CHAPTER II.

GROUPS IN CONTACT

1.

Theoretically, the individual might be independent of other individuals

and of groups as well. He might be his own alter, so that through the

active and reflective standpoints working on each other the individual

himself might constitute a group mind, and might produce many, if not

all, the characteristic products of the group.[31] But practically

in society, the exact opposite is invariably the case. According to

Baldwin’s dialectic of the individual development: [32]“The sense of

self always involves a sense of the other.” [33]“The real self is

always the bipolar self, the social self.” Empirically, not only are

civilization, history and government the products of social heredity;

the individual himself as we have him owes his mental content, many

of his feeling and motor responses, and his ultimate ideals, to the

group in which he was born and has developed. On this basis the ancient

conflict between the isolated individual and the group domination

becomes unimportant, if not meaningless from the empirical point of

view. As Joseph K. Hart remarks:

[34]Membership in the group establishes in the members a set of habits

which are the personal counterpart of the customs of the group; the

group is not outside and around him; it is inside him; what is custom

in the group has become habit in him.

Why, then, the eternal conflict between the individual and the group?

Why does a Schiller or an Ibsen proclaim, “The strongest man is he who

stands most alone”? Why do we have the group portrayed so often as

the oppressor, the individual as the hero, genius, and martyr to the

conventional ideas of the mass? Because the group has more fixed habits

than the individual, or at least than the exceptional individual;

because in most individuals the group factor is the dominant one by

preference, and the struggle against it is both rare and mild;

because, finally, the group mind does involve a sacrifice of the

individual purpose on many occasions, and these are the test cases

of the strength of the group itself. There are really two types

of individuals who stand out from the group—the genius, or social

discoverer; the criminal, or social rebel. Platt suggests that [35]“Man

has never become entirely socialized”; his biological heredity always

lags behind the social heredity of the group and leaves a residuum

of conflict. Baldwin gives a broader theory, which may include this:

[36]“The individual is the particularizing social force; society is

the generalizing social force.” That is, the individual produces

variations, which are then stamped out by social disapproval, or

generalized by social acceptance. The genius thinks for the race; the

mass of individuals have their thinking done for them by the prepared

reactions of the group. Without the social group the individual would

be as unformed mentally, as helpless ethically, as is the single bee

without the hive. In Baldwin’s words: [37]“A man is a social outcome

rather than a social unit.”

All this by the way; if I were to take up the problem of the individual

and group, it would occupy this entire study. I merely want to show its

bearing on the central thesis here brought forward, which concerns the

relation between group and group, rather than that between individual

and group.

2.

The problem of group and sub-group can be approached either

descriptively or genetically. If we take the former angle, we see every

large group divided indefinitely into small, conflicting, overlapping,

and infinitely various sub-groups. Much of the complexity of our

society consists in this overlapping, by which the individual belongs

to many groups at once, so that his mind cannot attain complete unity,

and none of his groups can possess him wholly. A man belongs to a

family, a city, a profession, a church, a school alumni body, a nation

and an international peace society. In addition, he may join a

labor union, a chamber of commerce, or a half dozen fraternal orders.

His mind is a perfect maze of group attitudes; he shifts from one group

to another as interests or contiguity impel him. In the same way, a

large group such as a political party includes members from different

sections of the country, different economic strata, different churches,

and so on. The group mind, as a category in this situation, is purely

a functional unity, which works in and through its individual members

and through its smaller groups of individuals in exactly the same way.

I quote Dr. Singer: [38]“My world is highly organized—groups within

groups, and groups within these,” for that is the scientific, realistic

view of the social world.

Various classifications of groups have been devised by students of the

problem, useful for their different purposes. Cooley speaks of primary

and secondary groups, those in which men and women are born and grow,

and the larger integrations into which the smaller, more natural groups

enter. Miller prefers [39]“Vertical and horizontal groups,” the former

being the natural divisions which include all classes, such as the

nation; the latter a caste or class grouping. Hayes calls them personal

and impersonal groups, apparently meaning much the same as Professor

Cooley by the terms primary and secondary. Probably the most useful

mode of classification is the genetic, beginning with the family, and

then expanding according to the particular situation in view—in the

primitive group to the clan, tribe and confederacy; in the civilized

to the school, the interest group, the religious affiliation, the

political nation, the international ideals and bonds of union.

Whatever be the more or less arbitrary mode of classification, we see

that, except for the supposititious primitive horde, groups are never

single nor simple. They resemble rather the physical organism or the

mind of the individual, either of which is necessarily complex. Group

minds exist and grow by progressive integration of the lesser into the

greater, from the individual up to the greatest possible bodies of

human beings.

The group mind comes into being only through contact with other

groups. We may go so far as to conclude that there must be two groups

in order that there may be one group. If an isolated island possessed

a few people so unorganized that they felt no difference of groupings

among themselves, then there would be no sense of a total group,

either. Under those circumstances that would be attained only in case

of an invasion by people from without the land, or a rebellion within,

when group unity of the islanders would at once appear. If my previous

identification of mind in the individual and the group is exact, not

merely an analogy, then this follows from Baldwin’s genetic study of

the individual. The mind of the individual grows by constant reference

to the alter—for in the thought of the child the ego and alter are

one—and even in the highest reaches of moral judgment there remains an

element of social approval, of what would be the judgment of the ideal

group or the ideal comrade. [40]“We do right by habitually imitating

a larger self whose injunctions run counter to the tendencies of our

particular selves.”

To quote a few applications of this viewpoint to particular problems:

Sumner applies it to the primitive horde:

[41]The relationship of comradeship and peace in the we-group and

that of hostility and war toward others-group are correlative. War

and peace have reacted on each other and developed each other, one

within the group, the other in the inter-group relation. Loyalty

to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders,

brotherhood within, warlikeness without—all grow together, common

products of the same situation.

In Ellwoods’s words:

[42]While the stimuli afforded by the struggle with the physical

environment are conceivably sufficient to bring about the highest

degree of coordination, unity and solidarity in the larger human

social groups, yet historically they have not done so. Rather, it has

been the stimuli arising from the conflict and competition of one

human group with another which has chiefly developed conscious social

solidarity in the larger human group.

Dr. George E. Vincent wrote:

[43]Conflict, competition, rivalry, are the chief causes which bring

human beings into groups, and largely determine what goes on within

them.

[44]It is in conflict or competition with other nations that a country

becomes a vivid unity to the members of its constituent groups.

It is rivalry which brings out the sense of team work, the social

consciousness.

“Races, Nations and Classes,” a recent work by Dr. Herbert A. Miller,

presents a series of studies of social relations in terms of group

conflicts, group oppression and group revolt, as these exist in various

crucial situations today.

Most of the treatments of the subject calmly assume that the other

group with which contact is established must necessarily be parallel

and competing with the first group. But in empirical situations that is

not always, perhaps not often the case. We may become conscious of our

American unity in war with an external foe, but we may become equally

conscious of it in inter-state relations; because an inter-state

conflict may bring us to the superior federal power; or in the division

of powers between state and nation, or in the strong hand of the

federal government reaching out to detect groups of law-breakers within

the constituent states. That is, the two groups need not be parallel

and exclusive; they may overlap, or one may enclose the other entirely.

I can become conscious of my international Jewish loyalty in contrast

to the Christian church, which also is international; or I may become

conscious of it through the overlapping with my American citizenship;

or even through contrast with a family loyalty, which might conceivably

be enhanced by disregarding the membership in the Jewish people, with

its frequent disabilities. The first is a case of two separate groups;

the second, two overlapping ones; the third, where one is a sub-group

of the other. In this sense it is conceivable, though not usual, for

the individual with his own “group mind” to serve as a contrast to the

group in which he is included. For in every one of these instances

there has been actual or potential relinquishment of purpose into the

larger group which includes the smaller, or into the one which overlaps

and conflicts with the other; and in the case of two parallel

groups there is a conflict and contrast of purposes, hence of group

mind itself.

3.

The mode of group contacts has practically always been viewed in terms

of conflict and competition. In contrast to this, I present the view

that there are two modes of group contact—competition and imitation.

Competition strengthens and unites each competing group. Imitation

brings the different groups together into an overgroup. The two

together constitute the social process (if we allow for the element of

individual initiative and leadership, which hardly comes within the

special topic of this study).

The classic presentation of group struggle is by Gumplowitz, in

his “Rassenkampf,” where he took Gobineau’s rather crude theory of

races and applied it to history and sociology, including also groups

smaller and of different origin than the races themselves. To present

Gumplowitz’s view in his own words:

[45] History and the present day present us with a picture of almost

unbroken warfare of tribe against tribe, people against people, state

against state, nation against nation.

[46] Every greater ethnic or social element strives to subdue to its

purposes every weaker group which lies within its sphere of influence

or near it.

This is his “social law of nature,” which he compares to the law of

gravitation in its certainty. War is therefore necessary for civilized

as for primitive societies, and any talk of ideals or of peace is but

self-deception, if it be not deliberate masking of warlike intentions.

The race theory of Gobineau has gone on until it is one of the

important factors in American group oppositions today. And surprisingly

enough, the conflict theory of Gumplowitz comes back also from time to

time. In “Survival or Extinction,” a new work by Elisha M. Friedman, I

find this sentence: [47]“The absorption of a scattered minority people

is the inexorable law of History. Can the Jews hope to escape it?”

This on the basis of Gumplowitz, whose treatment of the Jewish problem

is very different; he criticized the Jews bitterly for being the one

exception to his “inexorable law,” and said they should have obeyed

it and been absorbed among the nations, as were the Phoenicians two

thousand years ago.

Certainly there is group struggle; it is a natural tendency when two

different groups come into contact; and it is a gross and obvious

phenomenon which nobody can help noticing. But at the same time

there goes on also a subtler but equally significant movement of

group imitation. The white settlers fought the Indians in a way that

everybody knew; many have missed the adoption by the whites of maize

and tobacco, names of rivers and sites of cities; by the Indians of the

horse, the rifle and the religion of the conquerors. Rome conquered

Greece in war, and Rome imitated Greece in art and literature. Israel

conquered Canaan and imposed the one God, destroying the high places

where the earlier inhabitants had worshipped the powers of fertility in

nature; but Israel incorporated the harvest festivals of the Canaanites

into its own shepherd and nomad ritual. Group imitation takes its place

beside group competition in the spread of culture elements about the

earth, in the study of foreign languages and literature, in missionary

effort, in the adoption of new inventions for warfare or for industry.

These are as important and as omnipresent as business competitions or

territorial rivalry, far more common than war.

The function of group conflict is to strengthen the separate groups and

bring them to recognizable group mind. Loyalty is never so strong as

when our group is under fire. War brings millions to an acute sense of

national loyalty who have hardly felt they had a nation. The ancient

loyalty of the Jew is largely due to the persecutors who constantly

reminded him that he had no right to desert his people. There is

definite survival value in this, which can easily be connected with

the historic and prehistoric process which brought our present groups

into being. As Dr. Miller says: [48]“Loyalty and patriotism are merely

the emotional side of the group impulse. They measure the identity

of the individual with his group.” Royce’s “Philosophy of Loyalty”

is one long praise of these virtues of the loyal son of his group. His

somewhat exaggerated discussion of the value of the “lost cause” for

character development illustrates the overemphasis on group struggle

which is typical of all those who long for group solidarity. For group

struggle does bring solidarity and loyalty except in the limiting case,

where the group is destroyed in the struggle and there is nothing left

to which we can be loyal. And that is precisely the case envisaged by

Gumplowitz, the case of the stronger group crushing and then absorbing

the weaker one.

Dr. Miller has worked out a type of group pathology which attacks

both victor and victim of a group struggle. He calls it the

“Oppression Psychosis.” Its effects on the victor are found in such

rationalizations as the “myth of superiority” and other defense

complexes, leading to “cultocracy” or class rule, and finally if

unchecked to the stagnation of caste. To quote:

[49]Hundred per cent. patriotism and confidence in Nordic superiority

are the two most dangerous ideas in the world today, because they

lead in exactly the opposite direction from that which civilization

must take if it is to survive. The fundamental objections to these

ideas are, first, that they have no basis in fact, and second that

the emotions which they organize, have far-reaching and disruptive

consequences.

The inferiority complex of the oppressed people has very different and

still more disastrous consequences. Dr. Miller points out that what are

usually considered Jewish traits may be found also among the Irish,

the Poles, and the Negroes, all very different groups but all subject

to oppression and therefore presenting a psychological reaction to

oppression.

[50]What we have designated as Jewish characteristics are primarily

based on the nervous reactions which have resulted from more varieties

and longer oppression than those of any other group. The Jew is

introspective, analytical, aggressive and conspicuous. The Negro also

has many of the same characteristics, though he has not yet developed

so many compensatory values, such as religious solidarity and business

technique.... The most outstanding result of the oppression psychosis

is to create a group solidarity which is far stronger than could have

been created by any other means.

And he goes on to show the use of symbols as compensatory mechanism

of the oppressed group, and thus to account for the ardent clinging of

such groups to their language or religion as the real outlet of their

self expression and of their will for resistance.

So far with conflict. Imitation of individuals has attracted much

attention, especially through its exhaustive treatment by Gabriel

Tarde, but group imitation has passed by with much less notice.

However, we may fairly say that group imitation is as universal a

by-product of group contact as are rivalry and conflict. The immigrant

comes to America, and the result of that transference of a group

into a new environment can be expressed in terms of either imitation

or conflict, but can be summed up fully only by recognizing both

processes at work at once. The children attend public schools, where

they learn the English language, the salute to the flag, and some

American group customs. The father learns English at his work; the

mother copies American fashions in dress and household; both become

naturalized citizens—that is what we call Americanization. But at

the same time they speak their native tongue in the home, they read

a foreign language newspaper, they keep up their correspondence with

the relatives back in the Old Country, they belong to a patriotic or

revolutionary society with its roots in the homeland. Often they even

organize a school that their children may learn the language, religion

and other essentials of their earlier group life. So the children often

attend two schools, an American one to assimilate them to the group

mind of America, a Polish or Russian or Jewish one to keep them in

touch with the group mind of their parents’ allegiance. The hatreds of

the central European peoples are transferred to America. The political

issues between Czarist and Bolshevist, or between Fascismo and

Socialism are perpetuated here. Sometimes the contrast between American

and alien is emphasized, and takes the place of the old-world conflicts

in the center of consciousness.

Conflict strengthens the fighting groups; imitation welds them

together into an overgroup. The American process is one of forming a

united people, an integrated, self-conscious group mind, out of

the many diverse elements which enter this continent. And this goes

on by conscious teaching and unconscious imitation, through social,

political and economic motives, everywhere except when interrupted by

the counter process of oppression and resistance. We speak nowadays

of a Greco-Roman civilization, a direct recognition of the part that

imitation played in the Roman empire with all its warlike power. We

speak of modern European culture, recognizing that European culture is

one, with local variations indeed, and that art, science, philosophy

and religion are international, for every group imitates every

other. The trend of such a tendency can only lead toward an eventual

amalgamation, not by abolishing present languages and parliaments,

but by the growth of every sort of international and supernational

consciousness, beginning with schools of literature or art, and

culminating in a World Court or a League of Nations.

4.

This suggests the ideal of society which is implicit in our minds

as we study its development by means of conflicting, imitating and

overlapping group minds. The desirable qualities which this process

evokes are heterogeneity and progress. We thus steer midway between

the equal dangers of uniformity and standardization, on the one hand,

and the isolation of castes, on the other. The caste system of India

provides plenty of heterogeneity, but because the groups are isolated

from each other physically and mentally, because of the influence

of “untouchability,” the mind of the group has never unified, never

presented the possibility of change. The modern movement in India under

Ghandi is precisely of this type, to unify India and introduce the

concept of progress by a double process, by abolishing “untouchability”

within and bringing the caste groups to imitate and emulate each other;

by strengthening loyalty through united opposition to the common

oppressor. It is a most significant example of the development of the

group mind through union of sub-groups and by contrast to another

hostile group. On the other hand, the beginning of modernity in Europe

meant a radical opposition to the levelling influence of the Church

universal, the rise of vernacular tongues, of national governments,

of national churches—that is, the dissociation of the medieval mind,

which was European, into the sub-groups, which are primarily national.

That the reverse movement is now taking place is significant, for this

reverse movement is a natural one by imitation and common interests,

not forced by the union of the Inquisition and the secular arm. As

Bernard Shaw remarks in the preface to “Saint Joan”:

[51]Though all society is founded on intolerance, all improvement is

founded on tolerance. [52]We must persecute, even to the death; and

all that we can do to mitigate the danger of persecution is, first,

to be very careful what we persecute, and second, to bear in mind

that unless there is a large liberty to shock conventional people,

and a well informed sense of the value of originality, individuality

and eccentricity, the result will be apparent stagnation covering a

repression of evolutionary forces which will eventually explode with

extravagant and probably destructive violence.

We must then, conceive modern society, not as a simple unity but as an

integration of group minds, from that of the individual, the family,

the clique, up to that of the nation, with a dawning international

mind now in process. These group minds struggle for domination and

for existence; they learn from each other at the same time. The

double process constantly in evidence is group conflict, resulting

in the mind of the sub-group, and group imitation, resulting in the

integration of the sub-groups into a larger and more inclusive mental

entity. In addition, the various groups are not all parallel, but very

largely crossing each other; one individual or sub-group may belong

to several of them. Economic classes cross national boundaries, for

both capital and labor are international. Most conspicuous of all,

religious groupings are international and interracial, so that a man

belongs to a church as well as a nation. In peace times the national

will to dominate and the church ideal of peace are kept carefully as

far apart in his mind as possible; the one coming into the center

of consciousness on Sundays, the other on election day or similar

occasions. In time of war, the two actively conflict within the

group mind, and thus within the individual minds which belong to the

group.

The accumulation of knowledge and the advancement of reason are

accompanied by a progressive widening of the circle of the group

mind, to include an ever larger number and variety of sub-groups. Dr.

Baldwin suggests this process: [53]“Group selection gives rise to

what may be called the law of the widening unit, that as the circle

of co-operation widens the unit of survival, the group, taken as a

whole, becomes larger.” The other side of the same process is the

increasing complexity of the mind of the individual and the sub-group

because of the richer world in which they exist—in Dr. Vincent’s words,

[54]“The person has as many selves as there are groups to which he

belongs. He is simple or complex as his groups are few and harmonious

or many and conflicting.” The actual growth of an international mind

today is evident, through scientific, religious, artistic and economic

influences; through the great alliances of the World War; through

the ease of communication and the spread of news and propaganda. A

world-wide group mind, if such is possible, cannot and should not

eliminate its sub-groups, but include them in a wider synthesis; even

enriching the complexity of the sub-groups by its further ramifications

and their further imitations.

But the easy and natural way for such an international group mind is

by conflict with a still different outside group. The white races

would easily attain unity if there were a real race conflict against

the colored races of the world; differences between French and German,

between Russian and American, would be swallowed up in a day. Unity

of the entire human race would come instantly if we were invaded from

Mars. The slogans of our earth-wide unity would be the defense of our

beloved planet and the common descent of all human beings. In default

of such a threat from without, is the international mind an impossible

hypothesis?

I suggest that actual contrasts exist which may make it possible for

a world-wide group mind to grow through the normal mode of group

conflict and group imitation and co-operation. Perhaps we can attain

race unity by envisaging the forces of nature as the rival group,

conceiving the inroads of the insect world as the threat against human

domination which must make us spring to arms in a sense of our common

unity and our common nature. Perhaps we can conceive the national group

as the contrasting element, and the international group mind as, not

its enemy, but its synthesis. Finally, one all-inclusive mind actually

does exist in the faith of most of the race—the ideal self of the group

to which we give the name of God. The God-idea of the group is not

the group itself, but is its outgrowth, its ideal self. Perhaps the

future unity of mankind may come at last through a summation of its

highest ideals and the rational toleration of diverse interpretations,

different personalities, and widely contrasting group customs and

manners. At present, however, an outstanding phenomenon of the group

mind is intolerance, and through a study of intolerance we can perceive

much of group nature and of the actual life of human societies.

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