Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban, son of Albin le Prestre and Aimée
Carmagnol, was born May 1, or, by other accounts, May 15, 1633, at St.
Leger-de-Foucheret, a small village between Saulieu and Avallon, in the
province of Burgundy. He became an orphan at an early age, his father
having lost both his life and fortune in the public service. Under the
protection and instruction of M. de Fontaines, prior of St. John at
Semur, he acquired some knowledge of geometry, a science then but little
cultivated among military men. At seventeen years of age he deserted his
home, and entered as a volunteer in the regiment of Condé, then employed
in the Spanish service, in which his zeal and abilities soon procured
him a commission. Nor was it long before he showed his talent for the
science of engineering. In 1652 he was employed in the erection of the
fortifications of Clermont, in Lorraine; and the same year, serving at
the first siege of S^{te.} Menehould, he made several lodgments, and
during the assault swam the river under the enemy’s fire. Public notice
was taken of this exploit; and by this means Vauban’s family heard, for
the first time, that he had embraced the military profession. In 1653 he
was taken prisoner by a French corps, and conducted to Cardinal Mazarin,
who thought it worth while to purchase his services with a lieutenancy
in the regiment of Bourgogne. In the same year he served as an engineer
under the Chevalier de Clerville, at the second siege of S^{te.}
Menehould; and the charge of repairing the fortifications of that town,
when retaken by the troops of Louis XIV., was confided to him.
In May, 1655, Vauban received his commission as engineer, and in the
following year he was rewarded for his services with the command of a
company in the regiment of the Maréchal de la Ferté. Not to mention the
numerous situations in which he bore an active but subordinate part, we
proceed at once to the year 1658, in which he had the chief direction of
the sieges of Gravelines, Ypres, and Oudenarde; where, being free to act
on his own opinions, yet still doubting his strength, he showed, by
judicious though slight innovations, what might be ultimately expected
from his matured experience. He was also charged with the improvement of
the port and fortifications of Dunkerque, on the surrender of that once
important place to France by the treaty of October 17, 1662.
When the war with Spain was renewed in 1667, Vauban had the principal
direction of the sieges at which Louis XIV. presided in person. At Douay
he received a musket-wound in his cheek, the scar of which is preserved
by Coisevox and Lebrun in his bust and portraits. The capture of Lille,
after only nine days of open trenches, procured for him a lieutenancy in
the Guards and a pension, accompanied with the far more gratifying
commendations of his sovereign. Hostilities were ended by the treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1668, in which year he prepared designs for the
citadel of Lille, for Ath, and several other places; and in 1669 the
king appointed him governor of the citadel of Lille, the first reward of
this description created in France.
Soon after the peace Vauban accompanied the minister Louvois on a
mission to the Duke of Savoy, and furnished plans for the fortifications
of Verrue, Verceil, and the citadel of Turin. Returning to Flanders, the
works of Dunkerque were prosecuted under his immediate direction with
unexampled activity. Three corps of 10,000 men relieved each other
daily, every four hours, proceeding from the camp with their arms, and
resuming them on the completion of their task. In the midst of these
labours he prepared his first work on the attack of fortresses, for the
instruction of Louvois, pointing out in it many of the errors committed
in former sieges, and proposing remedies for them.
The war with Holland, which commenced in 1672, afforded Vauban many
opportunities of displaying his superior abilities. Louis again took the
field in person; and again Vauban had the principal direction of the
sieges of which the king was a spectator. Previous to the siege of
Maestricht, in 1673, the regular method of assaulting a fortified place
was to excavate a trench parallel to the general contour of the
fortress, and from batteries erected near it to fire indiscriminately on
the works and the town. On this occasion Vauban introduced three
parallel trenches, connected by oblique or zigzag approaches, which
enabled him to place large bodies of infantry near the head of his
attack, each successive parallel more closely shutting in the garrison,
and restraining their offensive operations.
In 1674 Vauban was promoted to the rank of Brigadier. In the following
year he had the magnanimity to second with his recommendation the
ineffectual application made by his rival, Coehorn, for employment by
the French government.
In 1676 Vauban’s services were rewarded with the rank of Major-General;
and in 1677 the mode of attack adopted at Maestricht was perfected at
Valenciennes, where the fronts attacked were completely shut in by the
parallels, the flanks of which rested on the Scheldt and the marsh of
Bourlin.
At this siege it was determined to assault an earthen crown-work, and
Vauban proposed to make the attack during the day. Five Marshals of
France, Louvois, Monsieur, and even the king himself, opposed this
advice. Vauban was immoveable; he maintained that it was the only way to
avoid confusion and mistakes, to surprise the enemy, and to overpower
him by opposing fresh troops to his wearied garrison. “Night,” said he,
“has no shame! Open day and the eye of the commander restrain the
cowardly, animate the feeble, and add fresh courage to the brave.” The
king at length yielded to his arguments. The enemy was found, as he had
predicted, harassed with watching, sleeping, or absent in the fortress
seeking provisions. The crown-work, and a ravelin which served as an
interior intrenchment, were successively carried. The enemy, retreating
into the Paté, an extensive irregular work covering the place, was
promptly pursued. Four grenadiers got possession of a sally port, while
others entered by a subterraneous passage. The besieged fled into the
body of the place, and raised the bridge. An immediate and vigorous
assault soon placed the disputed works in the possession of the
assailants, who, pushing forward to the canal which traverses the city,
intrenched themselves in the houses bordering it. They were strongly and
speedily supported, and thus the place was taken at a single assault,
justifying Vauban’s advice, even beyond his most sanguine expectations.
His services on this occasion were rewarded with a gratuity of 25,000
crowns.
Cambray was besieged next. The town surrendered after a few nights of
open trenches. The citadel was then attacked. Du Metz proposed
assaulting the ravelin: Vauban opposed this counsel, representing that
the strength of the work, and the vigour of the defence, prescribed an
attack _en règle_. “Sire,” said he to the king, “you will lose some one
who is of more value than the ravelin.” The success at Valenciennes
inspired the troops with temerity: assault was given, the ravelin was
carried, and a lodgment in it was commenced; but the enemy brought a
heavy fire to bear on the work and its approaches, and then sallying
forth speedily drove back the assailants. Du Metz reproached Parisot,
the engineer who traced the lodgment, with having caused the failure of
the attack. Vauban however insisted that the work was lost, not through
any vice in the lodgment, but because the assault could not be
sufficiently supported. The siege was then proceeded with in the
ordinary manner, and the ravelin secured with the loss of five men only.
“I will believe you another time,” said the king to Vauban, and he kept
his word. A practicable breach being made, Louis expressed his intention
of giving no quarter to the three thousand men who formed the garrison,
and had so vigorously defended themselves. Vauban alone ventured to
oppose his views, representing that such conduct was contrary to the
usages of warfare among civilized nations; that the place would be
taken, but would cost more bloodshed; and, “Sire,” he added, “I would
rather have preserved 100 soldiers to your majesty than have deprived
the enemy of 3000.”
Vauban succeeded to the Chevalier de Clerville, as Commissary-General of
the Fortifications of France, in December, 1677. In 1678 he received the
congratulations of Colbert on the success attending the execution of his
projects for the improvement of the Port of Dunkerque, which, having
been previously used only by fishermen, was now made accessible to
vessels carrying forty guns. It would be useless to reckon all the
labours of this part of his life: the fortifications of Maubeuge,
Thionville, Sarre-Louis, Phalzbourg, Béfort, and the citadel of
Strasburg, were among the new works projected by him, while all the
principal ports and fortifications of France were more or less improved
by his master-hand.
The war of 1683 contributed to the increase of Vauban’s reputation. The
siege of Luxemburg, in 1684, was carried on under his direction; and he
here displayed an admirable presence of mind when discovered one evening
by the enemy, in reconnoitring the works of the place. He instantly made
a signal to them not to fire, and, instead of retreating, advanced
towards them; they mistook him for one of their own officers, and having
skirted the glacis, he retired slowly without exciting further
suspicion. After having surmounted the many difficulties presented by
the nature of the ground over which the attack was necessarily carried,
the assailants attained the covered way. To drive the enemy out of its
long branches, Vauban caused elevated parapets to be constructed on
their prolongations, whence a plunging musketry-fire was thrown into the
covered way, and the mass of its defenders were compelled to retreat;
the few who remained concealed behind the traverses being gradually
dislodged, as the crowning of the covered way was extended along the
crest of the glacis. This siege was remarkable both for the difficulties
which were overcome, and for the improvements made in the method of
conducting an attack and protecting the troops employed in it.
The new fortresses of Mont-Royal, Landau, and Fort Louis, together with
extensive projects for the improvement of the canal of Languedoc, formed
part of Vauban’s labours during the truce of Ratisbon. He likewise
prepared a general project for the improvement and defence of all the
ports, roadsteads, and coasts of France. To his exertions the French are
indebted for the first general statistical account of their country, he
having caused blank forms to be prepared and printed, which he
distributed, to be filled up by the several intendants, governors, and
other public functionaries with whom his frequent journeys through the
country in the execution of his ordinary duties brought him acquainted.
Louis XIV. afterwards caused these returns to be made generally
throughout France.
The war of 1688 commenced with the siege of Philisbourg, where the
Dauphin commanded in person, and Vauban directed the attacks. He here
tried the effect of firing _en ricochet_, of which he was the original
proposer. The superiority of this method of attack was not so decisively
shown in this first instance as on subsequent occasions: still it proved
so far effectual in subduing the fire of the town, as to cause its
surrender after twenty-four days of open trenches. The Duc de Montausier
said in a letter to the Dauphin, “I do not offer you my congratulation
on the fall of Philisbourg: you had a good army, mortars, guns, and
Vauban.” On the same occasion, Louis XIV. wrote thus to the successful
engineer:—“You know, long since, in what estimation I hold you, and the
confidence I have both in your knowledge and affection. Believe that I
do not forget the services you render me, and that I am particularly
pleased with your conduct at Philisbourg. If you reciprocate the
feelings of my son you must be on the best of terms, for I feel assured
that he, equally with myself, knows how to esteem and value you. I
cannot conclude without earnestly recommending you to preserve yourself
for the benefit of my service.”
Manheim and Franckenthal were next besieged and taken. On the surrender
of the latter, the Dauphin presented Vauban with four pieces of
artillery, to be selected by him from the arsenals of the conquered
fortresses, to ornament his chateau of Bazoches. He was this year
promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. The difficulty with which
the obstacles presented at the siege of Philisbourg were overcome,
induced Vauban to renew, with greater earnestness, his project for the
formation of a corps of sappers, originally suggested shortly after the
peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Louvois, though he yielded to Vauban’s
arguments in favour of this new force, postponed its formation, and
subsequent events prevented his adding this to the other establishments
which he created.
When the reverses suffered by the French armies in 1689, the disordered
finances, and the exhausted resources of the kingdom, had reduced Louis
XIV. to the greatest difficulties, Vauban alone had courage to propose
the re-establishment of the edict of Nantes. In a manuscript addressed
to Louvois, he says, “Forcible conversions, and the belief that they
yield no faith to sacraments, the profanation of which they make a jest,
have inspired an universal horror of the conduct of the clergy. If it is
resolved to proceed, either the new Protestants must be exterminated as
rebels, or banished as madmen: both execrable projects, opposed to every
Christian virtue, dangerous to religion itself; for persecution
propagates sects, as was proved when, after the massacre of St.
Bartholomew, a new census showed that the Protestants had increased in
number not less than 110,000.” He proposed, therefore, to re-establish,
purely and simply, the edict of Nantes; to restore all civil rights to
the Protestants and their clergy; to recall the one from exile; to
deliver the others from the galleys; to leave their consciences free;
and to permit the re-opening and rebuilding of their places of worship.
After the fall of Mons, in 1691, Vauban greatly strengthened that
fortress; placing outworks in the marshes, inaccessible to an enemy, and
seeing in reverse all the points of attack.
In 1692 Vauban directed the operations of the siege of Namur, where
Coehorn commanded the stronghold of Fort William. The army watched with
eagerness this struggle between the rival engineers, one of whom
defended his own work. Fort William was soon taken, and the triumph
rested with Vauban. The order of St. Louis, the first restricted to the
reward of military distinction, was instituted before the campaign of
1693. It is said to have been suggested by Vauban, who was one of the
seven Grand Crosses named at its creation.
In 1693 he conducted, with his usual skill, the siege of Charleroi, a
place which he had fortified, and of which he might well be supposed to
know the weakest points; yet it was confidently believed among the
besiegers that their celebrated engineer had at last made a mistake, in
having selected the strongest fronts as points of attack. Vauban soon
convinced them of their error, by the capture of Charleroi.
The system of _ricochet_ firing, devised at Philisbourg, and employed
with various success at subsequent sieges, was fully developed at the
siege of Ath, in 1697, when Vauban placed his first batteries in the
second parallel with such good effect as to reduce the place to
surrender after only three days of open trenches.
During the peace of Ryswick, Vauban made a tour of the northern
frontiers, in which he was occupied three years, preparing projects for
canals and various other public works, as well as for the improvement of
existing and the construction of new fortresses; among others, of
Neuf-Brisach, his last work, in which he improved on his system of tower
bastions, previously applied at Béfort and Landau. In 1699 he was
elected an honorary member of the French Academy; and, January 2, 1703,
was promoted to the rank of Marshal of France; a dignity which he
modestly wished to decline, lest it might, at a future period, deprive
him of the opportunity of serving his country.
In the autumn of 1703 Vieux-Brisach was besieged by the army under the
orders of the Duc de Bourgogne, who is reported to have thus addressed
Vauban:—“Monsieur Maréchal, you must lose your honour before this place:
for either we shall take it, and if so, they will say you have fortified
it badly; or we shall fail, and they will then say that you have ill
assisted me.” “Monseigneur,” replied Vauban, “it is already known how I
have fortified Brisach; they have yet to learn how you will take the
places I have fortified.” The siege lasted only thirteen days, and was
the last at which Vauban served. The following year he presented to the
Duc de Bourgogne his treatise on the Attack of Fortresses, first
published at the Hague by Pierre Dehoult, in 1737.
When Turin was attacked, in 1706, M. de la Feuillade rejected the
project of attack submitted by Vauban, and the result was, that a
perfect investment was not completed until after three months’ fighting.
Louis XIV., annoyed at the duration of the siege, and at the progress of
Prince Eugene, sent for Vauban, who, after pointing out the faults of
the attack, offered to give his assistance as a volunteer. “Recollect,”
said the king, “that this employment is beneath your dignity.” “Sire,”
replied Vauban, “my dignity consists in serving my country. I will leave
my baton at the door, and perhaps may assist M. de la Feuillade in
taking the city.” La Feuillade refused the proffered aid, lest he should
have to share with Vauban the honour of taking Turin: an honour,
however, which he did not acquire, being forced to raise the siege after
ninety-seven days of open trenches.
From the period of Vauban’s promotion to the dignity of Marshal of
France, his active labours in the public service were necessarily much
less numerous; much of his time being devoted to the arrangement of his
numerous memoranda, projects, &c., a compilation extending to twelve
volumes, entitled ‘Mes Oisivetés,’ of which however seven volumes are
lost. In 1706, after the battle of Ramillies, he was sent to command at
Dunkerque, and on the coast of Flanders, where, by his presence, he
reassured the timid, and prevented the destruction of a tract of land
which it was proposed to inundate, in order to avert an attack on
Dunkerque. This he did more effectually by forming an entrenched camp
between that place and Borgues.
The imperfect defence of several of the fortresses of France during the
same campaign induced him to commence a treatise on the defence of
fortresses, which he did not live to complete.
The Duc de St. Simon affirms that Vauban’s days were shortened by
chagrin, at having displeased his sovereign by the publication of his
scheme of taxation, entitled _Dixme Royale_, and that Louis XIV. was so
much offended as to be indifferent to the loss of a man beloved by his
countrymen, and celebrated throughout Europe. According to Dangeau, on
the contrary, so soon as Louis heard of Vauban’s illness, he sent his
principal physician to attend him. Fontenelle distinctly states that his
death, which took place March 30, 1707, was occasioned by an
inflammation of the lungs.
An authorized edition of Vauban’s treatise on the Attack and Defence of
Fortresses was published, in 1829, by M. le Baron de Valazé. His other
works principally consisted of projects for the defence and improvement
of France, and many of them are preserved in the depôt, of
fortifications, and in the collection of M. de Rosambo. A list of
Vauban’s works may be found in the notes to ‘L’Histoire du Corps
Impérial du Génie, par A. Allent,’ the best authority for an account of
his labours; the Eloges of Fontenelle and Carnot may also be consulted.
Honest, independent, humane, Vauban is characterised by Voltaire as the
“first of engineers and best of citizens.” The industry of his life may
be estimated from the calculation that he improved, more or less, three
hundred fortified or trading places, built thirty-three new fortresses,
conducted fifty-three sieges, and was present in a hundred and fifty
actions, greater or less.
[Illustration:
_Engraved by W. Holl._