The Battle of Tashichiao
In this war a battle usually signifies a number of engagements in
different localities carried out simultaneously, and often being
continued for several consecutive days. It is somewhat difficult for
any but military experts to understand the value of each particular
movement, and not easy to give an account of them all in a way which
will be readily comprehensible. Tashichiao, preceding Liaoyang and
Sakhé, was of the same character as those more famous encounters; I
saw the fighting on the west of the front, whilst the movement which
decided the real issue took place at another time on the extreme east.
To understand the battle it is necessary to know the position of the
belligerents.
The Japanese were attempting to turn the Russian army of occupation
out of Manchuria by forcing them north along the line of the Eastern
Chinese Railway between Harbin and Port Arthur. The line between Mukden
and the Kwan-tung peninsula, runs over the flat plain on the west
of the chain of rocky mountains, some 4,000 feet high. West of the
railway is the sea and the river Liao and its tributaries, the Hun-ho,
Sha-ho and Tai-tsu. At the end of June the Japanese had a strong force
investing Port Arthur, they had established themselves in the northern
portion of the Kwan-tung peninsula and after the battle of Telissu the
Russians evacuated all the “neutral zone,” intended as a buffer for
Port Arthur, and were just north of that boundary, which extends from
Kaiping on the west, up the Tuntai Valley and down the Ta-yang-ho to
its port on the Yellow Sea.
The Japanese first army under General Kuroki was following the old
main road from the Yalu River at Antung, to Liaoyang, with a depôt at
Feng-huang-cheng, from which a road to the north-east leads east of
Motienling to the Liao Valley, then west to Liaoyang and north-west to
Mukden. This first army was already holding the pass on the north road
and the Motienling Pass.
The Takushan army followed the road to Haicheng, and at Hsiu-yen sent
a force west to keep in touch with the second army under General Oku
whose headquarters were at Kaiping.
The Japanese plan of campaign was by frontal attacks to drive the
Russians back north along the railway, and, by flank attacks through
the hill passes to the north of wherever the frontal attack was made,
induce the Russians to withdraw from opposing the frontal attack.
General Kuropatkin had fortified Liaoyang and all the approaches
thereto from the north-east, east, and south. On the south-west he had
the Russian defences at Newchwang.
Tashichiao junction, where the branch line from Newchwang joins the
main line, is a station nearly midway between Haicheng and Kaiping,
each being about twenty miles distant, and the town a few miles
east in the mountains, and Newchwang sixteen miles west. If the
Newchwang-Tashichiao railway were continued eastward for one hundred
miles it would reach Feng-huang-cheng, and almost parallel with that
supposed line there is a cart road to Haicheng from the east.
At the end of June, General Kuropatkin, having then about 200,000 men
free for the operations, determined upon an offensive movement south.
At that time the Japanese were awaiting more men for the second army
before advancing further north, and the Takushan army was driving the
Russians back towards Tashichiao.
On June 27, the Japanese first army occupied one Feng-shui-ling, east
of Motienling, and the Takushan army another Feng-shui-ling in the
Tapien-ling pass, thirty miles west of Motienling.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF TASHICHIAO.]
The advance of General Kuroki’s force north of Motienling threatening
both Mukden and Liaoyang, the Russians attacked it on July 4; there was
a hand-to-hand fight in which the Japanese were the chief sufferers,
but eventually they maintained their position and two days later had
advanced their outposts to Hsien-chang, further to the north-east.
On July 9, the second army, reinforced by troops landed at a “certain
place” in Liaotung Bay seized the town of Kaiping.
The following day the Russians attacked the Takushan army at Hsien-cha,
and Hsui-tsai-Kiao, but were repulsed.
On July 17, General Keller led the Russians against General Kuroki’s
advanced force on Motienling, but was repulsed. The Japanese advanced
north and west and occupied Hsi-ho-yen at the junction of the roads
to Mukden and Liaoyang, and some sixty miles from the latter--towards
which General Keller retreated.
The success of a general Japanese advance depended largely upon
the possibility of concerted action, and much responsibility was
thrust upon the central force, known as the Takushan army, which had
constantly to maintain communication with both the first and second
armies, and operate almost exclusively in the hilly district which the
Chinese know as the “land of the thousand peaks.” The Takushan army
consisted of the Himeji, or Tenth Division, under the leadership of
Lieut.-Gen. Baron Kawamura. On July 22, a detachment of this force,
having pushed on towards Haicheng, surprised and surrounded a Russian
force guarding the Ta-tung-ling pass. This Russian force was composed
of a battalion of the 17th Siberian Rifles, with details. At dusk the
Japanese charged the position, carried it, and the Russians fell back
north towards Ma-shan. The Japanese declare that on this occasion
the Russians exhibited a Japanese flag before the engagement. They
responded by displaying their flag, and to this the Russians replied by
opening fire.
It was only a trifling engagement; the Russian losses were about a
score, and the Japanese had only nine killed, but it was important
because permitting the Takushan force to occupy Pan-ling, and thus
threaten Haicheng from the south-east.
It was now incumbent on the Takushan army to make good their position.
Advancing slowly they found the Russians had extensive defences on the
hills to the north of Hung-yao-ling and a line of guns in position
from that point through Chang-san-ku to San-chiao-shan, with three
battalions of infantry east of Ma-shan, or To-mu-cheng, and south of
the village of that name. The Russian forces defending the head of the
Ta-tung-ling pass were commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Alexeiev, of the Fifth
Infantry Division, and in addition to twenty-one field guns he had
several machine guns, some cavalry, and two divisions of infantry.
The Motienling and the Ta-tung-ling passes were both being held by
strong forces to protect the flank of Kuropatkin’s army during its
intended advance south towards Port Arthur. At the same time both
passes were being attacked by General Kuroki’s army and the Takushan
army, as part of a flank attack to weaken the frontal defence opposing
the second army’s proposed advance north. During the last week in July
heavy reinforcements were sent to the Takushan army, enabling it to
make a dangerous and successful attack.
Haicheng is a quaint Chinese town upon a plain at the foot of the
Thousand Peaks. It has long possessed fortifications and was ably
defended by a force under General Sun Sing during the China-Japanese
war, from whom it was captured by General Katsura who wintered his army
there. It was thought that the Russian commander-in-chief would make
it his stronghold, instead of Liaoyang, but he was content to improve
and greatly strengthen the then existing fortifications and regard the
position as a middle line of defence to Liaoyang.
The outer line was nearly thirty miles south, on a range of hills
extending east and west near Tashichiao. The following positions
were strongly fortified: Taipin, and Chung-sin, west of the railway;
Tashichien and Chia-to-pu, east of it, and the ridge beginning west
with Taiushan, and ending with Taipingling, twenty-five miles east
of the railway. The east central peak of Ching-shing-shan was the
main position, protected with terraced entrenchments provided with
shell-proof roof, and looped for rifle fire. This position was further
protected by land mines--the fougasses used so successfully at Port
Arthur--with wire entanglements, abbatis and other obstructions. The
cannon were masked, and placed so as to command all approaches. This
formidable outer line of defence had been admirably planned, and
divided so that each battery covered a defined range, and the whole
protected every zone of possible offensive movements from the south, in
which direction the Russian outposts then extended over twenty miles,
that is to say reaching as far as the Tuntai Valley and the “neutral
zone.”
The military operations of the second army to dislodge the Russians
from this strongly defended position were of a somewhat complicated
character.
On July 23 the main force left its line of positions, the right wing
marched east as far as Liu-chia-ku--east of which the Takushan army
had driven the Russians north--then turned north. The left wing marched
north to the east of the railway line and was opposed by various bodies
of Russian troops composed of horse artillery, cavalry and infantry. At
night the Japanese forces deployed and prepared for a general attack,
which was commenced before daybreak. Pushing on rapidly the right wing
occupied positions south of Taipingling, the main body was on the
height of Shan-hsi-tu opposite the Russian centre at Ching-shing-shan.
The left wing first occupied Wutai heights, just east of the line,
until the right wing took the offensive, late in the forenoon, when it
moved west, got its artillery into position near Taipin Hill and sent
its cavalry west of the railway, and itself rested on Chuchiatun on
the line. That day, July 24, there was a heavy artillery duel, chiefly
between the Japanese west wing on Taipin, and the Russian guns on
Wangmatai.
The Japanese main army was slow in getting its guns into position, and
the infantry advance was checked. The Russian guns commanded every
point of vantage the attacking army strived to obtain; the Japanese
guns were exposed to the Russian fire, and although their position was
changed repeatedly, and with the utmost difficulty always, owing to
the rough character of the ground in the ravines, they failed both to
secure a position of comparative safety and to silence the Russian
guns.
The Japanese right wing, exposed though it was to the Russian fire, yet
made an attempt to advance on Taipingling. It rushed into the Russian
position, but withdrew before an overwhelming counter attack.
The Russian supposed advance on July 23 was really a concentration
for defence against the advance of the second Japanese army, which at
sundown on July 24 occupied practically the same positions as it had
done the previous evening, with the exception of the left wing which
had extended west of the railway.
Having that Sunday delivered a counter attack which had forced the
Japanese infantry to retire behind the hills to the south, the Russians
believed they had gained a victory, or, at least had held their ground
successfully.
For two or three hours after sunset the Russians fired occasionally for
purposes of reconnaissance, to which the Japanese artillery made no
answer.
At ten o’clock that night some movements of the Japanese were
observable from Taipingling, and shortly afterwards the outer defences
of that position were attacked by an overwhelming force of Japanese
infantry. The attack was successful; the Russians fell back to the
next line, which the Japanese also attacked and carried before three
o’clock the next morning. A portion of the Japanese centre then
advanced and occupied positions near Shan-shi-tsu, and there remained
only the centre position at Ching-shing-shan--adjoining Shan-shi-tsu
on the ridge--to be attacked at daylight. As soon as it was light
the Japanese artillery on Wutai-shan mountain in the rear fired a
few rounds without provoking the Russian artillery to answer. It was
then discovered that the Russian forces had moved. The right wing
and main body of the Japanese army then occupied Ching-shing-shan
without encountering any resistance, and the left wing advanced along
the railway to Chiao-pu-tu. The cavalry operated to the west of the
line, and later in the day reached Niuchatun. The Japanese occupied
Tashichiao at noon.
The surprising feature of the battle was the total collapse of the
formidable Russian defence on the occupation of the outworks of the
position on the extreme east.
The Japanese infantry cannot have been in those trenches earlier than
ten o’clock; it was five hours later before they stormed and carried
the position, yet long previous to that it had been decided to abandon
Ching-shing-shan, Tashichiao, and all the positions to the west of
the line, including Newchwang and the port of Yingkow. At the two
last-named places the Russians were advised at midnight, and were
all away before dawn. Of course, it may be that the occupation of
Taipingling by the Japanese commanded the whole line of the Tashichiao
defences. As it was, the Russians did not need to fight many rear
actions to cover their very hurried, but orderly, retreat, otherwise
the abandonment of so strong a position as Ching-shing-shan would have
been most blameworthy.
The Russians for the most part went north towards Haicheng by the main
road, the last of the fugitives passing Tashichiao about eleven o’clock
in the forenoon.
Many preparations had been made at Ching-shing-shan to fit the position
for a vigorous and prolonged defence, as it was almost a perfect
position, giving the defenders every advantage. By abandoning it, the
Russians relinquished Newchwang and whatever advantages they derived
from the possession of the port of Yingkow through which to import
supplies.
The Russian forces included Russian troops, the 1st, 2nd, 9th Siberian
rifles, the Siberian reserve, and the Primorski dragoons; the artillery
amounted to more than 100 guns, nearly all of which were safely removed
by the Russians, whose retreat was in no sense a disorganized rout. The
Russian casualties during the two days’ fighting amounted to nearly
2,000; the Japanese to more than half that number.
[Illustration: THE RUSSIAN RETREAT.]
On the following day the Japanese made a reconnaissance north,
and found that the Russians had two batteries in position at
Chin-shan-ling, some twelve miles north of Tashichiao. A forward move
from Tashichiao was not made by them until August 1, when the second
column went north to Nan-chien-shan without being opposed; the first
column, taking the route to the east, worked north from Taipingling
by way of Lian-chia-pu-tzu, which is near Ma-shan, and made a frontal
attack on the enemy; the third column followed the railway line,
keeping to the west, the Russians retiring before this advance; the
fourth column was farther west, going in the direction of Old Newchwang.
The Japanese, on discovering some of the enemy, adopted somewhat
unusual tactics. The middle columns retired about five miles; their
artillery took up positions to the east of Tung-chi-ku and Wen-chi-ku,
one on each side of the railway. The first, fourth, and fifth columns
advanced. The Russians continued to attack the centre, and brought into
use two field batteries, and in the afternoon got another one into
action at Hsai-chi-ho, opposite the fourth column, but attacking the
third column. The third column therefore divided and made a flanking
movement from the west in connection with the fourth column, whilst the
fifth column on the extreme east also pressed on.
The Russians opposed the Japanese with six squadrons of cavalry and
some companies of mounted infantry. As these, as well as the two
batteries which first opened fire, were all but surrounded by the
Japanese, their losses were heavy. The Russian forces, nearly one
division in all, escaped by going round to the south of Tan-wan-shan
and falling back upon Haicheng. On August 2 the Japanese occupied the
road between Old Newchwang and Haicheng. These operations were all made
on the open plain, the hills upon which the batteries were posted being
little more than round-topped knolls.
In these, and other engagements with Russian cavalry, the Japanese use
with most effect a manœuvre first practised by German horsemen at the
battle of Renty in 1544. The Japanese cavalry ride towards the Cossack
lancers as though intending to charge; when they are within thirty
yards they halt suddenly, and use their revolvers with deadly effect on
the approaching line of lancers, sometimes not five yards distant. The
officers state that this is the only way in which the Japanese cavalry
has been able to succeed against the Cossacks; in all other tactics
which they have used they have been worsted badly.
The Japanese, for the most part, have been operating in hilly country,
and know better than the Russians how to occupy a ravine with advantage
to themselves. The Russians on more than one occasion have sent
squads of cavalry up these narrow defiles, only to be annihilated by
the Japanese infantry. Certain detachments of the Independent Tenth
Division, a portion of the Takushan army, are stated to be adepts in
trapping small bodies of Russian troops, and to have accomplished some
brilliant feats, on a small scale, during their advance through the
Ta-tung-ling pass.
Before the end of July Baron Kawamura had sufficient forces at his
disposal to warrant an attack on the Russian force, consisting of
about seven batteries and three battalions of infantry, in strongly
entrenched positions on hills commanding the pass near To-mu-cheng. The
tactics were those ordinarily employed by the Japanese: the main body
of the army made a frontal attack on the formidable defensive works
the Russians had constructed during the summer months on the heights.
The left wing made a simultaneous attack on the outlying positions to
the west, and deposed the Russians on the hill, a thousand feet high,
before eight o’clock.
The Russians brought up reinforcements of artillery, which the left
wing, further strengthened, repulsed by heavy gun fire before three
in the afternoon. The main body deposed the Russians from the first
position by eleven in the morning, but could not proceed farther until
the heavy cannonading from the Russian positions to the west slackened.
The Russians, again reinforced, assumed the offensive during the
afternoon, but were repulsed with great loss. The night was passed by
both armies facing each other at close range. Meanwhile, the successes
of the left wing compelled the Russians to withdraw under cover of the
darkness, and fall back to Haicheng. This strongly fortified position,
the second line of defence to the main position at Liaoyang, was now
quite untenable, for the Takushan army had its guns already in position
on the heights above the town, and an open road through the pass.
General Oku, with the second army, was also pressing the Russian forces
covering the retreat of the Russian main army from Tashichiao, so no
attempt was made to defend either Haicheng or Anshantien, to the north
of it, and the Russians hurriedly took up their strongest defensive
position at Liaoyang.
The prompt and successful operations of the Takushan army hastened the
Russian retreat, and caused them to abandon large quantities of stores
and railway material. The Takushan army in the attacks on the Russian
positions near To-mucheng lost 8 officers and 168 men, and had 24
officers and 642 men wounded. Some 700 Russian bodies were buried, and
the total casualties must have exceeded 2,000 of all ranks. Six guns
were abandoned, with supplies of ammunition, provisions, and clothing.
The Japanese officers state that the Russian defence at Taipingling
was determined and courageous, and that of all the battles to that
date, the end of July, the battle of Tashichiao was the most bitterly
contested and hardly fought. The Japanese casualties during the two
days’ fighting exceeded 1,000, and those of the Russians were double
that number. In addition, some two to three hundred Chinese bandits had
been killed in the neighbourhood of Tashichiao, and in the subsequent
operations the Japanese losses were not less than 12 officers and 150
men killed, and over 850 wounded.
At Telissu the Japanese derived an immense advantage from the
superiority of their artillery, their shells exploding over the Russian
trenches, blowing the infantrymen to ribands and annihilating whole
companies. At Tashichiao the Russian artillery fire was the more
effective; the Japanese guns could not be placed in tenable positions,
and the battle had to be won by hand-to-hand conflict in the darkness.
The result was the same in so far as the superiority of the Japanese
army as a fighting force is proven by its victories, but these
victories are not entirely satisfactory, as they fail to show that the
strategy of the Japanese is superior to that of the Russians, or prove
that the tactics employed will enable the Japanese to win through in
every battle of a long campaign.