise over all our military
establishments?
The British army never can be sufficiently grateful for the many and
valuable improvements introduced into our military system, by His
Royal Highness the late Duke of York. For more than thirty years, that
illustrious Prince laboured incessantly to improve the discipline,
increase the comforts, and raise the character of the British army in
the eyes of surrounding nations, and almost every person knows that
by diligence, perseverance, and the most assiduous attention to the
duties of his office, he at length succeeded in raising its character
to a point of excellence, unequalled for discipline, bravery, and
moral worth, by any other army under the canopy of heaven. But as to
revise, improve, and consolidate the various parts of the military
establishment of even a third rate power, is a task too arduous for
any one man to accomplish, how much more difficult must a similar
undertaking be in Britain, whose warriors are at this moment to be
found in considerable force in every part of the habitable globe? It
being impossible, therefore, for the Duke of York to accomplish every
thing called for in the way of correction and improvement, it ought
not to excite surprise, that our military institutions should still
claim the attention and serious consideration of the gallant and much
esteemed nobleman, who now presides over the military affairs of the
United Kingdom.
The discipline of a battalion being invariably more or less perfect,
in exact proportion as the officers are more or less qualified to
convey military instruction to those over whom they are placed, it
should be the grand object of general officers and colonels commanding
battalions, to have all the officers under their command thoroughly
instructed in every branch of duty which they can be called upon to
perform at home or abroad. This appears to me the more necessary from
this circumstance, that a great proportion of the junior officers
hold erroneous opinions regarding those military qualifications;
many of them conceiving that if they can perform a portion of their
minor public and regimental routine duties with some appearance of
accuracy, any farther attempt at improvement in military science is an
_unnecessary waste of their time_, which, perhaps after all, is spent
in an idle round of frivolous amusements. By obstinately clinging to
those opinions, numerous officers not only permit year after year
to roll over their heads without making one attempt to explore the
rich mines of military wealth, contained in the various books of
instruction, but as a natural consequence of such egregious folly, plod
their way through, perhaps, a long military life, more like walking
automatons than officers, and then slip into retirement as utterly
ignorant of the great leading principles of regimental discipline, as
they were on the day they first entered the service.
Besides being a source of great uneasiness to themselves, the
inattention of officers to their studies must invariably lessen the
general efficiency of their respective battalions. With a few lessons
in the facings, wheelings, and manual and platoon exercises, any
officer may perform the _formal_ portion of his regimental duties; but
no officer can ever arrive at any thing like a proficiency in drill,
or become thoroughly acquainted with his public or regimental duties,
until he has treasured up in his memory, every rule and section of the
book of rules and regulations for the formation and exercise of the
army. To accomplish this most desirable object, a little application is
all that is necessary, provided the pupil is assisted in his studies
by a tutor qualified to convey military instruction in a clear and
forcible manner. But if he is permitted to grope his way through the
mazes of that volume without a guide to direct him in the proper path,
it is a hundred to one, but he will be found at the expiry of five,
ten, or twenty years, to have proceeded but a very short way from
whence he started;--totally unacquainted with the ground over which he
has travelled, and altogether unable to proceed one step farther.
I may perhaps be told that it is a part of the adjutant's duty to
instruct the young officer. I admit the fact; but in doing so must
add, that if the adjutant discharges as he ought all the other duties
which more immediately belong to his situation, he will have but very
little time to bestow on the instruction of officers. From a personal
knowledge of the duties of that officer, I am so satisfied he cannot
give that attention to the instruction of the young officers which the
good of the service requires, that I have no hesitation in saying, that
this part of an adjutant's duty should be removed from his shoulders to
those of the junior major and senior lieutenant of each regiment.
The duties of a lieutenant-colonel commandant are so numerous and
important, that to burden him with others, which some of the junior
officers could equally well perform, would, in effect, be to render
him incapable of performing any one of them with credit to himself,
or advantage to his battalion. And as the senior major has frequently
to assume the command of the battalion in the temporary absence of
the lieutenant-colonel, it would be equally imprudent, I conceive,
to select him for this duty. But as the duties of the junior major
are neither many or important, I would delegate to him the entire
superintendence of all drills having for their object the instruction
of the juniors, or the farther improvement of those of longer standing,
in every branch of duty which they can be called upon to perform at
home or abroad. And as the major, in the discharge of this honourable
and important duty, would be afforded numerous opportunities of
bringing his military acquirements under the eyes of his superiors,
it is obvious that he could not be appointed to a situation better
calculated to bring him into notice in that quarter, towards which the
eyes of all those who look forward to rank, and honours are continually
bent.
I would further suggest, that the senior lieutenant in each battalion
should be appointed the major's assistant, with the temporary rank
of captain, and allowed the pay of an adjutant. Should the senior
lieutenant appear to the commanding-officer to be unfit for the
situation, an indulgence of a few months might be granted, to enable
him to qualify himself for it. But should he, at the expiration of the
given period, be still deficient in the necessary qualifications, the
lieutenant next in rank should be appointed; failing him, the third,
and so on, until one of them is found competent to discharge as he
ought the multifarious duties of the office.
In regard to those lieutenants who may from _inattention_ be found
unqualified six months after the promulgation of any order on this
subject, perhaps it might be prudent to transmit their names to the
Horse-Guards, in order that they might be made to attend to their
duties, or retire from the service, and make room for others more
desirous of serving their country. At all events, a hint from that
quarter that promotion would be stopped, if improvement did not
take place after a farther limited period, would operate powerfully
and favourably on the minds of the juniors, and by stimulating them
to immediate exertion, and consequent improvement, render a future
recurrence to harsh measures altogether unnecessary; for what officer
of spirit would not sacrifice rest, comfort, _even life itself_ rather
than return to the bosom of his family with any thing approaching to a
stain upon his character?
In order to facilitate the instruction of the young officers, I am of
opinion that a company, consisting of forty privates, and a proportion
of non-commissioned officers, should be formed in every battalion and
the command of it given to the "Captain lieutenant." The men should be
selected in equal portions from every company, and none but the very
best men admitted into it. This would prove a stimulus to good conduct,
which, if carefully fostered, might be productive of much real good to
the service. And farther, from the high state of discipline, &c. in
which the "Company of Instruction" would invariably appear on parade,
the commanding-officer would be enabled at all times to hold it up
to the permanent companies of his battalion, as a pattern worthy of
imitation in every thing touching duty, cleanliness, or intelligence.